Manchester Arena Inquiry

A clean start should be possible when a student moves from school to college or higher education, such that it would not be appropriate for a general file on significant behavioural problems to follow them at that point. However, there may still be value in passing on a record of any behaviour that is assessed to indicate vulnerability to radicalisation. I recommend that the Department for Education consider whether this is workable and, as with the school record, what nature of incident and level of seriousness should be included in this kind of record.

In a Cabinet Office dashboard update in February 2026, the Department for Education stated that implementation remained in progress, having analysed sector views on Keeping Children Safe in Education guidance, but noted it still needed to discuss detailed proposals with ministers while "awaiting broader steers" on the government's approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

All ambulance service trusts should consider appointing a person within their control rooms who, in the event of a Major Incident, has the sole role of gathering and collating all available information and intelligence, and sharing it internally and externally to the extent appropriate.

The Inquiry asked ambulance trusts to consider appointing dedicated control room intelligence collators. The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that all ambulance trusts have processes to share information between emergency services control rooms and are utilising guidance to implement best practice, stating that the recommendation "can be marked as complete" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Appointing dedicated intelligence collators is not mentioned in the update (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

All ambulance service trusts should undertake training and exercising with neighbouring ambulance service trusts to ensure that cross-border support is efficient and effective.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that implementation was in progress, noting that mutual aid is already a specific requirement for interoperable capabilities within the NHS emergency preparedness framework (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added in February 2026 that further work remained to specifically include training and exercising with neighbouring organisations for wider responders, with exercising to be incorporated into plans covered by emergency core standards assured annually by NHS trusts (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

All fire and rescue services should consider appointing a person within their control rooms who, in the event of a Major Incident, has the sole role of gathering and collating all available information and intelligence, and sharing it internally and externally to the extent appropriate.

The Inquiry asked fire and rescue services to appoint control room intelligence collators. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that 64 percent of 50 responding fire and rescue services (FRS) had completed the recommendation (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that actions taken included establishing operations rooms alongside control rooms and supplementing staff with flexi duty officers as single points of contact during major incidents (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

All North West Fire Control staff should be trained on the best practices for responding to a Major Incident, as identified through its participation in exercises. North West Fire Control should ensure that learning is kept under review.

The Inquiry recommended that all North West Fire Control staff receive major incident training. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that major incident training and awareness for control room staff was "progressing well", with many services routinely incorporating control staff into training plans and response exercises (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The update refers to control room services generally, while North West Fire Control specifically and keeping learning under review are not mentioned in the sources (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

All police services should ensure that they have made adequate provision for Airwave Tactical Advisors, in particular that an identified Airwave Tactical Advisor is either on duty or on call at all times.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery remained in progress, noting that there were approximately 700 Airwave tactical advisors across the three emergency services (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that revised national guidance on training and testing was launched in August 2024, alongside regular testing of shared radio talk groups and alignment with the Emergency Services Mobile Communication Programme (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

All police services should ensure that they have robust version control arrangements in place for all plans.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress, stating that a third version of the tri-service Joint Operating Principles had been produced and signed off (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that this guidance incorporates operational learning across multiple response areas and is reviewed annually to ensure ongoing relevance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Ambulance service trusts should review their capacity to respond to a mass casualty incident. That should include an assessment of whether they have an adequate number of trained specialist personnel to respond effectively to a mass casualty incident.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, stating that ambulance trusts had submitted bids to their lead commissioners and NHS England had reviewed these against the EPRR Core Standards assurance process (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had provided that same progress update in November 2025 (Cabinet Office, Nov 2025). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

A Protect Duty, as set out above, should be enacted into law by primary legislation.

In April 2026, the Home Office published statutory guidance stating that the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025 is subject to an implementation period of at least 24 months from Royal Assent to fully establish the SIA as regulator and allow those in scope to prepare, noting that there is no legal requirement to comply until commencement (Home Office, Apr 2026). The Cabinet Office previously recorded in February 2026 that the legislation received Royal Assent on 3 April 2025 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

A significant issue in a mass casualty situation is that all of those paramedics who have arrived in ambulances may be required for the treatment of casualties, so that no paramedic is available to drive patients to hospital. The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider how to resolve that problem. Consideration should be given to the training of other emergency service personnel in driving ambulances.

In a February 2026 update, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress with a revised timeline to 2027, explaining that the CRMI group had agreed to the delay in view of resource constraints and would focus initially on casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

As of September 2020, all primary and secondary school pupils were required to be taught health education, including first aid, as part of the National Curriculum. This involves children aged over 12 being taught CPR. This is necessary. The Department for Education should ensure that it continues.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery of the recommendation was completed, stating that there were "no plans to stop statutory health education as part of the national curriculum, including first aid and CPR", and that guidance was under review for a consultation process (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in its November 2025 response (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

British Transport Police should ensure that all its Inspectors are trained to undertake the Bronze Commander role in the event of a Major Incident.

The Inquiry recommended that British Transport Police train all its Inspectors as Bronze Commanders. In a February 2026 update published by the Cabinet Office, the force reported that it completed two-day Major Incident command training for all Inspectors in March 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added that it had launched an additional Hydra course to consolidate the training, with all trained officers rostered to attend (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

British Transport Police should ensure that all its Sergeants are trained in what is required of a Bronze Commander in the event of a Major Incident. This will help to make sure that the first Sergeant on scene can undertake the initial steps in the emergency response, prior to the arrival of an Inspector.

The Inquiry recommended that British Transport Police train all sergeants in Bronze Commander duties. In a dashboard update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the force stated that in March 2024 it completed two-day major incident command training for all sergeants and inspectors (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added that it had moved on to roster all trained personnel for a follow-up Hydra course to consolidate the training (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

British Transport Police should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

The Inquiry recommended that British Transport Police improve its Major Incident record-making. In a dashboard update in February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the CLIO decision-making system was in place across the force and had been tested during Golden Orb (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The update described introducing the decision-making system, but record-making during and immediately following a major incident was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

British Transport Police should review its procedures to ensure the prompt appointment of a Bronze Commander during a Major Incident.

The Inquiry recommended reviewing procedures to ensure prompt Bronze Commander appointments. In a Cabinet Office update published in February 2026, British Transport Police stated that the recommendation was complete after all Sergeants, Inspectors, and Chief Inspectors finished two-day Major Incident Command training in March 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added that a Major Incident Hydra course was launched in September to consolidate this training, though reviewing procedures for Bronze Commander appointments was not mentioned in the update (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

British Transport Police should work with the Home Office police services with which it shares policing responsibilities at or for a particular location: a. to agree which police service has primacy in the event of a Major Incident; b. to put in place appropriate plans to make clear the responsibilities of each police service in the event of a Major Incident; c. to conduct regular exercises, including joint exercises, to test those plans; and d. to ensure that all police officers and police staff are adequately trained in what will be required of them.

The Inquiry recommended British Transport Police (BTP) coordinate major incident planning with local forces. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office pointed to new national command guidance but stated that the force's jurisdiction is "too extensive to have bespoke agreements in place for all stations and track", describing work on command arrangements while joint exercises and staff training are not mentioned in the sources (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government recorded that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

BTP and all Home Office Police Services should conduct a review of the areas in which their jurisdictions overlap. In the case of areas which have a significant footfall by members of the public which are not part of the railway estate, a review should be conducted by both BTP and the Home Office Police Services. Following the review, agreement as to primacy should be reached and recorded in writing.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, recording that all Home Office police forces with high-footfall locations had signed memorandums of understanding with British Transport Police detailing jurisdiction and primacy (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that agreements with Greater Manchester Police, West Yorkshire Police, and Hertfordshire Constabulary were stored electronically in control rooms and on an operational application, with refresh dates and owners identified (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

BTP should address the systemic failings identified in Volume 1, so as to ensure that they are not repeated.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the British Transport Police considered the recommendation complete, noting that "All 37 deliverables are now complete" under the SABRE project team covering recommendations MR3 and MR9 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). This maintained the position recorded in November 2025, when the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full and also reported those deliverables finished (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Consideration should also be given by those organisations to the provision of such equipment to key personnel within control rooms.

In a February 2026 update on its recommendations dashboard, the Cabinet Office reported that implementation remained in progress, stating that it was "awaiting further data from services regarding their provision as per recommendation 85" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that once this data had been received, it would publish the compliance rate (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Consideration should be given to whether contractors who carried out security services should be required to be licenced.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, following a written answer that month from Dan Jarvis, Minister of State for Security, noting that the Home Office had launched a public consultation on licensing security businesses (Dan Jarvis, Feb 2026; Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In June 2026, the Security Industry Authority stated in its strategic plan that it was ready to implement any changes approved by the government to make business licensing mandatory following that consultation (Security Industry Authority, Jun 2026).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should ensure that all firearms officers, including firearms commanders, receive adequate training in Operation Plato, including in what such a declaration means and the demands it will place upon them. This should include instruction in the importance of zoning, communicating zoning decisions to other emergency services and joint working with those other services in the course of the response to an Operation Plato situation.

In a February 2026 update published on the Cabinet Office dashboard, the addressees recorded the recommendation as completed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The update stated that revised and refreshed training for strategic firearms command, cadre tactical firearms commanders, and operational firearms commanders had been implemented nationally, and that the work strand was closed via NPCC governance in May 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should ensure that all unarmed frontline police officers receive training in what Operation Plato is and what will be expected of them following such a declaration. The training should include the importance of zoning, the identification of who can ordinarily work in different zones and the importance of joint working.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported on its dashboard that new e-learning modules preparing frontline officers and supervisors for threat-related incidents were live, stating that "this work strand is now complete" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Relaying an update from the National Police Chiefs' Council, it noted that the strand would be submitted for closure through governance in December 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should issue guidance on the circumstances in which a police officer or officers with responsibility for the tactical/silver command of the unarmed officers at the scene or scenes of a Major Incident should deploy to that scene or scenes.

The Inquiry recommended guidance on when silver commanders should deploy to major incident scenes. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the emergency services had signed off Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) Version 3 for responding to marauding terrorist attacks (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that the document covers areas including mobilisation, communication, and scene assessment, though guidance on silver command deployment to the scene was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation had been accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should review the advantages and disadvantages of a combined Silver and Gold Control Room as opposed to separate rooms, and issue guidance for all police services on best practice.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the review of approved professional practice was complete and updated guidance was launched to forces in April 2024, though the recommendation remained in progress (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that the continuing development of new command and control guidance might result in further updates to civil contingencies guidance to ensure alignment (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the evidence heard during the Inquiry, including that heard in restricted sessions, to consider the advantages and disadvantages of embedding doctors with some police firearms teams, and how, if that is advantageous, it could be achieved.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress, with a working group established to take forward work identified in the Clinical Response to Major Incidents review (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted in February 2026 that this work included embedding medics within police firearms teams and that the team was considering practice across Europe, including France's RAID team (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the experience of other jurisdictions that embed medics with police firearms officers, such as Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion (RAID) in France, to understand how their systems operate and whether they ought to be replicated in the UK or some further learning taken from them.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation remained in progress, with a working group established to consider embedding medics within police firearms teams and review practice across Europe including the French RAID team (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The group was taking forward work identified in the Clinical Response to Major Incidents review and was due to report back in the summer of 2025 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the procedures by which it is notified of a terrorist attack to ensure that all police services know that this is an early priority.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office recorded the recommendation as completed on its monitoring dashboard, stating that "this recommendation is high in compliance" and highlighting progress such as multi-agency briefings and the sharing of risk information and intelligence (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when an earlier dashboard update also listed it as completed (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Each emergency service should ensure that it is represented at a senior level at every meeting of a local resilience forum.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation on senior emergency service representation remained in progress, stating that "Guidance has been issued by the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) Portfolio instructing them regarding this recommendation" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, at which point the department had also recorded the measure as in progress with identical wording (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Each police service must ensure that adequate time is allocated to the training of all police officers and frontline police staff in first responder interventions.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported the recommendation as completed, stating that a revised First Aid Learning Programme incorporating life-saving elements was published to forces in summer 2023, with full implementation expected in spring or summer 2025 and work closed through NPCC governance in May 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had earlier recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Given the broad command responsibilities that the Force Duty Officer or Force Incident Manager will have in the early stages of the response to a Major Incident, the Home Office and the College of Policing should develop nationally accredited training to prepare those officers for that role.

The Inquiry recommended nationally accredited training for Force Duty Officers and Force Incident Managers. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Force Incident Manager curriculum, accreditation processes, and guidance had been finalised for central delivery by the College of Policing (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that training was scheduled to go live in spring 2025 and the work strand had been closed through National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) governance in May 2024, though the update did not mention Force Duty Officers (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The Southport Inquiry noted in April 2026 that decision-making principles for threat to life situations are addressed across police training, including the Force Incident Manager course (Sir Adrian Fulford, Apr 2026).

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Fire Control should conduct a joint review of the circumstances in which it is appropriate for Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service personnel to check the North West Fire Control incident log. Policies should be written by both organisations to reflect the outcome of this review. Training should be delivered to embed it into practice.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that delivery remained in progress, noting that "a high number of Fire and Rescue Services are reporting steady progress in this area" by using technology to provide live information between control rooms and incidents (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had recorded that same update in November 2025, when the UK Government confirmed that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should ensure that its commanders are adequately trained in the use of operational discretion.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that delivery remained in progress, explaining that operational discretion was being reviewed nationally and commanders continued to operate under National Operational Guidance pending any revisions (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded the same update in November 2025, when the UK Government confirmed that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

The Inquiry asked Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service to improve major incident record-making. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the use of body-worn video cameras was becoming more prevalent across fire and rescue services, while trained loggists and routine documentation such as command and decision logs were also widely in use (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the United Kingdom Government recorded that the recommendation was "accepted in full" (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should review its guidance and policies on how it receives and passes on information during a Major Incident. It is important that, for any update given, it is established when the last time the person receiving the update was provided with information, to ensure that they are completely up to date.

The Inquiry asked Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service to review its information sharing guidance. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that positive examples were being shared regarding alerting systems, such as Blackberry Athoc, to allow quick sharing of emergency information, though the update did not mention reviewing guidance and policies or establishing when recipients were last provided with updates (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government recorded that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should review the policy by which the Incident Commander takes up the role, in light of the shortcomings I have identified in the policy in operation on 22nd May 2017.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress, stating that UK fire and rescue services adopt a national incident command structure based on National Operational Guidance alongside formalised command qualifications and competencies (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when this same progress update was first recorded (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Police should ensure that its plans for responding to a Major Incident, including a terrorist incident, are reviewed regularly by those with the appropriate skills and experience to make meaningful improvements to each plan. This must include a regular review of the Operation Plato plan, which must include obtaining the views of those with experience of firearms policing and of performing the role of Force Duty Officer.

The Inquiry recommended that Greater Manchester Police regularly review its major incident plans. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the force manages its major incident plan through a specialist team, with updates reviewed quarterly by subject matter experts (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated that the force also reviews its Operation Plato plan quarterly alongside a firearms governance unit, though obtaining views from Force Duty Officers was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Police should ensure that its role cards are always immediately accessible to the officers who are to perform those roles.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, relaying a National Police Chiefs' Council update that a new operational and tactical commander training curriculum had been agreed for local delivery across winter 2024 and would be underpinned by approved professional practice (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously recorded its response to the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Police should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

The Inquiry asked Greater Manchester Police to review and improve major incident record-making. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the force directs commanders and officers in key roles to record their actions, decisions, and rationale using body-worn video, digital encrypted dictaphones, or loggists on the Clio database (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It also stated that the force's major incident plan directs commanders to record evidential statements, and that a Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters review had concluded, with the work strand closed through multi-agency governance in September 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Police should review its Operation Plato plans to ensure that there is only a single plan to which all can work and that this plan gives clear and consistent guidance on how to respond to an Operation Plato incident.

In February 2026, Greater Manchester Police reported via the Cabinet Office dashboard that the recommendation was completed, stating that its Operation Plato Marauding Terrorist Attack Overall Plan is the only plan that exists within the force (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The force noted that this plan incorporates role cards providing clear guidance during an incident and that strict version control prevents responders from accessing superseded versions (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Greater Manchester Police's Major Incident Plan should be reviewed to ensure that it includes clear guidance on the capabilities of Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, including its Specialist Response Team, as well as on the importance of joint working.

The Inquiry recommended that Greater Manchester Police's major incident plan include fire service capabilities. Relaying progress in February 2026, the Cabinet Office stated that the plan includes a section written by Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service on its capabilities and specialist assets, including the Specialist Response Team (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added that this text, containing guidance for commanders and responders, was reviewed by the fire service and the Greater Manchester Blue Light Working Group ahead of publishing the next plan (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Guidance on the importance of joint working is not mentioned in the update (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

Greater Manchester Police's Major Incident Plan should be reviewed to ensure that it includes clear guidance on the capabilities of North West Ambulance Service, including its Hazardous Area Response Team, Ambulance Intervention Team and Special Operations Response Team, as well as on the importance of joint working.

The Inquiry recommended that Greater Manchester Police include ambulance capabilities in its major incident plan. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the force's plan includes a section on Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) capabilities written by the service and reviewed with the Greater Manchester Blue Light Working Group, though North West Ambulance Service (NWAS), its specialist teams, and joint working are not mentioned in the sources (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

SMG should review its processes to ensure that it shares with Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, British Transport Police and North West Ambulance Service its most current emergency response plans and policies for dealing with an incident at the Arena. It should apply this approach more generally to its operations.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, stating that 64 percent of responding fire and rescue services had completed related measures, including establishing operations rooms and providing flexi duty officers as single points of contact during major incidents (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Guidance should be provided to event healthcare providers, to emergency service responders other than paramedics and to the public generally about the circumstances in which those who are believed to be dead should be covered. The guidance should make clear that this step should only be taken by a paramedic or other healthcare professional. The guidance should also make clear that paramedics at the scene of a mass casualty incident should inform others present that only healthcare professionals should cover those believed to be dead. The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should provide guidance addressing this important issue.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress, noting that Ten Second Triage had been introduced for first responders at major incident scenes (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In that February 2026 update, the department stated that labels identify casualties as not breathing rather than deceased, noting that "Triage of casualties as deceased will only be performed by healthcare responders" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Having carried out that review, the trusts should make recommendations to their NHS commissioners about the additional and/or different resources they require in order to ensure that they are able to respond effectively to a mass casualty incident in the numbers required.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work was in progress following ambulance trusts' reviews and submissions of resource bids to their lead commissioners (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated in February 2026 that NHS England and the NHS Resilience Emergency Capabilities Unit were establishing a working group to review and prioritise bid content for consideration by the Department of Health and Social Care (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In the same February 2026 update, it noted that emerging insights from the 2025 to 2026 contracting round indicated "limited evidence of additional funding from commissioners" to date (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should take steps to ensure that all police services have in place effective systems for the prompt deployment of explosives detection dogs in circumstances in which such animals are needed.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation had been completed and closed, stating that Chief Constables agreed the availability of explosive ordnance disposal dogs at the National Chiefs Council and that this was included in the Strategic Policing Requirement (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing and the Home Office should issue guidance for all police services on how often operational plans for responding to a Major Incident, including a terrorist incident, should be reviewed, how that review should be conducted, and what rank and experience the officers involved should have.

The Inquiry recommended issuing guidance to police services on reviewing Major Incident operational plans. The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the three services had signed off Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) Version 3, which is reviewed annually and applies to marauding terrorist attacks, but the department did not mention guidance on review frequency, review conduct, or officer rank and experience for police plans (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing and the Home Office should work together to put in place robust systems, policies and guidance to ensure that all police services have sufficient resources dedicated to the development of operational and contingency plans, particularly for responding to Major Incidents, including terrorist attacks.

The Inquiry recommended ensuring police services dedicate sufficient resources to operational planning. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that while each police service is operationally responsible for resourcing, new approved professional practice (APP) guidance was being developed to support forces (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that the guidance was in the latter stages of development to align with civil contingencies standards and underpin training, aiming for consultation in spring and a launch in summer 2025, though systems and policies were not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

If the decision is that the regulatory regime should be altered in this way, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider urgently whether the use of such analgesia should be rolled out to all Hazardous Area Response Team and other specialist operatives, as part of their basic equipment, and to paramedics more generally.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery remained in progress, stating that once regulatory requirements are confirmed, the proposal is to roll out analgesia "in a phased approach" as more evidence is reviewed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that confirming regulatory requirements and reviewing evidence across patient groups remain outstanding before rollout can proceed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, having initially set out this phased plan (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Improvements, to the extent that they have not already been made, should be made at the Arena to address the failings identified in Volume 1. Specific consideration should be given to how to address my concerns in relation to complacency.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, noting that the Arena and all SMG venues had appointed dedicated security managers and adopted a risk assessment toolkit (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated in February 2026 that the operator had introduced a digital system to monitor patrols in real time to guard against complacency, added reporting reminders to pre-event briefings, and mandated Action Counters Terrorism training for all staff (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government previously recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Improvements, to the extent that they have not already been made, should be made by Showsec to address the failings identified in Volume 1. Specific consideration should be given to how to address my concerns in relation to complacency.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that work on the recommendation was completed, stating that Showsec requires all staff to complete ACT Security training, annual refresher courses, and pre-event counter-terrorism briefings (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added that new staff at Manchester Arena must undergo an in-person venue familiarisation session before their first shift (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). To address complacency, the department stated that the company introduced a system asking staff on each shift whether they observed hostile reconnaissance, adopted digital logging at the arena, and expanded supervisor training (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

In 2021, the Commission for Countering Extremism published a report entitled Operating with Impunity. Hateful Extremism: The Need for a Legal Framework. I recommend that the Home Office consider and respond to this document as a matter of urgency.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the action was complete, noting that a counter-extremism review had concluded and the Commission for Countering Extremism's report helped inform its findings (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that recommendations from the review were being considered and that the government would continue to work closely with the Commission to determine its approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the Crown Prosecution Service establish a written protocol in relation to its approach to any application from an inquiry Chairman for a section 35 prosecution to be taken over under section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, stating that published Crown Prosecution Service guidance confirms an inquiry chairman can ask the service to take over proceedings under section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the measure in full in November 2025, when the department first recorded this position (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the Department for Education consider whether schools should include notes of any significant behavioural problems on the Common Transfer File, or some other suitable new form of record which follows a student if they move school. The focus should be on any behaviour that may be indicative of violent extremism, such as physical aggression or misogynistic conduct. This kind of behaviour is consistent with the development of a violent extremist mindset, but is not necessarily an indication of it by any means. Details as to what nature of incident and level of seriousness should be included in such a record will therefore require careful thought by the Department for Education, alongside consultation with relevant stakeholders.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Department for Education's work on the recommendation remained in progress (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated in February 2026 that it had analysed sector responses to a call for evidence on statutory safeguarding guidance to inform its proposed approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted in the same February 2026 update that it still needed to take a detailed submission to ministers and was awaiting broader government steers on the guidance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

I recommend that the Home Office consider introducing a system based on a robust assessment of the risk a prisoner poses for radicalisation of others. This system should allow for proportionate restrictions to be applied to visitors to that person. Controls such as prohibiting vulnerable visitors where justified or ensuring conversations are supervised should be among the options available in the case of a prisoner who poses a particular risk to others.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation was complete following the rollout of the Enhanced Contact Vetting Scheme in June 2025 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted in that February 2026 update that the scheme limits all terrorist prisoners to 20 social contacts and requires identification checks alongside counter-terrorism police vetting (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded in November 2025 that the government accepted the recommendation in full, while introducing enhanced monitoring of communications and increased vetting checks for high-risk prisoners (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the scheme be codified, and clear policy and guidance be published so that it can be applied consistently across the prison estate.

The Cabinet Office stated in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, noting that the Authorised Communications Controls and Interception Policy Framework was published in September 2022 to provide rules and guidance across prisons and Young Offenders Institutions (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In the same February 2026 update, it added that HM Prison and Probation Service had established a National Counter Terrorism Communications Centre to monitor authorised phone communications and conduct vetting checks for high-risk prisoners (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

I recommend to all educational establishments and the Department for Education that images of school pupils or college students handling firearms, explosives or other weapons that come to the attention of staff be recorded as a potential indicator of violent extremism, unless there is a very clear innocent explanation, so that this can be taken into account in any assessment of vulnerability to radicalisation.

The Cabinet Office stated in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, reporting that it had analysed sector responses after it "utilised the existing call for evidence" on the Keeping Children Safe in Education statutory guidance to inform its response (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It had given the same progress update in November 2025, when it also recorded the status as complete (Cabinet Office, Nov 2025). The UK Government originally accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Local resilience forums have a vital role in the preparation for the response to any Major Incident. The Cabinet Office and the Home Office should consider implementing an independent inspection regime for local resilience forums.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress, noting that the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government was preparing proposals for a new peer review protocol for local resilience forums (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department first stated that it hoped to begin testing the protocol later in 2025/26 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

Local resilience forums should establish procedures to ensure that they oversee the process of identifying the lessons to be learned from major exercises, or serious incidents, in their areas, and that they are responsible for overseeing the debriefing of those events.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation was completed, noting that all 38 English Local Resilience Forums had confirmed in December 2023 that they have systems in place to identify lessons from multi-agency exercises and ensure changes are implemented (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It recommended closing the recommendation to business as usual, with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government continuing oversight through routine processes, forum meeting attendance, and future assurance work (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

Local resilience forums should monitor attendance and participation at their meetings, and flag promptly any concerns about attendance by members to the leadership of the organisation concerned. The Home Office should ensure that this is being done by local resilience forums.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In that February 2026 update, it stated that five local resilience forums in England had been selected for a trailblazer programme to test models of strengthening forum accountability, leadership and assurance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, in November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

NaCTSO should create a centralised library of training materials.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that this recommendation was complete, stating that the ProtectUK platform had been created and populated with guidance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department noted that the platform continues to evolve and adapt to meet different user needs and respond to new legislative or policy requirements, such as the Protect Duty (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

NaCTSO should issue guidance in relation to the completion of risk assessments addressing the threat of terrorism.

The Cabinet Office stated in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, reporting that the Risk Management Process had been uploaded to ProtectUK, although it noted that "the process is currently being reviewed and aligned to ISO" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in its response dashboard in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should ensure that all its site-specific plans are multi-agency and that all Category 1 responders operating in the areas it serves have contributed to them.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that processes had been strengthened for capturing and sharing learning from events and related planning (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Building upon these improvements, new national guidance was being developed to cover partnership planning, engagement with safety advisory groups, and the sharing of emergency plans across tri-service and wider partners (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

North West Ambulance Service should ensure that it has a policy that sets out the circumstances in which an Operational Commander may be relieved and how that should occur and be communicated to the outgoing Operational Commander and beyond.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported on behalf of the North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust that the recommendation was completed, recording that "A new process to capture these scenarios has been included in the North West Ambulance Service Incident Response Plan" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when an earlier dashboard update also listed the status as completed with the same policy addition (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should ensure that it has up-to-date site-specific plans for all large, complex or high-risk locations within its area.

A Cabinet Office update in February 2026 recorded the recommendation as completed, stating that site-specific plans had been reviewed, updated, and shared on an internal ambulance service system and on Resilience Direct (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that the plans are reviewed on a cycle of one to three years, while new national events guidance was being developed to support partnership planning and information sharing (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

North West Ambulance Service should ensure that its commanders are adequately trained in the use of operational discretion.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, stating that North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust had updated the Incident Response Plan and trained it through annual commander training (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added that the trust had invested in a command training team to focus on all levels of command training (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). This followed the UK Government's acceptance of the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should ensure that non-specialist ambulance personnel are involved in multi-agency exercising.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that delivery by North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust remained in progress, noting that multi-agency exercises already included some non-specialist ambulance personnel alongside a new recording system for attendees (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added in February 2026 that wider work to include non-specialist frontline staff in multi-agency training was continuing as service pressures allowed, and delivery would be marked green once exercise planning and personnel inclusion were complete (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

The Inquiry asked the North West Ambulance Service to improve its major incident record-making. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that record taking had been reviewed and the Incident Response Plan updated with new record processes (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated that Body Worn Video Camera (BWVC) equipment had become available to all commanders, National Interagency Liaison Officer (NILO) personnel, and Emergency Operational Centre staff to allow recording and logging of incidents (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review how it rosters Tactical Advisors and National Interagency Liaison Officers so as to ensure that there is adequate geographical coverage enabling those on duty to arrive promptly at the scene of any Major Incident.

The Inquiry asked for a review of ambulance tactical advisor rostering and coverage. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that investment by North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) will increase its National Interagency Liaison Officers (NILOs) from 12 to 21, ensuring three are on call to improve geographical coverage (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that the trust removed the title Tactical Advisors in October 2023, with liaison officers providing the role following discussions with the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review its Major Incident Response Plan to consider whether, in order to speed up mobilisation, it should provide pre-determined attendances for the Hazardous Area Response Team, Ambulance Intervention Team and Special Operations Response Team crews for Major Incidents.

The Inquiry asked North West Ambulance Service to consider predetermined attendances for specialist teams. In a February 2026 update published by the Cabinet Office, it stated that predetermined attendance includes Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) and specialist resources such as Special Operations Response Teams, and that the trust's Incident Response Plan had been updated with action cards, though the Ambulance Intervention Team is not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review its Major Incident Response Plan to consider whether it should be updated to include a pre-determined attendance for Major Incidents.

The Inquiry asked North West Ambulance Service to consider predetermined attendance for major incidents. In an update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the trust stated that it had introduced a Predetermined Attendance (PDA) in January 2021 before the Inquiry's report was released, noting that this is mandated through its Incident Response Plan (IRP), embedded in annual commander training, displayed in the Emergency Operations Centre, and used effectively in exercises (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review its Major Incident Response Plan to make clear that the first resource on scene should assume the role of Operational Commander only once they have achieved situational awareness.

The Inquiry asked North West Ambulance Service to clarify when responders assume operational command. In a progress update published in February 2026, the Cabinet Office stated that the service's Incident Response Plan and action cards reflect that, subject to a dynamic risk assessment, first resources should obtain situational awareness prior to assuming the role of Operational Commander (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded that it had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review its policies for mobilising the Hazardous Area Response Team resource, to ensure that this team is available as soon as possible for an emergency where its specialist skills are required.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust had completed the recommendation, noting that it had updated its Incident Response Plan, reviewed procedures within its Emergency Operation Centre, and established a specialist Complex Incident Hub to assist in coordinating specialist resources (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government had previously recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review its procedures with local NHS trusts to ensure that it has effective policies in place for quickly dispatching patients injured in a Major Incident to an appropriate hospital.

The Inquiry asked North West Ambulance Service to review its major incident hospital dispatch procedures. In an update published in February 2026, the Cabinet Office relayed that the trust, in partnership with National Health Service (NHS) England North West, reviewed and updated the Mass Casualty Distribution Plan to produce version 1.4, which went live in July 2023 and is owned by the regional body, though reviewing procedures with local hospital trusts was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the United Kingdom Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should review the number of Tactical Advisors and National Interagency Liaison Officers it has, and whether the number of such specialists, both generally and on call, should be increased.

In a Cabinet Office dashboard update in February 2026, North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust recorded the recommendation as completed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that investment would increase its National Interagency Liaison Officers from 12 to 21, with 17 in post by November 2023 to expand rota and geographical coverage (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It also noted that it had removed the title of Tactical Advisor in October 2023, assigning those duties to liaison officers following executive approval and dialogue with the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Ambulance Service should train its Operational Commanders on the appropriate practice for relieving another of command and being relieved of command.

Reporting through the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust recorded the recommendation as completed, stating that the practice is "included in North West Ambulance Service annual commander training and exercises" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the trust initially reported that same training position (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

North West Fire Control should ensure that it regularly tests how it operates, by ensuring that its staff participate in regular exercises and practical tests. These should include multi-agency exercises.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work was in progress, stating that a "good rhythm being reported across the country" was building on the culture of testing and exercising through tri-service exercises and Local Resilience Forums (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department recorded the same update (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

North West Fire Control should reflect on its approach to record-making during and immediately following a Major Incident, with a view to improving the current practice.

The Inquiry asked North West Fire Control to improve its major incident record-making. The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that across 50 responding fire and rescue services (FRS), 60 percent had completed the recommendation while two services had not started (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that submitted evidence included reviews of major incident plans, contemporaneous note keeping, decision logging, control room fire standards, and debriefing, though the service is not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Fire Control should review how it allocates the best-trained and most suitable Control Room Operators to roles during a Major Incident. It should consider whether it is beneficial to allocate a Control Room Operator to monitor communications on a multi-agency control room talk group and another Control Room Operator as the specific point of contact for the fire and rescue service. Both roles could be supervised by a Team Leader.

The Inquiry recommended that North West Fire Control review operator allocations during major incidents. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that "steady progress is being made" but noted this was largely influenced by different operational and resourcing models across control rooms (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The update did not mention the suggested roles for monitoring multi-agency communications or acting as fire service contact points (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

North West Fire Control should review its guidance and policies on how it receives and passes on information during a Major Incident. It is important that, for any update given, it is established when the last time the person receiving the update was provided with information, to ensure that they are completely up to date.

The Inquiry recommended that North West Fire Control review its major incident information policies. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported high compliance, stating that services were evidencing progress through multi-agency hailing groups, Airwave network talk groups, and developing electronic recording practices, though it did not mention establishing when an update recipient was last provided with information (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). This reiterated an update published by the department in November 2025, when the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

North West Fire Control should review the way it captures and records key information on its incident logs in order to ensure that the information is stored in one place and is readily accessible at all times by those who need it.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that work remained in progress, noting that control room operations vary across the country but all have technology, such as bespoke software and voice recordings, to log key information and share it with partners and responding teams (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department recorded an identical progress update (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

North West Fire Control should take steps to ensure that it is involved in multi-agency exercises, particularly those that test mobilisation and the response to a Major Incident in line with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).

The Inquiry recommended that North West Fire Control participate in multi-agency exercises. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that a Central Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) team provides assurance for emergency service control rooms and that local groups support exercising, though the department did not mention North West Fire Control (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government confirmed in November 2025 that it accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

SMG should ensure that the healthcare service provider at the Arena has adequate staffing and skill levels for every event at that location.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, noting that SMG's Arena medical plan outlines the staffing levels allocated to each event following individual risk assessments (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In the same update, the department stated that the healthcare provider uses an electronic rostering system that checks skills before staff are rostered, backed by monthly dip sample testing by the venue operator (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

SMG should ensure that the healthcare service provider at the Arena has a strong working relationship with North West Ambulance Service.

In a February 2026 progress update published by the Cabinet Office, the addressees reported that the recommendation was completed, explaining that SMG had agreed a medical plan with the North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust covering equipment, staffing levels, and major incident protocols, alongside hosting monthly meetings and annual reviews (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

SMG should review its approach to the provision of healthcare service equipment at the Arena to ensure that adequate equipment is always available.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that SMG considered the recommendation completed, following a review of its healthcare service equipment at Manchester Arena (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated in that February 2026 update that required supplies are detailed in the Arena medical plan, stock is checked before each event alongside monthly stocktakes, and venue staff are trained to use accessible tourniquets (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation had been accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

That standard needs to be regulated and enforced. The Care Quality Commission is the appropriate body to provide regulation and enforcement. The Department of Health and Social Care should give urgent consideration to making the necessary changes in the law to enable the Care Quality Commission to become the regulator for this sector.

In September 2026, Dame Diana Johnson, Minister of State at the Department of Health and Social Care, stated that new rules bring event healthcare at sporting and cultural events, sports grounds, and gymnasiums under the regulation of the Care Quality Commission (Dame Diana Johnson, Sep 2026). Baroness Merron, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the department, stated in June 2026 that registration begins in September 2026, followed by a 15-month transition period before the regulations come into force (Baroness Merron, Jun 2026).

The College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should ensure that all firearms officers are trained to understand that, while their primary role in an Operation Plato situation is to neutralise any armed terrorist, their role also involves providing Care Under Fire.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, explaining that the armed policing first aid training module had been rewritten to ensure armed officers deliver appropriate first aid during tactical situations with ongoing firearms threats (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added in February 2026 that the revised training was launched to forces in winter 2024 for delivery across armed policing teams, and that the work strand was closed via NPCC governance in May 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review whether firearms officers should be deployed with analgesia and trained in its use, as part of providing Care Under Fire.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress, with 20 police forces having officers trained in administering analgesia, predominantly Penthrox (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that national guidance from the NPCC Clinical Panel had undergone consultation and would be published shortly, though analgesia deployment remains a force-level decision under local clinical governance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added that all public-facing officers and staff were now trained in non-pharmacological pain management techniques under the new First Aid Learning Package (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should take steps to ensure that each police service establishes a hotline that enables those within the command structure of the three emergency services to make contact with the Force Duty Officer in the event of a declaration of Operation Plato.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that a third version of the Joint Operating Principles had been produced and signed off across the emergency services to incorporate inquiry learning (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department first recorded that progress update (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The College of Policing and His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that each police service has in place a system that means appropriately qualified and experienced personnel are rostered 24 hours each day so that, in the event of a terrorist attack or any Major Incident, a prepared and effective command structure can be geared up swiftly.

The Inquiry recommended ensuring continuous qualified command rostering across all police services. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA) initial response contingency planning guidance was in place, covering command resilience for firearms, tactical, and strategic command functions (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that this guidance would undergo annual assurance processes, with a new Command and Control Authorised Professional Practice (APP) still under development, though 24-hour rostering across police services was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The College of Policing should assess whether delays in the provision of written accounts by some firearms officers involved in the response to the Attack were due to Post-Incident Procedures. If so, those procedures should be reviewed.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office recorded the recommendation as completed on its monitoring dashboard, stating that the armed policing review relating to post-incident procedures was closed with no update required (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the dashboard also logged the review as closed (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The College of Policing should consider whether the current process for maintaining and storing training records for all police officers can be improved. That should include assessing the following: a. the introduction of electronic training records in a standard form across all police services; b. the introduction of centrally held electronic training records for all police officers; and c. the introduction of a system whereby each police officer is required to view their record each year and identify any errors or omissions within it.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress to establish a unique reference number centrally held by the College of Policing to record training across forces, adding that while early-stage feasibility scoping was complete, delivery remained within longer-term timescales due to the need for a considerable transformation approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The College of Policing should issue guidance to all police services to ensure the following, in the event of a Major Incident: a. The Force Duty Officer is not expected to deal with media enquiries. b. The important task of ensuring that the media is kept informed is done in a way that does not interfere with the work of the police control room.

The Inquiry recommended that guidance ensure Force Duty Officers do not handle media enquiries. In a progress update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) reported that guidance had been issued to forces in spring 2023 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The update noted that feedback helped the College of Policing finalise a Force Incident Manager (FIM) training curriculum for delivery from spring 2025, with both work strands closed under NPCC governance in May 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). However, neither the training details nor the guidance mentioned media enquiries or police control room interference (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The College of Policing, the Fire Service College and National Fire Chiefs Council should consider devising training packages for operators within control rooms, to enable them to give guidance on basic trauma care to 999 callers.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, noting that the National Police Chiefs' Council had updated its contact management national curriculum to incorporate all guidance and set the national standard (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In the same February 2026 update, the department stated that it was awaiting further data from services regarding their provision before publishing the compliance rate (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The Department for Education should consider extending the National Curriculum to ensure that pupils, once of an appropriate age, receive education in all first responder interventions.

In a February 2026 update published by the Cabinet Office, the Department for Education recorded the recommendation as completed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated that statutory health education had included first aid and CPR since 2020, and that guidance was under review with plans for "adding further content in this space" during an autumn 2024 consultation process (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in its November 2025 response (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should review the guidance given to all licensing authorities on the decisions they make in relation to venues that hold events, and on what level of event healthcare services may be required at the events likely to be held at those venues. The guidance should indicate appropriate licence conditions to be used. The licensing authorities should then impose conditions accordingly or make those standards a requirement of meeting existing conditions.

The Cabinet Office recorded the recommendation as complete in February 2026, reporting that section 182 guidance accompanying the Licensing Act 2003 had been updated to include further information and an annex of resources on event healthcare provision (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that wider work continues through a Department of Health and Social Care task and finish group, which includes Home Office officials, covering a set of related longer-term recommendations (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the Care Quality Commission should consider introducing guidelines to ensure that all event healthcare staff who work at events are trained in first responder interventions.

In a February 2026 update published by the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care stated that work on the recommendation was in progress, with a review of current standards complete and the resulting standard "due to be published in 2026" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had earlier recorded in its November 2025 response dashboard that it accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) should consider urgently whether the regulatory regime should be altered to enable analgesia, such as fentanyl lozenges or sufentanil sublingual tablets, to be given by paramedics to injured persons.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Department of Health and Social Care was "drafting the consultation document for proposed legislative changes on analgesia" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025). In August 2025, the department had proposed adding oral transmucosal, intranasal, and intravenous fentanyl to take forward the inquiry's recommendations (Department of Health and Social Care, Aug 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider ensuring that there is further training of HART personnel so that at least one member on every HART deployment has the ability to deliver the most enhanced care interventions.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that this recommendation remained in progress under an NHS England task and finish group (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated in the same February 2026 update that the group agreed a "revised timeline to 2027" because of resource constraints while reviewing competencies along the patient pathway, including training for HART personnel (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider the scope of the role of an Ambulance Liaison Officer and issue guidance to ambulance services in that regard.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that it is being considered as part of work to develop a healthcare standard for events (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that research projects were complete and drafting of the standard had begun, with the role to be included during scoping and writing where appropriate (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System is fit for purpose and, if it is, whether it can be improved. Particular consideration should be given to how the system prioritises emergency calls.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, stating that the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System "has been reviewed and is fit for the purpose for which it was designed" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when earlier dashboard monitoring similarly recorded the review as completed (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether the Basic Life Support and Advanced Life Support bags used by paramedics should contain SMART Triage Tags or an equivalent.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that the CRMI group met to agree a "revision to timelines in view of resource constraints" with a revised timeline to 2027 and an initial focus on casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop a system for ensuring that the duty command structure in each ambulance service has notice of any significant pre-planned event, such as a major concert or sports match, taking place within the ambulance service area.

The Cabinet Office stated in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, reporting that individual ambulance trusts already had processes in place to notify staff of pre-planned events although this was "variable across the country", and that work on a separate Event Healthcare Standard was taking the recommendation into account regarding information sharing by Safety Advisory Groups (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop procedures to ensure that, so far as possible, each ambulance service trust is able to deploy or call upon HART resources immediately in the event of a Major Incident. As part of that, the Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop procedures to ensure that, so far as possible, each ambulance service trust can call upon cross-border support in respect of HART resources immediately in the event of a Major Incident. There may be some incidents that are so significant that an individual ambulance service will need to mobilise its own HART resources and also draw upon cross-border support. Procedures need to accommodate this.

The Inquiry recommended procedures ensuring immediate deployment of Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART). The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that ambulance services are required under emergency preparedness standards to mobilise four HART personnel within 15 minutes and six within 10 minutes of confirmed need (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that organisations must maintain a 30-minute notice to move across the country following an endorsed mutual aid request (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that procedures are developed and implemented and are monitored through assurance processes, enabling resources to deploy as recommended (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The United Kingdom Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should ensure that all ambulance commanders receive regular Major Incident training. The training should include training on HART capabilities, on all the command roles and where they will be located, on how to gain situational awareness through the deployment of sector commanders and other roles, on the importance of getting ambulance personnel to casualties without delay and on the circumstances in which they may use operational discretion.

The Inquiry recommended that ambulance commanders receive regular Major Incident training. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that command training is covered under the National Health Service (NHS) Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience (EPRR) Framework and that the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU) has produced additional command guidance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that operational discretion requires further development and NHS England is reviewing training, though topics including Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) capabilities, command roles, and rapid casualty access were not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The report noted that work will remain ongoing because this training forms part of continuous professional development (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should review whether stretchers should be carried on National Capability Mass Casualty Equipment Vehicles.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, recording that the "Roll out of (new) Mass Casualty Vehicles complete" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). This followed the UK Government's response in November 2025 accepting the recommendation in full, alongside an earlier update published that same month by the department that also marked the work as completed (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care should consider issuing guidance on the first aid equipment that event providers should have available on the relevant premises, as well as where that equipment should be stored to ensure that it is readily accessible when required and how often it should be checked to ensure that it is up to date and in good working order.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that action by the Department of Health and Social Care remained in progress, noting that equipment guidance would be considered during scoping stages for "developing a healthcare standard for events" and progressed through work with NaCTSO on Public Access Trauma Kits (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care should establish the standard for the level of healthcare services required at events. Consideration should be given to putting that standard on a statutory footing.

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care reported via the Cabinet Office dashboard that work remained in progress, stating that "a programme has been established and a number of steps are complete" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, at which point the department similarly reported that the programme had been established (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care should give urgent and close consideration to any recommendations made by the trusts and the NHS commissioners.

In an update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care recorded the recommendation as completed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that recommendations "would not usually come from Ambulance Trusts or Commissioners, but through NHS England or established workstreams", adding that annual mandate letters set expectations and that it considers recommendations where appropriate (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care should take steps to ensure that Public Access Trauma kits contain the equipment that is necessary to enable first responder interventions to be undertaken.

In a progress update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care reported that the contents of Public Access Trauma kits had been clinically reviewed, finalised, and published on the ProtectUK website (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department noted that "we could consider this complete" with the content agreed, although the entry remained listed as in progress, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office would continue work, and the contents would be reviewed periodically (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The Department of Health and Social Care should undertake a review, with input from other bodies as the Department considers appropriate, in order to identify the type of stretcher that is of the greatest utility in the event of a mass casualty incident. The product of that research should be rolled out to all of those with responsibility for the response to a mass casualty incident, including a terrorist attack, whether in the public or private sector.

In a February 2026 update published by the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care stated that the stretcher review had been completed and shared with relevant groups, marking the recommendation as complete (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, with the department recording at that time that the review was complete (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider issuing guidance on how to ensure that specialist paramedics take with them, into a warm zone, equipment that enables them to carry out bridging interventions.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery remained in progress, stating, "Equipment to undertake life-saving interventions is already taken forward" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added in February 2026 that the CRMI group had agreed a revised timeline to 2027 due to resource constraints, with focus directed initially to casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had earlier accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether all Hazardous Area Response Team operatives should be deployed with freeze-dried plasma and trained in its use.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, stating that the trial had concluded but noting that it was "awaiting confirmation of publication of review" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously given this identical progress update in November 2025 (Cabinet Office, Nov 2025). In November 2025, the UK Government confirmed that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should review the current model for evacuation to hospital operated in the UK by reference to the different approaches around the world in order to see whether triage at different times and in different places remains best practice, or whether there should be a greater emphasis on rapid evacuation to hospital.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on reviewing the evacuation model remained in progress, with the CRMI group agreeing a revised timeline to 2027 in view of resource constraints (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In the same February 2026 update, it noted that the initial focus would be on casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care, the Faculty of Pre-Hospital Care, the College of Paramedics and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should undertake a review into whether frontline ambulances should carry intramuscular tranexamic acid or TXA.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery remained in progress, noting that the availability of intramuscular administration had been reinforced within guidelines (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added in February 2026 that trials would be undertaken once the ongoing development of auto injector presentations is complete, and that legislative requirements were being reviewed for wider use by responders (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care, the NHS, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, ambulance service trusts, Air Ambulances UK, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and JESIP should consider what staff training and resources would be required to integrate air ambulance organisations into the emergency response to Major Incidents, including terrorist attacks.

The Inquiry recommended planning training and resources to integrate air ambulances into major incident response. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Clinical Response to Major Incidents (CRMI) group had agreed a revised timeline to 2027 because of resource constraints (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that initial focus would be on casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups, but air ambulance organisations were not mentioned in the update (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government recorded that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Department of Health and Social Care, the NHS, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, ambulance service trusts, Air Ambulances UK, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and JESIP should consider whether air ambulances should be integrated into the emergency response to Major Incidents, including terrorist attacks, and, if so, how that is to be achieved.

The Inquiry recommended considering how to integrate air ambulances into major incident responses. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Clinical Response to Major Incidents (CRMI) group agreed to revise timelines to 2027 in view of resource constraints (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that initial focus would be on casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups, though air ambulances are not mentioned in the source (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The emergency services should prepare, train and exercise for how they will maintain effective radio communications between emergency responders on the ground, commanders and control rooms, during the response to a Major Incident.

The Inquiry recommended emergency services prepare, train, and exercise to maintain major incident radio communications. The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that a multi-agency radio control talk group had been established with regular tri service testing and training, alongside roughly 700 tactical advisers (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that national guidance was updated in August 2024, while further training and testing guidance was currently being revised (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added that work connects to the Home Office led Emergency Services Mobile Communication Programme (ESMCP) to prepare emergency personnel for transitioning to a new commercial network (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum should oversee, at least every six months, a regular tri-service review of the Major Incident plans used by Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Ambulance Service. The purpose of that review should be to ensure that there is a common understanding by each emergency service of the plans of the other emergency services. It should also ensure that the importance of joint working is embedded within each emergency service.

The Inquiry recommended regular six-monthly joint reviews of emergency service major incident plans in Greater Manchester. In an update published in February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Manchester Arena task and finish group had closed, with the recommendation delegated to the Greater Manchester blue light working group (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that the group's terms of reference incorporated the recommendation, the first plan review was underway with the intention to continue every six months, and British Transport Police had also been included (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded that it accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and College of Policing should ensure that all newly recruited and existing police officers and all frontline police staff, such as Police Community Support Officers, are trained in first responder interventions.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, stating that a revised First Aid Learning Programme incorporating triage learning outcomes had been issued to police forces in summer 2023 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted an expectation of full implementation in spring or summer 2025, adding that the work strand was closed under National Police Chiefs' Council governance in May 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had earlier recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and College of Policing should ensure that any police officer whose position carries with it the expectation that they will assume a Tactical/Silver Commander role in the event of a spontaneous Major Incident (e.g. Night Silver in Greater Manchester Police) has undertaken an accredited course preparing them for that role.

The Inquiry recommended accredited training for police officers expected to assume tactical commander roles. The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that new operational and tactical commanders training had been devised and launched to forces (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated that this would be underpinned by new command and control approved professional practice (APP), due for launch in 2025, which will designate role accreditation (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government recorded that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and the College of Policing should regularly assess and appraise the training on first responder interventions provided by each police service to ensure that it is of an appropriate quality and that adequate time is allocated to it.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, explaining that a revised First Aid Learning Programme had been issued to forces in summer 2023 with full implementation expected in the 2025 training year, and that the work strand was closed through National Police Chiefs' Council governance in May 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government confirmed in November 2025 that it accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should ensure that there exist robust national and local systems and sufficient resources to make sure that the debrief process following multi-agency exercises is effective to capture the lessons that need to be learned.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that "processes around organisational learning have been strengthened" and that additional resources had been secured to support this work (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In that February 2026 update, it stated that this work strand will seek to identify opportunities to improve how multi-agency learning is managed, including enhancing horizon scanning and urgent lessons processes (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should ensure that there exist robust national and local systems to identify and record the lessons learned from all multi-agency exercises and ensure that change is implemented as a result, where change is indicated.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported on its monitoring dashboard that the recommendation was completed, stating that processes around organisational learning had been strengthened and additional transformation resource had been secured to further improve how multi-agency learning is managed, including enhancing horizon scanning and urgent lessons processes (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care should consider how the threshold for a requirement that an Ambulance Liaison Officer be present at an event is to be identified.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery remained in progress, explaining that the threshold is being considered as part of work to develop an events healthcare standard (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added in February 2026 that research projects were complete and drafting of the standard by an authorship group had begun, with the requirement to be included in scoping and writing stages where appropriate (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care should consider how to ensure Public Access Trauma kits are available in all locations where they are most likely to be needed.

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care reported that delivery remained in progress, as it continued working with the National Counter Terrorism Security Office to promote Public Access Trauma kits through the Protect UK website and security adviser briefings (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated that "work is continuing to establish recommendations for placement locations and the amount of kits to provide" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the College of Policing and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should ensure that all police officers to be appointed to the role of Force Duty Officer or Force Incident Manager attend a comprehensive training course dedicated to Operation Plato before they take up their role. Such courses must ensure that those attending understand the exceptional demands that will be placed upon them in the event of an Operation Plato declaration. Any course should include training in the following: a. the need, following a declaration of Operation Plato, to carry out regular reviews of that declaration; b. the need to identify with clarity the Operation Plato zones at the scene or scenes covered by the declaration; c. the need to communicate those zones to all emergency services promptly; d. the need to keep zoning decisions under review; and e. the need to work jointly with emergency service partners in the response to an Operation Plato situation.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, stating that the Force Incident Manager curriculum, accreditation processes, and supporting guidance had been finalised for centrally managed delivery by the College of Policing, with training scheduled for spring 2025 and the work strand "closed via NPCC Governance May 2024" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had provided the same progress update in November 2025, when the UK Government also recorded the recommendation as accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the College of Policing should consider whether firearms officers should be equipped routinely with body-worn video cameras.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported on its monitoring dashboard that the recommendation was completed, stating that the armed policing review was closed with "NO UPDATE REQUIRED" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It had first recorded that completed status in an earlier update in November 2025 (Cabinet Office, Nov 2025). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in its formal response in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider introducing the use of regular 'high-fidelity training' to give emergency responders better experience of the stress, pressure and pace of a no-notice attack.

The Inquiry recommended introducing regular high-fidelity training for emergency responders facing no-notice attacks. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office stated that the proposal is considered as part of developing a healthcare standard for events and will be included in scoping and writing stages where appropriate (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In April 2026, the Southport Inquiry reported hearing that the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS), in common with other ambulance services, does not currently have the funding capacity to allow all frontline staff to participate in regular major incident exercises (Sir Adrian Fulford, Apr 2026).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, and the Fire Service College should develop a system for ensuring that the duty command structure in each fire and rescue service has notice of any significant pre-planned event, such as a major concert or sports match, taking place within the fire and rescue service area.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that implementation remained in progress and was "high in compliance" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that while local variations exist across boundaries and organisational structures, positive progress included the role of local resilience forums, safety advisory groups, pre-planned multi-agency briefings, and the sharing of event management plans and risk intelligence (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should oversee the development and implementation of action cards for the police, fire and rescue service, and ambulance service for use in a Major Incident.

The Inquiry recommended developing and implementing emergency service action cards for major incidents. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that action cards for a Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA) response had been given to all forces and services under a review of Joint Operating Principles (JOPS) (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that these cards are held in control rooms nationwide as checklists, while testing and assurance remain ongoing under the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Programme (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Action cards for other major incidents were not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and all local resilience forums should take steps to ensure, whether through multi-agency training and exercising or otherwise, that the members of each emergency service are aware of the specialist capabilities of every other emergency service.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress, stating that the recommendation was being considered alongside recommendations R132 to R139 on developing a healthcare standard for events and would be "included in scoping and writing stages, where appropriate" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and JESIP should ensure that all emergency services use common terminology to describe the Operation Plato hot, warm and cold zones and all have a common understanding of those terms.

The Inquiry asked emergency responders to establish common terminology for Operation Plato zones. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that emergency services had approved Version 3 of the Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) covering areas including communication and scene assessment, which are reviewed annually, though hot, warm, and cold zones are not mentioned in the sources (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In November 2025, the UK Government recorded that the recommendation was accepted in full, while the department published the same update regarding the operating principles that month (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and JESIP should ensure that all emergency services use common terminology to describe the zoning of hazardous areas in non-Operation Plato Major Incident situations and that all services have a common understanding of those terms. The terms should be different from those used when Operation Plato is declared.

The Inquiry recommended common emergency service terminology for non-Operation Plato hazardous zones. In an update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the department reported that version 3 of the Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) had been produced and signed off by the tri-services to guide responses to a Marauding Terrorist Attack (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). That update outlined principles covering fire and hazards management and scene assessment, but common terminology for non-Operation Plato situations was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and JESIP should review and, as necessary, update the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework (the Joint Doctrine) and Responding to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack and Terrorist Siege: Joint Operating Principles for the Emergency Services (the Joint Operating Principles). The following matters should be considered in that review: a. achieving a situation in which commanders understand that the critical decisions of the commander most directly concerned in the issue under consideration are followed, unless there is a good reason for not doing so; b. achieving a situation in which risk appetite is common across the three emergency services - this will require collaborative work; c. achieving a situation in which forward deployment of specialist resources is the presumption, to be displaced only in the presence of a properly evidenced basis for not deploying resources forward; and d. achieving a situation in which the possibility of a secondary device does not delay forward deployment of resources, unless there is a proper basis for believing that such a device exists.

The Inquiry recommended reviewing and updating emergency services joint doctrine and operating principles. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Protocol (JESIP) Transformation Programme had been completed, with priorities including doctrine updates and guidance products (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). That statement described doctrine updates, but did not mention the Joint Operating Principles or the Inquiry's specific points regarding commander decisions, risk appetite, forward deployment, and secondary devices (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, individual police services and JESIP should review what changes need to be made to the Major Incident plans and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters Operation Plato guidance in order to achieve the aims set out in R45.

The Inquiry asked emergency response bodies to review Major Incident plans and Operation Plato guidance. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters had reviewed and updated its national guidance, completed training, and closed the work strand under multi-agency governance in January 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). This update addressed Operation Plato guidance, while changes to Major Incident plans were not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College, the National Ambulance Resilience Unity, individual police services and JESIP should develop a nationally agreed format for all plans, placing JESIP at their centre.

The Inquiry asked authorities to develop a nationally agreed format for emergency plans. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Protocol (JESIP) Transformation Team was taking this area of work forward throughout 2025, with ongoing consultation continuing around national plans and their format for agreement (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, in its government response in November 2025, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider empowering the leadership of local resilience forums to compel the attendance of a senior representative of its Category 1 and Category 2 responders at all local resilience forum meetings. Inspections by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should include an analysis of a service's engagement with its local resilience forum or forums. Consideration should be given to putting this on a statutory footing.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that delivery was in progress, explaining that existing statutory regulations already place duties on Category 1 and 2 responders to attend local resilience forum meetings (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added in February 2026 that while fire service inspections already examine forum engagement, police frameworks do not, and it will explore assessing police engagement through upcoming consultations with His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The Home Office should consider how local resilience forums are to be funded consistently and sufficiently to enable them to do their important work.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress, noting that MHCLG had selected five local resilience forums in England, including Greater Manchester and London, to join the Stronger LRF trailblazer programme as a key mechanism for testing models of strengthening accountability, leadership and assurance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider how the presence of an Ambulance Liaison Officer in appropriate circumstances may be made mandatory. This may need to be put on a statutory footing.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation remained in progress, stating that research projects were complete and an authorship group had begun drafting a healthcare standard for events that would consider the proposal in its scoping and writing stages (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, which asked the Home Office to consider making the presence of an Ambulance Liaison Officer mandatory (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider the introduction of a national standard requiring a meeting of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group to take place no more than two hours after the declaration of a Major Incident where more than one emergency service is engaged in the response to that incident.

The Inquiry asked the Home Office to consider requiring Strategic Co-ordinating Groups within two hours. In an update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the department stated that revised Civil Contingencies approved professional practice (APP) was launched to police forces in April 2024 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted that the work strand was complete for submission to National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) governance in December 2024, but the update did not mention a two-hour meeting standard (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider the introduction of a public education programme to educate the public in first responder interventions.

The Home Office stated in February 2026 that this action was complete, recording that communications with venue operators and the public on protective security and preparedness were continuing at pace following Martyn's Law becoming an act (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously reported in November 2025 that the measure was in progress after accepting it in full, highlighting public engagement initiatives, the ProtectUK platform, and the rollout of Public Access Trauma kits (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider the introduction of a requirement into law, for example through regulations issued under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, that employers train all employees, or certain categories of employees, in first responder interventions.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the action was complete and closed, stating that the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act did not include a specific requirement on first aid provision or equipment, although advice and guidance products continued to be provided (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It had earlier noted in November 2025 that workers would require training to carry out procedural and counter-terrorism measures under Martyn's Law, following the UK Government's acceptance of the recommendation in full that same month (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider, together with local resilience forums, how they are to have sufficient staff and resources to enable them to function effectively.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that work on the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government had selected five local resilience forums in England to join a trailblazer programme testing models of accountability, leadership and assurance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department first recorded that same progress position (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office should consider whether the requirement for adequate healthcare provision at events is a topic that should also be addressed by the Protect Duty.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, noting that the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025 requires those responsible for enhanced duty premises and qualifying events to put in place appropriate public protection measures (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that wider work is ongoing to strengthen healthcare standards, with the Department for Health and Social Care working to issue updated guidance that will then be assessed with NHS England to decide whether to make it a statutory obligation (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

The Home Office, the College of Policing and His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should develop a system for ensuring that the duty command structure in each police service has notice of any significant pre-planned event, such as a major concert or sports match, taking place within the police service area.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress, noting that processes for capturing and sharing learning had been strengthened while "new national Events guidance" was being developed (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated in February 2026 that this guidance would encompass partnership planning, engagement with Safety Advisory Groups, and the sharing of emergency plans across the tri-service and wider partners (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the College of Policing, the Fire Service College and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider together whether an app giving ready access to the contact details for all on-duty and on-call commanders is feasible and, if so, likely to be of benefit in the response to a Major Incident.

The Inquiry recommended evaluating the feasibility of an app providing commander contact details. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that additional resource had been secured to map technologies used by services and build a network to share best practice (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It added in February 2026 that market exploration and national framework options were being considered to scope available technology, noting that this work remained ongoing (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should ensure that all those who may be required to take up a command position in the event of a Major Incident are issued with a means to record what they say, hear and see unless there are good reasons why they should not be so equipped.

The Inquiry asked emergency services to issue incident commanders with recording equipment. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that processes had been strengthened to capture and share learning from events, with new national events guidance currently being developed to address partnership planning, engagement with Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs), and sharing emergency plans across tri-service and wider partners, though recording equipment was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should ensure that, in the course of exercises, such equipment is used by those who would use it in the circumstances of a real-life incident.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work remained in progress, noting that requirements for record-keeping are contained within the Joint Operating Principles, including the need to ensure commanders record and are given the means to do so (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when it first published that update (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should ensure that training is given to all who are issued with such equipment, on the circumstances in which it should be used and the importance of its use.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation remained in progress, stating that record-keeping requirements are contained within joint operating principles, including the need to ensure that commanders record and are given the means to do so (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department recorded the same progress status (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the College of Policing, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Fire Service College should take steps to ensure that all emergency services understand the importance of promptly obtaining comprehensive accounts from commanders as part of the debrief process following a Major Incident.

The Inquiry asked emergency services bodies to ensure debriefs promptly gather full commander accounts. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the three emergency services had agreed version 3 of the Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that this document covers debriefing and lessons identified, captures several inquiry recommendations, and is reviewed annually, though obtaining accounts from commanders was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, in November 2025, the UK Government recorded that the recommendation had been accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider how to ensure that the role of an Ambulance Liaison Officer is properly resourced and also whether venue operators should fund the presence of an Ambulance Liaison Officer where one is required.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that Ambulance Liaison Officer resourcing was being considered as part of developing a healthcare standard for events, with research completed and drafting underway (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the department first confirmed that the matter would be included in the scoping and writing stages of the standard (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Department for Transport and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should conduct a review to ensure that stretchers that are appropriate in design and adequate in numbers are always available for use by the emergency services and in appropriate locations in the event of a mass casualty incident.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the review of stretcher availability had been "completed and shared with relevant groups", advising that the recommendation could be marked as complete (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when the dashboard first published this update recording the review as complete (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The Home Office, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, the College of Policing and the Fire Service College should develop guidance as to where commanders should locate during a spontaneous Major Incident. Steps should be taken to ensure that a consistent approach is taken so that equivalent commanders locate in the same place. During the response to a terrorist attack, the need for commanders on scene who are not engaged in directing individual actions should be recognised and accommodated.

The Inquiry recommended guidance ensuring emergency service commanders locate consistently together during major incidents. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that emergency services produced and signed off version 3 of the Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) to address recommendations on responding to marauding terrorist attacks (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department noted that this document covers areas including communication, scene assessment, and risk understanding, though specific guidance on commander location is not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Inquiry heard evidence that the impact of public funding cuts fell disproportionately hard on metropolitan police services, such as Greater Manchester Police, compared with non-metropolitan services. In the event that public funding cuts are in the future considered necessary by the government, the Home Office should consider whether some funding arrangement for police services different from that applied in the post-2010 period is necessary.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, explaining that an ongoing review of the police funding formula is considering the relative impact of local factors and pressures on forces, and adding that "this work continues" alongside close engagement with the policing sector (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The National Fire Chiefs Council and the Fire Service College should establish a scheme for ensuring that all fire fighters are trained in first responder interventions.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported the recommendation as completed, stating that an increase in services completing the measure brought "the total completion rate to 86% across all responding services" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). This reiterated its update from November 2025, when the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full and first recorded the same progress (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The requirement that only those monitoring CCTV under a contract for services need to hold an SIA licence should be reviewed.

The Cabinet Office reported in a February 2026 dashboard update that a ministerial review to deliver on the intent of the recommendation was complete (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In June 2026, the Security Industry Authority stated in its strategic plan that it was ready to implement any changes approved by the government to extend statutory licensing to in-house roles following the public consultation (Security Industry Authority, Jun 2026).

The role of the Senior Duty Officer in a Major Incident should be clearly defined and explained in the British Transport Police Major Incident Manual. This role should have a corresponding action card.

The Inquiry asked British Transport Police to define its Senior Duty Officer role. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that an agreed curriculum for Operational and Tactical Commander training was scheduled to launch across winter 2024, underpinned by updated approved professional practice (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The report does not mention the Senior Duty Officer role, the Major Incident Manual, or an action card (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Security Industry Authority should take steps to encourage the security industry generally to ensure that even those members of staff who do not require a licence from the Security Industry Authority develop skills in basic trauma care.

In an update published by the Cabinet Office in February 2026, the Security Industry Authority stated that the recommendation remained in progress, noting that it had worked with first aid providers to adopt the additional training across sectors outside security (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It also reported in February 2026 that although its reach to unlicensed sectors was more limited, it had promoted the inquiry's recommendation through social media and newsletters (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The Security Industry Authority should take urgent steps to devise a training scheme in first responder interventions that educates all of those licensed by it, both existing licensees and new licence applicants. The Security Industry Authority may find it helpful to consult with the College of Policing in this, since it is apparent that the College of Policing has already undertaken a good deal of work in this regard.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the Security Industry Authority had worked with the Health and Safety Executive to introduce a sector-specific Emergency First Aid at Work certificate covering the inquiry's recommended training (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department added in February 2026 that while the syllabus applies to all door supervisors and security guards obtaining or renewing a licence, an adaptation period allowing recent non-sector certificates was scheduled to conclude in late May alongside a broader review (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Previously, the UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The team led by Philip Cowburn has devised a tool that is designed for use by a wide range of emergency responders in a mass casualty situation. It is known as Ten Second Triage. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit, the College of Policing and the Fire Service College should consider as a matter of urgency whether all of their frontline staff should be trained in the use of Ten Second Triage.

In its February 2026 dashboard update, the Cabinet Office recorded delivery of the recommendation as in progress, stating that "Roll out across the NHS is complete" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, at which point the department similarly listed delivery as in progress with the same note regarding NHS rollout (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

The team led by Philip Cowburn has devised a tool that is designed to replace the existing systems of primary and secondary triage. It is known as the Major Incident Triage Tool. It already has the support of NHS England. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit and all ambulance services should consider introducing the Major Incident Triage Tool as a matter of urgency.

The Inquiry urged ambulance services to urgently consider introducing the Major Incident Triage Tool. In an update published on its recommendations dashboard in February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Major Incident Triage Tool was launched in April 2023 and had been rolled out across the National Health Service (NHS), marking the recommendation as complete (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had earlier confirmed in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

The terms Casualty Collection Point and Casualty Clearing Station are capable of being confused, one for the other, particularly in circumstances of stress. That happened on the night of the Attack. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit should consider whether different and more distinct terms should be used for these two locations.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on clarifying casualty collection terminology remained in progress, with a revised completion timeline to 2027 agreed "in view of resource constraints" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated in February 2026 that focus would initially be directed to the programme's casualty management and clinical support to command sub-groups (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Those organisations should consider what changes need to be made to Major Incident plans in order to achieve those aims.

The Inquiry recommended reviewing Major Incident plans to improve joint working. In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the tri-services had produced and signed off Version 3 of the Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) for responding to marauding terrorist attacks (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated that the document incorporates operational learning, covers areas including communication, casualty management, and joint understanding of risk, and undergoes an annual review (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

Those organisations should consider what changes need to be made to the Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters Operation Plato guidance in order to achieve those aims.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that delivery of the recommendation was completed, directing readers to recommendation 45 regarding the "Review of the Marauding Terrorist Attack Joint Operating Principles" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded this same completed status in November 2025 (Cabinet Office, Nov 2025). The UK Government accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).