Recommendations & Conclusions
79 items
32
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information regarding threats and the UK’s readiness to respond 48 Meg …
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Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information regarding threats and the UK’s readiness to respond 48 Meg Russell and Lisa James, Parliamentary scrutiny: what is it and why does it matter?, UCL Constitution Unit briefing, September 2023 49 Liaison Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2017–19, The effectiveness and influence of the select committee system, HC 1860, para 51 50 Liaison Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2017–19, The effectiveness and influence of the select committee system, HC 1860, para 91 16 Ready for War? to those threats, and these judgments may change as the threat landscape changes. However, Parliament’s role and our role in particular is to hold Ministers to account for their actions. We cannot fulfil this role without adequate information, along the lines that was available to our predecessors. At present there is no regular mechanism which allows us to scrutinise ministerial decisions on readiness and their impact on risk.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that there is no regular mechanism for scrutiny on readiness and offers a regular annual open session for the Committee to meet with Ministers and Service Chiefs to address this gap.
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Ministry of Defence
33
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s offer of a meeting in private to review classified information. …
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The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s offer of a meeting in private to review classified information. This was both constructive and informative, but it took place 10 months after our initial request for this data, and there is no guarantee that it will be repeated in the future, which raises the concern about whether there is sufficient ministerial grip on readiness.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that the response time for this specific inquiry was slow and commits to making every effort to prevent recurrence. They assure that the newly offered annual open session will be prioritised and provide useful, timely information.
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Ministry of Defence
34
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they are. It does not need to be like this. The …
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In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they are. It does not need to be like this. The information flow in many of our NATO allies is far franker. Our request is not for very detailed, very highly classified information, but for information that only the most naïve would think was not already in the hands of the UK’s potential adversaries and their intelligence apparatus.
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Government response AI summary
The government recognizes the need for more public information on planning assumptions and readiness, committing to releasing headlines from current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) and 'as much as possible' of future DPAs when national and NATO planning processes mature.
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Ministry of Defence
37
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
At the end of 2023, over 7,000 UK Armed Forces personnel were deployed on more than 40 operations abroad.51 Some of these operations are long-standing commitments whereas others are in response to unexpected events. In the last quarter of 2023, the Secretary of State deployed a Royal Navy task group …
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At the end of 2023, over 7,000 UK Armed Forces personnel were deployed on more than 40 operations abroad.51 Some of these operations are long-standing commitments whereas others are in response to unexpected events. In the last quarter of 2023, the Secretary of State deployed a Royal Navy task group to the east Mediterranean and both a P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and a Rivet Joint to the Middle East following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October and the Israeli response. HMS Diamond was also deployed east of Suez, originally to increase the size of the UK’s ongoing Operation KIPION and later joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to secure trade routes. These deployments resulted in an increase of some 1,000 personnel in the region.52 A battalion was also deployed to the NATO KFOR mission on the Kosovo-Serbia border in response to increased tensions.53 In late December, HMS Trent was deployed to Guyana in support of that Commonwealth nation which is facing claims to part of its territory by neighbouring Venezuela.54
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Government response AI summary
The government states that the UK Armed Forces continue to meet all their operational commitments, including participation in NATO missions, support for Ukraine, and addressing Houthi shipping attacks in the Red Sea.
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Ministry of Defence
38
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Standing commitments and ‘flying the flag’ operations can play a vital role in building alliances and partnerships that could help deter or win a future war. The Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the work which the Rangers carried out countering Russian influence55 and the Secretary of State cited the …
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Standing commitments and ‘flying the flag’ operations can play a vital role in building alliances and partnerships that could help deter or win a future war. The Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the work which the Rangers carried out countering Russian influence55 and the Secretary of State cited the deployment of the Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific as being critical in building relationships with partners in the region.56
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of alliances and partnerships, stating that the UK, as a leading NATO member, already leverages these relationships and deploys assets like aircraft carriers to build international defence capabilities.
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Ministry of Defence
39
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Secretary of State told us that in relation to the additional deployments to KFOR and the Middle East, his “experience of our Armed Forces has been that when I have needed something so far, it has been there”: They will say yes, but they will also say, “But these …
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The Secretary of State told us that in relation to the additional deployments to KFOR and the Middle East, his “experience of our Armed Forces has been that when I have needed something so far, it has been there”: They will say yes, but they will also say, “But these are the compromises you will be making.” … I haven’t found any of those to be unreasonable or unsustainable decisions to make. … I have been very impressed, with more in reserve on each of these if we wanted.57 Appropriate operational readiness was essential to enable these deployments and the ability of the Armed Forces to respond to crisis situations in an effective and timely manner is evident.58
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Government response AI summary
The government affirms that the Armed Forces continue to meet all operational commitments, including NATO missions, support for Ukraine, and tackling Houthi attacks, demonstrating their ability to respond effectively to crises.
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Ministry of Defence
41
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Professor Michael Clarke told us “British forces over the past 30 years have done a great deal of operating, but have not prepared for war fighting, and there is a big difference between operating efficiently and well, and preparing for war fighting. The Ukraine war has brought the spectre of …
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Professor Michael Clarke told us “British forces over the past 30 years have done a great deal of operating, but have not prepared for war fighting, and there is a big difference between operating efficiently and well, and preparing for war fighting. The Ukraine war has brought the spectre of industrial warfare back to Europe in ways that have been relatively surprising, I think.”62 Warfighting readiness
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees the threat has changed and states that Defence is being optimized to fight, with lessons from Ukraine leading to re-evaluation of capabilities and readiness. It highlights £1.95bn allocated to address capability gaps and improve resilience.
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Ministry of Defence
42
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
All three witnesses in our first evidence session questioned the warfighting readiness of the UK Armed Forces.63 General Lord Houghton later told us that the “hollowing out” of the Armed Forces since 2010 had led to shortfalls in the UK’s warfighting resilience: one of the ways in which we were …
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All three witnesses in our first evidence session questioned the warfighting readiness of the UK Armed Forces.63 General Lord Houghton later told us that the “hollowing out” of the Armed Forces since 2010 had led to shortfalls in the UK’s warfighting resilience: one of the ways in which we were able to cope—take risk with less money— was to take risk against the warfighting consumables, or stocks, that we held for major warfare. Arguably, you could say that at the time—2010— that was a fair risk to take; clearly, in the judgment of the Government of the day, it was a fair risk to take. By the time I was writing my first letter on arrival to the [then] Prime Minister, from memory, I was warning him then that the threats of the possibility that we might be called on to cross the threshold of formalised warfare against an aggressive Russia were no longer latent but patent, to use my language. And they were acknowledged.64 General Sir Nick Carter noted that the reduction in the size of the Armed Forces undermined their resilience, with the lack of mass and scale meaning that in a peer-on- peer conflict, the Forces would have exhausted their capabilities “after the first couple of months of the engagement”.65 Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman told us that if we had to fight a come-as-you-are war, the Armed Forces would have difficulty given their current resilience in relation to equipment and stockpiles.66
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Government response AI summary
The government confirms £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget has been allocated to improve defence resilience by building munitions and medical stockpiles, enhancing critical infrastructure, and supporting activities like supply chain mapping and wargaming.
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Ministry of Defence
43
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The MOD have acknowledged that there are gaps in their warfighting readiness. In written evidence submitted to this inquiry, the MOD highlighted that investment is required in: • Defence rail outload theatre capability; • Infrastructure and warehousing munitions; 59 Q427; 365 60 Q429;431–2; 435 61 Oral evidence taken before the …
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The MOD have acknowledged that there are gaps in their warfighting readiness. In written evidence submitted to this inquiry, the MOD highlighted that investment is required in: • Defence rail outload theatre capability; • Infrastructure and warehousing munitions; 59 Q427; 365 60 Q429;431–2; 435 61 Oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 22 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 451, Q114 62 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q11 63 Q1 64 Q75 65 Q167 66 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q33 Ready for War? 19 • Infrastructure at key ports and airbases; • Operational medical capacity; • Armoured vehicle equipment support; and • Interim and future strategic lift concept phase.67
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Government response AI summary
The government confirms £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget has been allocated to improve defence resilience by building munitions and medical stockpiles, enhancing critical infrastructure, and supporting activities like supply chain mapping and wargaming, directly addressing identified investment needs.
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Ministry of Defence
44
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Chief of the Defence Staff also told us that the MOD was investing in capabilities such as “complex weapons, general munitions, and operational spares stocks to meet the needs of sustained operation”.68 The Minister for the Armed Forces argued that decisions taken to make savings at the expense of …
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The Chief of the Defence Staff also told us that the MOD was investing in capabilities such as “complex weapons, general munitions, and operational spares stocks to meet the needs of sustained operation”.68 The Minister for the Armed Forces argued that decisions taken to make savings at the expense of warfighting readiness were correct when they were taken but recognised that “there is a whole load of stuff that we disinvested in that we urgently need to reinvest in”.69 He acknowledged that the MOD “have an awful lot of work to do to recover the … readiness that we enjoyed during the cold war, and that we require again now”.70
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Government response AI summary
The government details that it has placed almost £1Bn in contracts to replenish UK stocks of equipment and munitions, including various anti-tank weapons, missiles, and artillery rounds, which were provided to Ukraine.
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Ministry of Defence
45
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Using open source evidence provided to us, we have below set out a range of capability gaps and readiness shortfalls in each of the Front Line Commands. We do not doubt that the Government will be able to point to procurement programmes and arrangements with Allies which alleviate the situation. …
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Using open source evidence provided to us, we have below set out a range of capability gaps and readiness shortfalls in each of the Front Line Commands. We do not doubt that the Government will be able to point to procurement programmes and arrangements with Allies which alleviate the situation. Nevertheless, the evidence we have received demonstrates the scale of the issue. The British army
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Government response AI summary
The government states that a significant recapitalisation programme is already underway across all domains, with new platforms entering service and commitments made in DCP23 to prioritize lethality, stockpiles, munitions, and a transformed partnership with industry to address capability shortfalls.
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Ministry of Defence
46
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
General Sir Nick Carter told us that the Army was the “weakest service” and that it had “significant capability deficiencies”.71 Both Dr Simon Anglim and General Lord Houghton questioned whether the UK could field the heavy division which is committed to NATO without an Ally providing a Brigade.72 Professor Malcolm …
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General Sir Nick Carter told us that the Army was the “weakest service” and that it had “significant capability deficiencies”.71 Both Dr Simon Anglim and General Lord Houghton questioned whether the UK could field the heavy division which is committed to NATO without an Ally providing a Brigade.72 Professor Malcolm Chalmers questioned whether any such division could be deployed given that the British Army lacked both equipment and the logistics required to support it.73 Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre listed the capability resource and readiness shortfalls of the Army which he described as “substantial”. These included: • The lack of Infantry Fighting Vehicle once Warrior is replaced by Boxer (which is an Armoured Personnel Carrier); • The lack of funding for new and upgraded systems with resources only available to procure 1,016 Boxer APCs out of a requirement for 1,305 and 61 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) of a requirement for 75, plus only eight recovery vehicles out of a requirement for 10; • The reduction in the fleet of Challenger tanks as they are upgraded to Challenger 3s and ammunition shortages for the Challenger 2’s 120mm rifled main gun; • The delay in the delivery of the Ajax Armoured Fighting Vehicle; 67 Ministry of Defence (AFR0009) 68 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 69 Q392; 410 70 Q350 71 Q174; 176 72 Q22; Q107 73 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q37 20 Ready for War? • The readiness of the AS-90 self-propelled artillery fleet which has been reduced by the (necessary) donation of 30 vehicles to Ukraine. The announcement that the UK will purchase 14 Archer artillery systems is not a full recapitalisation; • Inadequate domestic air and missile defence capabilities. The British Army holds responsibility for the majority of UK ground-based surface-to-air missile unit but only one medium-range and one short-range SAM regular regiments, plus one short-range Army Reserve regiment, are in existence. Ballistic missi
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Government response AI summary
The government responds to concerns about the Army's capability deficiencies by detailing existing recapitalisation and modernisation programmes, new platforms, and commitments under DCP23 to enhance lethality, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships.
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Ministry of Defence
47
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Many of Dr Allport’s assessments of the capability shortages regarding the Army’s fighting vehicles align with what we discovered when we produced our 2021 Report on the challenges faced by the Army in updating its heavy armoured capability.76 When we suggested that there were serious deficiencies in the Army’s capabilities …
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Many of Dr Allport’s assessments of the capability shortages regarding the Army’s fighting vehicles align with what we discovered when we produced our 2021 Report on the challenges faced by the Army in updating its heavy armoured capability.76 When we suggested that there were serious deficiencies in the Army’s capabilities to the Chief of the Defence Staff, he told us that: We have a warfighting division that we put forward to NATO, and we recognise that we need to strengthen that division. That is what is in existence now, and we will strengthen it even further. … I have to be careful when it comes to specific numbers, but I absolutely acknowledge, on the Challengers that we provided to Ukraine and the AS-90s, that we had, on 74 As outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review and the subsequent Defence Command Paper. 75 Human Security Centre (AFR0004) 76 Defence Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2019–21, Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability, HC 659 Ready for War? 21 paper, quite large fleets, but the number of tanks and batteries of guns that we could put forward with confidence was lower than we anticipated. … We accept that the vehicles are really old. We are investing like crazy in our warfighting division to improve it for 2030. It is still a warfighting division; it is not the one that we want.77
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the concerns regarding the Army's heavy armoured capability by outlining its ongoing recapitalisation programme and modernisation efforts across all domains, prioritizing new platforms, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships.
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Ministry of Defence
48
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
These capability shortfalls exist despite the fact that the Army budget has increased over the past decade and investment in the Army as an overall proportion of Defence spending has been maintained. Between the financial years 2013–2014 and 2022–2023, the Army’s overall budget grew in real terms by 15%78 and …
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These capability shortfalls exist despite the fact that the Army budget has increased over the past decade and investment in the Army as an overall proportion of Defence spending has been maintained. Between the financial years 2013–2014 and 2022–2023, the Army’s overall budget grew in real terms by 15%78 and over the past three years the Army consistently received around 25% of the overall budget, which represented the largest area of spending within MOD. The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the British Army’s budget is currently £12 billion a year and will soon rise to £14 billion. This will “amount to more than £130 billion over the next 10 years, of which over £40 billion will be spent on equipment”.79
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Government response AI summary
The government responds to the observation about capability shortfalls despite budget increases by outlining existing recapitalisation programs, new platforms coming into service, and current prioritization of lethality, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships under DCP23.
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Ministry of Defence
49
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
When we discussed the current state of the Army with the Chief of the General Staff, he acknowledged issues existed but pointed to the work which he had done to “mobilise the Army so that it would be ready to fight with what it has in the course of the …
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When we discussed the current state of the Army with the Chief of the General Staff, he acknowledged issues existed but pointed to the work which he had done to “mobilise the Army so that it would be ready to fight with what it has in the course of the next two or three years” which included “significant uplifts in investments, in our workforce, in improving the availability of our equipment and in accelerating modernisation, to significant investment in training and increasingly—not at the pace I would like and not at the volume I would like, but increasingly—to investment in stockpiles”.80 He gave examples of actions taken—the replacement of gifted artillery pieces within a two-month timeframe and doubling the amount of logistic lift.81 On training, he emphasised that whilst in 2020–21 only 10% of the Army’s battle groups had undertaken combined arms training, this will have risen to 90% by next year. Furthermore, the Army had carried out a divisional-level exercise in 2023 which consisted of 4,000 troops, 2,000 vehicles and 40 sub-units at 22 different training sites. He also announced that investments in stockpiles would result in “sufficient stockpiles for fighting, among the brigades that would make up a division, within a year or two”.82 He went on to highlight that the British Army was the most productive in Europe and currently delivering 130% of its capacity (given its resources).83
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterates its ongoing recapitalisation programme, new platforms, and commitments under DCP23 to prioritize lethality, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships, in line with the Chief of the General Staff's previous statements about mobilizing the Army.
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Ministry of Defence
50
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Despite these actions, the Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the “complete renewal of the British Army’s fighting echelon is in order to sustain our ability to put a British Division into the NATO fight under a British-led corps” would not be realised until “ the two Armoured Infantry …
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Despite these actions, the Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the “complete renewal of the British Army’s fighting echelon is in order to sustain our ability to put a British Division into the NATO fight under a British-led corps” would not be realised until “ the two Armoured Infantry Brigades and the Deep Recce Strike Brigade are fully constituted in the middle of the next decade”.84 77 Q65; 70 78 In comparison the Navy’s grew by 15% and Air’s by 18%. 79 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 80 Q222 81 Q237 82 Q236–7 83 Q223 84 Q 441;443 22 Ready for War? The Royal Navy
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Government response AI summary
The government outlines its ongoing recapitalisation programme and modernisation efforts across all domains, encompassing new platforms, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships, as its strategy to address Army renewal.
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Ministry of Defence
51
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
We have been told that the Navy is undergoing a “maritime renaissance”85 and that the UK is moving towards a maritime strategy (which prioritises a naval response above land or air capabilities).86 The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy made up 20–25% of NATO maritime …
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We have been told that the Navy is undergoing a “maritime renaissance”85 and that the UK is moving towards a maritime strategy (which prioritises a naval response above land or air capabilities).86 The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy made up 20–25% of NATO maritime capacity (as compared to the RAF making up 10% of NATO’s air capacity).87 Despite this, there are still capability gaps—Nick Childs pointed to the ability to deploy a carrier strike capability being hindered by “questions over aircraft that you could put there, the airborne early warning capability aboard, the actual weapons capability and integration of stand off weapons that would make a difference in terms of being able to take the fight to the enemy”.88 He also questioned whether the SSN89 force—platforms and personnel—would be able to cope with the demands of deploying simultaneously to the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.90 General Lord Houghton pointed to the shortage of available vessels and further noted that he found the high proportion of naval equipment which was inoperable to be “quite disturbing”.91
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Government response AI summary
The government addresses concerns about Navy capability gaps by detailing an ongoing recapitalisation programme, commitments under DCP23, and specific enhancements like the Naval Strike Missile, which are intended to transform and improve the Armed Forces' capabilities.
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Ministry of Defence
52
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre produced a detailed list of what he perceived to be Royal Navy readiness gaps and capability shortfalls which included: • Delays to the Type 26 frigate programme which have resulted in the Type 23 frigate force being run on far past its …
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Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre produced a detailed list of what he perceived to be Royal Navy readiness gaps and capability shortfalls which included: • Delays to the Type 26 frigate programme which have resulted in the Type 23 frigate force being run on far past its expected lifespan, meaning sustainment of the platform had become increasingly difficult and expensive. • The reliance on RFA Fort Victoria as the only RFA solid stores ship is compounded by the fact that it is at reduced readiness due to personnel shortages. The replacement Fleet Solid Support Ships are (currently) due to enter service from 2028 onwards—meaning that RFA Fort Victoria will more than likely be required for the Carrier Strike Group deployment when it travels to the Indo- Pacific in 2025. • The availability of SSNs has dropped as a result of delays in the Astute-class attack submarine building programme. Even once all seven Astutes are in service, it is questionable whether the force will be able to sustain their current tasks and the additional deployments to Australia and wider region from 2026 onwards. • Delays to the Power Improvement Project (PIP) upgrade on the Type 45s to replace the two existing diesel generators with three more powerful models have impacted availability of the vessels. • The Littoral Response Group (South), which will operate in the Indo-Pacific, will be led by RFA Argus—the ship “is now 42 years old and will inevitably be increasingly prone to mechanical and other issues as time passes”. 85 Q100 86 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q44 87 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q63 88 Q13 89 SSN (Ship Submersible Nuclear) is the designation for a nuclear-powered attack submarines. 90 Q26 91 Q100 Ready for War? 23 • The Royal Navy’s Merlin HM2 fleet has only 30 aircraft but is over-tasked, responsible for both most Navy airborne anti-submarine warfare missions92 and Airborne Surveillance and Control taskings.93
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
53
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
These gaps are compounded by the efforts which have previously been made to improve the availability of Royal Navy vessels. Nick Childs described these as “in part, robbing Peter to pay Paul within the fleet in terms of stores, key equipment to cannibalise and sometimes personnel. It will be a …
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These gaps are compounded by the efforts which have previously been made to improve the availability of Royal Navy vessels. Nick Childs described these as “in part, robbing Peter to pay Paul within the fleet in terms of stores, key equipment to cannibalise and sometimes personnel. It will be a difficult problem to fix”.99 We raised many of the above issues in our 2021 Report which looked at the role and capabilities of the Royal Navy.100
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
54
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In response to questions on naval readiness, the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy was “on the up” with significant transformation between 2020 and 2030 as it “becomes a carrier Navy again, that alongside the Air Force goes from fourth generation jets to fifth generation …
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In response to questions on naval readiness, the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy was “on the up” with significant transformation between 2020 and 2030 as it “becomes a carrier Navy again, that alongside the Air Force goes from fourth generation jets to fifth generation jets, and that then has, by dint of previous investment, 22 ships and submarines coming through”, citing the Fleet Solid Support Ships, Type 26, and both Astute and Dreadnought-class submarines as examples. He also stressed that all commitments (across defence) are being met.101 The First Sea Lord also pointed to future capabilities as being the key to readiness: We are going through a tremendously exciting transformation at the moment: the Type 26, which is a world-leading ASW frigate; the Type 31s, which are a really innovative way of thinking differently about a general purpose frigate; and the new submarines that we have on order. All these are just about to arrive, in strategic terms. For us, that represents one of the single biggest transformations in the history of the Navy—when we 92 As Wildcat HMA2 helicopters do not possess a dipping sonar. 93 When fitted with the Crowsnest system. 94 With 32 missile launch cells. 95 With 24 missile launch cells 96 The Resolution-class Polaris missile-carrying submarines were known to have had a number of technical problems towards the end of their lives. The longest-serving Resolution-class remained in service for 28 years. The longest-serving British nuclear submarine was operational for 33 years. HMS Vanguard was commissioned 30 years ago and will likely serve into the 2030s. 97 Brigade-scale Royal Marine landings are no longer envisaged. 98 Human Security Centre (AFR0004) 99 Q29 100 Defence Committee Third Report of Session 2021–22, “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” HC (2021–22) 168 101 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q74 24 Ready for War? genuinely move from an analogue Navy to a digital Navy. It is someth
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
55
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
However, both First Sea Lord and the Director Force Generation of the Royal Navy (Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse) acknowledged that there were further steps to be taken, in terms of maintenance of vessels,103 both increasing lethality and managing stockpiles (including working closely with the supply chain to ensure they “understand …
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However, both First Sea Lord and the Director Force Generation of the Royal Navy (Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse) acknowledged that there were further steps to be taken, in terms of maintenance of vessels,103 both increasing lethality and managing stockpiles (including working closely with the supply chain to ensure they “understand the imperatives”)104 and continuing to improve training.105 The First Sea Lord also acknowledged concerns with the pressure put on personnel as a result of the current state of platforms, citing both the submarine service and naval engineers as professions which have had huge demands made of them.106
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
56
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The difficulty of crewing naval vessels has resulted in consideration being given to removing some ships from the Fleet.107 The Royal Navy currently has two amphibious assault ships (HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion) which cycle in availability with one placed into maintenance and extended readiness whilst the other is held …
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The difficulty of crewing naval vessels has resulted in consideration being given to removing some ships from the Fleet.107 The Royal Navy currently has two amphibious assault ships (HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion) which cycle in availability with one placed into maintenance and extended readiness whilst the other is held at readiness for operational duties. These ships are used by the Royal Marines and can deliver, sustain and recover troops via helicopter and/or specialist landing craft in potentially hostile environments. In early January, there were reports suggesting that the MOD were considering retiring HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark in advance of their out of service dates in the 2030s. When questioned the Government originally stated that the matter was still under consideration.108 However, on 24 January, the Minister for Development and Africa responded to a question in the House to say that Government was supportive of retaining the vessels rather than seeing them scrapped or mothballed.109 The RAF
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Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out-of-service dates in the 2030s.
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Ministry of Defence
58
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Human Security Centre again produced a list of outstanding or near-future capability, resource and readiness shortfalls which the RAF faces: • A shortfall in combat aircraft numbers. The retirement of 30 Tranche 1 Typhoon aircraft in 2025 (with the majority of their airframe lives remaining) will leave only 107 …
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The Human Security Centre again produced a list of outstanding or near-future capability, resource and readiness shortfalls which the RAF faces: • A shortfall in combat aircraft numbers. The retirement of 30 Tranche 1 Typhoon aircraft in 2025 (with the majority of their airframe lives remaining) will leave only 107 Typhoons in service. 48 F-35B aircraft should be delivered by the end of 2025,115 but these will be jointly operated by the Royal Navy and will have a commitment to carrier operations. • There is also a shortfall in fixed-wing transport aircraft numbers and capabilities caused by the retirement of the C-130J Hercules116 with plans to procure greater numbers of the A400M judged by the National Audit Office to be unaffordable. • Delays in the procurement of 14 new model Chinook helicopters with extended ranges have occurred due to budget shortfalls. The new Chinooks are intended to replace older model Chinooks but the new model’s increased range could help cover some tasks previously assigned to the C-130J fleet and in supporting the Persistent Engagement strategy. • There has been a lack of a dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defence/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD/DEAD) capability since the RAF retired the Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) in 2013. The planned introduction by the UK of the SPEAR 3 missile with a multi-mode seeker and a range of around 80 miles could—particularly if used in conjunction with the F-35B’s electronic warfare system—provide a new SEAD/DEAD capability. • Failures in the pilot training system have led to shortfalls in pilot numbers. • There are insufficient numbers of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Wedgetail AEW1 airborne early warning and control aircraft. 112 Combined Air Operations Centres—multinational headquarters responsible for planning, directing, tasking, coordinating, supervising and supporting air operations. 113 Q101 114 Q11 115 Additional orders are planned to bring the F-35B fleet size to 74 and pla
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Government response AI summary
The government explains that aircraft are retired when no longer cost-effective to maintain due to obsolescence or compliance costs, and that components from retired aircraft are used to maintain the operational fleet, which applies to Hawk and Typhoon Tranche 1.
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Ministry of Defence
67
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
When we asked each of the single service heads what shortfalls their Forces were carrying, all mentioned stockpiles as an area of significant (current) concern.135 The high rate of consumption of munitions in the war in Ukraine has exceeded the assumptions (and therefore the quantities held) by most Western forces. …
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When we asked each of the single service heads what shortfalls their Forces were carrying, all mentioned stockpiles as an area of significant (current) concern.135 The high rate of consumption of munitions in the war in Ukraine has exceeded the assumptions (and therefore the quantities held) by most Western forces. Estimates for the use of artillery rounds in Ukraine were 5,000 a day in February 2023 (equivalent to a smaller European country’s annual order in peacetime)136. In June 2021, the rate at which Ukraine was using Javelin missiles would have exhausted the entire US stockpile in 42 days.137 Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman told us that “a very high priority is to crank up the industrial base so that we have got the stocks even just to sustain Ukraine in the current war, never mind to fill in the backlog that we have”.138
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Government response AI summary
The government has allocated £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget and placed nearly £1Bn in contracts to build munitions and medical stockpiles and replenish UK stocks of equipment, directly addressing concerns about current stockpile levels.
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Ministry of Defence
68
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Although all of the Chiefs had pointed to events in Ukraine as the catalyst for investment in stockpiles, General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter both told us that stockpiles had been reducing for a number of years before the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.139 We have also heard …
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Although all of the Chiefs had pointed to events in Ukraine as the catalyst for investment in stockpiles, General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter both told us that stockpiles had been reducing for a number of years before the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.139 We have also heard concerns in previous inquiries from General Ben Hodges (who recounted how the British Army ran out of munitions 8 days into a 10-day US wargaming exercise in 2021) and General Sir Richard Barrons (who told us in April 2022 that he would be surprised if the UK had sufficient munitions to sustain high- intensity conflict for more than a week).140
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Government response AI summary
The government has allocated £1.95 billion to address long-standing challenges in defence, specifically using this funding to build munitions and medical stockpiles, including significant purchases of 155mm munitions and Storm Shadow, and has developed a strategy for munitions.
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Ministry of Defence
70
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Beyond securing investment, there are further difficulties in replenishing stockpiles at pace. We heard from Professor Michael Clarke that the companies responsible for supplying precision weapons to UK Armed Forces have had small production runs for some time which there are challenges in scaling up, partly because of the consolidation …
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Beyond securing investment, there are further difficulties in replenishing stockpiles at pace. We heard from Professor Michael Clarke that the companies responsible for supplying precision weapons to UK Armed Forces have had small production runs for some time which there are challenges in scaling up, partly because of the consolidation of companies in defence industry both at the prime and sub-prime levels.145 Media and think tank reports have also demonstrated that there is insufficient industrial capacity to replace munitions transferred to Ukraine at the speed required, as set out in the box below.146 Box 1: Challenges for industry in increasing production of munitions • The small pool of consumers of military equipment means that a production line will be closed if there are insufficient orders to maintain it. Many components and subcomponents are likely to be provided by a subcontractor—without revenue from that line, these may go out of business or switch focus to providing parts for a different production line making the original line difficult to restart, as happened in relation to NLAW.147 • There are supply chain bottlenecks and a lack of available raw and processed materials. The manufacturing of components and subcomponents—which in many cases stopped or slowed during the COVID-19 pandemic—requires the sourcing of production materials (“chemicals for explosives to metals and plastics for fuses and artillery shell casings”) some of which can take months to arrive. Without an increase in the capacity of the supply chain, there cannot be an increase in the production of the finished product. This is further hampered by other supply chain issues, for example: the difficulty of sourcing castings and forgings (the US Navy is investing in metal additive manufacturing due to the scarcity of producers148); the scarcity of semiconductors (for instance, the British Army has found that the lead time for delivery of semiconductors has increased from one to three wee
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Government response AI summary
The government outlines funding for munitions and medical stockpiles and commits to transforming its partnership with industry, engaging earlier in strategic conversations to create a more resilient industrial base and improve supply chain capacity, alongside implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model.
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Ministry of Defence
71
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In our March 2023 Report ‘Special Relationships? The US, UK and NATO’ we highlighted the issue of industrial capacity in relation to supply chain capacity and a lack of skilled workers.152 We were told by Government that: Further developing strategic alignment with industry will mean that together we can better …
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In our March 2023 Report ‘Special Relationships? The US, UK and NATO’ we highlighted the issue of industrial capacity in relation to supply chain capacity and a lack of skilled workers.152 We were told by Government that: Further developing strategic alignment with industry will mean that together we can better understand long-term strategic challenges and identify solutions to issues such as the availability of critical skills, resilience within the supply chain, and productivity. We will outline how we are working more closely with industry in the upcoming Defence Command Paper Refresh.153
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Government response AI summary
The government details funding for stockpiles and commits to a transformed partnership with industry, including earlier engagement and a new Integrated Procurement Model, to build a more resilient industrial base and address supply chain and skills challenges, aligning with previous commitments.
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Ministry of Defence
74
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In January 2024, we took evidence on Army recruitment from Capita with which the Army has a contract to administer recruitment services.156 We heard that in 2022– 23, Capita recruited 68% of the target number of people that the Army said it required to maintain the workforce. In 2023–24, it …
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In January 2024, we took evidence on Army recruitment from Capita with which the Army has a contract to administer recruitment services.156 We heard that in 2022– 23, Capita recruited 68% of the target number of people that the Army said it required to maintain the workforce. In 2023–24, it expects to recruit 70% of the target number (although three quarters of the way through the recruitment year it had successfully recruited barely half).157 In relation to the ‘pinch point’ professions, the Army had given Capita 73 specific professions where recruitment was necessary—in two of them (HR and Communications Specialists) current recruitment was only one in five (22%) of the target number but against others (“Paras, combat med techs, vehicle mechanics, dog handlers and police”) we were told that recruitment was within 10% of the target. We have requested a full list of the requirements and Capita’s performance against those targets.158
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges recruitment and retention as absolute priorities, detailing pay increases for Armed Forces personnel and referencing measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023 to address staffing challenges, including establishing a new Transformation Directorate.
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Ministry of Defence
75
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The MOD publicly concedes that for every eight service personnel who leaves, it currently recruits five people, although we understand the situation may have deteriorated further.159
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges recruitment and retention as absolute priorities and has introduced pay increases, explored 'zig-zag' careers, and established a new Transformation Directorate to address staffing challenges and improve the flow of personnel.
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Ministry of Defence
82
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Professor Justin Bronk told us that the IR23 and DCP23 had demonstrated “the broad challenges and ambitions that the UK is faced with” but had given no indication of priority.175 We made the same criticism (which the Government rejected) of the 2021 strategies.176 This lack of prioritisation has resulted in …
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Professor Justin Bronk told us that the IR23 and DCP23 had demonstrated “the broad challenges and ambitions that the UK is faced with” but had given no indication of priority.175 We made the same criticism (which the Government rejected) of the 2021 strategies.176 This lack of prioritisation has resulted in leaders of the UK Armed Forces feeling the need to show the Services “doing things all over the place all the time”, otherwise “not only will they not get additional investment to plug gaps or increase capability, but they will risk being cut”.177 Professor Malcolm Chalmers told us that a number “of the issues around personnel in relation to the Army are about the breadth of their commitments”.178 General Lord Houghton agreed, telling us that “the Armed Forces are consistently on some form of operation. Not a lot of them are left at home, in the locker”.179
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of prioritising resources and outlines existing mechanisms, such as continuous review with NATO allies, balancing the Global Operate programme with DCP23 outcomes, the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework (CRAF), and the Defence Design review, which aim to improve prioritisation within Defence.
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Ministry of Defence
86
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Readiness is determined by the number of trained personnel and viable equipment the Armed Forces have available to deploy and sustain on operations determined by ministerial priorities. However, whilst the size of the Forces and the equipment available to them is primarily controlled through budget allocations, policy changes can also …
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Readiness is determined by the number of trained personnel and viable equipment the Armed Forces have available to deploy and sustain on operations determined by ministerial priorities. However, whilst the size of the Forces and the equipment available to them is primarily controlled through budget allocations, policy changes can also have an impact.188 The Haythornthwaite Review of Armed Forces Incentivisation
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Government response AI summary
The government recognizes the importance of ensuring the Armed Forces have the right people and skills, committing to increasing recruitment and improving retention through measures such as pay increases, zig-zag careers, and the establishment of a new Transformation Directorate to build an evolving people system.
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Ministry of Defence
87
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Haythornthwaite Review ‘Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era’, was an independent study commissioned by the MOD and published in June 2023. The Review looked at a number of areas where recruitment and retention could possibly be improved within the UK Armed Forces. 183 Q349; 427 184 …
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The Haythornthwaite Review ‘Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era’, was an independent study commissioned by the MOD and published in June 2023. The Review looked at a number of areas where recruitment and retention could possibly be improved within the UK Armed Forces. 183 Q349; 427 184 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q40–2 185 Q212 186 Q23; 37; 67 187 Oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 22 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 451, Q114 188 Policy changes relating to the MOD’s engagement with industry are covered in the final chapter on strategic readiness. 36 Ready for War? Box 3: Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era The Review considered the offer to personnel in relation to: their accommodation and food; their family life; their career structure; working conditions and renumeration; the training available to those in service; and a reduction in bureaucracy.189 The most far-reaching recommendations related to career structure, working conditions and renumeration: the ‘spectrum of service approach’ and the ‘total reward approach’. The spectrum of service approach (often referred to as the ‘zig zag career’) is a recommendation to replace the current blanket terms of service with individualised ones. This would allow an individual to determine their engagement type, engagement length, compulsion, mobility and military training factors, making their service much more flexible. The Review describes this as allowing the differing expectations placed on those serving to range “from those giving 24/7 whatever their Service asks of them, to increasing levels of control over working patterns or geographical stability, through to occasional weekends or short-term projects”. It would also allow personnel to leave and re-join the service after working in a different profession (such as in government or industry). The total reward approach, a complementary recommendation, would allow personnel to determin
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for the right people and skills, outlining priorities for increasing recruitment and improving retention. It highlights measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, such as pay increases, zig-zag careers, and a new Transformation Directorate, to address staffing …
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Ministry of Defence
88
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) identified the areas of the Haythornthwaite Review that Defence would take forward as a priority: • greater career flexibility through a Spectrum of Service, which will enable Defence to be better at retaining and surging talent across the whole force. This will include increasing fluidity …
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Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) identified the areas of the Haythornthwaite Review that Defence would take forward as a priority: • greater career flexibility through a Spectrum of Service, which will enable Defence to be better at retaining and surging talent across the whole force. This will include increasing fluidity between the military, the Civil Service and industry. Defence will promote ‘zig-zag’ or ‘portfolio’ careers for all of those who want them; • enhanced effectiveness of Defence’s offer by adopting a Total Reward Approach, to offer a more compelling and competitive incentivisation package; and • the digitalisation and simplification of Defence’s people management system, to remove the barriers that prevent flexibility and workforce agility and restrict access to talent.192
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Government response AI summary
The government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring the Armed Forces have the right people and skills, outlining ongoing priorities such as increasing recruitment, improving retention, introducing zig-zag careers, reviewing pay and progression, and establishing a new Transformation Directorate, all of which align with areas already …
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Ministry of Defence
90
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
When we took evidence from Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, he welcomed the proposals in DCP23 but told us that he would have liked to have seen actual targets and descriptions of how the MOD was planning to achieve them: 189 Ministry of Defence, Agency and Agility: Incentivising people in a …
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When we took evidence from Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, he welcomed the proposals in DCP23 but told us that he would have liked to have seen actual targets and descriptions of how the MOD was planning to achieve them: 189 Ministry of Defence, Agency and Agility: Incentivising people in a new era, A review of UK Armed Forces incentivisation by Rick Haythornthwaite, June 2023 190 In relation not just to take home pay but also pension contribution. 191 Non-financial rewards might include: gaining qualifications; annual leave entitlement; flexible working; mobility; and deployment opportunities and/or requirements. 192 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 193 Service Accommodation - Committees - UK Parliament Ready for War? 37 you have to look at implementation. In terms of all the things they say they are going to do in opening up, how well are they being enacted? What sort of response do they get? What adjustments will be made?194
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Government response AI summary
The government states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's 67 accepted recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining next steps for delivery and implementation, including a broad roadmap for recruitment and retention and regular reporting of key indicators to measure progress.
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Ministry of Defence
91
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In Autumn 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Secretary of State “will continue to study the Review’s 67 complex, interconnected recommendations and make a more detailed formal response later in the year”.195 At the time of writing, this has yet to happen.
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In Autumn 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Secretary of State “will continue to study the Review’s 67 complex, interconnected recommendations and make a more detailed formal response later in the year”.195 At the time of writing, this has yet to happen.
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Government response AI summary
The government confirms that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's 67 recommendations, which were accepted in the Defence Command Paper refresh in 2023, will be published during 2024. This response will detail next steps for delivery and implementation, including a broad roadmap and key …
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Ministry of Defence
96
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
General Lord Houghton told us that the UK Armed Forces have maintained high levels of readiness for standing commitments (to domestic security and overseas non- discretionary tasks) and contingent commitments (commitments to allies and alliances such as the commitment to deploy forces to NATO at varying levels of readiness). Therefore …
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General Lord Houghton told us that the UK Armed Forces have maintained high levels of readiness for standing commitments (to domestic security and overseas non- discretionary tasks) and contingent commitments (commitments to allies and alliances such as the commitment to deploy forces to NATO at varying levels of readiness). Therefore readiness for these tasks (as opposed to warfighting readiness) was unlikely to be an issue because the Armed Forces had long been subject to demands to engage in significant 200 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q44; Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q95 201 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q43 202 HC Deb, 26 October 2023, HCWS1097 [Commons Written Ministerial Statement] Ready for War? 39 operational activity, geographically widely dispersed and across a range of tasks.203 The First Sea Lord also acknowledged this, and when questioned about the range of tasks carried out by the Royal Navy noted that: You will always have more tasks for a Navy than there are ships, by dint of the fact that we are a maritime nation. … I don’t own the task allocation; I am merely forced to generate forces against that. The range of tasks would be a question for Ministers. As for whether I have sufficient forces to meet the full range of tasks all the time in the way they would wish, as I said at the beginning, there is always a desire to do more than the fleet is actually capable of doing. What we pride ourselves on is the degree of agility that will allow us to rebalance against what the ministerial priorities are at the time.204
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Government response AI summary
The government refers to Defence Command Paper 2023, which outlines a clear purpose for Defence and a program of modernisation and mobilisation to address capability shortfalls, enhance lethality across the Royal Navy, Army, and RAF, and increase operational productivity.
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Ministry of Defence
100
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
When we raised the prospect of specialisation with the Minister for the Armed Forces, he suggested that the greatest challenge would be coming to a consensus on what the UK might specialise in.212 He acknowledged that due to the current period of “great geopolitical uncertainty and instability” the UK Armed …
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When we raised the prospect of specialisation with the Minister for the Armed Forces, he suggested that the greatest challenge would be coming to a consensus on what the UK might specialise in.212 He acknowledged that due to the current period of “great geopolitical uncertainty and instability” the UK Armed Forces were being asked to do more than they were designed for, but maintained that it was important for Britain to have a tier-one Army, Navy, Air Force and cyber force which could fulfil a range of tasks. He gave an example of a task which was not warfighting but was still considered “non- discretionary”: Dauntless … was rushed out of refit successfully to go and furnish a non-discretionary task to be available to the Overseas Territories during hurricane season. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office rightly pushed us on that. Dauntless successfully met the requirement. While she has been there she has been able to do all sorts of great stuff, working with partners in the region doing counter-narcotics and, more widely, flying the flag for freedom, all very valuable. She will come back, refurbish and will be ready again for operations. The tempo at which she has been doing all of that you won’t find in any handbook, and the First Sea Lord would rightly say to you that some risk comes with that.213
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Government response AI summary
The government reaffirms its commitment to providing NATO with a full spectrum of defence capabilities, including nuclear and offensive cyber, arguing this comprehensive approach underpins both its NATO contributions and wider global hard-power projection. It highlights the dual utility of assets like aircraft carriers in …
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
101
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
A further example was presented at our sessions with the Secretary of State and senior MOD officials, when we questioned the utility of a contract to procure the Chinook CH-47. The project had already been delayed and (as a result of that delay and inflationary pressures) had increased in cost.214 …
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A further example was presented at our sessions with the Secretary of State and senior MOD officials, when we questioned the utility of a contract to procure the Chinook CH-47. The project had already been delayed and (as a result of that delay and inflationary pressures) had increased in cost.214 However, we also heard that 14 of the 51 Chinooks would be the Extended Range variant and the military advice was that without them, Special Forces would be “unable to prosecute the targets we need to against the adversarial threat. If we wish to prosecute the targets against Government policy today, … operational judgment is that you need that capability.”215 The Permanent Secretary explained that: There was concern in the summer about cost growth in the programme, and how that could be afforded and what the impact would be on other related capabilities, including, conceivably, other helicopter projects. That has a question around whether this is the best deal that we can get, and if it is the best deal that we can get, do we want to carry on with it? As the 210 Q37 211 Q148 212 Q433 213 Q435 214 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q75 215 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q21 Ready for War? 41 General said, if we do not carry on with it in the way that we are currently planning, there will be an impact on the range of operations that our armed forces are able to prosecute.216
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Government response AI summary
The government has introduced a new Integrated Procurement Model to address issues of over-complex, over-budget, and delayed programmes by ensuring earlier expert assurance and empowering subject matter experts.
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Ministry of Defence
102
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Professor Bronk told us the choice was stark: either sufficiently resource the UK Armed Forces to allow them to have “full spectrum forces that can concurrently provide a reference force as a backbone of European NATO, while also doing expeditionary things for signalling, diplomacy and all sorts around the world” …
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Professor Bronk told us the choice was stark: either sufficiently resource the UK Armed Forces to allow them to have “full spectrum forces that can concurrently provide a reference force as a backbone of European NATO, while also doing expeditionary things for signalling, diplomacy and all sorts around the world” or to ruthlessly prioritise: If you specifically tasked the MoD and said, “Your primary role now is to provide a backbone of European deterrence against Russia, with credible warfighting capabilities in Europe in the next three to five years”, you would see an enormous change in the way that it plans its force structure and its planning, but you would also find a lot of objections from people … If you want to keep doing what we are currently doing and get ready for warfighting in three to five years’ time, it is probably [needs to be] closer to 3% of GDP as a ballpark figure. If you were to say, “This is now all hands on deck. We need to get the force we currently have as ready as we can, but we are prepared to pull the plug on all sorts of things and go right down to just getting ready for the big fight, as it were, and buying weapons stocks,” you could probably do it with a relatively modest uplift, but you would have to cut so much in terms of what people are used to seeing as the standard pattern of activity to do it.217
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Government response AI summary
The government reaffirms its commitment to providing NATO with a full spectrum of defence capabilities, including nuclear and offensive cyber, arguing this comprehensive approach underpins both its NATO contributions and wider global hard-power projection. It highlights the dual utility of assets like aircraft carriers in …
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
103
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Professor Chalmers thought it unlikely there would be an increase in defence spending anytime soon given the UK’s poor economic performance, as any increase would have to come either from cuts in other government spending or an increase of taxation.218 The Minister for the Armed Forces recognised that the funding …
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Professor Chalmers thought it unlikely there would be an increase in defence spending anytime soon given the UK’s poor economic performance, as any increase would have to come either from cuts in other government spending or an increase of taxation.218 The Minister for the Armed Forces recognised that the funding was not available for an increase in the size of the Armed Forces so it could continue to manage both its operational and warfighting readiness: “We are just going to have to accept that we will be running the force very hot indeed, and well beyond any reasonable planning assumptions.”219 Mothballing
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Government response AI summary
The government states that the MOD's budget has increased to over £50 billion, projected to rise further, and that it is prioritising transforming the workforce model to attract and retain talent. It highlights recent pay increases for junior service personnel (up to 9.7%) and other …
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Ministry of Defence
110
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention of personnel. It also appears to be delaying the development …
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The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention of personnel. It also appears to be delaying the development of warfighting readiness.
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Government response AI summary
The government responds by detailing existing efforts and newly published strategies (DCP23, Haythornthwaite Review) to recapitalise, modernise, and improve the readiness, lethality, and personnel retention of the Armed Forces.
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Ministry of Defence
111
Recommendation
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of pushing the Armed Forces far beyond what is sustainable. We …
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Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of pushing the Armed Forces far beyond what is sustainable. We recommend that either a budget uplift or a (strictly adhered to) prioritisation ranking is introduced. Any prioritisation ranking adopted needs to be drawn up within the National Security Council to ensure agreement amongst the Prime Minister, Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, given that all of those Departments play a role in determining and enabling the deployment of UK Armed Forces.
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Government response AI summary
The government states it continuously reviews priorities with NATO, balances programmes based on DCP23, and uses the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework (CRAF) to inform investment and prioritisation. It also mentions an ongoing review of the Defence Operating Model to better achieve prioritised outcomes.
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Ministry of Defence
113
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Strategic readiness is described by the Minister for the Armed Forces as “the readiness of the nation to bring to bear all the nation’s strength to compete with an adversary”.227
Government response AI summary
The government explains that strategic resilience is maintained through the ability to mobilize military resources, with Reserves and the Strategic Reserve playing a central role. It adds that the Armed Forces are integral to countering threats and supporting civil authorities, maintaining high readiness for national …
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Ministry of Defence
114
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Describing the key components of strategic readiness, the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of the industrial base and its ability to increase its capacity; enablers which project and sustain the force (not just in terms of equipment and warfighters but also medical services, signallers, logisticians and engineers …
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Describing the key components of strategic readiness, the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of the industrial base and its ability to increase its capacity; enablers which project and sustain the force (not just in terms of equipment and warfighters but also medical services, signallers, logisticians and engineers as well as Reserves who can form part of the second echelon force); and resilient (and therefore dispersed) warehousing and stores.228 He acknowledged that the Government needed to consider all of this as part of its future thinking: The MOD generates a first echelon force to get us into the fight. A war of national endeavour requires a whole of government, whole of industry and whole of society mobilisation to sustain us in the fight thereafter. No private business has a peacetime contractual obligation. So, thinking through how we mobilise the UK industrial base to sustain us is a really important piece of work. … We just simply have not had to think about this for a really long time. What is the skills base? What is the capacity to generate a second echelon force? How do you mobilise industry? How do you assure your supply chains? What are your access to the critical minerals, the semiconductors, and all the other things that are needed? The consideration of our national resilience and our ability to war fight will require us to consider what we need to be sovereign and then to start making policy to do so.229
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Government response AI summary
The government is implementing a 'transformed partnership with industry' to build a more resilient industrial base, and is prioritising stockpiles, munitions, enablers, and storage facilities to enhance strategic readiness.
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Ministry of Defence
116
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
As well as addressing its own resilience and readiness issues, the MOD is involved in drawing up the national defence plan which will address the wider issues in strategic resilience and readiness. Initial work was carried out for the Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) and the intention is for this …
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As well as addressing its own resilience and readiness issues, the MOD is involved in drawing up the national defence plan which will address the wider issues in strategic resilience and readiness. Initial work was carried out for the Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) and the intention is for this to become a central part of the next integrated review.232 Commitments in the Defence Command Paper 2023
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Government response AI summary
The government confirms that MOD has consistently maintained national defence plans, recently consolidated its contributions, and works collaboratively with other departments, welcoming continued scrutiny of these ongoing efforts.
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Ministry of Defence
117
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) looked at the requirements for strategic resilience in its final chapter. In relation to the defence of the homeland, the MOD highlighted areas where Defence plays a critical role, including the policing of national airspace (through the constant provision of Quick Reaction Alert aircraft) …
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The Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) looked at the requirements for strategic resilience in its final chapter. In relation to the defence of the homeland, the MOD highlighted areas where Defence plays a critical role, including the policing of national airspace (through the constant provision of Quick Reaction Alert aircraft) and UK waters (monitored by maritime patrol aircraft, surveillance software, coastal radar, 227 Q350 228 Q351; 361; 374; 402; 446; 453 229 Q472–3 230 Q473; Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q56 231 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q118 232 Q383 Ready for War? 45 aviation operations, space-based reconnaissance, and government vessels)233 The DCP23 committed the MOD to increasing efforts to deliver integrated air and missile defence with the RAF promoting the use of “advanced ground-based, airborne, at sea and space-based sensors, and an extensive range of air and missile capabilities, including counter-UAS, to detect, protect and defend the UK”.234 The MOD also announced it would examine the missile “detection and interception technologies of the future”.235 In November 2023, we heard that proposals to strengthen “medium-range air defence system and improving its command-and-control capability, to go beyond what we currently have in the Falklands and to develop a contingent capability” were shortly to go before the investment approvals committee in the MOD.236
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Government response AI summary
The government lists military outputs and non-discretionary tasks related to strategic resilience, confirms the importance of Reserves, and reiterates the Armed Forces' ongoing role in civil contingencies and national security.
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Ministry of Defence
118
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The DCPR23 committed the MOD to working with partners across Government to plan and test how vulnerabilities could be identified and to work together to exercise the systems required in a time of war. It states that Defence will “support a wider Governmental effort to better anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, …
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The DCPR23 committed the MOD to working with partners across Government to plan and test how vulnerabilities could be identified and to work together to exercise the systems required in a time of war. It states that Defence will “support a wider Governmental effort to better anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from risks” as well as working with other Government Departments to implement the 2022 Resilience Framework.237
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has increased transparency in the National Risk Register and that departmental responsibilities for national defence planning will follow the Cabinet Office's Resilience Directorate approach for inter-departmental collaboration on risk.
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Ministry of Defence
119
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Finally, the DCP23 highlights the work carried out by Defence to “identify and mitigate a range of economic security risks” including the screening of investment in defence- relevant sectors of the UK economy. Work is ongoing to establish how Defence can stop adversaries from gaining specialist defence knowledge through research …
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Finally, the DCP23 highlights the work carried out by Defence to “identify and mitigate a range of economic security risks” including the screening of investment in defence- relevant sectors of the UK economy. Work is ongoing to establish how Defence can stop adversaries from gaining specialist defence knowledge through research collaboration, the employment of UK defence and technical experts and business partnerships or technical support contracts. Further work focuses on supporting the UK’s contribution to international efforts to access critical minerals and secure the defence supply chain.238
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Government response AI summary
The government refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, which addresses the identification and mitigation of economic security risks, access to critical minerals, and securing the defence supply chain, implying that work is already underway.
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Ministry of Defence
120
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
External to the DCP23 process, the MOD has also been engaged in Exercise AGILE STANCE which is a five-year programme originally set up by General Sir Nick Carter to “up [the UK Armed Forces’] game in terms of what our readiness looked like and be realistic about it” by exercising …
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External to the DCP23 process, the MOD has also been engaged in Exercise AGILE STANCE which is a five-year programme originally set up by General Sir Nick Carter to “up [the UK Armed Forces’] game in terms of what our readiness looked like and be realistic about it” by exercising the Services’ ability to disperse from their bases in order to maintain survivability in the event of an attack. He explained that it was based on a Cold War concept exercise called Active Edge: If you were based on the inner German border, you were at four hours’ notice to move. An exercise called Active Edge tested your ability to leave your barracks, get into a forest and hide yourself. It exercised the ability of RAF squadrons to leave their bases in Germany and go and park themselves on the autobahn, in cover. I wanted to return to a system where we exercised that regularly. For example, Brize Norton, where every single logistic Air Force egg is in the same basket, had to disperse to—I do not know—an airport in Leeds or wherever it might be. Coningsby should be able to empty itself and send the F-35s on to the M1, whatever it may be. It is the same with the Navy getting out of the three big ports we have.239 233 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 88–9 234 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 90 235 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 91 236 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q10 237 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 87;91 238 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 92 239 Q124 46 Ready for War?
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Government response AI summary
The government refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, implying that ongoing work already addresses the exercise of the Services’ ability to disperse from their bases in order to maintain survivability in the event of an attack.
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Ministry of Defence
121
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Reserve was also being mobilised under Exercise Agile Stance with a series of mobilisation exercises of Active Reserve elements taking place across each of the single Services, between January and March 2024 and in September 2024 which will “inform and …
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The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Reserve was also being mobilised under Exercise Agile Stance with a series of mobilisation exercises of Active Reserve elements taking place across each of the single Services, between January and March 2024 and in September 2024 which will “inform and develop the UK’s ability to mobilise Reserve Forces at pace and scale”. This will be followed by a strategy and concurrently an updated Agile Stance directive “to develop the capability and capacity to mobilise the Strategic Reserves at scale”—something which has not been done since 1991.240 In December 2023, the Permanent Secretary told us that the “the use and availability of, and ability to call out, a strategic reserve” had been a neglected area of MOD thinking in recent years.241 The role of the defence industry in the UK readiness
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Government response AI summary
The government reaffirms the critical role of Reserves and the Strategic Reserve in national resilience and civil contingencies, highlighting their importance for mobilising military resources and sustaining warfighting capabilities.
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Ministry of Defence
122
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Defence industry plays an integral role in Armed Forces readiness. The First Sea Lord explained that the UK Armed Forces rely heavily on the defence industry to deliver “world-leading capability to deal with those who may wish us harm”.242 Nick Childs and Professor Justin Bronk both highlighted that contracts with …
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Defence industry plays an integral role in Armed Forces readiness. The First Sea Lord explained that the UK Armed Forces rely heavily on the defence industry to deliver “world-leading capability to deal with those who may wish us harm”.242 Nick Childs and Professor Justin Bronk both highlighted that contracts with defence companies are vital to ensuring UK Armed Forces readiness in relation to maintenance and sustainment of equipment.243 Beyond equipment, the British Army currently relies on a private company (Capita) to manage its recruitment of personnel, a model which looks to be extended to all the Front Line Commands under the proposed Tri-Service Recruitment contract.244
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Government response AI summary
The government states it will implement a transformed partnership with industry through DCP23 commitments, engaging earlier in strategic conversations to create a more resilient, reliable, and adaptable industrial base.
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Ministry of Defence
123
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Despite the acknowledged reliance on industry, both General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter questioned whether the relationship between the MOD and industry was effective in supporting strategic readiness. General Lord Houghton told us that despite numerous reviews on defence procurement, the relationship between Defence and the defence industry …
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Despite the acknowledged reliance on industry, both General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter questioned whether the relationship between the MOD and industry was effective in supporting strategic readiness. General Lord Houghton told us that despite numerous reviews on defence procurement, the relationship between Defence and the defence industry “is still not anywhere close to where it needs to be”.245 General Sir Nick Carter pointed out that defence industry reports to its shareholders rather than Government and so if the Government required resilience from industry then it would need to incentivise that rather than focusing on efficiency and value for money.246 Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman described the lack of thinking about industrial capacity as a strategic failure.247
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Government response AI summary
The government is reforming the defence acquisition system with a new Integrated Procurement Model and committing to earlier engagement with industry under DCP23 to create a more resilient industrial base.
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Ministry of Defence
124
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In 2023, we examined the organisation responsible for the majority of MOD procurement (Defence Equipment & Support).248 Pointing to the conclusion by the Public Accounts Committee that defence equipment “arrives into service many years late and significantly over-budget, with depressing regularity”, something which means that “neither taxpayers nor our Armed …
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In 2023, we examined the organisation responsible for the majority of MOD procurement (Defence Equipment & Support).248 Pointing to the conclusion by the Public Accounts Committee that defence equipment “arrives into service many years late and significantly over-budget, with depressing regularity”, something which means that “neither taxpayers nor our Armed Forces are being served well”,249 we welcomed the acknowledgement by the CEO of Defence Equipment & Support that “we have some really horrible, broken programmes that aren’t good enough”.250 240 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q46; Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 241 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q97 242 Q318 243 Q34–5; 48–9 244 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 245 Q99 246 Q115 247 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q37–8 248 Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2022–23, It is broke — and it’s time to fix it The UK’s defence procurement system, HC 1099 249 Public Accounts Committee, Forty-Eighth Report of Session 2022–23, MoD Equipment Plan 2022–2023, HC 731 250 Oral evidence taken on 21 February 2023, HC 1119, Q110 Ready for War? 47
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Government response AI summary
The government is reforming the defence acquisition system with a new Integrated Procurement Model, which includes earlier expert assurance and empowerment of subject matter experts, to prevent over-complex and over-budget programmes.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
125
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Professor Clarke warned us in April 2023 that the implications of the Ukraine war were “taking time to filter through to Governments.”251 One of the most obvious examples of this is the length of time it took to conclude a contract for an increase in production of 155 mm artillery …
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Professor Clarke warned us in April 2023 that the implications of the Ukraine war were “taking time to filter through to Governments.”251 One of the most obvious examples of this is the length of time it took to conclude a contract for an increase in production of 155 mm artillery shells.252 This is despite regular pleas from Ukraine for these shells in the Spring of 2023.253 It was first reported that the Government had issued a letter of intent (telling industry that it intended to purchase more artillery shells) in November 2022254 but it took 9 months of negotiation before a contract was finally signed in July 2023.255 When we raised this with the Minister for the Armed Forces, he told us that the delay had been caused by the lack of a “going-concern production line and there was some debate about how the manufacturing capacity was going to be funded”. The contract, when agreed, was a multi-year contract which specified a number of shells to be delivered each year ensuring the long-term viability of the production line, but the Minister acknowledged that it had demonstrated a need to change the way in which the MOD approaches procurement.256 There are possible lessons to be learned from the pace at which our US allies have increased capacity and production. Box 5: Timelines of contracting for NLAWs and 155 shells NLAW • Letter of intent presented to Saab as Authorisation to Proceed: September 2022 • Contract to Saab: 7 December 2022 • Delivery from July 2023 155 Shells • Letter of intent presented to BAE as Authorisation to Proceed: November 2022 • Contract to BAE: 11 July 2023 • Delivery: Q1 2025 Source: Compiled by Defence Committee staff
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Government response AI summary
The government allocated £1.95Bn and placed £1Bn in contracts to build munitions stockpiles, including 155mm rounds, and has developed a strategy for munitions based on lessons from the Ukraine war.
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Ministry of Defence
126
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
When we took evidence on DE&S, we heard from industry that it wanted: long- term consistency on required capabilities; earlier engagement in the requirement setting process, multi-year budgets; an improved (and consistent) social value framework; and decisions made with reference made to imperatives other than lowest up-front cost (such as …
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When we took evidence on DE&S, we heard from industry that it wanted: long- term consistency on required capabilities; earlier engagement in the requirement setting process, multi-year budgets; an improved (and consistent) social value framework; and decisions made with reference made to imperatives other than lowest up-front cost (such as end-user needs, through-life cost, or industrial resilience).257 There was a recognition among witnesses that improvements were taking place but a warning that much of the required change would need to be cultural (as opposed to process-based).258 ADS also 251 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q17 252 Q271; Defence Committee, Sixth Special Report of Session 2022–23, Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report, HC 1533, Para 16 253 Ukraine asks EU for 250,000 artillery shells a month, Financial Times, 3 March 2023; Why the 155 mm round is so critical to the war in Ukraine, Associated Press News, 23 April 2023 254 UK Asks BAE to Ramp Up Artillery Shell Production Amid Ukraine Drawdown, The Defense Post, 17 November 2022 255 DE&S places new order with BAE Systems to increase 155mm shells stockpile for British Army, DE&S press release, 11 July 2023 256 Q378; 381 257 BAE Systems plc (DES0035); ADS (DES0021); Lockheed Martin UK (DES0022) 258 Oral evidence taken on 17 May 2023 HC (2022–23) 1099, Q25 [Lucia Retter] 48 Ready for War? highlighted that many of these issues had a different impact on SMEs meaning that when changes were introduced, their impact needed to be considered not just in relation to defence primes, but in relation to the whole of the supply chain.259
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Government response AI summary
The government's new Integrated Procurement Model aims for earlier expert assurance, empowerment of subject matter experts, and spiral development, alongside a transformed partnership with industry that includes earlier strategic engagement to build resilience.
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Ministry of Defence
128
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Our Report did not cover issues with the outsourcing of Army recruitment as that is (currently) a contract managed by the Army rather than DE&S. However, we raised it and the proposed future tri-service recruitment contract with the Secretary of State and the Minister for the Armed Forces. The Secretary …
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Our Report did not cover issues with the outsourcing of Army recruitment as that is (currently) a contract managed by the Army rather than DE&S. However, we raised it and the proposed future tri-service recruitment contract with the Secretary of State and the Minister for the Armed Forces. The Secretary of State assured us that he was “looking at it carefully”261 and the Minister told us that he was in no doubt that the future tri-service recruitment contract needed to work better than the current model. For him, this included ensuring that society’s connection with the military was maintained—a difficulty when its personnel were consistently deployed away from the communities from which it needed to recruit.262
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Government response AI summary
The government accepted all 67 recommendations from the Haythornthwaite Review addressing recruitment and retention, with a formal response outlining next steps and a broad roadmap to be published in 2024.
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Ministry of Defence
129
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Shortly after our Report was published, the DCP23 was produced by the Government. It announced that key lessons from Ukraine had resulted in the following conclusions: • The pace of battlefield innovation means that decades-long acquisition programmes and upgrades are no longer suitable—instead simpler platforms which can be upgraded at …
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Shortly after our Report was published, the DCP23 was produced by the Government. It announced that key lessons from Ukraine had resulted in the following conclusions: • The pace of battlefield innovation means that decades-long acquisition programmes and upgrades are no longer suitable—instead simpler platforms which can be upgraded at speed (and by a range of companies, rather than just the original prime contractor) are required; • Defence must partner with industry, sharing both advances in technology and the risk in exploiting them in recognition of the key role which the industrial base plays in UK national security; 259 ADS (DES0021) 260 Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2022–23, It is broke — and it’s time to fix it The UK’s defence procurement system, HC 1099 261 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q51 262 Q463–6 Ready for War? 49 • Time is key—platforms must be accepted at ‘good enough’ so that they can be deployed at pace. The MOD therefore committed to forging a new alliance with industry to create an environment that “generates a shared sense of national endeavour”.263
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Government response AI summary
The government highlighted its new Integrated Procurement Model and transformed partnership with industry, which aligns with the DCP23 conclusions by focusing on earlier expert assurance, driving pace through spiral development, and creating a resilient industrial base.
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Ministry of Defence
130
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Many of our recommendations were adopted within the DCP23. That document commits Defence to engaging at an earlier stage in strategic conversations with industry about requirements and developing relationships with key Defence Executives. This should allow Defence and industry to work together to address issues such as “availability of critical …
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Many of our recommendations were adopted within the DCP23. That document commits Defence to engaging at an earlier stage in strategic conversations with industry about requirements and developing relationships with key Defence Executives. This should allow Defence and industry to work together to address issues such as “availability of critical skills, diversification and resilience within the supply chain and productivity”. In addition, industry are being involved earlier in the military capability development processes and have greater visibility of Defence’s long-term plan.264
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterated its commitments from DCP23, detailing how the new Integrated Procurement Model supports earlier engagement with industry, expert assurance, and spiral development to build a resilient industrial base.
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Ministry of Defence
131
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In December 2023, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there had been recognition of the importance of trying “to make sure that our pipeline of munitions is always on, rather than boom and bust” and that the MOD were now working with …
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In December 2023, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there had been recognition of the importance of trying “to make sure that our pipeline of munitions is always on, rather than boom and bust” and that the MOD were now working with industry to secure long-term contracts. He explained that the UK Armed Forces have “shifted from what we would say in the military as ‘operating’ in various parts of the world to now ‘deterring’, but being prepared to war-fight if necessary [which] means long-term commitment to industry”.265 The Director General Strategic Enablers and Deputy CEO at Defence Equipment & Support explained that those long term commitments allowed industry to invest in skills generation: There is scaling of things in the munitions complex, where we need to build long-term pipelines. The surety of contract you talked about allows [industry] to build the skills pipelines and training academies that need to be there.266 There is a broader economic argument for investing in the skills being taught through apprenticeships and training in defence industry and the Armed Forces as they are also required in other sectors of the economy that the UK is seeking to grow. For instance, skills required in the Defence Nuclear Enterprise are also needed in the civil nuclear workforce.267 Similarly, digital skills required for defence are also of benefit to the wider UK economy.268
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Government response AI summary
The government highlighted its new Integrated Procurement Model and transformed partnership with industry, which aims for earlier strategic engagement, expert assurance, and spiral development to create a resilient industrial base and align with long-term commitments.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
132
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
As well as earlier engagement on requirements, the acquisition process is moving from one focused on specifying exact requirements to one which focuses on the ‘spiral development’ of capabilities—this will allow for the iterative development of capabilities to keep pace with innovation on the battlefield whilst also ensuring that these …
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As well as earlier engagement on requirements, the acquisition process is moving from one focused on specifying exact requirements to one which focuses on the ‘spiral development’ of capabilities—this will allow for the iterative development of capabilities to keep pace with innovation on the battlefield whilst also ensuring that these are not closed systems which can only be developed by the original vendor (“vendor lock-in”).269
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Government response AI summary
The government confirmed that its new Integrated Procurement Model emphasizes earlier engagement and spiral development of capabilities, aiming for iterative improvements and a resilient industrial base.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
133
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In order to ensure that Defence can replenish and increase stockpiles of munitions, spares and operational supplies, the DCP23 recognises that industry needs to have robust and resilient supply chains which have assured access to “key materials, components and 263 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and …
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In order to ensure that Defence can replenish and increase stockpiles of munitions, spares and operational supplies, the DCP23 recognises that industry needs to have robust and resilient supply chains which have assured access to “key materials, components and 263 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 37–8 264 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 39 265 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q60–2 266 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q115 267 Oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 22 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 451, Q83 268 Q406 269 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 40 50 Ready for War? critical technologies”. A joint assessment of industrial capability, capacity, and sustainment will be undertaken along with communications on sovereign requirements (including what needs to be ‘onshore’ and what can be ‘friendshored’) and engagement on how to incentivise industry to prioritise national security needs over commercial ones.270 In November 2023, we were told that the MOD was launching a supply chain strategy which would identify (as part of the increasing defence outputs programme) where those supply chain pinch points are and ensure that the Department is “being proactive around them”.271
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Government response AI summary
The government committed £1.95 billion from the 2023 Spring Budget to build munitions and medical stockpiles and support critical activities, including supply chain mapping. It detailed significant investments in various munitions purchases and confirmed £1 billion in contracts to replenish UK stocks of equipment sent …
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Ministry of Defence
134
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising time within its acquisition system (within the parameters of time, cost and performance) as: driving pace is critical–even if it forces us to increase our risk tolerance elsewhere. Our ambition is to reduce radically the average time from the identification of a military need …
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The DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising time within its acquisition system (within the parameters of time, cost and performance) as: driving pace is critical–even if it forces us to increase our risk tolerance elsewhere. Our ambition is to reduce radically the average time from the identification of a military need to contract placement, and from contract placement to delivery to the front-line.272
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterated its commitment to prioritising speed in the acquisition system through the new Integrated Procurement Model, which involves earlier expert assurance, empowering subject matter experts, and using 'spiral' development to reduce programme complexity and delivery times.
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Ministry of Defence
135
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
It also states that Defence intends to set “a maximum five-year commitment for acquisition programmes, with a maximum three-year commitment for digital programmes” although it acknowledges that the MOD procures a wide range of equipment, goods and services and so will need to “tailor our approach to reflect the risk …
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It also states that Defence intends to set “a maximum five-year commitment for acquisition programmes, with a maximum three-year commitment for digital programmes” although it acknowledges that the MOD procures a wide range of equipment, goods and services and so will need to “tailor our approach to reflect the risk and complexity of each programme, ensuring that we are proportionate in the approach we take. For example, we recognise that some of our more exceptional programmes–those on the Government Major Projects Portfolio–will out of necessity take longer.”273
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Government response AI summary
The government states that the new Integrated Procurement Model, which involves earlier expert assurance and empowered subject matter experts, is designed to ensure future military programs are delivered efficiently, avoiding past challenges of over-complexity and delays, and will incorporate 'spiral' development.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
136
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Both Commander, Strategic Command and the Minister for the Armed Forces were at pains to emphasise that this was a real change in approach. Commander, Strategic Command told us that Defence needed to look at long-term pipelines to supply the munitions and stockpile capabilities which meant moving away from a …
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Both Commander, Strategic Command and the Minister for the Armed Forces were at pains to emphasise that this was a real change in approach. Commander, Strategic Command told us that Defence needed to look at long-term pipelines to supply the munitions and stockpile capabilities which meant moving away from a “just-enough, just- in-time approach [which] has put us in a place that limits our capability, our decision space and our options … We may well need enduring and surge support to be able to execute against particular contingencies”.274 He noted that industry had welcomed the concept of a partnership which spreads risk and provides long-term resilience but that Defence required the “freedoms and ability to enter into those sorts of agreements and structures”.275 The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the new approach would require “all sides of the equation—the MOD, Government and the Treasury—… to be willing to change policy on how we procure, how we work with industry and how we run competitions” as well as industry changing its approach to the process.276
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Government response AI summary
The government affirmed its commitment to a transformed partnership with industry and a new Integrated Procurement Model to create a more resilient industrial base, engaging earlier in strategic conversations to avoid previous challenges of over-complex and delayed programmes.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
137
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Minister was clear that current procurement processes were no longer viable as a result of the pace of innovation.277 He acknowledged that this was a complete paradigm shift and a “frankly nascent part of policy making”.278 He warned that no private business has a peacetime obligation to maintain unused …
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The Minister was clear that current procurement processes were no longer viable as a result of the pace of innovation.277 He acknowledged that this was a complete paradigm shift and a “frankly nascent part of policy making”.278 He warned that no private business has a peacetime obligation to maintain unused production capacity without a contract 270 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 40–41 271 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q78 272 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 42 273 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, Cm 901, July 2023, p 43 274 Q372 275 Q373 276 Q377 277 Q377; 381 278 Q389–391; 472 Ready for War? 51 and so having the resilience in the industrial base to scale is a live issue which neither the MOD nor the Department for Business and Trade (responsible for the mobilisation of the industrial base) have considered for at least a generation. He told us that: Whoever is in my office, the Secretary of State’s office and MinDP’s office for the next integrated review will have to have this stuff in mind, because we have not had to think about it since the ’80s.279 On 22 January 2024, the Permanent Secretary told our sister Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, that the MOD was hoping to make the announcement of the changes to procurement policy before the House rose for the Easter recess.280 Conclusions and recommendations
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Government response AI summary
The government highlighted its new Integrated Procurement Model, a system designed to reform military procurement with earlier expert assurance, empowered subject matter experts, and 'spiral' development to avoid over-complex, over-budget, and delayed programmes.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
139
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not yet in a position to reach a view on the …
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The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not yet in a position to reach a view on the appropriateness or effectiveness of the likely policy changes—which we very much hope will be announced to the House prior to the Easter recess, in late March 2024.
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Government response AI summary
The government confirmed that details of the new Integrated Procurement Model were announced by the Minister for Defence Procurement on 28 February 2024, prior to the Easter recess, and a supporting document is publicly available.
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Ministry of Defence
141
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK and Allies.
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Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK and Allies.
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed that Russia's invasion changed the threat, requiring a wholesale shift, and outlined its response via the 2023 Defence Command Paper, a sustained campaigning approach, Euro-Atlantic focus, NATO commitments, and reliance on Reserves and a Strategic Reserve for warfighting resilience.
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Ministry of Defence
142
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have sustained this effort for so long. But overtasking has both a personal cost for …
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It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have sustained this effort for so long. But overtasking has both a personal cost for service personnel and an opportunity cost for the UK. The increase in global instability has coincided with a period of decreasing recruitment and reduced industrial capacity, which requires sustained, long-term investment. The Government risks being unable to build true warfighting and strategic readiness because of the sheer pace of operations, which could threaten the security of the UK.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged challenges like overtasking, recruitment shortfalls, and industrial capacity, outlining its strategy through DCP23, increased budget, and a transformed industry partnership. It is prioritising workforce model transformation with improved career opportunities, easier re-joining, pay increases, and a new Transformation Directorate to boost recruitment …
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
143
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Personnel need time to recover from operations, and time to train and develop new skills. But the demand of operations makes that harder to achieve. It is unsurprising that more people are leaving the Forces than joining them. All three services have growing capability shortfalls—these have been a feature of …
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Personnel need time to recover from operations, and time to train and develop new skills. But the demand of operations makes that harder to achieve. It is unsurprising that more people are leaving the Forces than joining them. All three services have growing capability shortfalls—these have been a feature of our inquiries over the course of this Parliament. As these shortfalls increase, this places greater pressure on those who remain, leading to a vicious cycle.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged the challenges of operational demands on personnel, retention, and capability shortfalls, committing to implement all 67 recommendations from the Haythornthwaite Review. A formal response outlining delivery and implementation steps for recruitment and retention will be published in 2024.
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Ministry of Defence
144
Recommendation
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. Ready for War? 53 Conclusions and recommendations What is Readiness?
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The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. Ready for War? 53 Conclusions and recommendations What is Readiness?
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees the threat has changed and states it is already embedding a sustained campaigning approach and leveraging existing commitments to NATO, reserves, and strategic reserves to ensure readiness.
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Ministry of Defence
1
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The protection of sensitive information plays a vital role in the security of this country. However, the Ministry of Defence has become demonstrably less transparent over the past decade. The fact that the Minister and senior military personnel did not realise that information which is now classified was once widely …
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The protection of sensitive information plays a vital role in the security of this country. However, the Ministry of Defence has become demonstrably less transparent over the past decade. The fact that the Minister and senior military personnel did not realise that information which is now classified was once widely available suggests that this trend towards greater secrecy has been either clandestine or unconscious. Other nations, facing very similar threats, provide significantly more information about readiness than the UK, both to the public and to relevant parliamentary committees.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for greater transparency regarding planning assumptions and readiness, immediately releasing 'headlines' from current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA23) and committing to release as much information as possible from the next iteration.
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Ministry of Defence
2
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information regarding threats and the UK’s readiness to respond to those …
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Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information regarding threats and the UK’s readiness to respond to those threats, and these judgments may change as the threat landscape changes. However, Parliament’s role and our role in particular is to hold Ministers to account for their actions. We cannot fulfil this role without adequate information, along the lines that was available to our predecessors. At present there is no regular mechanism which allows us to scrutinise ministerial decisions on readiness and their impact on risk.
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Government response AI summary
The government committed to establishing a regular annual open session for the committee to meet with Ministers and Chiefs of the Single Services to scrutinize readiness decisions and risk management.
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Ministry of Defence
4
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they are. It does not need to be like this. The …
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In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they are. It does not need to be like this. The information flow in many of our NATO allies is far franker. Our request is not for very detailed, very highly classified information, but for information that only the most naïve would think was not already in the hands of the UK’s potential adversaries and their intelligence apparatus.
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Government response AI summary
The government explained the evolution of Defence Planning Assumptions into classified documents but committed to enhancing transparency and has released a version of the 2023 DPAs.
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Ministry of Defence
10
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention of personnel. It also appears to be delaying the development …
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The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention of personnel. It also appears to be delaying the development of warfighting readiness.
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Government response AI summary
The government responded by referencing the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23), which outlines its strategy to protect the nation and enhance lethality of forces through initiatives like the Naval Strike Missile, Army deep fire capabilities, and RAF drone technology, alongside increasing operational productivity. This outlines …
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Ministry of Defence
13
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in progress but we intend to maintain ongoing scrutiny of the …
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We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in progress but we intend to maintain ongoing scrutiny of the Government’s developing plans to ensure warfighting and strategic readiness.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that the MOD has always maintained defence plans and has recently consolidated contributions and improved command, control, and operational planning, and is currently considering capability options to sustain warfighting.
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Ministry of Defence
14
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not yet in a position to reach a view on the …
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The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not yet in a position to reach a view on the appropriateness or effectiveness of the likely policy changes—which we very much hope will be announced to the House prior to the Easter recess, in late March 2024.
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Government response AI summary
The government committed to and has now delivered details of the new Integrated Procurement Model, which were set out in an oral statement on 28 February 2024 with a supporting document made available.
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Ministry of Defence
16
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK and Allies.
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Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK and Allies.
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed that the threat has fundamentally changed due to Russia's invasion and described its ongoing efforts, including updating the Defence Command Paper and embedding a campaigning approach, to maintain warfighting resilience.
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Ministry of Defence
17
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have 56 Ready for War? sustained this effort for so long. But overtasking has both …
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It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have 56 Ready for War? sustained this effort for so long. But overtasking has both a personal cost for service personnel and an opportunity cost for the UK. The increase in global instability has coincided with a period of decreasing recruitment and reduced industrial capacity, which requires sustained, long-term investment. The Government risks being unable to build true warfighting and strategic readiness because of the sheer pace of operations, which could threaten the security of the UK.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the changed threat context and references the Defence Command Paper 2023, outlining existing strategic ambitions to protect the nation. It details ongoing efforts by the Armed Forces, Reserves, and Strategic Reserve to meet operational and civil contingency commitments, implying current approaches …
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Ministry of Defence
19
Recommendation
First Report - Ready for War?
Accepted
The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. (Paragraph 144) Ready for War? 57
Government response AI summary
The government agrees the threat environment has changed and asserts that it is already responding by embedding a sustained campaigning approach, maintaining strong NATO commitments, and developing strategic reserves and civil contingencies support.
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Ministry of Defence