Public Inquiry
Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry
Status: Completed
Chair: Sir Patrick Coghlin
Established: Jun 2017
Report: Mar 2020
Commissioned by: Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland inquiry into the Renewable Heat Incentive scandal which led to collapse of power-sharing. The flawed scheme cost the public purse nearly £500 million.
Response breakdown
Evidence & impact
The Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry examined the design and operation of a flawed energy subsidy scheme in Northern Ireland that led to significant overspending of public funds. Sir Patrick Coghlin's report made 45 recommendations addressing policy development, governance, financial controls, professional skills, and the conduct of ministers and special advisers.
The Northern Ireland Executive accepted 43 of 45 recommendations in October 2021, accepting one in principle and rejecting one concerning an independent mechanism for assessing special adviser compliance. The Northern Ireland Audit Office has published two progress reports (June 2022 and October 2024) assessing implementation.
Substantial structural changes are documented in the public record. The Functioning of Government Act 2021 created a statutory framework for ministerial standards, while revised codes of conduct for ministers and special advisers were published in 2020-21. New policy guidance including 'Making a Difference' (2023) and Better Business Cases NI (2020) addressed policy development and business case processes. Financial controls were strengthened through updated Managing Public Money NI guidance (2023).
The NIAO's October 2024 assessment found 29 recommendations (64%) showing evidence of completion through specific actions, while 15 recommendations (33%) had no recent updates on progress. Six recommendations were assessed as unlikely to be fully addressed, with the Department of Finance maintaining that existing arrangements are sufficient or that monitoring would be disproportionate.
Key gaps identified by NIAO include the absence of regular record-keeping audits, no specific action to ensure ministers familiarise themselves with legislation they present, and no requirement in the Ministerial Code for ministers to actively question official advice. While training programmes and guidance have been developed across multiple areas, NIAO notes the need for evidence that new frameworks are being rigorously applied in practice.
The Northern Ireland Executive accepted 43 of 45 recommendations in October 2021, accepting one in principle and rejecting one concerning an independent mechanism for assessing special adviser compliance. The Northern Ireland Audit Office has published two progress reports (June 2022 and October 2024) assessing implementation.
Substantial structural changes are documented in the public record. The Functioning of Government Act 2021 created a statutory framework for ministerial standards, while revised codes of conduct for ministers and special advisers were published in 2020-21. New policy guidance including 'Making a Difference' (2023) and Better Business Cases NI (2020) addressed policy development and business case processes. Financial controls were strengthened through updated Managing Public Money NI guidance (2023).
The NIAO's October 2024 assessment found 29 recommendations (64%) showing evidence of completion through specific actions, while 15 recommendations (33%) had no recent updates on progress. Six recommendations were assessed as unlikely to be fully addressed, with the Department of Finance maintaining that existing arrangements are sufficient or that monitoring would be disproportionate.
Key gaps identified by NIAO include the absence of regular record-keeping audits, no specific action to ensure ministers familiarise themselves with legislation they present, and no requirement in the Ministerial Code for ministers to actively question official advice. While training programmes and guidance have been developed across multiple areas, NIAO notes the need for evidence that new frameworks are being rigorously applied in practice.
Reports & milestones
Reports
13 Mar 2020
45 tracked recs
The Report of the Independent Public Inquiry into the Non-Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) Scheme
· Tracked recommendations
· PDF
13 Mar 2020
0 tracked recs
Report of the Independent Public Inquiry into the Non-Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme
· PDF
Timeline
24 Jan 2017
Inquiry Announced
01 Jun 2017
Inquiry Establish…
13 Mar 2020
Final Report Publ…
Recommendations
| Code | Recommendation | Addressed to | Response | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RHI-1 |
A new policy at its earliest stage should be subject to a rigorous process to determine whether the Northern Ireland devolved administration …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-2 |
Novel, potentially volatile and untested initiatives should in future be scrutinised thoroughly, well ahead of ministerial and business case approval. The Inquiry …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-3 |
As far as practicable, Northern Ireland Civil Service teams working on policies, particularly new and untested initiatives, should be trained and supported …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-4 |
A lesson from the RHI experience is that action is needed to raise and sustain the quality of advice to Ministers and …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-5 |
One role of Ministers in a democratic system is to decide on policies and they can only do so effectively if they …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-6 |
(i) Under existing arrangements, Northern Ireland Ministers should be responsible for their Special Advisers. (ii) New or returning Ministers should be invited …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-7 |
There should be a clearly defined induction process for new Special Advisers, shared by the appointing Minister and the relevant Permanent Secretary, …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-8 |
A fundamental shift is needed in the approach used within the Northern Ireland Civil Service with regard to recruitment and selection for …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-9 |
Commercial and business awareness amongst policy officials, particularly those working in roles relating to the economy of Northern Ireland, must be improved. …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-10 |
The Northern Ireland Civil Service should consider what changes are needed to its guidance and practices on the use of external consultants …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-11 |
Best practice project and risk management disciplines should be the default practice within the Northern Ireland Civil Service when developing novel and …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-12 |
The leaders of the Northern Ireland Civil Service should work with Invest Northern Ireland and the Strategic Investment Board to consider how …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-13 |
Project boards are an essential element of project management oversight and must include individuals who can challenge and who are not directly …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-14 |
The risks involved in implementation of an initiative must be tracked, re-considered regularly and used to manage, improve and adjust the project …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-15 |
Co-ordination of groups of projects aiming to achieve change in a particular sector – e.g. renewable energy projects – would be stronger …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-16 |
Where other government bodies, such as Ofgem, or contractors or other third parties are involved in the implementation of a project, the …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-17 |
The Northern Ireland Civil Service should take steps to draw on best practice from other jurisdictions to provide more support for professions …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-18 |
More generally, we recommend a Northern Ireland government-wide framework for information exchange and, where appropriate, co-operation between the Northern Ireland Civil Service, …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-19 |
The processes within a Department for approving new expenditure and business cases including, where it forms part of that process, the role …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-20 |
Public expenditure rules should be sufficiently flexible so that false economies can be avoided. In order to deliver a policy objective, Departments …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-21 |
The Department of Finance's distinctive role in scrutinising business cases should be searching and sceptical, guarding against over-reliance on the assurances offered …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-22 |
Particularly where a policy initiative is demand-led, novel, complex and/or likely to be lengthy, consideration should be given to increasing Department of …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-23 |
Ministers should always be advised of any conditions attached to the approval of a policy or project by the Department of Finance. …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-24 |
Senior managers in the Civil Service must take responsibility for guiding and, where necessary, sequencing the timing of staff moves so that …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-25 |
In light of their legal responsibility to direct and control the Department for which they are responsible, and their democratic accountability to …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-26 |
Notes of significant meetings between officials and ministers, particularly those affecting decision-making and spending, must be taken and retained. The responsibility for …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-27 |
Ministers' responses to submissions should be formally and timeously recorded and disseminated to officials by the Minister's Private Office. That responsibility should …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-28 |
The culture and practice of record keeping and access to records within the Northern Ireland Civil Service needs to change so that …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-29 |
The finance function within a Department should exert the necessary authority and capability to fulfil the requirements of 'Managing Public Money Northern …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-30 |
Civil servants who are responsible for holding and monitoring a budget should have to demonstrate core requirements in financial literacy and an …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-31 |
Any imperative to spend a budget within a given timeframe should not be allowed to take precedence over how that budget is …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-32a |
The checks and balances within a Department designed to catch problems early failed over many years in DETI to identify certain of …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-32b |
Civil servants should be encouraged not to feel in any way inhibited about disclosing possible or emerging problems, raising concerns, negative aspects …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-33 |
The protocol for relations with HMT, namely that the Northern Ireland Department of Finance must be the sole conduit of formal communication, …
|
Department of Finance | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-34 |
The Northern Ireland Civil Service should have regard to best practice elsewhere about how to respond effectively when serious problems emerge, such …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-35 |
Better systems are needed for spotting early warnings and concerns from the public and businesses that something unexpected could be happening or …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-36 |
The Northern Ireland Civil Service should develop a better process to learn from past failures, one that goes beyond the traditional method …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-37 |
In keeping with the spirit of the Ministerial Pledge of Office, the Northern Ireland political parties, supported by the Northern Ireland Civil …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-38 |
The Inquiry recommends that the Northern Ireland Assembly should strengthen the scrutiny role of Assembly Committees, reviewing whether the existing balance between …
|
NI Assembly | Accepted in Part | View → |
| RHI-39 |
Any Minister presenting the Assembly with legislation for approval should sufficiently read and familiarise themselves with that legislation and ensure an adequate …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-40 |
Ministers, Special Advisers and officials in Northern Ireland government Departments should declare their interests annually in writing. When any conflict of interest …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-41 |
The Special Adviser Code of Conduct should be revised. How these changes are achieved will need to be a matter for the …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-42 |
The Code of Conduct issued to Northern Ireland Ministers in 2007 (contained within the Northern Ireland Ministerial Code 2006) should be revised …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Accepted | View → |
| RHI-43 |
In addition, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly ought, in the Inquiry's view, to give due consideration to an independent mechanism to …
|
Northern Ireland Executive | Not Accepted | View → |
| RHI-44 |
The Inquiry recommends a role in future for the Northern Ireland Audit Office in assessing and validating the extent of progress in …
|
NI Audit Office | Accepted | View → |
Parliamentary activity
1 question
08 Jun 2020
Written Question
Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry: Northern Ireland
Ian Paisley (Democratic Unionist Party)
Ian Paisley (Democratic Unionist Party)