Recommendations & Conclusions
19 items
40
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the UK Armed Forces were deployed in excess of what the force structure was designed for, noting that “there is absolutely no pretending that we are not spending resource more keenly than our 51 X (formerly known as Twitter) post by the …
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The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the UK Armed Forces were deployed in excess of what the force structure was designed for, noting that “there is absolutely no pretending that we are not spending resource more keenly than our 51 X (formerly known as Twitter) post by the Ministry of Defence, 21 December 2023 [Accessed 26 January 2024] 52 HC Deb, 20 November 2023, col. 3; Defence Secretary visits Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories to explore options to boost humanitarian aid, Ministry of Defence Press Release, 7 December 2023 ; HC Deb 19 December 2023; HCWS163 [Commons Written Ministerial Statement] 53 Defence Secretary deploys UK forces to Kosovo for NATO peacekeeping mission, Ministry of Defence Press Notice, 1 October 2023 54 Guyana: UK to send warship to South America amid Venezuela tensions, BBC News, 24 December 2023; Royal Navy patrol ship visits Guyana amid border claim, Royal Nay press release, 18 January 2024 55 Q406 56 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q35 57 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q12–13 58 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52 Q12 18 Ready for War? current force levels would require, but in an age as unstable and insecure as this is—and worsening—we have no choice but to do that”.59 When we questioned how sustainable crisis response deployments were, the Minister declined to tell the Committee what the opportunity costs of such deployments were, beyond acknowledging that the UK Armed Forces had a finite number of personnel and platforms.60 However, the CEO of DE&S cited the high operational tempo as the reason that a number of platforms have not entered planned maintenance.61
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need to prioritise resources for modernisation and readiness, stating that lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War have led to a re-evaluation of assumptions and a greater focus on warfighting readiness, balancing existing programmes.
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Ministry of Defence
57
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Both Generals Lord Houghton and Sir Nick Carter questioned the RAF’s ability to engage in peer-to-peer warfighting. General Lord Houghton suggested that the RAF had “good kit” in relation to its platforms and weapons but not enough of them—and a pilot shortage problem.110 He went to note that the RAF …
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Both Generals Lord Houghton and Sir Nick Carter questioned the RAF’s ability to engage in peer-to-peer warfighting. General Lord Houghton suggested that the RAF had “good kit” in relation to its platforms and weapons but not enough of them—and a pilot shortage problem.110 He went to note that the RAF was rarely asked to carry out a short notice operation (other than QRA111) on its own, meaning that whilst it worked well in alliances on standing tasks, it would face difficulties in a warfighting situation because the 102 Q311 103 Q315 104 Q320 105 Q322–3 106 Q325; 336–7 107 Oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 22 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 451, Q48–50 108 HC Deb, 20 November 2023, col. 3 109 HC Deb, 24 Jan 2024, Col.400; Col. 401 110 Q100; Q143 111 Quick Reaction Alert—the rapid deployment of RAF Typhoons against aircraft threats. Ready for War? 25 RAF “can force packet—that is run from CAOC112—in a way that is impressive, but [is] far more ugly with ground combat”.113 Professor Justin Bronk was in agreement with this assessment, telling us that: The big thing on munitions is also that they are not the right kind of munitions. We have a reasonable number of munitions for permissive or semi-permissive environments—for, essentially, very precisely blowing up technicals, killing snipers on rooftops and things. … [On fighting the Russians] we would have to beat them on the ground, but, ultimately, our armies will never be resourced or the size required to beat them land for land. Our strategy is predicated, as is the entire western military instrument, on air superiority. Put bluntly, we have a Russia problem if we cannot establish air superiority over where we have to fight.114
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people, stating that increasing recruitment and improving retention are absolute priorities, with measures outlined in the Haythornthwaite Review and DCP23, and a new Transformation Directorate driving delivery.
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Ministry of Defence
59
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Professor Justin Bronk also raised the issue of F-35 fleet size, describing the F-35 force as “triple or quadruple-hatted in terms of how many parts of UK defence are counting on it for how many mission outputs in the case of a war [and] … there are not very many …
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Professor Justin Bronk also raised the issue of F-35 fleet size, describing the F-35 force as “triple or quadruple-hatted in terms of how many parts of UK defence are counting on it for how many mission outputs in the case of a war [and] … there are not very many of them.”119 Professor Bronk also addressed other issues raised by the Human Security Centre including the pilot shortage—which he attributed to a lack of RAF engineers and supply of spares to sustain the fleet and keep them flying; the lack of SEAD/DEAD capability (which, despite the planned introduction of SPEAR CAP 3 in 2028,120 will be compounded by the small number of F-35s) and the need for the hardening of air bases or the ability to disperse aircraft to a wider range of air bases and airports to avoid their destruction by enemy attack.121 We also examined many of these points in our recent report on aviation procurement.122
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people, stating that increasing recruitment and improving retention are absolute priorities, with measures outlined in the Haythornthwaite Review and DCP23, and a new Transformation Directorate driving delivery.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
62
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Strategic Command is a joint force Command, working across defence and with the three Front Line Commands to integrate capabilities across all domains. Commander, Strategic Command told us that he would regard the different parts of his organisations as some of the jewels in the crown of defence’s capability: Permanent …
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Strategic Command is a joint force Command, working across defence and with the three Front Line Commands to integrate capabilities across all domains. Commander, Strategic Command told us that he would regard the different parts of his organisations as some of the jewels in the crown of defence’s capability: Permanent Joint Headquarters 117 The new aircraft are compatible with the boom-receptacle in-flight refuelling system used by the US Air Force amongst others. The A400M is also capable of boom-receptacle in-flight refuelling but the use of UK A400Ms for such a purpose has been ruled out by the MOD. 118 Human Security Centre (AFR0004) 119 Q46 120 Letter from the Minister of State for Defence Procurement to the Committee, Ministry of Defence, 10 July 2023 121 Q37; Q42; Q46 122 Defence Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Aviation Procurement: Winging it?, HC 178 123 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q93 124 Q241; Q243 Ready for War? 27 (PJHQ) which “effectively co-ordinat[es] defence-wide operations”; Defence Intelligence; Special Forces; the National Cyber Force; Defence Digital (“looking at both defensive cyber operations but also providing the digital capability and digital transformation for all of defence”); Defence Medical Services; the Chief of Defence Logistics and Support; responsibility for the UK’s overseas bases and the Defence Attaché network; defence thinking and education (including the development of concepts and doctrine); and an innovation hub.125
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Government response AI summary
The government explains that the Defence Command Paper 2023 outlines a new purpose for Defence and details significant investments to upgrade nuclear systems and enhance ISTAR, Electronic Warfare, signals intelligence, and cyber capabilities, alongside improving the lethality of the Royal Navy, Army, and RAF with …
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Ministry of Defence
64
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
In July the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that, as well as in medical and health, there were also skills and capability shortages in cyber/digital127 and in addition, the MOD Annual Report and Accounts highlighted intelligence as a “key workforce capability area for priority action”. The shortfall in …
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In July the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that, as well as in medical and health, there were also skills and capability shortages in cyber/digital127 and in addition, the MOD Annual Report and Accounts highlighted intelligence as a “key workforce capability area for priority action”. The shortfall in those professions (alongside engineering) is now being addressed through the development of pan-Defence plans.128
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges its responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people in the right place with the right skills and recognizes the challenge of competing in a demanding labour market to recruit and retain personnel.
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Ministry of Defence
66
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Both he and the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of exploring a range of interventions in order to attract a modern workforce, with the Minister highlighting the Haythornthwaite Report as an ongoing project in this area.133 Commander, Strategic Command also pointed to the Reserve as being a …
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Both he and the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of exploring a range of interventions in order to attract a modern workforce, with the Minister highlighting the Haythornthwaite Report as an ongoing project in this area.133 Commander, Strategic Command also pointed to the Reserve as being a significant source of skill and capability, highlighting the role of Reservists with specialist skills in providing capability in the aforementioned Strategic Command shortfalls: medical, cyber and intelligence.134 We examine the utilisation of the Reserve and the Haythornthwaite Report later in this chapter. What are the cross-Service issues? Stockpiles
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges its responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people and recognizes the importance of attracting new generations with modern and flexible offers in a competitive labour market.
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Ministry of Defence
73
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
The Haythornthwaite Review (examined in the section below) found that in 2022 there was a net outflow (the difference between the number of people leaving and those joining) of 4,660 from the UK Armed Forces with the “overall voluntary outflow rate increasing to 6.0%, up 1.7% from the previous year”. …
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The Haythornthwaite Review (examined in the section below) found that in 2022 there was a net outflow (the difference between the number of people leaving and those joining) of 4,660 from the UK Armed Forces with the “overall voluntary outflow rate increasing to 6.0%, up 1.7% from the previous year”. In the past decade the forces’ proportion of untrained personnel has “significantly increased”, which means that the “rising demand for skills is already not being met in some key areas, including cyber, engineering, nuclear, digital, logistics, aviation and medical” and that there are now “significant risks to overall capability arising from skills shortages in cyber and digital, intelligence, engineering 150 Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2023–24, A rock and a hard place: building critical mineral resilience, HC 371, paras 5; 9 151 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q77 152 Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2022–23, Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO, HC 184, Paras 86–95 153 Defence Committee, Sixth Special Report of Session 2022–23, Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report, HC 1533, Para 16 Ready for War? 31 (including nuclear), logistics and health/medical professions”.154 Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman underlined that without sufficient numbers of trained personnel, the Services simply would not be able to operate the equipment that was available to them.155
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges its responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people and skills, and recognizes the importance of attracting and retaining personnel with modern offers in a competitive labour market.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
76
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
The Chief of the Air Force highlighted the difficulty in recruitment presented by the UK labour market which had 1.3 million vacancies at the start of 2023.160 The First Sea Lord described the Armed Forces as being “in a battle for national talent” which required the Armed Forces to be …
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The Chief of the Air Force highlighted the difficulty in recruitment presented by the UK labour market which had 1.3 million vacancies at the start of 2023.160 The First Sea Lord described the Armed Forces as being “in a battle for national talent” which required the Armed Forces to be “as attractive a place as it possibly can be for young people to come to and commit to.”161 The most recent figures (from October 2023) show the current state of the UK Armed Forces: 154 Ministry of Defence, Agency and Agility: Incentivising people in a new era, A review of UK Armed Forces incentivisation by Rick Haythornthwaite, June 2023, p 2; 15 155 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q16 156 This means that Capita is responsible for attracting candidates and the application process until the recruits arrive in basic training. 157 Oral evidence taken on 16 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 480, Q13; 17 158 Q39–42 159 Oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 22 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 451, Q7; Q11 160 Q220 161 Q344 32 Ready for War? (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:14) (cid:15)M(cid:6)(cid:2)B(cid:16)M(cid:17)X,(cid:18)X(cid:19)(cid:1)X(cid:20),(cid:6)(cid:21)(cid:2)WX(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:6)(cid:22)7(cid:21)(cid:2)X!(cid:2)(cid:6)W,BB(cid:2)(cid:23) (cid:24)(cid:25)X(cid:26)X(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31) X"#"$ %X&(cid:31)(cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:24)’(cid:31)X(cid:29)(X)*++#X-$./X0(cid:31) X(cid:28)(cid:31)1(cid:25)2X’31(cid:28)(cid:31)X(cid:26)X(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31) X"#"" (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:13)X!,7BMWX(cid:3)B(cid:4)X(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:2)B(cid:4)W (cid:7)(cid:8)4(cid:8)(cid:11)4(cid:8)(cid:14) (cid:20)5(cid:23)(cid:23)6(cid:5)78(cid:2)X(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:3)7B(cid:2)(cid:4)X(cid:15)M(cid:6)(cid:2)B(cid:16)M(cid:17)X9:;<:=X>X:?(cid:20)@X(cid:3)B(cid:4)X(cid:20)5(cid:23)(cid:23)6(cid:5)78(cid:2)X(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:2) (cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:3)7B(cid:2)(cid:4)X(cid:15)M(cid:
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the challenge of recruitment and retention in a competitive labour market, highlighting recent pay increases, measures outlined in the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, and the establishment of a new Transformation Directorate to address these issues.
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Ministry of Defence
77
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
We understand from witnesses including the Minister for the Armed Forces and 0(cid:31) 3(cid:29)& Capita that this labour market challenge is not just an issue in the UK, and that partner m(cid:7)iUl(cid:11)iUta(cid:9)r(cid:14)ies in! (cid:2)N,DA(cid:23)T(cid:2)XO(cid:23)(cid:2)(cid:18), MAXM(cid:17)u(cid:2)sXt(cid:20)r5aMl5i(cid:6)a(cid:2), X:N(cid:2)eWw(cid:2)(cid:6) (cid:22)Z(cid:2)eWaXPla(cid:14)nPd(cid:14) and Japan are also struggling to recruit.162 31X(cid:25)F(cid:31)X0(cid:24)’(cid:25)X(cid:26)"XG(cid:29)1(cid:25)F’X-(cid:26)X(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31) X"#""XHX$#XI(cid:31)0(cid:25)(cid:31)G(cid:30)(cid:31) X"#"$2 Indeed, when we …
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We understand from witnesses including the Minister for the Armed Forces and 0(cid:31) 3(cid:29)& Capita that this labour market challenge is not just an issue in the UK, and that partner m(cid:7)iUl(cid:11)iUta(cid:9)r(cid:14)ies in! (cid:2)N,DA(cid:23)T(cid:2)XO(cid:23)(cid:2)(cid:18), MAXM(cid:17)u(cid:2)sXt(cid:20)r5aMl5i(cid:6)a(cid:2), X:N(cid:2)eWw(cid:2)(cid:6) (cid:22)Z(cid:2)eWaXPla(cid:14)nPd(cid:14) and Japan are also struggling to recruit.162 31X(cid:25)F(cid:31)X0(cid:24)’(cid:25)X(cid:26)"XG(cid:29)1(cid:25)F’X-(cid:26)X(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31) X"#""XHX$#XI(cid:31)0(cid:25)(cid:31)G(cid:30)(cid:31) X"#"$2 Indeed, when we visited the US in March 2023 we heard of difficulties that the US Services %X&(cid:31)(cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:24)’(cid:31)X(cid:29)(X+(cid:26)#X-A.VX0(cid:31) X(cid:28)(cid:31)1(cid:25)2X(cid:28)(cid:29)G0(cid:24) (cid:31)&XK3(cid:25)FX(cid:25)F(cid:31)X0 (cid:31)L3(cid:29)N’X(cid:26)"XG(cid:29)1(cid:25)F were encountering in recruiting and retaining personnel. 0(cid:31) 3(cid:29)&
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the global nature of the recruitment challenge for Armed Forces, outlining ongoing efforts like pay increases, measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, and a new Transformation Directorate to improve recruitment and retention.
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Ministry of Defence
78
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
In November, the Secretary of State told us that recruitment and retention was an area of concern for him given that in September 2023 there had been “183 pinch points, of which 61 were assessed as having a significant or acute impact”.163 The Minister for the Armed Forces echoed this: …
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In November, the Secretary of State told us that recruitment and retention was an area of concern for him given that in September 2023 there had been “183 pinch points, of which 61 were assessed as having a significant or acute impact”.163 The Minister for the Armed Forces echoed this: The existence of these pinch-point trades where we have shortages is a real concern. You are absolutely right to speculate that they are mostly the trades that are very technical and, frankly, make the force work. … We have to do some pretty urgent work to fill some of those pinch points because they are limiting what we can do with the force for as long as we are carrying the gaps that we have.164 162 Q402; Oral evidence taken on 16 January 2024, HC (2023–24) 480, Q90; 96 163 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, HC (2023–24) 52, Q46–7 164 Q402 Ready for War? 33 Utilisation of the Reserve
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the concerns regarding recruitment and retention "pinch points" within the Armed Forces, detailing ongoing initiatives such as recent pay increases, measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, and the creation of a new Transformation Directorate to address these staffing …
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Ministry of Defence
83
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
The Chief of the General staff told us that the Army is currently delivering 130% of its capacity.180 The First Sea Lord admitted that there are always more tasks for a Navy than there are ships.181 We heard that by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational …
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The Chief of the General staff told us that the Army is currently delivering 130% of its capacity.180 The First Sea Lord admitted that there are always more tasks for a Navy than there are ships.181 We heard that by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational sorties as in the previous 12 months.182 The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged the pressure that the Forces were under: 169 Council of Reserves Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Statutory Report 2023, December 2023, Para 9 170 Council of Reserves Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Statutory Report 2023, December 2023, Para 10 171 Q244; 272 172 Q346 173 Ministry of Defence, Quarterly service personnel statistics 1 October 2023, 14 December 2023 174 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689 Q45; Q272; Q446; Q453 175 Q17 176 Defence Committee, Third Special Report of Session 2022–23, The Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report, HC 865, p 6 177 Q17 178 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q37 179 Q74; 76 180 Q223 181 Q287 182 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q93 Ready for War? 35 The reality is that politicians ask chiefs to go well beyond what they are asked to provide for. … We are just going to have to accept that we will be running the force very hot indeed, and well beyond any reasonable planning assumptions. … we are asking more of the force right now than it is designed to deliver.183
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Government response AI summary
The government points to the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) as its strategy to address defence challenges, outlining its purpose to protect the nation, enhance capabilities (including nuclear, ISTAR, electronic warfare, cyber, and lethality), and increase operational productivity by rebalancing investment.
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Ministry of Defence
97
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Professor Michael Clarke told us that both Integrated Review documents (the original and the refresh) had demonstrated that ministerial priorities were that “Britain should have a series of multiple roles that it can perform in the world and that it has high aspirations to a significant place in world politics, …
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Professor Michael Clarke told us that both Integrated Review documents (the original and the refresh) had demonstrated that ministerial priorities were that “Britain should have a series of multiple roles that it can perform in the world and that it has high aspirations to a significant place in world politics, at a time of darkening international relations”.205 Professor Malcolm Chalmers agreed, describing the strategic narrative in both documents as “very geographically and thematically ambitious and not having a very strong sense of prioritisation”.206 Both suggested that the documents had the potential to enable the Prime Minister to make demands of government departments which they were not necessarily being equipped to fulfil.207 Professor Clarke told us: all three branches of the services, in their own separate ways, are inadequate to the tasks that the refresh suggests they will undertake.208
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Government response AI summary
The government published the Defence Command Paper 2023, outlining a new purpose for Defence focused on protecting the nation and its prosperity, and highlighting the UK's role within NATO and its alliances. This paper, built on an increased MOD budget and refreshed Integrated Review, aims …
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Ministry of Defence
98
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
General Lord Houghton was clear that the only way to reduce risk to readiness was to increase funding, while noting that this was a political choice, not a military one. The readiness assessments carried out by the MOD were shared with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the NSC for …
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General Lord Houghton was clear that the only way to reduce risk to readiness was to increase funding, while noting that this was a political choice, not a military one. The readiness assessments carried out by the MOD were shared with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the NSC for discussion. As the decision whether to increase resources to reduce the risk to defence and security was discussed in those forums, they are effectively the ultimate owners of that risk.209
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need to prioritise resources for modernization and readiness, stating that lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War have led to a re-evaluation of assumptions and a greater focus on warfighting readiness. It details ongoing work, including balancing the Global Operate programme with the …
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Ministry of Defence
99
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
One option that was suggested was that the UK Armed Forces could specialise in certain roles, relying on Allies to fill gaps in capability. Professor Bronk used the example of the Typhoon force which he described as covering “far too many mission sets” following its adoption of the roles previously …
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One option that was suggested was that the UK Armed Forces could specialise in certain roles, relying on Allies to fill gaps in capability. Professor Bronk used the example of the Typhoon force which he described as covering “far too many mission sets” following its adoption of the roles previously covered by Tornado. The range of activities which the Typhoon force trains for and carries out means that “they cannot possibly be good at everything” and instead are “not particularly excellent at any mission”. He contrasted this to the situation in the early part of the 2010s, when “Typhoon was somewhat mature but was only doing air superiority, where that fleet was specifically and very highly valued by the Americans, because it was superb at air superiority”. He warned that: 203 Q74; 76 204 Q289; 309 205 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q1 206 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q1 207 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q2 208 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q5 209 Q73 40 Ready for War? The biggest issue with high-intensity warfare now is that it is so lethal and so demanding that the generic force of gifted amateurs that can try and span everything, which is essentially what Britain has always tried to be very good at and in the past has been excellent at, does not really work any more. You need to be very good at one or two things.210 However, General Sir Nick Carter warned that specialisation “is obviously a risk, but … these things are about trade-offs. You may need to invest in that because you fear that others might not mitigate it for you.”211
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the discussion on specialisation, stating that the UK's approach through NATO leverages the collective capabilities of 32 nations, and Defence continuously reviews priorities in concert with allies.
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Ministry of Defence
138
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in progress but we intend to maintain ongoing scrutiny of the …
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We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in progress but we intend to maintain ongoing scrutiny of the Government’s developing plans to ensure warfighting and strategic readiness.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated the MOD has always maintained defence plans, recently consolidating its contribution and improving operational planning, and is considering options for sustaining warfighting capabilities. It welcomed continued scrutiny of warfighting and strategic readiness efforts.
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Ministry of Defence
3
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s offer of a meeting in private to review classified information. …
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The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s offer of a meeting in private to review classified information. This was both constructive and informative, but it took place 10 months after our initial request for this data, and there is no guarantee that it will be repeated in the future, which raises the concern about whether there is sufficient ministerial grip on readiness.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged its slow response time for this inquiry and committed to making every effort to prevent recurrence, assuring the planned annual open session would be prioritised and substantive for providing information.
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Ministry of Defence
8
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces. For that reason, we welcome the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out of service dates in the 2030s. However, we are also increasingly concerned about the ability of the Armed Forces to attract and …
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There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces. For that reason, we welcome the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out of service dates in the 2030s. However, we are also increasingly concerned about the ability of the Armed Forces to attract and retain personnel. Whilst we welcome the Government’s recognition that these issues require fresh solutions and look forward to reviewing plans based on recommendations from the Reserve Forces 2030 Review and the Haythornthwaite Review to alleviate the crisis in the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves, we do not believe it is being carried out at the required pace. We heard no evidence that gives us confidence that the recruitment crisis will be resolved anytime soon.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the concerns about attracting and retaining personnel, stating a formal HMG response to the Haythornthwaite Review will be published during 2024 to outline next steps for delivery and implementation of recruitment and retention reforms.
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Ministry of Defence
11
Recommendation
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of pushing the Armed Forces far beyond what is sustainable. We …
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Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of pushing the Armed Forces far beyond what is sustainable. We recommend that either a budget uplift or a (strictly adhered to) prioritisation ranking is introduced. Any prioritisation ranking adopted needs to be drawn up within the National Security Council to ensure Ready for War? 55 agreement amongst the Prime Minister, Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, given that all of those Departments play a role in determining and enabling the deployment of UK Armed Forces.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated it is taking forward work to balance the Global Operate programme with Defence Command Paper priorities, continuously reviewing capabilities and utilising the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework, but did not commit to a budget uplift or a new, strictly adhered to prioritisation ranking.
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Ministry of Defence
15
Recommendation
First Report - Ready for War?
Acknowledged
Under a national defence plan, each relevant Government Department would have its own responsibilities. We recommend that these responsibilities are published as far as possible, and—if any responsibilities cannot be published for national security reasons—these should be provided in confidence to the relevant select committee. We also recommend that, for …
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Under a national defence plan, each relevant Government Department would have its own responsibilities. We recommend that these responsibilities are published as far as possible, and—if any responsibilities cannot be published for national security reasons—these should be provided in confidence to the relevant select committee. We also recommend that, for each Department, its role in the national defence plan should be added to the list of responsibilities of a named Minister. (Paragraph 140)
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Government response AI summary
The government committed to making departmental responsibilities in national defence planning as transparent as possible, following the existing approach for lead government departments in risk planning, but did not commit to publishing specific responsibilities or assigning a named minister.
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Ministry of Defence