Select Committee · Defence Committee

Armed Forces Readiness

Status: Closed Opened: 24 Apr 2023 Closed: 24 May 2024 10 recommendations 122 conclusions 1 report

The Committee welcomes written evidence on the following: Are the armed forces sufficiently capable, resourced and ready to protect the UK and our allies? What are the main gaps in capability and/or readiness, and what will it take to fill these gaps? Are the UK armed forces a ‘tier one fighting force’? Do they need …

Clear

Reports

1 report
Title HC No. Published Items Response
First Report - Ready for War? HC 26 4 Feb 2024 132 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

13 items
61 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Limited airfield flexibility hampers RAF warfighting ability despite past investment, requiring further resources.

The Chief of the Air Staff argued that the RAF had benefitted significantly from investment in the past 15 years which had resulted in the bringing into service the F-35 fleet; A400M fleet; the Voyager fleet and the P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleet. This had made the RAF “more capable” …

Government response. The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address the RAF's acknowledged need for investment in spares, infrastructure, and …
Ministry of Defence
63 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Strategic Command maintains constant readiness but raises concerns about war-fighting medical cover.

He acknowledged the difficulty of talking about readiness in relation to Strategic Command given that “a lot of my organisation operates at readiness all the time, and readiness does not apply to quite a lot of my organisation”. He cited the nature of “constant engagement” in the work of PJHQ; …

Government response. The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address concerns about the scale of medical cover needed for war-fighting …
Ministry of Defence
65 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Strategic Command addresses shortfalls by enhancing medical capacity and introducing digital career pathways.

When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves through the NHS in order to avoid wasting product by …

Government response. The government details £1.95Bn in funding from the 2023 Spring Budget allocated to improve resilience and build munitions and medical stockpiles, and nearly £1Bn in contracts to replenish equipment, but does not address the specific methods mentioned for alleviating personnel …
Ministry of Defence
69 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Allocated funds for stockpile replenishment at risk of diversion to offset MOD funding shortfalls.

The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 134 Q453 135 Q213; 220; 237; 322 136 Ammunition supply …

Government response. The government reiterates the allocation of £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget for munitions and medical stockpiles and contracts to replenish equipment, but it does not address the committee's concern regarding the NAO's finding that these funds were not ringfenced …
Ministry of Defence
72 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

DCP23 policy intentions on MOD-industry relationship and industrial capacity to be addressed later.

We address the DCP23’s policy intentions on the MOD’s relationship with industry and the steps it has subsequently taken to improve industrial capacity in the final chapter on strategic readiness. Recruitment and retention

Government response. The response refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, its purpose and objectives, but does not address industrial capacity or strategic readiness, the topic of the recommendation.
Ministry of Defence
84 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Budgetary constraints force cuts to training, impacting readiness, retention and maintenance

In December 2023, we were told that budgetary constraints meant that training had been cut in 2023 (and had the potential of being cut similarly in 2024) in order to manage the pressures on the defence budget.184 As the Chief of the General Staff noted, training is a vital part …

Government response. The government's response highlights the Defence Command Paper 2023 and its focus on enhancing capabilities and operational productivity, but does not directly address the committee's specific concern about cuts to training due to budgetary constraints and their impact on readiness …
Ministry of Defence
85 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Government over-reliance on Military Aid to Civil Authorities pressures Armed Forces readiness

Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) requests are an additional operational pressure on the armed forces, but we are unable to quantify this without information on the impact of MACA on the readiness of the Armed Forces, requested from the Government in November 2023, but not received at the time …

Government response. The government affirms that the Armed Forces will continue to provide support to civil authorities and maintain high readiness for national events, but the response does not address the committee's concern about other departments' over-reliance on military assistance or provide …
Ministry of Defence
93 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Budgetary pressures hinder faster implementation of Haythornthwaite Review recommendations for the Armed Forces.

The Minister for the Armed Forces welcomed the work ongoing in relation to the Haythornthwaite recommendations but when asked whether that work could be speeded up, told us that whilst the MOD’s inclination was to implement as many of the recommendations as possible, that work was not cost-neutral and the …

Government response. The government states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining implementation steps, but the response does not specifically address the Minister's previously noted concerns about budgetary pressures impacting the speed of this …
Ministry of Defence
94 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

DCP21 committed to new roles, flexible service for reserves and the Reserve Forces Review 2030.

The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and abroad”. The MOD would “create an efficient and fluid spectrum …

Government response. The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but the response does not specifically address the prior DCP21 commitments regarding reserve forces or the recommendations …
Ministry of Defence
95 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

MOD to create Reserves Roadmap synergising Haythornthwaite and Reserve Forces Review 2030 recommendations.

Both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the MOD Permanent Secretary pointed out that much of the work relating to the Haythornthwaite Review would impact on thinking about the Reserves.200 In July 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the MOD intended to respond to Lord …

Government response. The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but it does not address the previously stated intention to respond to the Reserve Forces Review 2030 …
Ministry of Defence
115 Conclusion First Report - Ready for War? Not Addressed

Strategic readiness depends on other government departments to address national skills shortages and infrastructure.

It therefore goes wider than the remit of the Ministry of Defence—for example, having appropriate infrastructure and sufficient skilled and experienced workers are areas which are vital but are responsibilities of other government departments.230 A current example of this is that the national skills shortage is the main cause of …

Government response. The government's response focuses on MOD's internal recruitment and retention efforts and the Haythornthwaite Review, but does not address the conclusion that issues like infrastructure and skilled workers extend beyond MOD's remit and involve other government departments.
Ministry of Defence

Oral evidence sessions

6 sessions
Date Witnesses
22 Nov 2023 General Sir Jim Hockenhull · Ministry of Defence, Rt Hon James Heappey MP · Ministry of Defence View ↗
14 Nov 2023 Admiral Sir Ben Key KCB CBE · Ministry of Defence, Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse CBE · Ministry of Defence View ↗
7 Nov 2023 Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton KCB · Ministry of Defence, General Sir Patrick Sanders · Ministry of Defence View ↗
21 Jun 2023 General (Retd) Sir Nick Carter, Former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) View ↗
20 Jun 2023 The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL View ↗
6 Jun 2023 Dr Simon Anglim · Kings College London, Nick Childs · The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Professor Justin Bronk · RUSI View ↗