Review terrorist attack notification procedures
Manchester Arena Inquiry · Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 2: Emergency Response · Issued 3 November 2022 · Addressed to: Counter Terrorism Policing, Police Services
Government responseUK Government: Accepted (Nov 2025)
DeliveryCabinet Office says completed (Feb 2026)
Recommendation, verbatim from the inquiry
●Inquiry recommendation
Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review the procedures by which it is notified of a terrorist attack to ensure that all police services know that this is an early priority.
Manchester Arena Inquiry, Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 2: Emergency Response · 3 Nov 2022 Source PDF →
Published evidence summary
AI-generated evidence summary
In February 2026, the Cabinet Office recorded the recommendation as completed on its monitoring dashboard, stating that "this recommendation is high in compliance" and highlighting progress such as multi-agency briefings and the sharing of risk information and intelligence (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025, when an earlier dashboard update also listed it as completed (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 26 Sep 2026.
Government response
●UK Government · Accepted · 14 Nov 2025
Accepted in full
Response document: Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations (GOV.UK page linking to the Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard)
Delivery
●Cabinet Office says completed · 27 Feb 2026
This recommendation is high in compliance. Whilst there will always be local variations due to boundaries and organisational structures positive examples of progress include the role of LRFs, Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs), sharing of event management plans, pre-planned multi agency briefings and sharing of risk information and intelligence.
Earlier statements on delivery (0)
●Cabinet Office · 14 Nov 2025
This recommendation is high in compliance. Whilst there will always be local variations due to boundaries and organisational structures positive examples of progress include the role of LRFs, Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs), sharing of event management plans, pre-planned multi agency briefings and sharing of risk information and intelligence.
From: Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard, original version (data file)
How this page is built
The recommendation and the government responses are verbatim from primary documents. Delivery statements and other bodies' findings are shown in their own words, each with its source. The summary is written by this site and labelled as such. The Index does not paraphrase sources or characterise intent; it records what has been published.