Limited Cold Weather Defence Capability
Limited specialised cold weather capability within the UK armed forces to meet objectives in extremely cold environments.
Source spread
Where this theme appears
This theme appears across 3 independent accountability sources, so the source mix matters as much as the headline total.
1 PFD report
127 committee recs
2 IMB recs
Browse by source
Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Select committee recommendations(127)— showing 50 strongest matches
#6 —
Recommendation: The government should consider whether the JEF focuses on the High North, concentrating finite resources on maximising its ability to operate more frequently in the harsh climate there while undertaking the demanding anti-submarine mission, rather than operating as often in …
Report: Government response awaited
#23 —
Recommendation: Government is already investing in the Hybrid Navy and Atlantic Bastion concepts to deter and, if necessary, defeat those threats in the High North. However, Royal Navy equipment readiness and platform numbers in particular are currently far worse than the …
Report: Government response awaited
#22 —
Recommendation: The MOD has recognised that the gradual opening of the High North in recent years has made the defence and security of the region a high priority. Failure to deter Russia in the region, particularly from underwater threats, puts at …
Report: Government response awaited
#21 —
Recommendation: In its response to this report the government should set out how major naval export programmes, including the Norway Type 26 agreement and any future uncrewed maritime systems, will support High North deterrence while protecting Royal Navy capabilities. This should …
Report: Government response awaited
#20 —
Recommendation: Defence exports can strengthen the UK’s position in the High North when they help closely aligned allies field capabilities that are interoperable with the Royal Navy and are suited to northern operations. The Norway Type 26 agreement is a clear …
Report: Government response awaited
#19 —
Recommendation: Within a year the government should set out how it will robustly test and validate the Hybrid Navy’s principal uncrewed systems in High North conditions before they are relied upon for Atlantic Bastion or other operational tasks. This should include …
Report: Government response awaited
#18 —
Recommendation: Uncrewed systems could help the Royal Navy generate the mass and persistence needed for sustained operations in the High North, the North Atlantic and around critical undersea infrastructure. They could be especially valuable for surveillance, anti-submarine sensing and seabed protection, …
Report: Government response awaited
#16 —
Recommendation: Alongside its response to this report the Ministry of Defence should provide the Committee with a classified assessment of the capability gaps that would arise in a 2030 High North conflict scenario in which the UK and regional allies had …
Report: Government response awaited
#15 —
Recommendation: To offer as credible a deterrent as possible to dissuade Russian aggression in the High North, NATO needs effective military capabilities. Evidence suggests there would be critical military gaps if the United States were not involved in countering such aggression. …
Report: Government response awaited
#14 —
Recommendation: Alongside its response to this report the government should brief the Defence Committee on progress it is making to re-establish as rapidly as possible an under-ice capability for at least some of the Astute Class submarines so they can operate …
Report: Government response awaited
#13 —
Recommendation: The UK has allowed its under-ice submarine capability to lapse at a time when the High North has become strategically more important. Without a credible under-ice capability, the UK is less able to contest Russian freedom of action in the …
Report: Government response awaited
#12 —
Recommendation: When responding to this report the government should provide the Defence Committee with a plan setting out how the Ministry of Defence will improve the availability of the Royal Navy’s frigates, destroyers and attack submarines before 2030. This update might …
Report: Government response awaited
#11 —
Recommendation: The Royal Marines’ Arctic expertise is a significant national strength, but it cannot compensate for shortfalls in the naval platforms needed to deploy, protect and sustain operations in the region. The UK’s ability to deter and respond to threats in …
Report: Government response awaited
#10 —
Recommendation: Given the critical role of anti-submarine operations in the High North, the government should ensure no further towed array-equipped Type 23 Frigates leave service until they are replaced on a one-for-one basis by the new Type 26 vessels. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Report: Government response awaited
#9 —
Recommendation: Measured against its own military requirements, the Ministry of Defence has a serious anti-submarine warfare gap. Towed array sonar-equipped frigates are central to detecting and tracking hostile submarines in the High North, the North Atlantic and UK waters, including around …
Report: Government response awaited
#8 —
Recommendation: Alongside its response to this report the Ministry of Defence should provide the Defence Committee with a classified briefing on how the Department intends to enhance nuclear deterrence through the acquisition of its new sub-strategic capability, including any discussions with …
Report: Government response awaited
#7 —
Recommendation: The United Kingdom has committed to acquiring a sub-strategic nuclear capability to enhance deterrence, although how this aligns with the security of the High North is less clear. To ensure the capability is effective it will probably be necessary for …
Report: Government response awaited
#5 —
Recommendation: If the government believes that the JEF provides a valuable additional capability alongside NATO structures, and Canada is admitted into the JEF, then focusing more on the High North may well be the most effective use of resources. With Sweden …
Report: Government response awaited
#2 —
Recommendation: The government should prepare options for a UK state-owned vessel to transit the Northern Sea Route in support of international freedom of navigation rights, including an assessment of the legal basis, operational risks and potential Russian response. (Recommendation, Paragraph 17) …
Report: Government response awaited
#1 —
Recommendation: As the Northern Sea Route becomes more accessible, Russia may seek to turn its control of the route into a de facto monopoly. A transit by a UK state-owned vessel through international waters could help uphold freedom of navigation rights …
Report: Government response awaited
#163 —
Recommendation: It is essential that the UK Government pays close attention to Sino -Russian collaboration in the Arctic. UK scenario planning should consider the possibility that China could in the future seek to establish a military presence in the Arctic. This …
Report: Government response published
#158 —
Recommendation: China is rapidly developing its nuclear potential. The Arctic Ocean represents the shortest missile flight trajectory as well as submarine passage between China and North America. 183 Dr Ash told us that by deploying ballistic missile submarines in the Arctic, …
Report: Government response published
#157 —
Recommendation: Mr Lapsley noted that building military forces that could successfully operate in the region would represent a major challenge for China. He observed that: “We know that they have an aspiration generally to make themselves a more powerful Arctic nation, …
Report: Government response published
#125 —
Recommendation: We are concerned, however, that the UK has insufficient key military assets, such as submarines, maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft, to support this increased focus on the Arctic alongside the UK’ s growing interest in other regions such …
Report: Government response published
#124 —
Recommendation: We welcome the UK Government’s increased defence commitments to the region, including the recently announced plans for deeper collaboration with Nordic partners to combat hybrid threats. The UK Government remains committed to holding cold weather training and military exercises in …
Report: Government response published
#115 —
Recommendation: Likewise, the Scottish Affairs Committee inquiry into Scotland’s defence contribution in the High North heard evidence that the UK’s current fleet of P-8As would be insufficient to maintain a persistent presence in the High North and Arctic alongside a long-term …
Report: Government response published
#114 —
Recommendation: We question, however, whether such a small number of platforms would be sufficient to provide adequate defensive cover for the UK, let alone allow for a contribution to operations in the High North.
Report: Government response published
#110 —
Recommendation: In the maritime domain, the House of Commons Defence Committee’s 2018 report on defence in the Arctic raised concerns regarding the operational availability of the UK’s very limited number of submarines. 136 The UK has few dedicated capabilities for Arctic …
Report: Government response published
#109 —
Recommendation: There remain long-standing concerns that the UK lacks the resources and platforms to maintain a meaningful presence in the High North and the Arctic.
Report: Government response published
#108 —
Recommendation: The UK has historically played an important role within NATO in anti-submarine warfare and air policing in the High North and the Arctic. Among NATO allies, only Britain and the US have the capability to conduct nuclear submarine patrols under …
Report: Government response published
#106 —
Recommendation: On 13 October 2023, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would increase its presence in Northern Europe and the High North, and would deepen co-operation on countering hybrid threats. This would include sending more than 20,000 personnel for regional …
Report: Government response published
#103 —
Recommendation: The UK is one of the few non-Arctic states that invests in the military capability to operate in the High North. Prof Lackenbauer told us that the UK is “key to North Atlantic security across all domains” and plays an …
Report: Government response published
#102 —
Recommendation: The UK, along with other members, must adapt their strategic doctrines to apply the security guarantees under Article 5 to the two Arctic states. Mr Lapsley told us that the consequence of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is that …
Report: Government response published
#101 —
Recommendation: We heard that in the medium term, there is a strong likelihood that Russia will respond to NATO enlargement with increased military build-up in the Arctic. Prof Zysk told us that NATO enlargement will unavoidably increase Russia’s sense of vulnerability: …
Report: Government response published
#100 —
Recommendation: Contrary to the expectations of officials in the Nordic states, and the public messaging of Russian officials, NATO has so far not detected a change in Russia’s military posture in response to Finland’s accession to the Alliance. 121 Indeed, Finnish …
Report: Government response published
#98 —
Recommendation: Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession also presents strategic and organisational challenges. NATO deterrence in the High North has traditionally focused on the maritime domain. Finland’s accession to NATO has doubled the length of the Alliance’s land border with Russia. There …
Report: Government response published
#96 —
Recommendation: Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO provides an opportunity for the UK to deepen its already extensive defence co-operation with the Nordic states. The RAND Corporation suggested this could include deepening co-operation around common platforms, such as the F-35 combat …
Report: Government response published
#65 —
Recommendation: Professor Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, therefore saw the challenge for NATO as ensuring sufficient presence in the High North, while minimising the risk of accidents and unintentional escalation. 66 Professor Lackenbauer, Canada Research …
Report: Government response published
#55 —
Recommendation: It is therefore essential that NATO retains an effective deterrent in the High North. This requires sufficient investment in Arctic-capable assets, and regular training to demonstrate capability and commitment. Mr Lapsley summarised NATO’s task as follows: “What we most need …
Report: Government response published
#53 —
Recommendation: It is highly likely that Russia’s Northern Fleet and Arctic-based strategic capabilities would be involved in the event of a broader conflict between Russia and NATO. Russia’s Arctic-based forces would likely seek to interdict and disrupt sea lines of communication …
Report: Government response published
#47 —
Recommendation: At the same time, the UK needs to prepare for the potential for significant change in the Arctic. The Arctic will remain a key strategic priority for Russia, and the UK needs to be able to play its part in …
Report: Government response published
#17 —
Recommendation: It is essential that the UK Government pays close attention to Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic. UK scenario planning should consider the possibility that China could in the future seek to establish a military presence in the Arctic. This would …
Report: Government response published
#9 —
Recommendation: We are concerned, however, that the UK has insufficient key military assets, such as submarines, maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft, to support this increased focus on the Arctic alongside the UK’s growing interest in other regions such as …
Report: Government response published
#8 —
Recommendation: We welcome the UK Government’s increased defence commitments to the region, including the recently announced plans for deeper collaboration with Nordic partners to combat hybrid threats. The UK Government remains committed to holding cold weather training and military exercises in …
Report: Government response published
#4 —
Recommendation: Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. The UK and its allies should prepare contingency plans to detect, deter and respond to hybrid and ‘grey-zone activities’, and consult on how to best do this …
Report: Government response published
#3 —
Recommendation: While it is not in Russia’s interest to start a conventional conflict in the Arctic, sub-threshold activity and accidental escalation represent significant risks to the region’s security.
Report: Government response published
#2 —
Recommendation: The Arctic will remain central to Russia’s military and strategic thinking. The military setbacks it has suffered in Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession, will only increase the importance of the region for Russia’s leadership. Russia has a legitimate …
Report: Government response published
#1 —
Recommendation: The Arctic has traditionally been viewed as an area of high co-operation and low tension. The UK’s long-term goal is for the region to return to this state. It is questionable whether this is achievable. As the region pivots from …
Report: Government response published
#27 —
Recommendation: The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from …
Report: Government response published
#25 —
Recommendation: The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United …
Report: Government response published