Select committee: International Relations and Defence Committee

1st Report - Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic

Published 29 November 2023

International Relations and Defence Committee The Arctic Report on parliament.uk ↗

At a glance9 recommendations and 192 conclusions · Government response published 26 January 2024 (deadline 29 January 2024)

The government's response

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The government's response marks most of the Committee's recommendations as "Agree", marks some as "Partially agree", and "Disagree"s with the proposal for an Arctic Ambassador or Envoy.

On Russian sub-threshold activity, it marks the recommendation "Agree" and says it "regularly" considers how to respond to hybrid challenges bilaterally, in the JEF and in NATO, while noting that details of risk assessments "cannot always be publicly shared or attributed".
On the Central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement, it marks the recommendation "Agree", says it is "committed to joining the Agreement at the earliest possible opportunity" and is engaging with Parties on the accession process ahead of the next Conference of Parties in June 2024.
On the Polar Code review, it "Partially agree"s, stating there is "no defined schedule for review" and that the Code "may be reviewed on any aspect, as needed", with a Post Implementation Review of the UK's own regulations.
On ministerial engagement, it marks the recommendation "Agree" and says David Rutley MP has been appointed Minister for the Polar Regions and is establishing a Ministerial group on Arctic policy.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

What the committee recommended 201

1
The Arctic has traditionally been viewed as an area of high co-operation and low tension. Conclusion · paragraph 22
2
The Arctic will remain central to Russia’s military and strategic thinking. Conclusion · paragraph 118
3
While it is not in Russia’s interest to start a conventional conflict in the Arctic,... Conclusion · paragraph 119
4
Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. Conclusion · paragraph 120
5
Close co-operation between the state and the private sector, which operates most subsea cables and... Recommendation · paragraph 121

See all 201 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

1st Report - Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic ↗The committee's report, parliament.uk
Government Response to the International Relations and Defence Committee’s Report ‘Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic’ ↗The government's response, 26 January 2024, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 201

1
The Arctic has traditionally been viewed as an area of high co-operation and low tension. Conclusion · paragraph 22 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic has traditionally been viewed as an area of high co-operation and low tension. The UK’s long-term goal is for the region to return to this state. It is questionable whether this is achievable. As the region pivots from an area of co-operation to one of competition and potential confrontation, the UK Government needs to make sure its strategy reflects this new reality.
2
The Arctic will remain central to Russia’s military and strategic thinking. Conclusion · paragraph 118 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic will remain central to Russia’s military and strategic thinking. The military setbacks it has suffered in Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession, will only increase the importance of the region for Russia’s leadership. Russia has a legitimate interest in the Arctic, but the UK approach and that of its allies must be robust in deterring malign activity.
3
While it is not in Russia’s interest to start a conventional conflict in the Arctic,... Conclusion · paragraph 119 Conclusion (the committee's words)
While it is not in Russia’s interest to start a conventional conflict in the Arctic, sub-threshold activity and accidental escalation represent significant risks to the region’s security.
4
Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. Conclusion · paragraph 120 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. The UK and its allies should prepare contingency plans to detect, deter and respond to hybrid and ‘grey-zone activities’, and consult on how to best do this in situations when public attribution is not possible .
5
Close co-operation between the state and the private sector, which operates most subsea cables and... Recommendation · paragraph 121 Recommendation (the committee's words)
Close co-operation between the state and the private sector, which operates most subsea cables and pipelines, is key to deterring threats to critical infrastructure. The UK Government should establish partnerships for working with businesses to combat threats to critical infrastructure.
6
The risk of unintentional escalation in the Arctic following an accident has risen as a... Conclusion · paragraph 122 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The risk of unintentional escalation in the Arctic following an accident has risen as a result of increasing maritime activity in the region, and the sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West . The UK must continue to work closely with its allies to maintain good situational awareness. It should co-operate closely with Arctic allies on intelligence gathering and sharing on Russian activities in the High North.
7
The UK’s Arctic allies have continued to work with Russia in areas such as search... Conclusion · paragraph 123 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK’s Arctic allies have continued to work with Russia in areas such as search and rescue and military-to-military communication for the purpose of deconfliction, emergency response, and reassurance. It is in the UK’s interest that these channels of communication and co-operation are maintained.
8
We welcome the UK Government’s increased defence commitments to the region, including the recently announced... Conclusion · paragraph 124 Conclusion (the committee's words)
We welcome the UK Government’s increased defence commitments to the region, including the recently announced plans for deeper collaboration with Nordic partners to combat hybrid threats. The UK Government remains committed to holding cold weather training and military exercises in the High North.
9
We are concerned, however, that the UK has insufficient key military assets, such as submarines,... Conclusion · paragraph 125 Conclusion (the committee's words)
We are concerned, however, that the UK has insufficient key military assets, such as submarines, maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft, to support this increased focus on the Arctic alongside the UK’s growing interest in other regions such as the Indo-Pacific.
10
It is essential that the UK continues to train sufficiently with its NATO and Nordic... Conclusion · paragraph 126 Conclusion (the committee's words)
It is essential that the UK continues to train sufficiently with its NATO and Nordic allies to maintain capabilities and signal commitment to defending the region. The UK Government should continue to enhance capabilities through support for the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Northern Group and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. To avoid unintentional escalation, the UK and its allies should ensure their actions are predictable and there are clear contingency plans in place in the event of an incident.
11
The UK has well-established defence links with the Nordic countries and is a valued partner... Conclusion · paragraph 127 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK has well-established defence links with the Nordic countries and is a valued partner in the region. We welcome the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which will strengthen the military effectiveness of the Alliance, including in the Arctic.
12
We are concerned that placing Finland (and Sweden) under the Brunssum Joint Force Command runs... Recommendation · paragraph 128 Recommendation (the committee's words)
We are concerned that placing Finland (and Sweden) under the Brunssum Joint Force Command runs at cross-purposes to the efforts of the Nordic states to strengthen inter-operability and joint defence in the Nordic region. We call on the UK Government to assist in capacity building at JFC Norfolk so that Finland and Sweden can be placed under its command as soon as possible. In the interim, it is particularly important that NATO tests the flexibility and inter-operability between the two joint commands.
13
The UK Government sees China as an “epoch-defining challenge” to the international order. Conclusion · paragraph 159 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government sees China as an “epoch-defining challenge” to the international order. In the Arctic, however, it appears China has so far sought to work within the Arctic’s existing governance framework. That can change quickly.
14
China has shown a strong interest in contributing to polar research and environmental protection in... Conclusion · paragraph 160 Conclusion (the committee's words)
China has shown a strong interest in contributing to polar research and environmental protection in the region. The UK should continue to engage with China on scientific research and climate change issues as they relate to the Arctic, where possible, while remaining vigilant regarding the dual civilian-military use of some research activities.
15
Concerns regarding Chinese strategic investment in the Arctic and its long-term intentions in the region... Conclusion · paragraph 161 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Concerns regarding Chinese strategic investment in the Arctic and its long-term intentions in the region are legitimate. At present, China’s economic presence in the Arctic outside Russia is small and the Arctic Seven have grown more cautious regarding the strategic implications of Chinese investment. Investment decisions are matters for the individual Arctic states to decide. There is, therefore, only a limited role for the UK to play beyond sharing relevant intelligence and working with partners to ensure there are clear alternatives to Chinese technology and financing.
16
The UK Government is correct to identify the deepening partnership between Russia and China as... Conclusion · paragraph 162 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government is correct to identify the deepening partnership between Russia and China as an area of particular concern to the UK and its allies. One region where the deepening partnership may manifest itself is the Arctic.
17
It is essential that the UK Government pays close attention to Sino-Russian collaboration in the... Conclusion · paragraph 163 Conclusion (the committee's words)
It is essential that the UK Government pays close attention to Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic. UK scenario planning should consider the possibility that China could in the future seek to establish a military presence in the Arctic. This would represent a significant strategic challenge to the West.
18
As a non-Arctic state, the UK’s influence in the Arctic depends on strong diplomacy and... Conclusion · paragraph 174 Conclusion (the committee's words)
As a non-Arctic state, the UK’s influence in the Arctic depends on strong diplomacy and coalition-building, and it should seek to expand co-operation with other observer states on the Arctic Council on matters of shared interest. However, it should do this in a way that does not undermine existing governance structures. In particular, the notion of the primacy of the Arctic states in Arctic governance should be maintained.
19
Fishing and the sustainable management of fish stocks in the Arctic is of direct interest... Conclusion · paragraph 192 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Fishing and the sustainable management of fish stocks in the Arctic is of direct interest to the UK.
20
Due to the size of its fishing fleet and reliance on fish and seafood to... Conclusion · paragraph 193 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Due to the size of its fishing fleet and reliance on fish and seafood to feed its population, it is imperative that China is included in, and adheres to, current and future Arctic marine conservation regimes.
21
The UK should continue to advocate for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the Arctic... Recommendation · paragraph 194 Recommendation (the committee's words)
The UK should continue to advocate for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the Arctic Ocean. We urge the Government to re -join the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean at the first opportunity. In the meantime, and as a signal of its commitment, the UK should make a unilateral declaration stating that it will abide by the Agreement’s fishing moratorium, pending accession. In response to this report, we ask the Government to set out the steps it is taking to clarify with the Parties the Agreement’s accession process and timeline for joining.
22
The UK should collaborate in international fora on Arctic fisheries management to ensure the long-term... Conclusion · paragraph 195 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK should collaborate in international fora on Arctic fisheries management to ensure the long-term sustainability of Arctic fish stocks and thus safeguard food security.
23
Commercial maritime activity in the Arctic is likely to grow significantly in the coming decades,... Conclusion · paragraph 221 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Commercial maritime activity in the Arctic is likely to grow significantly in the coming decades, increasing the risk of pollution and accidents.
24
It is vital that regulation of shipping evolves to meet this challenge. Recommendation · paragraph 222 Recommendation (the committee's words)
It is vital that regulation of shipping evolves to meet this challenge. As a leading maritime nation and the headquarters of the International Maritime Organisation, the UK should take a leading role in negotiating a new Polar Code. We call on the UK Government to set out the steps it is taking to work with others , including businesses, to review the effectiveness of the Polar Code and how it should be strengthened to mitigate risks to safety and the environment. In particular, we ask the Government to provide us with a timeline for conducting its review of the Polar Code, alongside its assessment of whether cruise ships operating in Arctic waters should sail in pairs, and whether this should be covered in an updated version of the Code.
25
Arctic shipping is concentrated in the European Arctic, in close proximity to the UK. Conclusion · paragraph 223 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Arctic shipping is concentrated in the European Arctic, in close proximity to the UK. As commercial and private shipping increases in the region, demands on the UK’s maritime search and rescue capabilities are likely to grow. The UK Government should plan to invest in increased SAR capabilities to meet the predicted demand.
26
In the short-term, UK and EU demand for Norwegian oil and gas is likely to... Conclusion · paragraph 230 Conclusion (the committee's words)
In the short-term, UK and EU demand for Norwegian oil and gas is likely to increase and will create pressures to raise production, including in the Arctic offshore. This will carry with it greater environmental and safety risks.
27
We recognise that Norway has a comprehensive framework in place to respond to an oil... Conclusion · paragraph 231 Conclusion (the committee's words)
We recognise that Norway has a comprehensive framework in place to respond to an oil spill emergency. Nonetheless, the UK Government should continue to press for high environmental standards and the protection of the Arctic marine environment by contributing to the scientific research and through continued participation in the work of the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME ) Working Group at the Arctic Council.
28
The UK’s stated policy on protecting Arctic biodiversity and mitigating climate change requires new fossil... Conclusion · paragraph 232 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK’s stated policy on protecting Arctic biodiversity and mitigating climate change requires new fossil fuel extraction in the Arctic region to be kept to a minimum. The UK can most effectively contribute to this goal by adhering to its legally binding commitments to decarbonising its economy and achieving net zero by 2050.
29
The UK Government should continue to advocate for the establishment of marine protected areas, including... Conclusion · paragraph 244 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government should continue to advocate for the establishment of marine protected areas, including in the Arctic. The Agreement on Biological Diversity Beyond National Jurisdictions offers the UK and its partners a unique opportunity to do the same for the high seas and the central Arctic Ocean in particular (although we recognise that it will likely be several years before the Agreement comes into force, and that the Agreement’s impact in the Arctic will be limited as long as Russia is not a party). We encourage the UK Government to ratify the treaty as soon as practicable and take the lead on establishing Arctic marine protected areas under the Agreement as soon as feasible.
30
The UK Government should promote a sustainable approach to UK investment in the Arctic, including... Conclusion · paragraph 248 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government should promote a sustainable approach to UK investment in the Arctic, including by directing potential investors to the Arctic Investment Protocol and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the Ruggie Principles).
31
We welcome that the UK Government’s Arctic Policy Framework makes specific reference to economic development... Conclusion · paragraph 255 Conclusion (the committee's words)
We welcome that the UK Government’s Arctic Policy Framework makes specific reference to economic development in the Arctic being achieved in a way that is safe, responsible and sustainable, and to the benefit of communities living in the Arctic.
32
While there are limits to the direct support the UK can provide to local communities... Conclusion · paragraph 256 Conclusion (the committee's words)
While there are limits to the direct support the UK can provide to local communities and indigenous populations, the UK Government can and should assist by maintaining its support for the work of the Arctic Council, particularly the work of its Sustainable Development Working Group .
33
There are opportunities for UK companies to increase their footprint in the Arctic in a... Conclusion · paragraph 261 Conclusion (the committee's words)
There are opportunities for UK companies to increase their footprint in the Arctic in a way that is responsible and sustainable.
34
The UK Government should encourage local partnerships and support UK businesses wishing to operate in... Conclusion · paragraph 262 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government should encourage local partnerships and support UK businesses wishing to operate in the Arctic by signposting them towards local companies and business organisations.
35
The Arctic Council has a proven track record of promoting international collaboration in the Arctic... Conclusion · paragraph 277 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic Council has a proven track record of promoting international collaboration in the Arctic on environmental protection and scientific research. It has provided a vital platform for the voices of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples to be heard, and their status as permanent representatives has been an innovative model of governance.
36
Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine the Council had been relatively insulated from geopolitical tensions. Conclusion · paragraph 278 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine the Council had been relatively insulated from geopolitical tensions. This is no longer the case and there are questions over its long-term future as a forum for circumpolar co-operation.
37
The Arctic Council’s diminished efficacy does not mean that it is no longer useful. Conclusion · paragraph 279 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic Council’s diminished efficacy does not mean that it is no longer useful. We agree that the continued operation of the Arctic Council is in the UK’s interests. Re-engaging Russia at a working group level has the potential to ensure that vital scientific co-operation and data exchanges related to climate change and pollution can be resumed.
38
However, Russia’s attitude towards genuine co -operation should be carefully monitored. Conclusion · paragraph 280 Conclusion (the committee's words)
However, Russia’s attitude towards genuine co -operation should be carefully monitored. Russia must not be allowed to take advantage of its participation in working group activities to undermine the steps taken by the UK and others to isolate Russia diplomatically in response to the war in Ukraine.
39
This will be a challenging balancing act for the UK’s Arctic allies, and one which... Conclusion · paragraph 281 Conclusion (the committee's words)
This will be a challenging balancing act for the UK’s Arctic allies, and one which may prove difficult to sustain in the longer term as there currently appears to be no prospect of an improvement in Russia’s relations with the West. The UK Government should therefore prepare for the possibility that the Arctic Council may cease to function or diminish in importance. If a new governance structure were to be established in the Arctic, the UK Government should advocate for indigenous representation that is at least equivalent to the status they currently hold within the Arctic Council.
40
The UK Government can help strengthen Arctic governance by continuing to work with its partners... Conclusion · paragraph 290 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government can help strengthen Arctic governance by continuing to work with its partners to uphold the rules and obligations set out in UNCLOS.
41
Supporting Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Council, can help shield the region from attempts... Conclusion · paragraph 291 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Supporting Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Council, can help shield the region from attempts by others to impose a vision for the Arctic that could conflict with Western interests and those of the UK.
42
The UK is a world leader in polar science and this provides a strong platform... Conclusion · paragraph 297 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK is a world leader in polar science and this provides a strong platform for legitimising our involvement and exerting soft power in the region. The UK Government should continue to support Arctic science and ensure that its funding is appropriately prioritised.
43
We welcome the UK’s commitment to supporting and respecting the rights of indigenous peoples, as... Conclusion · paragraph 306 Conclusion (the committee's words)
We welcome the UK’s commitment to supporting and respecting the rights of indigenous peoples, as articulated in the UK’s Arctic Policy Framework.
44
Initiatives like the Canada-Inuit Nunangat-UK Arctic Research Programme, which engages directly with indigenous peoples on... Conclusion · paragraph 307 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Initiatives like the Canada-Inuit Nunangat-UK Arctic Research Programme, which engages directly with indigenous peoples on scientific research, have been well received. Building on this initiative, the UK Government should consider establishing similar programmes with other Arctic indigenous groups.
45
The UK Government should also consider increasing support for (1) the study and protection of... Conclusion · paragraph 308 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government should also consider increasing support for (1) the study and protection of the languages of Arctic indigenous peoples, and (2) Arctic social science research to better understand and respond to the impact that climate , development and geopolitical changes are having on Arctic indigenous peoples .
46
Our inquiry found that the UK has built strong relationships with the Arctic Seven and... Conclusion · paragraph 314 Conclusion (the committee's words)
Our inquiry found that the UK has built strong relationships with the Arctic Seven and demonstrated it can make positive contributions in areas of shared interest: regional security, environmental protection, sustainable economic development, and polar science. The balance of evidence from our witnesses suggests that the UK has broadly set the right priorities for the Arctic, and that the UK is seen as playing a valuable role in the region. This provides a good basis on which to maintain and build relations with key allies.
47
At the same time, the UK needs to prepare for the potential for significant change... Conclusion · paragraph 315 Conclusion (the committee's words)
At the same time, the UK needs to prepare for the potential for significant change in the Arctic. The Arctic will remain a key strategic priority for Russia, and the UK needs to be able to play its part in guaranteeing the security of Finland (and Sweden) within the NATO Alliance. There is a high likelihood that the UK Government will need to give greater attention to the region in the future. In particular, it should consider whether it has invested sufficiently in relevant military assets to meet future as well as current deterrence needs .
48
We are concerned that the region is not receiving sufficient ministerial attention. Conclusion · paragraph 316 Conclusion (the committee's words)
We are concerned that the region is not receiving sufficient ministerial attention. The UK aims to exert influence in the region by maintaining strong relationships with the Arctic Seven. This requires sustained political engagement as well as resources.
49
We note that during our visit to Norway and Finland, Arctic stakeholders told us that... Recommendation · paragraph 317 Recommendation (the committee's words)
We note that during our visit to Norway and Finland, Arctic stakeholders told us that there was limited UK ministerial participation in Arctic multilateral meetings, whereas ministers from the Scottish Government regularly attended. We call on the Government to increase the participation of UK Government ministers at Arctic multilateral meetings.
50
The Arctic affects a range of UK interests, from security to energy and climate change. Conclusion · paragraph 318 Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic affects a range of UK interests, from security to energy and climate change. This requires a cross-government and multi-disciplinary approach. The need for effective cross-governmental working will increase as the Arctic opens up to greater maritime activity and the security challenges in the region grow more complex.
51
We reiterate the recommendation of previous inquiries that the UK should establish the position of... Recommendation · paragraph 319 Recommendation (the committee's words)
We reiterate the recommendation of previous inquiries that the UK should establish the position of Arctic Ambassador or Arctic Envoy, who would assist the Minister for the Polar Regions in co-ordinating a cross-government approach to the Arctic. This appointment would send a strong signal regarding the UK’s commitment to the region.
0
pdf [accessed 1 November 2023] Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
pdf [accessed 1 November 2023]
52
However, witnesses saw a significant risk that the Arctic could become another front in a... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
However, witnesses saw a significant risk that the Arctic could become another front in a war originating elsewhere between Russia and NATO. Russian military thinking does not perceive the Arctic as a distinct theatre of operations that is insulated from points of tension in the Baltic, Atlantic or Black Sea. 52 Dr Duncan Depledge, Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security at Loughborough University, and Lt Commander Dr John Ash, Associate Professor at the University of Tromsø, both noted that historically most major conflicts in Europe have included an Arctic element, and that any regional conflict between NATO and Russia would likely spill over into the Arctic. 53
53
It is highly likely that Russia’s Northern Fleet and Arctic-based strategic capabilities would be involved... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
It is highly likely that Russia’s Northern Fleet and Arctic-based strategic capabilities would be involved in the event of a broader conflict between Russia and NATO. Russia’s Arctic-based forces would likely seek to interdict and disrupt sea lines of communication and US reinforcements in the North Atlantic. Dr Rowan Allport explained that “a lot of Russia’s capabilities in a general war are based in the Arctic in terms of disrupting NATO sea lines of communication and deploying precision strike capabilities.” 54
54
Angus Lapsley, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning at NATO, told us that... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Angus Lapsley, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning at NATO, told us that “there are relatively few obvious ways in which conflict would break out in the Arctic.” 55 The focus of NATO planning is therefore more on the role that High North and the Arctic might play in a broader conflict and, in particular, the strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula to Russia, both as the base for many of its nuclear forces, its submarines and many of its bombers, but also as the base for its conventional but nuclear-powered submarines and its Northern Fleet. 56
55
It is therefore essential that NATO retains an effective deterrent in the High North. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
It is therefore essential that NATO retains an effective deterrent in the High North. This requires sufficient investment in Arctic-capable assets, and regular training to demonstrate capability and commitment. Mr Lapsley summarised NATO’s task as follows: “What we most need to do in the Arctic and the High North—and there may be some other bits of geography where this holds too—is to demonstrate that we are capable of operating there. If we need to be there, we can be there, and we will not be intimidated out of regions.” 57
56
Despite Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic, we heard that the risk of Russia initiating... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Despite Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic, we heard that the risk of Russia initiating a conventional conflict in the region itself remained relatively low.
57
Some witnesses assessed that the Russian leadership’s current strategic focus remains on removing tension from... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Some witnesses assessed that the Russian leadership’s current strategic focus remains on removing tension from the Arctic. Professor Dodds, Executive Dean and Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway, told us that “it is not in the interests of the Russian Federation to have a conflictual Arctic”. 58 Dr Rebecca Pincus of the Wilson Centre Polar Institute noted that Russia has developed some of its most advanced and strategic military capabilities in the Arctic territory, but stressed that the key question was not about Russian capabilities, but intent: “I do not see motives for Russia to initiate conflict in the Arctic. The past year of fighting in Ukraine only reinforces my thinking. Russian lower-end capabilities have been significantly eroded in Ukraine. It is not clear why, or to what purpose, Russia would initiate or expand conflict in the Arctic, which would entail conflict with a NATO ally”. 59
58
Gabriella Gricius, Research Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN),... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Gabriella Gricius, Research Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), argued that Russia’s reliance on the Arctic for its economic development incentivises Russia to keep tensions low. 60 Others noted that, while Arctic assets have been largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, Russia would not wish to overstretch itself while the war is ongoing. 61
59
Prof Zysk, however, cautioned that “we should be careful about getting too complacent” about the... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Prof Zysk, however, cautioned that “we should be careful about getting too complacent” about the idea that conflict would not originate in the Arctic. She noted that “importantly, the changing international strategic environment, increases the potential for a possible intended and unintended regional escalation”. 62
60
The consensus view from our witnesses was that the two principal threats emerging from within... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The consensus view from our witnesses was that the two principal threats emerging from within the Arctic are: (1) escalation arising from accidents, miscalculation, or human error; and (2) malign activity in the ‘grey zone’ below the threshold for armed conflict. Accidental escalation
61
Growing maritime activity in the Arctic and the deterioration of relations between Russia and the... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Growing maritime activity in the Arctic and the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West have increased the risk of accidental escalation in the Arctic.
62
Dr Pincus noted that unintentional escalation could arise from bad weather, an accident, or an... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Pincus noted that unintentional escalation could arise from bad weather, an accident, or an unintended incident, adding that: “The Arctic is a harsh place to operate in the best of circumstances. Russian operators have been known to conduct unsafe manoeuvres in proximity to US and allied military exercises, for example.” 63
63
This risk is compounded by the secrecy surrounding Russian activities in the Arctic and the... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
This risk is compounded by the secrecy surrounding Russian activities in the Arctic and the Russian military’s willingness to engage in risky behaviour. Mathieu Boulègue told us: “If we look at the track record of Russian incidents in the past few years, whether it is the Norilsk spill or the Nyonoksa radiation incidents that were picked up by the Norwegian radiological agency, there is more secrecy around activities that could lead to further escalation if we do not know what is going on.” 64
64
Reduced channels of communication make it harder to deconflict military activity and avoid misunderstanding or... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Reduced channels of communication make it harder to deconflict military activity and avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation. Increased tensions between Russia and the West and vehemently anti-Western attitudes among the Russian leadership may also complicate efforts to de-escalate following an incident. Mathieu Boulègue noted: “It would not benefit Russia to escalate in case of accident in the region, once again because it wants to move tension away, but accidents happen and there is always the possibility and the opportunity for accidents to happen—hot-headed pilots who have been decimated in Ukraine taking a very strong and very brazen reaction, which therefore leads to brinkmanship activities that could increase the cost of deterrence and therefore lead to escalation, if not confrontation. There is less restraint and more pressure in this environment.” 65
65
Professor Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, therefore saw the... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Professor Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, therefore saw the challenge for NATO as ensuring sufficient presence in the High North, while minimising the risk of accidents and unintentional escalation. 66 Professor Lackenbauer, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North at Trent University, emphasised that with increasing Russian activity in the region, maintaining good situational awareness and intelligence sharing among NATO allies is key. 67
66
Despite tensions between Russia and the West, some forms of co-operation with Russia have been... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Despite tensions between Russia and the West, some forms of co-operation with Russia have been retained. For example, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters in Reitan has maintained a hotline with the Admiral of the Northern Fleet, which acts as an important deconfliction mechanism. 68 Norway continues to co-operate with Russia on search and rescue. 69 Russia continues to participate in Arctic Council negotiated treaties on oil spill response and search and rescue. 70 It also remains part of the international Cospas-Sarsat programme, a satellite system that detects and locates emergency beacons that are activated by planes, vessels or people in distress in remote areas, including the Arctic. 71
67
Prof Zysk told us that despite the tensions between Russia and the West it is... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Prof Zysk told us that despite the tensions between Russia and the West it is critical to maintain communication channels to support deconfliction efforts in the Arctic: “That is a very important instrument to reduce the risk of conflict and increase accountability for possible dangerous military practices and situations.” 72 Sub-threshold activity in the Arctic and High North
68
Several witnesses emphasised that one of the most significant areas of concern in the Arctic... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Several witnesses emphasised that one of the most significant areas of concern in the Arctic related to sub-threshold activity—malign activity conducted by an adversary below the level required to trigger a military response. Dr Pincus told the Committee that these activities represented the most likely form of any intentional initiation or escalation in the Arctic region. 73 The Rt Hon James Heappey MP, the Minister for the Armed Forces, also told us that sub-threshold activity, such as maritime sabotage, represented the biggest direct threat from Russia to NATO’s strategic interests. 74
69
The UK’s Nordic allies are at the front line of Russian sub-threshold operations. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK’s Nordic allies are at the front line of Russian sub-threshold operations. Russia regularly engages in a range of disruptive actions to test the Nordic states’ responses and resilience. This includes GPS jamming, military exercises simulating attacks on its neighbours, maritime sabotage, cyber-attacks and information warfare. 75 Professor Niklas Eklund, Chair of politics and public administration at Umeå University in Sweden, characterised Russia’s approach as a “constant full spectrum testing of our systems”. 76
70
The Norwegian Aviation Authority reported in mid-2022 that Russian GPS jamming had intensified following Russia’s... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Norwegian Aviation Authority reported in mid-2022 that Russian GPS jamming had intensified following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 77 Russian military jets also compromise air traffic safety by frequently flying with their transponders switched off. 78 In October 2022, Norwegian authorities detained a Russian national after drones were sighted flying over critical energy infrastructure. 79
71
Minna Ålander of the Finnish Institute for International Affairs told us that Russian jamming of... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Minna Ålander of the Finnish Institute for International Affairs told us that Russian jamming of GPS signals in the Gulf of Finland presents a serious issue for civilian air traffic in the region. 80 Lieutenant Commander John Ash noted that the risks posed by GPS jamming in the Arctic are particularly acute because navigation in the Arctic environment is difficult in all circumstances, and GPS signals are often weaker because they rely on satellites at a low altitude that are more regularly restricted by terrain. 81
72
Russian sub-threshold activity around the Svalbard archipelago, located halfway between Norway and the North Pole,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Russian sub-threshold activity around the Svalbard archipelago, located halfway between Norway and the North Pole, represents a particular set of challenges for Norway and its allies. Norway has full sovereignty over Svalbard, but the 1920 Svalbard Treaty 82 gives all 46 states Parties equal rights of access and commercial exploitation on land and in Svalbard’s territorial waters. Article 9 of the treaty prohibits naval bases on the archipelago and any other fortifications for “warlike purposes”.
73
Russia has maintained a strategic foothold on the archipelago, operating a consulate and a coal... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Russia has maintained a strategic foothold on the archipelago, operating a consulate and a coal mine in the settlement of Barentsburg. We heard that Norwegian policymakers believe they have established and well-resourced mechanisms to manage incidents on Svalbard. 83 Prof Dodds told the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2017 that “Some obvious flashpoints would be anything to do with Svalbard … you would not have to be terribly clever to think of scenarios where the delicate relationship that exists between Russia and Norway could be upended.” 84 The RAND Corporation also identified Svalbard as a potential flashpoint for sub-threshold and ‘grey zone’ threats. 85
74
Dr Pincus told us that alongside conventional deterrence, NATO also has a role in developing... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Pincus told us that alongside conventional deterrence, NATO also has a role in developing a strategy for responding to sub-threshold threats: “We should have consultations and draw up contingency plans for hybrid or grey-zone activities in the Arctic, how those activities would be responded to and what those escalation dynamics would look like, and prepare for unintentional accidents that, without adequate preparation, could rapidly escalate.”
75
Mathieu Boulègue told the Committee that the track record of recent sub-threshold incidents pointed to... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Mathieu Boulègue told the Committee that the track record of recent sub-threshold incidents pointed to the fact that Russia is willing to take more risks and accept higher costs to put pressure on its neighbours, including in the European Arctic. 86 In their written evidence, the RAND Corporation noted that sub-threshold and subversive activities directed at the UK’s partners in the High North may increase as a result of NATO’s enlargement to include Finland or Sweden. 87 We heard that both Finland and Sweden have prepared for an increase in sub-threshold activity, although—for now at least—there has been no evidence of a pick-up in activity. 88 Maritime sabotage and threats to critical infrastructure
76
Russia has developed a range of capabilities to sabotage and disrupt critical infrastructure, including undersea... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Russia has developed a range of capabilities to sabotage and disrupt critical infrastructure, including undersea data cables in the Arctic and further afield. The specialised capabilities for deep-sea maritime sabotage are based on the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic. 89
77
In 2017, then-Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart (now Lord) Peach stated... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In 2017, then-Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart (now Lord) Peach stated that Russia’s unconventional warfare capabilities were creating “a new risk to our prosperity and way of life” through the potential exploitation of “the vulnerability of the cables that criss-cross the seabed”. 90 In May 2023, David Cattler, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, said that “there are heightened concerns that Russia may target undersea cables and other critical infrastructure in an effort to disrupt Western life, to gain leverage against those nations that are providing support to Ukraine”. 91
78
There have been several unattributed incidences of damage to subsea infrastructure in the Arctic. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
There have been several unattributed incidences of damage to subsea infrastructure in the Arctic. In November 2021, the Lofoten-Vesterålen Ocean observatory, an underwater facility in northern Norway, was put out of service after more than 4.3km of its specially designed fibre optic and electric cables were cut. 92 In January 2022, one of two subsea data cables connecting Norway’s Svalbard archipelago and the Norwegian mainland at Harstad was damaged. In both cases, the cause of the damage has not been explained. 93
79
We were told by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We were told by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, that within the Russian system, capabilities to conduct maritime sabotage sit within two organisational frameworks: the specialised Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), and Russian naval intelligence. 94
80
GUGI operates deep-diving mini submarines equipped with manipulators that can work at extreme depths. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
GUGI operates deep-diving mini submarines equipped with manipulators that can work at extreme depths. Larger mothership vessels such as the Belgorod , a stretched Oscar-class submarine, act as a host both for these deep-diving mini subs and, potentially, a range of unmanned underwater vehicles. 95
81
Russian naval intelligence operates surface vessels that can be used for maritime sabotage, such as... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Russian naval intelligence operates surface vessels that can be used for maritime sabotage, such as the Admiral Vladimirsky , which is officially classed as an oceanographic research vessel. Russian naval intelligence also uses Russian civilian ships, including fishing trawlers, to survey and potentially attack infrastructure in shallower waters, such as in areas of the North Sea. 96
82
Assets of Russian naval intelligence have operated in UK waters. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Assets of Russian naval intelligence have operated in UK waters. In November 2022, the Admiral Vladimirsky entered the Moray firth and loitered near the RAF’s maritime patrol base at Lossiemouth. 97
83
Dr Kaushal set out the logic of Russian activities to target critical infrastructure: “In terms... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Kaushal set out the logic of Russian activities to target critical infrastructure: “In terms of Russia’s intent, it has been clear that Russia sees the ability to inflict what it describes as dose damage as a means of what it would call war containment on its periphery—ensuring that a local war with a neighbouring country does not involve a larger regional coalition—and one of their primary means of doing so is signalling the ability to target critical national infrastructure.” 98
84
Maritime sabotage is difficult to deter. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Maritime sabotage is difficult to deter. The rules of engagement in peacetime constrain the response to ships suspected of engaging in maritime sabotage. 99 Moreover, states may be unable or unwilling to publicly attribute attacks to adversaries because the maritime assets or intelligence that could be used for attribution may be highly classified. This may in turn constrain the punitive responses that Western states can employ.
85
In addition, Dr Lee Willett noted that it can be difficult for states to respond... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In addition, Dr Lee Willett noted that it can be difficult for states to respond rapidly to sub-threshold threats to critical infrastructure because cables and pipelines are typically privately owned and pass through many different legal jurisdictions. 100
86
The UK has an important role to play in deterring maritime subversion. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK has an important role to play in deterring maritime subversion. The Royal Navy operates Astute-class submarines, capable of detecting underwater activity, and mine countermeasure vessels, which operate sub-surface systems. RAF maritime patrol aircraft can track surface and sub-surface vessels. 101
87
The UK has invested in new capabilities to manage the threat to seabed infrastructure, including... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK has invested in new capabilities to manage the threat to seabed infrastructure, including two new Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) vessels operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. These act as ‘motherships’ for a range of remotely operated and autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles for underwater surveillance and seabed warfare. 102 The first MROS, RFA Proteus, entered service in October 2023, following an acceleration of the acquisition announced by the Defence Secretary in late 2022. 103
88
On 18 May 2023, the UK and Norway agreed to develop a strategic partnership “to... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
On 18 May 2023, the UK and Norway agreed to develop a strategic partnership “to counter shared threats in the undersea domain” including threats to undersea infrastructure. Norway has already stepped up surveillance in the North Sea in response to undersea threats. 104 We heard that the UK has co-operated with Norway on the inspection of all its undersea infrastructure following the attack on the Nord Stream pipeline. 105 In January 2023, NATO and the EU established a joint taskforce on resilience and critical infrastructure protection. 106 In February this year, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the creation of a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO Headquarters. The centre “will facilitate engagement with industry and bring key military and civilian stakeholders together”. 107
89
A range of measures can be taken to deter threats to critical infrastructure, depending on... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
A range of measures can be taken to deter threats to critical infrastructure, depending on the type of asset used. Dr Kaushal highlighted that GUGI possessed a limited number of specialised assets able to operate at extreme depths. GUGI also performs a range of other tasks, including laying undersea sensors for the Harmony networks, which protect its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and provide surveillance around Russian waters. Dr Kaushal told us that the range of tasks assigned to GUGI has put organisational strain on a highly elite body. The UK and its allies can therefore potentially support deterrence through submarine activity that forces GUGI to devote greater resources to the surveillance and protection of its own infrastructure. 108
90
Dr Willett told us that international collaboration was “critical” to respond to the threat of... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Willett told us that international collaboration was “critical” to respond to the threat of maritime sabotage and the “one thing that potential adversaries of the West do not have”. 109 Dr Willett also emphasised the importance of effective collaboration between governments and industry, noting that private companies have extensive underwater surveillance capabilities. The Norwegian oil and gas sector, for example, has 600 remotely operated underwater surveillance vehicles. 110 The RAND Corporation told us that the UK could facilitate civilian-military collaboration on the protection of subsea infrastructure by creating a cross-government office that brought together the Ministry of Defence with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. 111
91
Dr Kaushal suggested that military partnerships with private companies could also aid deterrence, as targeting... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Kaushal suggested that military partnerships with private companies could also aid deterrence, as targeting infrastructure designated for both civilian and military use could mean adversaries would regard the risk of escalation from an act of sabotage as unacceptably high.
92
The Tony Blair Institute told us that state collaboration with major tech companies would be... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Tony Blair Institute told us that state collaboration with major tech companies would be key for internet resilience in the Arctic and beyond. They recommended that the UK should support investment in alternative Arctic infrastructure. The UK could also take the lead in developing agreement on norms and regulations governing subsea infrastructure in the Arctic. 112 Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession
93
Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO has fundamentally changed the geopolitics of the Nordic... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO has fundamentally changed the geopolitics of the Nordic region. Enlargement has increased NATO’s footprint in the Arctic and created new demands on the Alliance.
94
Mr Heappey emphasised that the accession of Sweden and Finland would strengthen NATO’s security and... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Mr Heappey emphasised that the accession of Sweden and Finland would strengthen NATO’s security and their decision to join the Alliance was arguably Russia’s biggest strategic failure of the war: “It is undoubtedly an enhancement to the Alliance to have countries such as Sweden and Finland, with such expertise in the environment in which they operate and with fantastic industrial bases.” 113
95
Likewise, Mr Lapsley told us that the accession of Sweden and Finland gave NATO “strategic... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Likewise, Mr Lapsley told us that the accession of Sweden and Finland gave NATO “strategic depth”, since it has always been assumed that in the event of any conflict with Russia, NATO would need to fight very closely with Finland and Sweden, and now that geography has become integral to NATO. 114
96
Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO provides an opportunity for the UK to deepen its... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO provides an opportunity for the UK to deepen its already extensive defence co-operation with the Nordic states. The RAND Corporation suggested this could include deepening co-operation around common platforms, such as the F-35 combat aircraft or the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft. Increased intelligence sharing could also strengthen situational awareness in the region. 115
97
The RAND Corporation also noted that there was an opportunity to learn from Norway, Sweden... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The RAND Corporation also noted that there was an opportunity to learn from Norway, Sweden and Finland’s Total Defence concepts, which emphasise “bolstering national preparedness and societal and psychological resilience in the face of sub-threshold threats”. 116 Finland’s accession to NATO is also an opportunity for the UK to increase its relationship with the Hybrid Centre of Excellence, based in Helsinki, which focuses on responding to sub-threshold threats in the Arctic, among other regions. The RAND Corporation told us that the Nordic States have significant experience and expertise in countering hybrid threats “and the UK Government, National Preparedness Commission and others could benefit from further international engagement to share lessons learned and best practice”. 117
98
Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession also presents strategic and organisational challenges. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession also presents strategic and organisational challenges. NATO deterrence in the High North has traditionally focused on the maritime domain. Finland’s accession to NATO has doubled the length of the Alliance’s land border with Russia. There is therefore a need to increase the training of land forces in cold weather conditions. 118 Norwegian defence planners are now investing in East-West infrastructure to facilitate the reinforcement of Sweden and Finland from the Atlantic across Norway in the event of a conflict with Russia.
99
Following NATO accession, Finland and Sweden wish to be part of the same Joint Force... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Following NATO accession, Finland and Sweden wish to be part of the same Joint Force Command (JFC) as Norway to consolidate Nordic defence co-operation and inter-operability. 119 At present, however, Norway is under JFC Norfolk, while Finland sits under JFC Brunssum. This is because Norfolk lacks sufficient operational capacity at present to cover Finland (and Sweden). JFC Norfolk currently has a staff of around 200, and we heard that this would have to rise to around 600 to meet new demands. 120
100
Contrary to the expectations of officials in the Nordic states, and the public messaging of... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Contrary to the expectations of officials in the Nordic states, and the public messaging of Russian officials, NATO has so far not detected a change in Russia’s military posture in response to Finland’s accession to the Alliance. 121 Indeed, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen noted in August this year that “our border is pretty empty during the war that Russia is illegally waging in Ukraine”. 122 This may reflect temporary resource constraints and a desire on the part of the Russian leadership to keep tensions in the Arctic at a low level while a large proportion of Russia’s land forces are engaged in Ukraine. 123 We were told that Russia’s response to a major NATO exercise planned in Finland next year would be monitored carefully. 124
101
We heard that in the medium term, there is a strong likelihood that Russia will... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard that in the medium term, there is a strong likelihood that Russia will respond to NATO enlargement with increased military build-up in the Arctic. Prof Zysk told us that NATO enlargement will unavoidably increase Russia’s sense of vulnerability: “In general, the many unintended consequences of the Russian assault on Ukraine have profoundly reshaped Arctic security and co-operation and governance regimes in the region—also for Russia. It has heightened the role of the Arctic as an arena of confrontation between Russia and the West, again stimulating the Russian threat perception”. 125
102
The UK, along with other members, must adapt their strategic doctrines to apply the security... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK, along with other members, must adapt their strategic doctrines to apply the security guarantees under Article 5 to the two Arctic states. Mr Lapsley told us that the consequence of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is that the Arctic is now becoming more like any other part of NATO’s area of operations, and an area in which the Alliance might be tested militarily: “The assumption that it would be a backwater, that it would not be part of an overall conflict, is one that we and the Arctic nations now feel much less confident about now.” 126 UK capabilities and defence contribution in the High North
103
The UK is one of the few non-Arctic states that invests in the military capability... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK is one of the few non-Arctic states that invests in the military capability to operate in the High North. Prof Lackenbauer told us that the UK is “key to North Atlantic security across all domains” and plays an important role in anti-submarine and air policing. 127
104
Witnesses emphasised the highly specialised set of skills required to operate in the Arctic, which... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Witnesses emphasised the highly specialised set of skills required to operate in the Arctic, which is one of the “worst battlespaces in the world to fight in”. 128 Lieutenant Commander Dr John Ash noted that: “You can take a competent pilot and that person would not be fit for duty in the Arctic.” 129 Regular training in Arctic conditions is essential to develop and maintain the ability to operate in the region effectively with allies. Dr Duncan Depledge observed that the cold-weather skills can be quickly lost owing to turnover of personnel, and thus a “very high tempo” of training is required. 130
105
The Royal Marines deploy annually to Northern Norway for winter training and we were pleased... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Royal Marines deploy annually to Northern Norway for winter training and we were pleased to learn that the UK has increased the scale and frequency of cold-weather training and exercises in the High North. In March 2023, the UK established a new Arctic operations base in Camp Viking in Northern Norway to serve as a hub for Royal Marines Commandos. 131 The Minister told us that the number of UK personnel with recent experience of operating in Arctic conditions “will be higher now than at any point since the early 1990s”. Mr Heappey told us that training in Arctic conditions was increasing across all domains: “The number of frigates that have painted their bows blue because they have been up into the Arctic Circle is the highest it has been since the end of the Cold War. The Air Force is pulsing up into the High North ever more frequently in order to rehearse the operation of complex fast jets in very austere cold environments.” 132
106
On 13 October 2023, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would increase its presence... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
On 13 October 2023, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would increase its presence in Northern Europe and the High North, and would deepen co-operation on countering hybrid threats. This would include sending more than 20,000 personnel for regional exercises, alongside eight Royal Navy ships, 25 fast jets and an aviation task force of helicopters. 133
107
Alongside its membership of NATO, the UK co-operates closely with Nordic allies on defence through... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Alongside its membership of NATO, the UK co-operates closely with Nordic allies on defence through the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, the European Defence Policy Forum, and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. Box 2: UK participation in Arctic security groupings The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a UK-led coalition of ten northern European countries. It provides a collective military capability, deterrent, and expeditionary force focused on security in the High North, North Atlantic, and Baltic Sea region. The Foundation Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2015, and full operational capability was declared in 2018. The JEF is designed to complement NATO and other existing alliances. The UK acts as the principal decision-maker, with other member states deciding whether to contribute forces or otherwise participate in the activity or operation. The JEF member states are the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The European Defence Policy Forum , or Northern Group , comprises the JEF members plus Germany and Poland. It is a UK-led forum aimed at strengthening mutual understanding and co-operation among members on defence and security issues. The forum first convened in 2010 and meets every six months at Defence ministerial level. The Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) is a regular meeting of defence representatives to discuss defence and security co-operation in the High North and Arctic. The members of the ASFR are Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Russia has not participated in the ASFR since its invasion of Crimea in 2014. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic: The United Kingdom’s Arctic Policy Framework (February 2023): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/looking-north -the-uk-and-the-arctic [accessed 16 November 2023]
108
The UK has historically played an important role within NATO in anti-submarine warfare and air... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK has historically played an important role within NATO in anti-submarine warfare and air policing in the High North and the Arctic. Among NATO allies, only Britain and the US have the capability to conduct nuclear submarine patrols under the ice cap. The demands on these capabilities in the High North are growing as Russia has invested in its Northern Fleet. The Government’s policy paper on the UK’s defence contribution in the High North notes that Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has reached “Cold War levels”, 134 and there is the added challenge of monitoring the new generation of Russian submarines, which are significantly quieter and so harder to detect. 135
109
There remain long-standing concerns that the UK lacks the resources and platforms to maintain a... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
There remain long-standing concerns that the UK lacks the resources and platforms to maintain a meaningful presence in the High North and the Arctic.
110
In the maritime domain, the House of Commons Defence Committee’s 2018 report on defence in... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In the maritime domain, the House of Commons Defence Committee’s 2018 report on defence in the Arctic raised concerns regarding the operational availability of the UK’s very limited number of submarines. 136 The UK has few dedicated capabilities for Arctic operations and just one dedicated ice patrol ship, HMS Protector , which must cover both polar regions and spends a large part of each year in the Antarctic.
111
The RAND Corporation told us that the acquisition of dedicated new vessels or uncrewed assets... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The RAND Corporation told us that the acquisition of dedicated new vessels or uncrewed assets assigned to each pole “would help to protect the UK’s critical infrastructure in austere northern oceanic environments all year-round, and to reassure allies and partners”. 137
112
Mr Heappey told us that the emphasis of UK Defence was to ensure that its... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Mr Heappey told us that the emphasis of UK Defence was to ensure that its platforms could operate across a range of environments and that there was “a balance to strike between the different theatres” the UK may need to operate in: “It is important not to specify ships to be extraordinarily capable in one environment to the exclusion of their capability in another. If we specify them to be extraordinarily capable in both environments, we will only be able to afford one, not six. There is always a balance to strike.” 138
113
In the air domain, the 2015 House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic identified... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In the air domain, the 2015 House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic identified a serious capability gap in maritime patrol aircraft following the withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft in 2011. 139 This was partially addressed in 2020, when the UK received the first of a new fleet of nine P-8A Poseidon jets, whose function includes anti-submarine warfare operations patrolling the GIUK gap. In addition, a new fleet of three E-7 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning aircraft, which are designed to provide aerial and maritime surveillance, is expected to enter service in 2024.
114
We question, however, whether such a small number of platforms would be sufficient to provide... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We question, however, whether such a small number of platforms would be sufficient to provide adequate defensive cover for the UK, let alone allow for a contribution to operations in the High North.
115
Likewise, the Scottish Affairs Committee inquiry into Scotland’s defence contribution in the High North heard... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Likewise, the Scottish Affairs Committee inquiry into Scotland’s defence contribution in the High North heard evidence that the UK’s current fleet of P-8As would be insufficient to maintain a persistent presence in the High North and Arctic alongside a long-term deployment to the Indo-Pacific and protection of the nuclear deterrent. The Minister told that Committee: “I think we have enough P-8 for the job that we designed the P-8 force to do, which is submarine surveillance in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and contributing to the NATO north Atlantic mission. Very obviously, if our ambition grows beyond that, either we need to say to the US and other P-8 operating nations, ‘Can you step up your contribution to the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, because we want to go off and do some stuff over the Sea of Japan?’ or we have to get more P-8.” 140 Impact of geopolitical tensions on indigenous communities
116
Representatives of Arctic indigenous peoples expressed concerns to us that further militarisation of the region... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Representatives of Arctic indigenous peoples expressed concerns to us that further militarisation of the region as a result of geopolitical tensions could have a significant impact on their way of life and security. In the past, the militarisation of the Arctic has been associated, in some cases, with the forced displacement of indigenous peoples and the pollution of their homeland with military waste. During a recent visit to Denmark and Greenland, Francisco Cali Tzay, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, drew attention to the history of adverse environmental and social effects of military activity. 141
117
Geopolitical tensions between Russia and the Arctic Seven have also led to a sharp reduction... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Geopolitical tensions between Russia and the Arctic Seven have also led to a sharp reduction in cross-border contacts between indigenous peoples in Russia and the other Arctic states. In April 2022, the transnational Saami Council suspended formal relations with Russia’s two internationally recognised Sami organisations, the Kola Sami Association and the Association of Sami in Murmansk Oblast, after their members publicly endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
118
The Arctic will remain central to Russia’s military and strategic thinking. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic will remain central to Russia’s military and strategic thinking. The military setbacks it has suffered in Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession, will only increase the importance of the region for Russia’s leadership. Russia has a legitimate interest in the Arctic, but the UK approach and that of its allies must be robust in deterring malign activity.
119
While it is not in Russia’ s interest to start a conventional conflict in the... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
While it is not in Russia’ s interest to start a conventional conflict in the Arctic, sub-threshold activity and accidental escalation represent significant risks to the region’s security.
120
Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. The UK and its allies should prepare contingency plans to detect, deter and respond to hybrid and ‘grey-zone activities’, and consult on how to best do this in situations when public attribution is not possible.
121
Close co-operation between the state and the private sector, which operates most subsea cables and... Recommendation Recommendation (the committee's words)
Close co-operation between the state and the private sector, which operates most subsea cables and pipelines, is key to deterring threats to critical infrastructure. The UK Government should establish partnerships for working with businesses to combat threats to critical infrastructure.
122
The risk of unintentional escalation in the Arctic following an accident has risen as a... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The risk of unintentional escalation in the Arctic following an accident has risen as a result of increasing maritime activity in the region, and the sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West. The UK must continue to work closely with its allies to maintain good situational awareness. It should co-operate closely with Arctic allies on intelligence gathering and sharing on Russian activities in the High North.
123
The UK’s Arctic allies have continued to work with Russia in areas such as search... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK’s Arctic allies have continued to work with Russia in areas such as search and rescue and military-to-military communication for the purpose of deconfliction, emergency response, and reassurance. It is in the UK’s interest that these channels of communication and co- operation are maintained.
124
We welcome the UK Government’s increased defence commitments to the region, including the recently announced... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We welcome the UK Government’s increased defence commitments to the region, including the recently announced plans for deeper collaboration with Nordic partners to combat hybrid threats. The UK Government remains committed to holding cold weather training and military exercises in the High North.
125
We are concerned, however, that the UK has insufficient key military assets, such as submarines,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We are concerned, however, that the UK has insufficient key military assets, such as submarines, maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft, to support this increased focus on the Arctic alongside the UK’ s growing interest in other regions such as the Indo- Pacific.
126
It is essential that the UK continues to train sufficiently with its NATO and Nordic... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
It is essential that the UK continues to train sufficiently with its NATO and Nordic allies to maintain capabilities and signal commitment to defending the region. The UK Government should continue to enhance capabilities through support for the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Northern Group and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. To avoid unintentional escalation, the UK and its allies should ensure their actions are predictable and there are clear contingency plans in place in the event of an incident .
127
The UK has well-established defence links with the Nordic countries and is a valued partner... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK has well-established defence links with the Nordic countries and is a valued partner in the region. We welcome the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which will strengthen the military effectiveness of the Alliance, including in the Arctic.
128
We are concerned that placing Finland (and Sweden ) under the Brunssum Joint Force Command... Recommendation Recommendation (the committee's words)
We are concerned that placing Finland (and Sweden ) under the Brunssum Joint Force Command runs at cross-purposes to the efforts of the Nordic states to strengthen inter -operability and joint defence in the Nordic region. We call on the UK Government to assist in capacity building at JFC Norfolk so that Finland and Sweden can be placed under its command as soon as possible. In the interim , it is particularly important that NATO tests the flexibility and inter-operability between the two joint commands. 25 Q 20 (Dr Rowan Allport) 26 Q 43 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 27 Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment, Chatham House (June 2019) p 10: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/russias-military-posture- arctic/4-arctic-force-structure [accessed 1 November 2023] 28 Defence Committee, On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic (Twelfth Report, Session 2017–19, HC 388) 29 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/ default/ 30 Defence Committee, On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic (Twelfth Report, Session 2017–19, HC 388) 31 Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘low tension’ environment , Chatham House (June 2019): https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/russias-military-posture-arctic /4-arctic-force-structure [accessed 1 November 2023] 32 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558 /documents/204655/default/ 33 Q 43 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 34 The 2022 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation identifies the Arctic waters around Russia’s northern coast and the waters of the Northern Sea Route as a zone of “vital national interest”, see: Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31.07.2022 No 512 Ob utverzhdenii Morskoi doktrini Rossiiskoi Federatsii (July 2022) p 1: http ://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48215/page/1 [accessed 1 November 2023] [ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 31.07.2022 No 512 On the Approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation ]. For an unofficial translation of the Doctrine, see: U.S. Naval War College, Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (July 2022) pp 1–94: https://dnnlgwick .blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies %20Institute/20220731_ENG_RUS_Maritime_Doctrine_FINALtxt.pdf?sv=2017–04-17 &sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=2zUFSaTUSPcOpQDBk%2FuCtVnb%2FDoy06Cbh0EI5tGpl2Y%3D [accessed 1 November 2023]. 35 Written evidence from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change ( ARC0013 ) 36 Written evidence by Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe to the Scottish Affairs Committee, Inquiry on Scotland and the High North ( DIS0047 ) 37 Mathieu Boulègue, ‘The Arctic Component of Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine’ (November 2022): https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/no-17-arctic -component-russias-new-maritime-doctrine [accessed 13 October 2023] 38 Q 44 (Mathieu Boulègue) 39 Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31.07.2022 No 512 Ob utverzhdenii Morskoi doktrini Rossiiskoi Federatsii (July 2022), p 1: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48215/page/1 [accessed 1 November 2023] [ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 31.07.2022 No 512 On the Approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation ] 40 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents /204655/default/ 41 Q 44 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 42 Q 45 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 43 Q 44 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 44 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 45 Q 44 (Mathieu Boulègue) 46 Q 44 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 47 Written evidence from Prof Gisele Arruda and Dr Marko Filijović ( ARC0009 ); International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4-8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/ 204655/default/ 48 Written evidence from Cornell Overfield and Dr Joshua Tallis ( ARC0011 ) and Q 24 (Dr Duncan Depledge) 49 Most notably, in 2010, Russia and Norway resolved the most potentially problematic maritime boundary in the Arctic region by signing a treaty delimiting their EEZs in the Barents Sea. The EEZ is a maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles beyond a state’s territorial sea and ‘contiguous zone’ (each 12 nautical miles in width respectively). The state has exclusive rights over natural resources within the EEZ. 50 Q 143 (Prof Michael Byers) 51 Q 144 (Prof Michael Byers) and Q 137 (Prof P Whitney Lackenbauer) 52 Q 46 (Mathieu Boulègue) 53 Q 19 (Lieutenant Commander Dr John Ash) and Q 25 (Dr Duncan Depledge) 54 Q 25 (Dr Rowan Allport) 55 Q 150 (Angus Lapsley) 56 Ibid. 57 Q 153 (Angus Lapsley) 58 Q 14 (Prof Klaus Dodds) and Q 46 (Mathieu Boulègue) 59 Q 135 (Dr Rebecca Pincus) 60 Written evidence from Gabriella Gricius ( ARC0001 ) 61 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https ://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ 62 Written evidence from Prof Katarzyna Zysk ( ARC0016 ) 63 Q 127 (Dr Rebecca Pincus) 64 Q 46 (Mathieu Boulègue). In May 2020, a major oil leak from a collapsed fuel tank 12km north of Norilsk in the Russian Arctic polluted a 350 sq km area in Lake Pysasina, which flows into the Kara Sea. See BBC, ‘Norilsk Nickel: Mining firm pays record $2bn fine over Arctic oil spill’: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56350953 [accessed 1 November 2023]. In August 2019, an explosion at the Nyonoksa military test range in Russia’s European Arctic led to rise in radiation to 16 times normal levels. President Vladimir Putin said a new weapon system had been tested. It is believed the test involved the 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, see: BBC, Russian nuclear accident: Medics fear ‘ radioactive patients’ (August 2019): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news /world-europe-49432681 [accessed 13 October 2023]. 65 Q 46 (Mathieu Boulègue) 66 Q 132 (Prof Michael Byers) 67 Q 136 (Prof P Whitney Lackenbauer) 68 Q 50 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 69 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees .parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ 70 Written evidence from Cornell Overfield and Josh Tallis ( ARC0011 ) 71 Q 132 (Prof Michael Byers) 72 Q 50 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 73 Q 127 (Dr Rebecca Pincus) 74 Q 114 (James Heappey MP) 75 Q 58 (Minna Ålander) 76 Q 57 (Prof Niklas Eklund) 77 ‘More Russian GPS jamming than ever before across border to Norway’, The Barents Observer (9 July 2022): https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/07/more-russian-gps- jamming-ever-across-border-norway [accessed 1 November 2023] 78 Q 58 (Prof Niklas Eklund) 79 Q 46 (Mathieu Boulègue); Deutsche Welle, Norway detains Russian man over drone flights (October 2022): https://www.dw.com/en/norway-russian-man- detained-with-2-drones-near-arctic/a-63441134 [accessed 1 November 2023] 80 Q 58 (Minna Ålander) 81 Q 27 (Lieutenant Commander Dr John Ash) 82 Treaty regulating the Status of Spitsbergen and conferring the Sovereignty on Norway, done at Paris, 9 February 1920: https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/data/ Library2/pdf/1924-TS0018.pdf [accessed 18 October 2023]. Depositary status lists for the treaty: http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ exl-php/vue-consult/mae_internet___traites/TRA19200018 [accessed 9 November 2023] 83 Q 67 (Dr Elana Wilson Rowe) 84 Oral evidence taken before the Defence sub-Committee, 1 March 2017 (Session 2016–17) QQ 27–29 85 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 86 Q 46 (Mathieu Boulègue) 87 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 88 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/ default/ 89 Royal United Services Institute,’Stalking the Seabed: How Russia Targets Critical Infrastructure’: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/ publications/commentary/stalking-seabed-how-russia-targets-critical-undersea-infrastructure [accessed 1 November 2023] 90 Ewen MacAskill, ‘Russia could cut off internet to Nato countries, British military chief warns’, The Guardian (14 December 2017): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/14/russia-could-cut-off-internet-to-nato-countries-british-military-chief-warns [accessed 16 November 2023] 91 Reuters, ‘NATO says Moscow may sabotage undersea cables as part of war on Ukraine’: https://www.reuters.com/world/moscow-may-sabotage- undersea-cables-part-its-war-ukraine-nato-2023–05-03/ [accessed 1 November 2023] 92 Q 114 (Dr Lee Willett) and ‘4.3 Kilometers of Subsea Cable Vanished Off North Norwegian Coast’ High North News. (10 November 2021): https://www.highnorthnews.com/ en/43-kilometers-subsea-cable-vanished-north-norwegian-coast [accessed 1 November 2023] 93 Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, The subsea cable cut at Svalbard January 2022: What happened, what were the consequences, and how were they managed? (18 January 2023): https ://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/the-subsea-cable -cut-at-svalbard-january-2022-what-happened-what-were-the -consequences-and-how-were-they-managed [accessed 1 November 2023] 94 Q 114 (Dr Sidharth Kaushal) 95 Q 106 (Dr Sidharth Kaushal) 96 Ibid. 97 UK Defence Journal, ‘Russian spy ship off Scottish coast’: https://ukdefencejournal .org.uk/russian-spy-ship-off-scottish-coast [accessed 1 November 2023] 98 Q 115 (Dr Sidharth Kaushal) 99 Ibid. 100 Q 117 (Dr Lee Willett) 101 House of Commons Library, Insight, Seabed warfare: Protecting the UK’s undersea infrastructure (24 May 2023): https://commonslibrary.parliament .uk/seabed-warfare-protecting-the-uks-undersea-infrastructure/ [accessed 1 November 2023] 102 Naval News, First of Two MROS Ships Arrives in the UK (19 January 2023): https://www. navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/first-of-two-mros-ships-arrives-in-the-uk/ [accessed 1 November 2023] 103 Ministry of Defence, Press Release: DE&S purchase specialist ship to protect our undersea cables (19 January 2023): https:// www.gov.uk/government/news/des-purchase-specialist-ship-to- protect-our-underwater-cables [accessed 1 November 2023] 104 Ministry of Defence, Press Release: UK and Norway to increase cooperation on undersea capabilities (18 May 2023): https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/uk-and-norway-to-increase-cooperation-on-undersea- capabilities [accessed 1 November 2023] 105 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ ; In September 2022, the EU said damage to the Nord Stream pipelines, which carried gas from Russia to Germany on the Baltic seabed, was the result of sabotage see: BBC, Nord Stream leaks: Sabotage to blame, says EU (28 September 2022): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63057966 [accessed 1 November 2023]. 106 NATO, ‘NATO and the EU set up taskforce on resilience and critical infrastructure’: https://www .nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_210611.htm [accessed 1 November 2023] 107 NATO, ‘NATO stands up undersea coordination cell’: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211919.htm [accessed 1 November 2023] 108 Q 106 (Dr Sidharth Kaushal) 109 Q 108 (Dr Lee Willett) 110 Ibid. 111 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 112 Written evidence from the Tony Blair Institute ( ARC0013 ) 113 Q 126 (James Heappey MP) 114 Q 151 (Angus Lapsley) 115 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 116 Ibid. 117 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 118 Written evidence from Cornell Overfield and Dr Joshua Tallis ( ARC0011 ) 119 NATO Joint Force Commands are operational-level commands under Allied Command Operations. There are three Joint Force Commands: JFC Brunssum (Netherlands), JFC Naples (Italy) and JFC Norfolk (United States). Established in 2018, JFC Norfolk focuses on the High North and protecting strategic lines of communication across the North Atlantic. 120 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default / 121 Q 152 (Angus Lapsley) 122 ‘Finnish border “pretty empty” of Russian troops’, The Financial Times (14 August 2023): https://www.ft.com/content/f7587dc3-3518–4084-b68a-1dd00ab83e2e [accessed 1 November 2023] 123 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/ publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ 124 Ibid. 125 Q 44 (Prof Katarzyna Zysk) 126 Q 150 (Angus Lapsley) 127 Q 139 (Prof P Whitney Lackenbauer) 128 Q 32 (Lieutenant Commander Dr John Ash) 129 Ibid. 130 Q 39 (Dr Duncan Depledge) 131 Royal Navy, ‘New Arctic operations base for UK commandos’: https:// www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2023/ march/08/230308-campvikingnorway [accessed 1 November 2023] 132 Q 124 (James Heappey MP) 133 Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release: PM accelerates military support to Northern Europe following visit to Sweden (13 October 2023): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-accelerates-military-support-to-northern-europe-following-visit-to-sweden/ [accessed 1 November 2023] 134 Ministry of Defence, The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North (March 2022), p 5: https://www.gov .uk/government/publications/the-uks-defence-contribution-in-the-high -north [accessed 1 November 2023] 135 Q 140 (Prof Michael Byers) 136 Defence Committee, On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic (Twelfth Report, Session 2017–19, HC 388) 137 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 138 Q 123 (James Heappey MP) 139 Select Committee on the Arctic, Responding to a changing Arctic (Report of Session 2014–15, HL Paper 118) 140 Oral evidence taken before the Scottish Affairs Committee inquiry on Defence in Scotland, 5 June 2023 (Session 2022–23), Q 211 (James Heappey MP) 141 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, A/HRC/54/31/ Add.1: Visit to Denmark and Greenland: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (September 2023): https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5431add1-visit-denmark-and-greenland-report-special-rapporteur-rights [accessed 15 November 2023] < Back Next > © Parliamentary copyright 2023 A-Z index Glossary Contact us Freedom of Information Jobs Using this website Copyright Privacy notice Cookie policy Cookie Manager House of Lords - Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic - International Relations and Defence Committee Accessibility Email alerts RSS feeds Contact us Home Parliamentary business MPs, Lords & offices About Parliament Get involved Visiting Education House of Commons House of Lords What's on Bills & legislation Committees Publications & records Parliament TV News Topics Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic Contents Chapter 3: The internationalisation of the Arctic
129
The interest of non-Arctic states in the region is growing, both as a locus of... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The interest of non-Arctic states in the region is growing, both as a locus of climate change research, and as an area of increasing economic activity and potential great power competition. The number of non-Arctic observer states has risen from four in 1998 (including the UK) to 13 as of today. This chapter looks in particular at China’s interest in the Arctic, and also considers the interests of Japan, South Korea and India in the region. The role of China
130
The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh identified China’s deepening partnership with Russia as a development of... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh identified China’s deepening partnership with Russia as a development of particular concern for the UK. 142 One of the areas in which there could be closer Sino-Russian co-operation is in the Arctic. At present, China’s involvement in the Russian Arctic has been focused primarily on joint ventures in the hydrocarbon sector. Russia’s leadership wishes to retain firm control over its sector of the Arctic. However, witnesses suggested that power dynamics could change as a weakened Russia turns East to meet its investment needs, providing China with increased leverage and influence in the region. 143 China’s growing interest in the Arctic
131
China’s interest in the Arctic has increased over the past decade. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
China’s interest in the Arctic has increased over the past decade. In 2013, along with eight other countries, it became an observer state of the Arctic Council. In the same year, it unveiled the concept of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the maritime counterpart to the One Belt One Road initiative, which seeks to expand Chinese investment and export markets.
132
In January 2018, China published its first Arctic policy white paper setting out its ambitions... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In January 2018, China published its first Arctic policy white paper setting out its ambitions in the region, in which it described itself as a “near Arctic state”. 144 The paper devotes substantial attention to the opportunities created by Arctic shipping for increased maritime activity. In the same year, the country launched its first domestically built diesel-powered icebreaker. 145 Russia and China have announced the aim of establishing a “Polar silk road” connecting China with Europe via Russia’s Northern Sea Route as part of China’s wider Belt and Road development initiative. In a speech in Hobart, Australia, in 2014, China’s President Xi Jinping stated that due to “profound changes in the international system” and China’s unprecedented economic development, China would soon be “joining the ranks of the polar great powers”. 146
133
Dr Gørild Heggelund of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute noted that the 2018 white paper had... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Gørild Heggelund of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute noted that the 2018 white paper had sparked widespread speculation regarding China’s intentions in the Arctic. In her view, the paper did not mark a substantial shift in China’s approach. Its primary function was to pull together previously articulated positions and draw a more coherent picture of China’s interests in the region. 147
134
There are divergent views on China’s intentions towards the Arctic and interpretations of China’s official... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
There are divergent views on China’s intentions towards the Arctic and interpretations of China’s official statements regarding the region. Dr Marc Lanteigne, Associate Professor at the University of Tromsø, noted that the notion of China as a “polar great power” ( jidi qiangguo ) can be understood in different ways. The term “power” could be taken as “might” and be understood to include a military aspect. However, in Dr Lanteigne’s view there is also a strong emphasis on China gaining knowledge as a relative newcomer to the region: “The discussion about ‘polar great power’ very much reflects this knowledge gap that China has been trying to fill and this has become much more difficult in the current geostrategic situation, especially with the worsened relations between the West and Russia.” 148
135
Mr Lanteigne told us that China is seeking to increase its involvement in Arctic science... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Mr Lanteigne told us that China is seeking to increase its involvement in Arctic science and research, to take advantage of expanding economic opportunities, including in resource extraction and shipping, and to establish its position as a legitimate actor in the Arctic region. 149 Oliver Gordon-Brown and Ella Startt noted the strong emphasis in China’s white paper on increasing scientific research to support environmental protection. 150
136
We heard that China has been very engaged in gathering data on emerging sea routes... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard that China has been very engaged in gathering data on emerging sea routes in the Arctic. 151 While noting that China’s research initiatives could serve a dual civilian-military use, the RAND Corporation told us that there are benefits to co-operation with China on economic development and climate change “where this is done on and equitable basis and with appropriate safeguards for national security”. 152
137
To date, China has not sought to challenge the governance structures in the Arctic. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
To date, China has not sought to challenge the governance structures in the Arctic. Mr Lanteigne told us: “there has definitely been a concerted effort to avoid any activities that could look overtly like being a spoiler: challenging international law in the Arctic, challenging the Arctic Council.” 153
138
However, Chinese officials have at times framed the Arctic as a space of global significance... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
However, Chinese officials have at times framed the Arctic as a space of global significance or ‘global common’, with the implication that it should have a greater role in the stewardship of its resources. 154 China has the largest distance-water fishing fleet in the world and there are concerns it may start to operate in the central Arctic Ocean in the future as this becomes more accessible to shipping (see also paragraph 190). 155
139
In other regions, China has tended to push back against international norms that it sees... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In other regions, China has tended to push back against international norms that it sees as constraining its interests. Defence analysts in Norway noted that while Russia had an incentive to maintain the current governance arrangements in the Arctic, which broadly favour its interests, the incentives for China to do so were less clear. 156 Chinese interest in shipping routes
140
Shipping routes through the Arctic offer a significantly shorter distance between Chinese ports and European... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Shipping routes through the Arctic offer a significantly shorter distance between Chinese ports and European markets. They also potentially provide a strategic alternative for Chinese ships to avoid maritime chokepoints in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca. 157
141
Captain Anurag Bisen, Research Professor at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Captain Anurag Bisen, Research Professor at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, told us that India was concerned by the strategic implications of China’s access to Arctic maritime routes: “In so far as China is a principal adversary of India, the opening of the Northern Sea Route would mitigate China’s so-called Malacca dilemma to a large extent. It would, therefore, need a re-evaluation of the resultant strategic maritime advantage that India holds”. 158
142
However, the operational challenges and cost of transit shipping through the Northern Sea Route, which... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
However, the operational challenges and cost of transit shipping through the Northern Sea Route, which runs along the northern coast of Russia, remain high (see paragraph 202). Mr Lanteigne cautioned that it was important to distinguish between “the rhetoric, the very high-level conversations between leaders, and what is actually happening, especially on a company-to-company level”. 159 For example, the scale of transit shipping through the Northern Sea Route has been modest to date, not exceeding 25 vessels in any single year. 160 Moreover, Chinese companies are wary of exposure to Western sanctions—in 2022 there were no transits at all through the Northern Sea Route. 161 Mr Lateigne explained: “The main shipping concern in China, COSCO, has in essence said that it is not going to be using the Northern Sea Route for the time being under current geopolitical circumstances.” 162
143
China depends on close co-operation with Russia to transit the Arctic through the Northern Sea... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
China depends on close co-operation with Russia to transit the Arctic through the Northern Sea Route. Mr Lanteigne noted that China’s Arctic white paper referred not only to the Northern Sea Route, which runs along the coast of Russia, but also the central Arctic route, which at present does not exist as an established route and is largely inaccessible to shipping due to ice coverage. 163 There is a long-term risk that Chinese factory trawlers could access North Atlantic and Arctic fishing grounds by going back and forth across the pole—which would have significant ecological impacts and affect local fish stocks. Western push-back
144
Mads Qvist Frederiksen, the director of the Arctic Economic Council, told us that China’s current... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Mads Qvist Frederiksen, the director of the Arctic Economic Council, told us that China’s current economic footprint in the Arctic is limited. He noted that in 2022, the RAND Corporation, a US think tank, sought to map out China’s economic role in the Arctic and concluded there was currently little Chinese investment in the region. 164
145
Arctic states are paying increased attention to the potential dual-use nature of Chinese research and... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Arctic states are paying increased attention to the potential dual-use nature of Chinese research and scientific activity in the Arctic. Experts in Norway told us that the government had “no illusions” about the dual-use potential of Chinese polar research. However, the Norwegian government noted it had robust measures in place to ensure that research centres on Svalbard established by Parties to the Svalbard Treaty were not used for other purposes. 165
146
We heard that there has been a general pushback against Chinese investment by the Arctic... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard that there has been a general pushback against Chinese investment by the Arctic Seven. Mr Lapsley told us that the UK’s Arctic allies are now “very attuned to” the risks posed by China’s employment of dual-use technology. 166 Dr Lanteigne told us that of the many projects that China has put forward over the past five to seven years, “very few of those have come to fruition”. 167 This has reflected both strategic concerns, as well as high costs and environmental risks. 168
147
By contrast, China’s investment in the Russian Arctic has expanded significantly since 2014, when Western... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
By contrast, China’s investment in the Russian Arctic has expanded significantly since 2014, when Western sanctions were first imposed on parts of the Russian oil and gas sector. China is the leading foreign investor in the development of major hydrocarbon projects in Russia’s Arctic. In January 2014, CNODC, a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corporation, became a 20% stakeholder in Yamal LNG, a giant gas field in northwest Siberia. 169 In 2019, China’s CNOOC and CNODC each acquired a 10% stake in Arctic LNG 2 on the Gyda peninsula in Siberia. For the moment, Western sanctions have led the companies to suspend their involvement in the project. Nevertheless, many witnesses expected Russia’s economic isolation from the West to lead to greater Chinese involvement in the Arctic in the future. Prof Dodds also noted that it was likely there would be greater investment in the development of Russia’s Arctic energy resources by countries from the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. 170 The importance of the Sino-Russian relationship
148
Several of our witnesses emphasised that China’s approach to the Arctic would be determined by... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Several of our witnesses emphasised that China’s approach to the Arctic would be determined by how its relationship with Russia develops in the coming decades.
149
The Russia-China bilateral relationship has deepened as both countries’ relations with the West have become... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Russia-China bilateral relationship has deepened as both countries’ relations with the West have become more adversarial. In February 2022, shortly before the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that the friendship between the two states had “no limits” and there were “no ‘forbidden’ areas of co-operation”. 171
150
The Sino-Russian partnership is likely to become increasingly asymmetric. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Sino-Russian partnership is likely to become increasingly asymmetric. Western sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine have increased the country’s dependence on China as a supplier of technology and finance. Captain Bisen highlighted the strengthening of the trade relationship between Russia and China: “The trade between Russia and the share of rouble and yuan mutual commission transactions has now risen to 65% and continues to grow. The bilateral trade has grown by 30% in 2022, setting a new record of $185 billion and aiming to surpass $200 billion in 2023. This is a real cause of concern.” 172
151
During a visit to Russia in March 2023, President Xi and President Putin discussed greater... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
During a visit to Russia in March 2023, President Xi and President Putin discussed greater collaboration in the Arctic, including increased investment in hydrocarbon projects on the Yamal peninsula. 173 Meetings between governors of northern Russian regions and Chinese officials and business leaders have intensified since the visit. 174
152
In the view of Prof Dodds, China could in future push for a greater presence... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In the view of Prof Dodds, China could in future push for a greater presence in the Russian Arctic: “One of the ‘no limits’ for China might be that it becomes an increasingly assertive polar power, which would include activity in the Arctic. Russia then potentially has a very difficult trade-off between needing China and, at the same time, jealously guarding the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. I would say that we need to look carefully at how that relationship develops in the coming years.” 175
153
This view was echoed by Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
This view was echoed by Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who told us that: “The other question in those calculations and in terms of whether there is a bill to pay in Moscow for Chinese support for Russia generally over Ukraine is whether that would involve at some point a renewed request—and it has been reported that requests have been made in the past—for China to have port access and greater naval access from Russian bases in the Arctic.” 176
154
We heard that at present there is no evidence of China seeking to establish a... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard that at present there is no evidence of China seeking to establish a hard power presence into the Arctic. Mathieu Boulègue told us that to date China is “testing the water” with soft-security operations, such as co-operation with Russia on search and rescue and joint constabulary operations. 177
155
Dr Elana Wilson Rowe of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs noted that if Russia... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Dr Elana Wilson Rowe of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs noted that if Russia and China’s co-operation in the Arctic moved from the economic realm into the security realm, this would be a “game-changing moment” and this is a dynamic that must be closely tracked. 178 She observed that there was at present a “very small accumulation of datapoints” of Sino-Russian security co-operation in the Arctic. For example, in September 2022 the US Coast Guard encountered Russian and Chinese military vessels in the US EEZ in the Bering Sea. 179
156
Many stakeholders we spoke to on our visit to Norway and Finland drew attention to... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Many stakeholders we spoke to on our visit to Norway and Finland drew attention to the April 2023 Russia-China memorandum of understanding on strengthening maritime law enforcement co-operation between the Chinese Coast Guard and the FSB Border Guard Service (Russia’s border guards and coastguard are under the authority of the FSB, the internal security service). 180 To date, there has not been any Chinese military or coastguard activity in the European Arctic. Any Chinese military or coastguard presence in the Barents Sea would be perceived by the European Arctic states as a serious security challenge. 181
157
Mr Lapsley noted that building military forces that could successfully operate in the region would... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Mr Lapsley noted that building military forces that could successfully operate in the region would represent a major challenge for China. He observed that: “We know that they have an aspiration generally to make themselves a more powerful Arctic nation, to build their presence. Whether that translates at some point into wanting to project hard military power into the region we do not know yet, but we certainly should keep an eye on it.” 182
158
China is rapidly developing its nuclear potential. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
China is rapidly developing its nuclear potential. The Arctic Ocean represents the shortest missile flight trajectory as well as submarine passage between China and North America. 183 Dr Ash told us that by deploying ballistic missile submarines in the Arctic, China could enlarge the number of targets it could hit and could use the Arctic environment to compensate for the relatively high noise signature of its Type 094 submarines. 184 Mr Lapsley suggested China could at some point seek to follow Russia in using the Arctic as a bastion for its nuclear forces, although there is currently no evidence that this has taken place. 185 Cornell Overfield and Dr Joshua Tallis told us that defence strategists affiliated with the Chinese military have stressed the Arctic’s value as a haven for submarines. 186
159
The UK Government sees China as an “epoch-defining challenge” to the international order. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government sees China as an “epoch-defining challenge” to the international order. In the Arctic, however, it appears China has so far sought to work within the Arctic’s existing governance framework. That can change quickly.
160
China has shown a strong interest in contributing to polar research and environmental protection in... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
China has shown a strong interest in contributing to polar research and environmental protection in the region. The UK should continue to engage with China on scientific research and climate change issues as they relate to the Arctic, where possible, while remaining vigilant regarding the dual civilian-military use of some research activities.
161
Concerns regarding Chinese strategic investment in the Arctic and its long-term intentions in the region... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Concerns regarding Chinese strategic investment in the Arctic and its long-term intentions in the region are legitimate . At present, China’s economic presence in the Arctic outside Russia is small and the Arctic Seven have grown more cautious regarding the strategic implications of Chinese investment. Investment decisions are matters for the individual Arctic states to decide. There is, therefore, only a limited role for the UK to play beyond sharing relevant intelligence and working with partners to ensure there are clear alternatives to Chinese technology and financing .
162
The UK Government is correct to identify the deepening partnership between Russia and China as... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Government is correct to identify the deepening partnership between Russia and China as an area of particular concern to the UK and its allies. One region where the deepening partnership may manifest itself is the Arctic.
163
It is essential that the UK Government pays close attention to Sino -Russian collaboration in... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
It is essential that the UK Government pays close attention to Sino -Russian collaboration in the Arctic. UK scenario planning should consider the possibility that China could in the future seek to establish a military presence in the Arctic. This would represent a significant strategic challenge to the West. Other East Asian countries with Arctic interests
164
Like the UK, Japan and South Korea’s Arctic strategies put strong emphasis on their contribution... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Like the UK, Japan and South Korea’s Arctic strategies put strong emphasis on their contribution to polar research and science diplomacy.
165
We heard from Dr Aki Tonami, Associate Professor at the University of Tsukuba, that Japan... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard from Dr Aki Tonami, Associate Professor at the University of Tsukuba, that Japan is eager to build up its involvement in Arctic research to replicate the success of science diplomacy in the Antarctic. 187 Like the UK, the Korean government is eager to maintain the Arctic as an area of low tension and high co-operation. 188 Dr Hyoung Chul Shin, Vice President of the Korea Polar Research Institute, told us that the major objectives of Korea’s polar activity plan included improving the mapping of the Arctic, joining international scientific efforts, environmental protection, and participating in sustainable economic development. 189
166
Korea has a large shipbuilding sector and provided ice-capable vessels to a number of customers,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Korea has a large shipbuilding sector and provided ice-capable vessels to a number of customers, including in Russia. Korea’s private sector has shown a clear interest in the development of Arctic maritime routes, should they become commercially viable, and Korean ships have conducted trial voyages through the Northern Sea Route. By contrast, Japanese policymakers do not currently see the development of Arctic maritime routes as important for Japan’s export economy. Nonetheless, like other East Asian states, Japan would like to “stay in the game” should transit routes become economically viable in the future. 190
167
As a major energy importer, the development of Arctic resources remains important for Japan. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
As a major energy importer, the development of Arctic resources remains important for Japan. Despite its tense relations with Russia, Japan’s Mitsui and Mitsubishi have retained a 22.5% combined stake in Russia’s Sakhalin 2 LNG project. 191
168
Prof Dodds told us that the UK should strengthen its relationships with other Arctic Council... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Prof Dodds told us that the UK should strengthen its relationships with other Arctic Council observer states such as Germany, Japan and South Korea with which the UK has shared interests in the region to consolidate a “coalition of the willing and able in Arctic matters”. 192 The Scott Polar Research Institute at the University of Cambridge also told us that the UK could increase its influence in the Arctic by expanding its diplomatic and strategic relations with Arctic Council Permanent Observer states in East Asia and South-East Asia. 193 India—an emergent power with an Arctic strategy
169
India became an observer at the Arctic Council in 2013, the same year as China,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
India became an observer at the Arctic Council in 2013, the same year as China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore. It published its first public Arctic policy in 2013. India is a contracting party to the Svalbard Treaty and is the only developing country aside from China that operates a research station on Svalbard. 194 Captain Anurag Bisen told us that maintaining scientific research in the Arctic was a policy priority. He told us that the pause in scientific co-operation with Russia represents a “great setback to global climate change mitigation efforts”. 195
170
India’s priorities include building partnerships with all stakeholders in the region, upholding international law and... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
India’s priorities include building partnerships with all stakeholders in the region, upholding international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as it applies to the Arctic, participating actively in climate change and environmental treaty frameworks relating to the Arctic, and promoting co-operation and scientific exchange with Arctic nations. 196
171
India sees the Arctic region as an important future source of energy and resources and... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
India sees the Arctic region as an important future source of energy and resources and its co-operation with Russia in the development and export of hydrocarbons has grown rapidly. Captain Bisen noted that Russia is India’s single largest destination for foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector. 197
172
We heard that, like the Arctic Seven, India is concerned about Russia’s deepening relationship with... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard that, like the Arctic Seven, India is concerned about Russia’s deepening relationship with China, including in the Arctic and it has an interest in preventing a strong Sino-Russian partnership. 198 Captain Bisen explained: “The Arctic presents India with a very complex set of opportunities as well as challenges. I am saying so because two of India’s closest strategic partners are Arctic nations—Russia and the United States—as is India’s principal adversary, China. All three of them are locked in a strategic contest. It is a complex situation for India.” 199
173
India is keen to develop and extend a north-south transport corridor in collaboration with Russia... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
India is keen to develop and extend a north-south transport corridor in collaboration with Russia and Iran (and others) to rival China’s Polar Silk Road. The corridor spans 7,200 kilometres through a network of roads, ships and railways running from Mumbai to St Petersburg via the Caspian Sea, with a potential extension to the Arctic. Nima Khorrami, a Research Associate at The Arctic Institute, explained that India’s interest in the corridor was motivated “by both strategic and status/prestige competition between the two Asian giants”. 200
174
As a non-Arctic state, the UK’s influence in the Arctic depends on strong diplomacy and... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
As a non-Arctic state, the UK’s influence in the Arctic depends on strong diplomacy and coalition-building, and it should seek to expand co-operation with other observer states on the Arctic Council on matters of shared interest. However, it should do this in a way that does not undermine existing governance structures. In particular, the notion of the primacy of the Arctic states in Arctic governance should be maintained. 142 Cabinet Office, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world (13 March 2023), p 30: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh -2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world [accessed 1 November 2023]. The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 updated the UK Government’s security, defence, development and foreign policy priorities to reflect changes in the global context since the Integrated Review 2021 . 143 Q 7 (Prof Klaus Dodds) 144 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy (26 January 2018): https://english .www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm [accessed 1 November 2023] 145 ‘China Launches Domestically-Built “Xue Long 2” Icebreaker’, High North News (11 September 2018): https ://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-launches-domestically-built-xue-long -2-icebreaker [accessed 1 November 2023] 146 Anne Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp 1–2 147 Q 93 (Dr Gørild Heggelund) 148 Q 93 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 149 Ibid. 150 Written evidence from Oliver Gordon-Brown and Ella Startt ( ARC0015 ) 151 Q 94 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 152 Written evidence from the RAND Corporation ( ARC0008 ) 153 Q101 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 154 Q 48 (Mathieu Boulègue) and Q 70 (Dr Elana Wilson Rowe) 155 ‘How China Targets the Global Fish Supply’, The New York Times (26 September 2022): https://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america. html [accessed 1 November 2023] 156 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ 157 Written evidence from Nima Khorrami ( ARC0002 ) 158 Q 106 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 159 Q 102 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 160 Q 97 (Dr Gørild Heggelund) 161 Written evidence from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change ( ARC0013 ). While Chinese vessels have not used the Northern Sea Route since 2022, Russia had relied on one ice-class tanker to deliver Russian oil to China. This August, it granted permission for two unreinforced Russian tankers to navigate the route. See also paragraph 201 in this report. 162 Q 102 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 163 Q 98 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 164 Q 76 (Mads Qvist Frederiksen) and RAND Corporation, China’s Strategy and Activities in the Arctic (December 2022), p 17: https://www. rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html [accessed 1 November 2023] 165 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees. parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ 166 Q 156 (Angus Lapsley) 167 Q 97 (Dr Marc Lanteigne) 168 Ibid. 169 The current shareholders are Novatek (50.1%), Total (20%), CNPC (20%), and Silk Road Fund (9.9%), see: Yamal LNG, About the Project (2015): http://yamallng.ru/ en/project/about/ [accessed 1 November 2023]. 170 Q 7 (Prof Klaus Dodds) 171 Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development (4 February 2022): http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 [accessed 1 November 2023] 172 Q 109 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 173 Ibid. 174 ‘Russian Arctic regions strengthen bonds with Beijing’, The Barents Observer (20 September 2023): https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/09/ russian-arctic-regions-strengthen-bonds-beijing [accessed 1 November 2023] 175 Q 7 (Prof Klaus Dodds) 176 Q 47 (Nick Childs) 177 Q 49 (Mathieu Boulègue) 178 Q 70 (Dr Elana Wilson Rowe) 179 Q 70 (Dr Elana Wilson Rowe); written evidence from Prof Gisele Arruda and Dr Marko Filijović ( ARC0009 ); Naval News, USCG Encounters Russian and Chinese Military Vessels in Bering Sea (27 September 2022): https://www.navalnews .com/naval-news/2022/09/uscg-encounters-russian-and-chinese-military -vessels-in-bering-sea/ [accessed 1 November 2023] 180 ‘FSB signs maritime security cooperation with China in Murmansk’, The Barents Observer (25 April 2023): https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/ 2023/04/fsb-signs-maritime-security-cooperation-china-murmansk [accessed 1 November 2023] 181 International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘Arctic Inquiry: Norway and Finland visit 4–8 September’, September 2023: https://committees. parliament.uk/publications/41558/documents/204655/default/ 182 Q 156 (Angus Lapsley) 183 Q 109 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 184 Q 29 (Lieutenant Commander Dr John Ash) 185 Q 155 (Angus Lapsley) 186 Written evidence from Cornell Overfield and Dr Joshua Tallis ( ARC0011 ) 187 Q 105 (Dr Aki Tonami) 188 Q 108 (Dr Hyoung Chul Shin) 189 Q 105 (Dr Hyoung Chul Shin) 190 Q 106 (Dr Aki Tonami) 191 Q 107 (Dr Aki Tonami) 192 Q 15 (Prof Klaus Dodds) 193 Written evidence from the Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge ( ARC0010 ) 194 Q 105 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 195 Q 108 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 196 Q 105 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 197 Q 107 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 198 Q 109 (Captain Anurag Bisen); written evidence from Nima Khorrami ( ARC0002 ) 199 Q 109 (Captain Anurag Bisen) 200 Written evidence from Nima Khorrami ( ARC0002 ) < Back Next > © Parliamentary copyright 2023 A-Z index Glossary Contact us Freedom of Information Jobs Using this website Copyright Privacy notice Cookie policy Cookie Manager House of Lords - Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic - International Relations and Defence Committee Accessibility Email alerts RSS feeds Contact us Home Parliamentary business MPs, Lords & offices About Parliament Get involved Visiting Education House of Commons House of Lords What's on Bills & legislation Committees Publications & records Parliament TV News Topics Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic Contents Chapter 4: Prospects and impacts of growing economic activity in the Arctic
175
Economic activity in the Arctic is not a new phenomenon. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Economic activity in the Arctic is not a new phenomenon. The economic exploitation of Arctic resources through coal mining, sealing and whaling has been conducted for decades, and in some cases for centuries. 201 Fishing in the Arctic has been practiced for over 1,000 years and remains one of the region’s most important industries. 202
176
The Arctic currently accounts for a small share of the world economy, estimated at $615... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic currently accounts for a small share of the world economy, estimated at $615 billion in 2018 (at purchasing power parity), or 0.7% of global output. Russia accounts for around three quarters of this output. 203 The UK and other Western companies have extensively divested from Russia’s economy since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, particularly in extractive sectors. This Chapter primarily focuses on the economic prospects in the non-Russian Arctic.
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Economic activity in the Arctic is centred on fishing, marine transport, tourism, oil and gas,... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Economic activity in the Arctic is centred on fishing, marine transport, tourism, oil and gas, and other mineral extraction. The Arctic also plays an increasingly important role in the communication sector, as the region is the most efficient location to receive data from satellites in a polar orbit. 204 The region has the potential to become a significant source of critical minerals needed to produce battery cells and other components for the green transition. 205
178
A warming Arctic means that previously inaccessible maritime regions may open up to economic activity. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
A warming Arctic means that previously inaccessible maritime regions may open up to economic activity. We heard from several witnesses, however, that the region would nevertheless remain a challenging environment in which to operate. Consequently, a substantial increase in economic activity is not guaranteed. Prof Dodds cautioned: “One thing that is very clear when you speak, for example, to business, industry or shipping representatives is that there is often a cautionary note: ‘Please don’t think that a warming Arctic makes the operating environment any easier, safer, or somehow cheaper. That is simply not the case.’” 206
179
The Arctic is heterogenous and the picture of economic prospects across the Arctic is not... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Arctic is heterogenous and the picture of economic prospects across the Arctic is not uniform. For example, Greenland, Sweden, Canada, and Alaska all have large known deposits of critical minerals, but different regulatory approaches determining their extraction. The prospects for shipping, often cited as a key growth sector due to retreating sea ice, also vary. While the waters along the Northern Sea Route and the Transpolar Sea Route may become more navigable, we heard that shipping prospects in Canada’s Arctic waters are limited “and will be for the foreseeable future”. 207 In addition, each Arctic country will have its own domestic priorities and approaches to dealing with environmental concerns and the interests of local Arctic communities. The interests of Arctic communities themselves are not uniform and there are often disparate views about what projects should go ahead in local areas. How the various priorities and interests are balanced will determine the extent to which a sector may be able to gain a foothold or expand. Shipping in the Arctic
180
Notwithstanding these caveats, reduced ice coverage is leading to an increase in shipping traffic in... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Notwithstanding these caveats, reduced ice coverage is leading to an increase in shipping traffic in the Arctic. A 2016 comparative analysis of shipping volumes published found that the Arctic accounted for over 9% of global shipping in 2014. 208 The Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment monitors Arctic ship traffic trends. It found that between 2013 and 2019 the number of ships entering the Arctic region grew by 25%, from 1,298 ships to 1,628 ships. The total distance sailed by those ships grew from 6.51 million nautical miles in 2013 to 9.5 million nautical miles in 2019. 209
181
The UK Chamber of Shipping told us that “projections, although highly variable, suggest growth might... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK Chamber of Shipping told us that “projections, although highly variable, suggest growth might increase as much as 50% from 2012 levels by 2050”. 210 While this would mark a significant increase in maritime activity in the region, a broad shift from existing trade routes appears unlikely. The UK Chamber of Shipping told us that: “while climate change will enhance the Arctic’s navigability, it is unlikely to revolutionise global maritime trade to the extent as has been speculated.” 211
182
Maritime activity is concentrated in the EEZs of Norway (63% of all unique ship days),... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Maritime activity is concentrated in the EEZs of Norway (63% of all unique ship days), Russia and Iceland (15–16% each). At present, the volume of shipping in the Arctic High Seas beyond the jurisdiction of the Arctic states (the central Arctic Ocean) remains low and the number of unique ship days was flat over the 2013–19 period. Figure 3: Arctic EEZs and international waters of the central Arctic Ocean Source: Environmental Audit Committee, The UK and the Arctic Environment (Sixth Report, Session 2022–23, HC 1141) and Patricia Derepentigny et al, ‘Increased Transnational Sea Ice Transport Between Neighboring Arctic States in the 21st Century’, Earth’s Future, vol 8(3), March 2020: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339802745_Increased_Transnational_Sea_Ice_Transport_Between_Neighboring_Arctic_States_in_the_21_st_Century [accessed 17 November 2023]
183
There are four key types of civilian shipping activity in the Arctic: fishing; tourism; transit... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
There are four key types of civilian shipping activity in the Arctic: fishing; tourism; transit shipping, which carries cargo through the Arctic between ports in Asia, Europe, and North America; and cargo-based destination shipping, which carries goods to and from Arctic ports. Prospects for increased commercial fishing
184
As with other economic activity in the Arctic, the growth of fishing is currently constrained... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
As with other economic activity in the Arctic, the growth of fishing is currently constrained by ice coverage and the challenges of operating in a harsh environment with limited search and rescue facilities. Commercial fishing is concentrated in the Bering and Barents Seas and is of huge economic significance to Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Alaska. 212 There is currently no commercial fishing in the international waters of the central Arctic Ocean, which historically has been covered by ice. However, that ice is melting and there are now parts that are ice-free and accessible to specialised vessels during the summer. This raises the prospect of commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean in the decades to come.
185
We heard that one of the potential impacts of ocean warming will be a move... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
We heard that one of the potential impacts of ocean warming will be a move northward of profitable fish stocks, such as cod, mackerel or pollock. This is already being observed further south. In evidence to our previous inquiry into UNCLOS, we were told that “climate-induced changes have affected the distribution of the mackerel so that it is now also found in the EEZ of Iceland and on the high seas”. 213
186
Changes in stock distribution can have economic and food security implications, which in turn can... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Changes in stock distribution can have economic and food security implications, which in turn can lead to international tensions. Mackerel stocks, for example, used to be managed co-operatively by the EU, the Faroe Islands and Norway, but “the former trilateral arrangement has become outdated” and no effective arrangement to replace it has been agreed. 214 Dr Ásgeirsdóttir, Professor at Bates College, Maine and National Science Foundation Arctic Scholar at the University of Iceland, noted that existing agreements tend to collapse when the distribution of fish stocks changes and that this could lead to conflict, even among allies. 215
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There is uncertainty over where exactly particular fish stocks will congregate in the future, but... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
There is uncertainty over where exactly particular fish stocks will congregate in the future, but as they are pushed north, they will likely move into the international waters of the central Arctic Ocean. There is further uncertainty over what fish species live in the central Arctic Ocean already, whether they may be of commercial interest, and how existing ecosystems would be affected by the migration of fish from waters to the south.
188
In 2018, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, the Republic of... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
In 2018, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the EU signed the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (also known as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement). This has introduced a 16-year commercial fishing moratorium, with a mechanism to extend the agreement in five-year increments from 2037 unless one or more Parties object to the extension. The UK ceased to be a party to the agreement when it left the European Union in January 2020. The FCDO told us that the UK Government is committed to joining the Agreement “at the earliest opportunity”. 216 In order to accede the UK must be invited by existing Parties to the Agreement, however this process has not yet been “fully elaborated”. The FCDO explained that the Government is continuing to engage with the Parties to the Agreement on the UK’s ambition to join. 217
189
While there appears to be no pressure, at the moment, for fishing to take place... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
While there appears to be no pressure, at the moment, for fishing to take place in the central Arctic Ocean, this is largely because “it is so incredibly remote and dangerous” and there is “scientific uncertainty” over fish stocks. 218 Yet this could change with increased accessibility, and the sunset clause in the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement implicitly acknowledges that possibility.
190
Although a signatory to the Agreement, we heard concerns that China could allow the Central... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Although a signatory to the Agreement, we heard concerns that China could allow the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement to lapse once the ice cap over the central Arctic Ocean has receded, enabling its fishing vessels to operate in the international waters of the Arctic. China has the largest distance-water fishing fleet in the world and consumes more than a third of the world’s fish. 219 Dr Dalee Sambo Dorough, Arctic Region member of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, told us she was concerned that China regarded the Arctic as a frontier for resource extraction: “We worry that China and their research program are geared toward waiting out the current moratorium on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean and its expiration, seeking to actively exploit the resources for their own food security and benefit.” 220 Box 3: Management of fish stocks Arctic states are responsible for managing fish stocks in their EEZs, but co-operate with each other to manage straddling fish stocks and those in the high seas. UNCLOS provides the legal framework for doing this. Under the Straddling Stocks Agreement 221 (the second implementing agreement to UNCLOS), fisheries that straddle EEZs and those in the high seas are managed by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). 222 In the Arctic, the three main RFMOs are: the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), which has a mandate over the North-East Atlantic sector; the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), which covers areas in the north western parts of the Atlantic Ocean; and the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC), covering the North Pacific area. The UK is a member of both NEAFC and NAFO.
191
The UK has a direct interest in the sustainable management of Arctic fish stocks. Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK has a direct interest in the sustainable management of Arctic fish stocks. In evidence to the House of Commons’ Environmental Audit Sub-Committee on Polar Research, Jane Sandell, CEO of UK Fisheries Ltd, explained: “The Arctic catch in 2019 constituted around 10% of the fish that went into British fish and chip shops, which sounds quite small but is actually massive. The context is that we need to look at food security… We have had long-term relationships in the area and it is important to the economy and to our cultural heritage, particularly for somewhere like Hull and particularly when we need high-quality jobs in the area.” 223
192
Fishing and the sustainable management of fish stocks in the Arctic is of direct interest... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Fishing and the sustainable management of fish stocks in the Arctic is of direct interest to the UK.
193
Due to the size of its fishing fleet and reliance on fish and seafood to... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Due to the size of its fishing fleet and reliance on fish and seafood to feed its population, it is imperative that China is included in, and adheres to , current and future Arctic marine conservation regimes.
194
The UK should continue to advocate for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the Arctic... Recommendation Recommendation (the committee's words)
The UK should continue to advocate for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the Arctic Ocean. We urge the Government to re-join the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean at the first opportunity. In the meantime , and as a signal of its commitment, the UK should make a unilateral declaration stating that it will abide by the Agreement’s fishing moratorium, pending accession. In response to this report, we ask the Government to set out the steps it is taking to clarify with the Parties the Agreement’s accession process and timeline for joining.
195
The UK should collaborate in international fora on Arctic fisheries management to ensure the long-term... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK should collaborate in international fora on Arctic fisheries management to ensure the long-term sustainability of Arctic fish stocks and thus safeguard food security. Cruise tourism—a growing industry
196
Fishing accounts for most of the recorded shipping activity in the Arctic (41% of all... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Fishing accounts for most of the recorded shipping activity in the Arctic (41% of all ships), but Arctic tourism is growing. Data from the Arctic Council’s 2020 report, The Economy of the North , shows that cruise passengers in the Arctic increased by over a third between 2016 and 2019 to more than 2 million passengers. 224 A total of 74 passenger cruise ships entered the Arctic in 2019, compared with 62 in 2013. 225
197
The central Arctic Ocean remains one of the remotest parts of the Arctic, but Mr... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
The central Arctic Ocean remains one of the remotest parts of the Arctic, but Mr Burgess told us that improvements in commercial ice-breaker technology have opened it for the first time to tourism. We heard that in the summer of 2021 the first purpose-built tourist ship, Le Commandant Charcot reached the North Pole. The boat has a higher polar classification, PC-2, and is a stronger icebreaker than many state-owned research vessels. 226 Although the number of sailings is very limited and, at a cost of £35,000+ per person, this is not mass tourism, it illustrates how technology advancements can make the most remote parts of the Arctic accessible. Prospects for transit shipping in the Arctic
198
There are two established routes for transit shipping through the Arctic—the Northwest Passage, which runs... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
There are two established routes for transit shipping through the Arctic—the Northwest Passage, which runs along the top of North America, and the Northeast Passage which runs predominantly along Russia’s northern coast. The route along the Northeast Passage is often interchangeably referred to as the Northern Sea Route, although the Northern Sea Route is technically a part of the Northeast Passage and defined in Russian law as running from the entrances to the Novaya Zemlya straits in the west to Cape Zhelaniya on the Bering Strait. 227 Figure 4: Arctic transit sea routes Source: Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, ‘Arctic Seaways’: https://www.arcticcentre. org/EN/arcticregion/Maps/Seaways [accessed 1 November 2023]
199
Transit through the Northwest Passage is limited as ice coverage is more extensive than in... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
Transit through the Northwest Passage is limited as ice coverage is more extensive than in the Northeast Passage and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Rising temperatures are increasing the number of icebergs calved from glaciers and these are only adding to the already treacherous conditions. 228 Furthermore, shallow waters make the route less navigable and limit the size and load of ships. 229
200
By contrast, cargo transit through the Northeast Passage offers the potential of significantly shortening shipping... Conclusion Conclusion (the committee's words)
By contrast, cargo transit through the Northeast Passage offers the potential of significantly shortening shipping routes between East Asia and Europe. For example, the difference in distance between the ports of Rotterdam and Yokohama going through the Northern Sea Route as opposed to the Suez canal is 37%. 230 Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route has grown almost five times over the five years to 2020, reaching 35 million tons in 2021. 231 In 2021, the insurance broker Allianz estimated cargo traffic could increase to 100 million tons by 2030. 232