Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
67th Report - NS&I’s transformation programme
Public Accounts Committee
HC 1237
Published 13 February 2026
Recommendations
2
Accepted
Seek positive attestation on NS&I implementing culture review recommendations and leadership learning lessons.
Recommendation
NS&I’s positive news culture has meant it has not learned lessons, which has affected its ability to deliver the programme. NS&I told us that that it promotes a “can do” attitude and culture; while this has benefits in encouraging commitment …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to presenting an initial plan for business-wide cultural change, addressing review findings, to the Board/Treasury in early Summer 2026 for implementation over 12-18 months. It also notes ongoing governance revisions to incorporate feedback and challenge.
HM Treasury
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3
Accepted
Strengthen and embed NS&I's new risk management framework, reporting progress to the Committee.
Recommendation
It has taken NS&I far too long to develop a risk management framework, which has left the taxpayer exposed to unacceptable risks. NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel with no understanding of the risks …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees with both recommendations, committing to Mr Goldstone reviewing the application of the new risk management framework and NS&I writing to the Committee by June 2026 on its progress in implementing and embedding the framework.
HM Treasury
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4
Accepted
Write to the Committee detailing resource management strategy, consultant use, and supplier contract management.
Recommendation
NS&I has failed to support the Programme with the skills and expertise it needs to deliver successfully. As an organisation with most of its operations contracted out to Atos, it is not surprising that NS&I had limited experience of digital …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to NS&I setting out its resource management strategy, including consultant and supplier contract management, to the Committee within six months.
HM Treasury
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5
Accepted
Amend NS&I's reporting to include additional metrics on Programme cost and progress.
Recommendation
NS&I’s governance structures still do not have the performance metrics and information needed to hold the Programme to account. It is difficult to establish the cost of the Programme from the information provided by NS&I. The Treasury told us that, …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating that NS&I has already implemented new monthly reporting metrics for delivery progress and spend, will complete a full spend audit by Q1 2026-27, and is working to enhance financial reporting across governance forums.
HM Treasury
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6
Accepted
Report to Committee on Treasury's assessment of NS&I's plan, budget, and oversight lessons.
Recommendation
The programme had suffered several serious setbacks before the Treasury gave it the attention it deserved. While NS&I is responsible for the Programme, the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor department and, given its wider role in promoting good practice in managing …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating the Treasury will assess NS&I's integrated plan through a new Full Business Case via the Treasury Approval Panel process, requiring external assurance and considering David Goldstone's advice. It also highlights actions already taken, such as bolstered Board representation and engaged skilled support, as examples of lessons learned from oversight.
HM Treasury
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Conclusions (24)
1
Conclusion
Acknowledged
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from National Savings & Investments (NS&I) and from HM Treasury (the Treasury) on NS&I’s Business Transformation Programme.1
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the Committee's foundational conclusion and provides an update on NS&I's Business Transformation Programme, including plans for developing options for a revised Full Business Case by Q2 2026-27 and leadership changes to address operational failures.
7
Conclusion
Not Addressed
We asked NS&I why it had been trying to do such a complex Programme, splitting operations undertaken by a single supplier into a multi-supplier model, in such a risky way. The NAO report shows that NS&I original planned expected four transition stages to happen largely at the same time, and …
Government Response Summary
The government's response completely fails to address the committee's conclusion about NS&I's complex programme transition and the need for re-evaluation, instead discussing unrelated matters concerning Carer's Allowance overpayments and reassessments.
8
Conclusion
In December 2025, after five years, NS&I still has no agreed and approved integrated plan to indicate a Programme end date and milestones. NS&I has repeatedly failed to deliver such a plan.12 At our session in December 2025, NS&I said its system integrator Capgemini had now developed a draft plan, …
9
Conclusion
In the absence of a complete and approved integrated plan, NS&I was unable to provide us with an updated estimate of Programme costs. It had spent £111 million on the Programme by March 2024, but could not give us a newer spend-to-date figure in our December 2025 evidence session, despite …
10
Conclusion
Despite the lack of information on timetable and cost, NS&I claimed it was confident that it could find a way to deliver the Programme by 2028, by “deprioritising” some aspects of the Programme.22 When asked how it could be confident without an agreed integrated plan, NS&I could only say this …
11
Conclusion
When we asked if decisions were being taken based on evidence, NS&I said that “there is always a chance that assumptions are incorrect”.26 The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority had found that NS&I’s understanding of the alternative approaches had not been robust, and NS&I said its understanding had improved …
12
Conclusion
The external organisations that have reviewed the programme told the NAO that NS&I was sometimes or often slow to act, or did not act at all, on advice.29 We asked whether NS&I’s leadership had learned from the issues with the Programme. NS&I offered two lessons: it acknowledged that it had …
13
Conclusion
We asked the chief executive if he was creating a ‘good news’ culture, which the NAO has identified as a factor in why programmes resets may not work, and which can lead to a situation where decisions are not made and disagreements between stakeholders are not resolved. He told us …
14
Conclusion
The Government Internal Audit Agency’s review of NS&I’s culture in December 2024, found that staff felt decision-making was slow and hierarchical, decision-making processes were not understood, and there was a lack of transparency within Programme processes.36 NS&I introduced a leadership development programme as a response to the review, and NS&I …
15
Conclusion
In taking forward the Programme, NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel, with no understanding of the risks that this was exposing the organisation and its customers to. NS&I said it had identified supply chain risk as a key area of focus.38 However, NS&I focused …
16
Conclusion
There are still many risks for the Programme to manage, for example the replacement of the ‘core banking engine’ is extremely high risk, but the main work has yet to start.41 NS&I agreed that when it replaced its banking engine, data migration would be a “huge consideration”, and said it …
17
Conclusion
In 2025, NS&I implemented a new Risk Management Framework, but has not yet fully embedded the framework throughout its organisation.43 We wanted assurance that this framework is good enough to ensure that risks to customer data could be managed, and NS&I claimed it was “comprehensive”.44 NS&I did say that it …
18
Conclusion
NS&I had most of its operations contracted out when starting the Programme, and it had limited capability to deliver a digital transformation.46 NS&I told us it has found it difficult to recruit the additional skills and capability the Programme needs. It has made substantial use of consultants in the Programme, …
19
Conclusion
We pushed NS&I to tell us if it now had the skills and capability it needed. NS&I acknowledged that it had needed to bring in more capability, including in systems integration and at senior levels.50 It also, eventually, recognised that for a Programme “this big and complex, we will not …
20
Conclusion
NS&I said it was now developing a plan for workforce management in a more structured way, but did not provide details.54 It had identified the need to transfer knowledge from consultants to permanent staff.55 Its recruitment 45 Q 63 46 C&AG’s Report, paras 8, 13 47 Q 67; C&AG’s Report, …
21
Conclusion
NS&I will continue to rely on Atos, which suffered financial distress in 2024, until at least 2028. NS&I told us it now has a contract management framework to manage Atos and the contracts with new suppliers. NS&I will need to be much better at managing supplier contracts to maximise the …
22
Conclusion
NS&I has its own accounting officer and its own Board, and is responsible for the Programme, while the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor in government and also has a role overseeing major programmes across government.64 The Treasury told us that it has to judge how it provides this oversight, operating an …
23
Conclusion
The NAO found that the Treasury has increased its scrutiny of the Programme since 2024, and had instigated changes to governance, including appointing new NEDs.66 The Treasury noted that it has now moved to a “quite interventionist” approach, but agreed that this could have happened earlier.67 Although the Treasury knew …
24
Conclusion
NS&I said its governance structures had evolved, and it would add more NEDs. It said these changes were improving delivery, but gave no substantive answer to how its governance would ensure problems did not happen again. It also acknowledged that there was still a lack of clarity over the role …
25
Conclusion
The NAO reported that it was challenging to establish the cost of the Programme from the information NS&I provided. NS&I said it was working on improvements to its cost data for its next business case this.72 The Treasury said it had been satisfied by the spend data in each business …
26
Conclusion
The Treasury told us that the lack of transparency from NS&I had made it difficult for the Treasury to understand the reasons for the cost increases, saying it was not always clear whether the funding NS&I received was being used on the Programme or running NS&I. It also said NS&I …
27
Conclusion
NS&I’s annual report and accounts state that it is meeting its overarching corporate metrics, including the important measure of how much finance it raises for government. There are risks to NS&I’s whole business and to its customers if the Programme is unsuccessful. NS&I agreed that its overall corporate metrics did …
28
Conclusion
The Treasury had applied its usual scrutiny to the Programme’s Outline Business Case in 2020 and Full Business Case in 2023, approving each subject to conditions.80 The Treasury said it had been satisfied by the spend data in the business case it approved, but the NAO found that there were …
29
Conclusion
The Treasury said its spending review controls require the lead NED on the transformation committee to assure Ministers that the finances of the programme are under control.84, and it now seeks quarterly affirmation from NS&I NEDs on progress before releasing funds.85 We asked the Treasury how NS&I could deliver the …