Risk-based visitor restrictions for radicalising prisoners
Manchester Arena Inquiry · Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3: Radicalisation and Preventability · Issued 2 March 2023 · Addressed to: Home Office
Government responseUK Government: Accepted (Nov 2025)
DeliveryCabinet Office says completed (Feb 2026)
Recommendation, verbatim from the inquiry
●Inquiry recommendation
I recommend that the Home Office consider introducing a system based on a robust assessment of the risk a prisoner poses for radicalisation of others. This system should allow for proportionate restrictions to be applied to visitors to that person. Controls such as prohibiting vulnerable visitors where justified or ensuring conversations are supervised should be among the options available in the case of a prisoner who poses a particular risk to others.
Manchester Arena Inquiry, Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3: Radicalisation and Preventability · 2 Mar 2023 Source PDF →
Published evidence summary
AI-generated evidence summary
In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation was complete following the rollout of the Enhanced Contact Vetting Scheme in June 2025 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted in that February 2026 update that the scheme limits all terrorist prisoners to 20 social contacts and requires identification checks alongside counter-terrorism police vetting (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded in November 2025 that the government accepted the recommendation in full, while introducing enhanced monitoring of communications and increased vetting checks for high-risk prisoners (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 26 Sep 2026.
Government response
●UK Government · Accepted · 14 Nov 2025
Accepted in full
Response document: Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations (GOV.UK page linking to the Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard)
Delivery
●Cabinet Office says completed · 27 Feb 2026
The new Enhanced Contact Vetting Scheme (ECV) was introduced on 9 June 2025 under section 23 the Authorised Communications Controls and Interceptions (ACCI) policy framework. ECV enables us to conduct more vigorous checks and monitoring of those visiting or communicating with our highest-risk prisoners and prevents any possible vulnerabilities from being exploited by potential radicalisers. ECV applies to all terrorist prisoners, limiting them to a maximum of 20 social contacts, ensuring they are only able to contact and communicate with individuals who have been subject to identification checks and Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) vetting. ECV replaces the intended Approved Contacts Scheme (ACS) that never came into force. This development is now complete.
Earlier statements on delivery (0)
●Cabinet Office · 14 Nov 2025
The Authorised Communications Controls and Interception Policy Framework was published in September 2022. This provides rules and guidance for prison staff to manage prisoner communications across prisons and Young Offenders Institutions. HMPPS has set up a new National Counter Terrorism Communications Centre, which dramatically increases our capacity and capability to monitor the authorised phone communications of our highest risk CT nominals in prisons. In collaboration with partners, the Centre will also conduct more vigorous vetting checks of those visiting or communicating with our highest risk prisoners.
From: Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard, original version (data file)
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