Recommendation 51

We have been told that the Navy is undergoing a “maritime renaissance”85 and that the UK is moving towards a maritime strategy (which prioritises a naval response above land or air capabilities).86 The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy made up 20–25% of NATO maritime capacity (as compared to the RAF making up 10% of NATO’s air capacity).87 Despite this, there are still capability gaps—Nick Childs pointed to the ability to deploy a carrier strike capability being hindered by “questions over aircraft that you could put there, the airborne early warning capability aboard, the actual weapons capability and integration of stand off weapons that would make a difference in terms of being able to take the fight to the enemy”.88 He also questioned whether the SSN89 force—platforms and personnel—would be able to cope with the demands of deploying simultaneously to the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.90 General Lord Houghton pointed to the shortage of available vessels and further noted that he found the high proportion of naval equipment which was inoperable to be “quite disturbing”.91