Address Arena failings identified in Volume 1
Manchester Arena Inquiry · Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 1: Security for the Arena · Issued 17 June 2021 · Addressed to: SMG
Government responseUK Government: Accepted (Nov 2025)
DeliveryCabinet Office says completed (Feb 2026)
Recommendation, verbatim from the inquiry
●Inquiry recommendation
Improvements, to the extent that they have not already been made, should be made at the Arena to address the failings identified in Volume 1. Specific consideration should be given to how to address my concerns in relation to complacency.
Manchester Arena Inquiry, Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 1: Security for the Arena · 17 Jun 2021 Source PDF →
Published evidence summary
AI-generated evidence summary
The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, noting that the Arena and all SMG venues had appointed dedicated security managers and adopted a risk assessment toolkit (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated in February 2026 that the operator had introduced a digital system to monitor patrols in real time to guard against complacency, added reporting reminders to pre-event briefings, and mandated Action Counters Terrorism training for all staff (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government previously recorded the recommendation as accepted in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 26 Sep 2026.
Government response
●UK Government · Accepted · 14 Nov 2025
Accepted in full
Response document: Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations (GOV.UK page linking to the Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard)
Delivery
●Cabinet Office says completed · 27 Feb 2026
The Arena, and every SMG venue, now has a dedicated security manager, each of whom is required to complete an Advanced Diploma in Counter-Terrorism Risk Management. All SMG venues, including Manchester Arena, now also use a risk assessment toolkit to calculate risk and identify mitigation measures. To guard against complacency in regards patrolling of its venues, SMG have introduced a digital system which provides real-time monitoring of patrols, an audit trail of patrols which have already taken place and an easily accessible place for staff to report suspicious activity. Staff briefings, which take place before every event at an SMG venue, now include a reminder for staff of the importance of reporting suspicious behaviour. All SMG staff must now undergo ACT (Action Counters Terrorism) training as part of their induction, and the training is provided on a continuous refresher basis.
Earlier statements on delivery (0)
●Cabinet Office · 14 Nov 2025
The Arena, and every SMG venue, now has a dedicated security manager, each of whom is required to complete an Advanced Diploma in Counter-Terrorism Risk Management. All SMG venues, including Manchester Arena, now also use a risk assessment toolkit to calculate risk and identify mitigation measures. To guard against complacency in regards patrolling of its venues, SMG have introduced a digital system which provides real-time monitoring of patrols, an audit trail of patrols which have already taken place and an easily accessible place for staff to report suspicious activity. Staff briefings, which take place before every event at an SMG venue, now include a reminder for staff of the importance of reporting suspicious behaviour. All SMG staff must now undergo ACT (Action Counters Terrorism) training as part of their induction, and the training is provided on a continuous refresher basis.
From: Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard, original version (data file)
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