Recommendations & Conclusions
13 items
60
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that whilst there may be a tension between training and operational sorties, by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational sorties as in the previous 12 months while also managing to deploy to the US Red Flag series of …
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The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that whilst there may be a tension between training and operational sorties, by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational sorties as in the previous 12 months while also managing to deploy to the US Red Flag series of training events. The Red Flag series had seen the RAF being tested “against some of the most difficult air threats in the world, [and the RAF] did incredibly well. Some of our missile systems are far superior to even the Americans’.”123
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Government response AI summary
The government published the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) and articulates a new, clear purpose for Defence: to protect the nation, and to help it prosper.
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Ministry of Defence
61
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
The Chief of the Air Staff argued that the RAF had benefitted significantly from investment in the past 15 years which had resulted in the bringing into service the F-35 fleet; A400M fleet; the Voyager fleet and the P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleet. This had made the RAF “more capable” …
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The Chief of the Air Staff argued that the RAF had benefitted significantly from investment in the past 15 years which had resulted in the bringing into service the F-35 fleet; A400M fleet; the Voyager fleet and the P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleet. This had made the RAF “more capable” and therefore “better able to meet the threats of the high- end fight”. However, he acknowledged the concerns about dispersal. He told us the current level of “agility and operational flexibility” was hampering the RAF’s warfighting ability leading to a need to increase flexibility in the airfields the RAF utilised. This would require “investment in spares and some further investment in infrastructure and in people”.124 Strategic Command
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Government response AI summary
The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address the RAF's acknowledged need for investment in spares, infrastructure, and people for dispersal and operational …
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Ministry of Defence
63
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
He acknowledged the difficulty of talking about readiness in relation to Strategic Command given that “a lot of my organisation operates at readiness all the time, and readiness does not apply to quite a lot of my organisation”. He cited the nature of “constant engagement” in the work of PJHQ; …
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He acknowledged the difficulty of talking about readiness in relation to Strategic Command given that “a lot of my organisation operates at readiness all the time, and readiness does not apply to quite a lot of my organisation”. He cited the nature of “constant engagement” in the work of PJHQ; Defence Intelligence; Special Forces and defensive cyber operators. However, he also acknowledged that there were weaknesses, for example he had “concerns over our ability to provide the scale of medical cover that we are going to need in the context of a war-fighting operation”.126
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Government response AI summary
The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address concerns about the scale of medical cover needed for war-fighting operations.
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Ministry of Defence
65
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves through the NHS in order to avoid wasting product by …
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When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves through the NHS in order to avoid wasting product by having it go out of date on the shelves.129 • Considering defence’s ability to deploy civilian medical staff (depending on the environment alongside the nature and level of threat) and working with NATO to understand where other nations might be able to provide capability.130 • Employing locums as surge capacity to resolve current domestic medical and dentistry capacity shortfalls.131 Digital • Exploring the potential for introducing bursaries for 16-year olds to encourage them to come into the service at 18 with an expectation that they will serve a shorter career than traditional. He told us that the “vision is that they will serve for seven years. We will give them an in-service degree. We expect many of them to leave in their mid-20s, hopefully then going out into the UK economy and 125 Q366 126 Q367 127 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 128 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2022–23, HC 1468, July 2023, p 46 129 Q367 130 Q369 131 Q374 28 Ready for War? helping with the right skills, qualifications and approach to life to make them influential members in the digital and cyber business of the UK. We hope they will come back at lateral entry later in their career, and certainly that they will join the reserves.”132
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Government response AI summary
The government details £1.95Bn in funding from the 2023 Spring Budget allocated to improve resilience and build munitions and medical stockpiles, and nearly £1Bn in contracts to replenish equipment, but does not address the specific methods mentioned for alleviating personnel shortfalls.
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Ministry of Defence
69
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 134 Q453 135 Q213; 220; 237; 322 136 Ammunition supply …
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The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 134 Q453 135 Q213; 220; 237; 322 136 Ammunition supply chain crisis: Ukraine war tests Europe in race to rearm, Financial Times, 7 February 2023 137 Alex Vershinin, The Return of Industrial Warfare, RUSI Commentary, 17 June 2022 138 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q29 139 Q76; 162 140 Oral evidence taken on 6 July 2021, HC (2021–2022) 166, Q282; Oral evidence taken on 19 April 2022, HC (2021– 2022) 608, Q93 Ready for War? 29 Systems and Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles”.141 In addition to the £560 million announced at the Autumn Statement in 2022, the IR23 had announced £1.95 billion to replenish stockpiles in 2023–24 and 2024–25 “and to increase them in line with a reassessment of appropriate levels … and to invest in the resilience of the UK’s munitions infrastructure”142 and DCP23 a further £2.5 billion on “replenishing—and augmenting—” munitions and stockpiles “through the coming decade”143. However, the NAO’s recent report on the Equipment Plan 2023–33 found that the £1.95 billion allocated in the IR23 (and then the Spring Budget 2023) was not ringfenced and so the MOD “is considering using it to help offset its funding shortfall in 2023–24 and 2024–25”.144
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterates the allocation of £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget for munitions and medical stockpiles and contracts to replenish equipment, but it does not address the committee's concern regarding the NAO's finding that these funds were not ringfenced and could be used to …
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Ministry of Defence
72
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
We address the DCP23’s policy intentions on the MOD’s relationship with industry and the steps it has subsequently taken to improve industrial capacity in the final chapter on strategic readiness. Recruitment and retention
Government response AI summary
The response refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, its purpose and objectives, but does not address industrial capacity or strategic readiness, the topic of the recommendation.
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Ministry of Defence
84
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
In December 2023, we were told that budgetary constraints meant that training had been cut in 2023 (and had the potential of being cut similarly in 2024) in order to manage the pressures on the defence budget.184 As the Chief of the General Staff noted, training is a vital part …
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In December 2023, we were told that budgetary constraints meant that training had been cut in 2023 (and had the potential of being cut similarly in 2024) in order to manage the pressures on the defence budget.184 As the Chief of the General Staff noted, training is a vital part of maintaining an agile force which can undertake “everything from peacekeeping operations right the way up to warfighting operations”.185 We heard that as well as impacting on warfighting readiness, the tempo of activity was also negatively impacting retention186 and the planned maintenance of platforms.187
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Government response AI summary
The government's response highlights the Defence Command Paper 2023 and its focus on enhancing capabilities and operational productivity, but does not directly address the committee's specific concern about cuts to training due to budgetary constraints and their impact on readiness and retention.
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Ministry of Defence
85
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) requests are an additional operational pressure on the armed forces, but we are unable to quantify this without information on the impact of MACA on the readiness of the Armed Forces, requested from the Government in November 2023, but not received at the time …
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Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) requests are an additional operational pressure on the armed forces, but we are unable to quantify this without information on the impact of MACA on the readiness of the Armed Forces, requested from the Government in November 2023, but not received at the time of writing. We have concerns that other Departments have become over-reliant on calling for assistance from the military rather than building civilian capacity. Can readiness be improved through policy changes?
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Government response AI summary
The government affirms that the Armed Forces will continue to provide support to civil authorities and maintain high readiness for national events, but the response does not address the committee's concern about other departments' over-reliance on military assistance or provide the requested information on MACA's …
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Ministry of Defence
89
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Service accommodation is also part of the package of incentives available to the Armed Forces and their families. We expect to report separately on this later in 2024.193
Ministry of Defence
93
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
The Minister for the Armed Forces welcomed the work ongoing in relation to the Haythornthwaite recommendations but when asked whether that work could be speeded up, told us that whilst the MOD’s inclination was to implement as many of the recommendations as possible, that work was not cost-neutral and the …
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The Minister for the Armed Forces welcomed the work ongoing in relation to the Haythornthwaite recommendations but when asked whether that work could be speeded up, told us that whilst the MOD’s inclination was to implement as many of the recommendations as possible, that work was not cost-neutral and the Department was facing some “pretty severe pressures” on its budget.197 Reserve Forces Review 2030
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Government response AI summary
The government states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining implementation steps, but the response does not specifically address the Minister's previously noted concerns about budgetary pressures impacting the speed of this work.
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Ministry of Defence
94
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and abroad”. The MOD would “create an efficient and fluid spectrum …
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The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and abroad”. The MOD would “create an efficient and fluid spectrum of military service, providing our people with a range of commitment options at different stages of their lives” and improving “the way we recruit and employ reserves, enabling us to bring expertise from across society, government, industry and academia to bear on some of the greatest challenges we face”. In addition, DCP21 committed the MOD to considering the recommendations from the Lord Lancaster-led Reserves Forces Review 2030 (RF30) “in due course”.198 That Review was published in May 2021 and the Government has yet to respond to its 18 recommendations (despite our recommendation in July 2022 that it ought to prioritise the work).199 194 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q13; 15 195 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 196 Q46 197 Q407 198 Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, Cm 411, March 2021, p 35 199 Defence Committee Second Report of Session 2022–23, The Integrated Review: Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, HC 180, Para 56 38 Ready for War? Box 4: The Reserve Forces Review 2030 The Reserve Forces Review 2030 was commissioned by the then-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, and conducted by a small team led by a senior serving reservist and former Minister of Armed Forces, Brigadier The Rt Hon the Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton TD PC. The Report offered 18 recommendations for consideration, in four key areas: • Re-defining the Reserves’ relationship with society, recognising the need to cooperate and share expertise with, for instance, industry and academia. • Expanding the role of the Reserves as part of an integrated joint force, h
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Government response AI summary
The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but the response does not specifically address the prior DCP21 commitments regarding reserve forces or the recommendations from the Lord Lancaster-led Reserve …
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Ministry of Defence
95
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
Both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the MOD Permanent Secretary pointed out that much of the work relating to the Haythornthwaite Review would impact on thinking about the Reserves.200 In July 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the MOD intended to respond to Lord …
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Both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the MOD Permanent Secretary pointed out that much of the work relating to the Haythornthwaite Review would impact on thinking about the Reserves.200 In July 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the MOD intended to respond to Lord Lancaster’s 2021 report on the Reserve Forces Review 2030 (RF30) in April 2024201 and in October, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans announced the creation of a Reserves Roadmap which would look at synergising the recommendations of both the RF30 Report and the Haythornthwaite Review in order to align and implement them. The Minister told the House that the intention was: To enhance the way reserves are utilised and supported, Defence will take a more strategic, top-down approach, to address policy and process frustrations, and tackle the cultural and resource issues Reservists face. This will also improve the structures and mobilisation processes needed to generate second- and third-echelon forces to reinforce and sustain warfighting capabilities, protect the Homeland, and strengthen national resilience.202 Prioritisation and specialisation
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Government response AI summary
The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but it does not address the previously stated intention to respond to the Reserve Forces Review 2030 by April 2024 or the …
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Ministry of Defence
115
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Not Addressed
It therefore goes wider than the remit of the Ministry of Defence—for example, having appropriate infrastructure and sufficient skilled and experienced workers are areas which are vital but are responsibilities of other government departments.230 A current example of this is that the national skills shortage is the main cause of …
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It therefore goes wider than the remit of the Ministry of Defence—for example, having appropriate infrastructure and sufficient skilled and experienced workers are areas which are vital but are responsibilities of other government departments.230 A current example of this is that the national skills shortage is the main cause of the issues in at least two thirds of the programmes rated ‘red’ in the Defence Major Projects Portfolio (DMPP).231
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on MOD's internal recruitment and retention efforts and the Haythornthwaite Review, but does not address the conclusion that issues like infrastructure and skilled workers extend beyond MOD's remit and involve other government departments.
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Ministry of Defence