Recommendations & Conclusions
5 items
104
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Rejected
Successive Defence Committees have looked at the possibility of mothballing equipment due to be retired220 to create a strategic reserve of equipment which could be utilised in the event of high intensity warfare. In 2018, the Government told our predecessor Committee that: When equipment is approaching retirement, Defence always has …
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Successive Defence Committees have looked at the possibility of mothballing equipment due to be retired220 to create a strategic reserve of equipment which could be utilised in the event of high intensity warfare. In 2018, the Government told our predecessor Committee that: When equipment is approaching retirement, Defence always has the option to retain it in reserve if it might be needed rapidly to provide additional capacity in the event of a major crisis. This will require the consideration of a number of factors, including the availability of suitable storage facilities, the cost of maintaining the equipment and the human resource to support 216 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q74 217 Q23; 67 218 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q20 219 Q349 220 Defence Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Aviation Procurement: Winging it?, HC 178, Para 37–38; Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2017–19, Indispensable allies: US, NATO and UK Defence relations, HC 387, Para 41; 44 42 Ready for War? its effective re-mobilisation. Ultimately, deciding to take this option for equipment depends on whether retaining the equipment is considered the most cost-effective decision when all relevant factors are taken into account.221
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Government response AI summary
The government clarifies that decisions on retiring equipment are made by Front-Line Commands, considering factors like obsolescence, maintenance costs, and the availability of spares. It explains that long-term storage is often not viable due to expense and unsupportability, and that equipment may be cannibalised for …
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Ministry of Defence
105
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Rejected
In response to our recommendation last year that the Government mothball the 30 Tranche 1 Typhoons it is proposing to retire in 2025 (with 60% of their airframe fatigue lives remaining), we were told that whilst it would be feasible to retain the aircraft in storage, the investment required to …
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In response to our recommendation last year that the Government mothball the 30 Tranche 1 Typhoons it is proposing to retire in 2025 (with 60% of their airframe fatigue lives remaining), we were told that whilst it would be feasible to retain the aircraft in storage, the investment required to maintain them and then “address significant capability, obsolescence and regulatory needs” upon regeneration would be at least £300 million. We were also told that that it would preclude the RAF from cannibalising the airframes for components which could be used for tranche 2 & 3 Typhoons.222 We note that some of these issues are more easily solvable than others—for instance, the US military stores their retired aircraft in deserts in order to reduce the cost of maintenance as the arid air prevents significant degradation and rust.223
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterates that decisions on equipment retirement lie with Front-Line Commands, citing obsolescence, maintenance costs, and lack of spares as key factors against long-term storage. It states that equipment may be cannibalised for parts for operational fleets (e.g., Hawk and Typhoon Tranche 1) or …
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Ministry of Defence
106
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Rejected
The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there was no point in holding on to capabilities which would become extinct, a point supported by the Secretary of State. However, he also acknowledged that mass would still be a requirement in future conflicts.224 The …
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The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there was no point in holding on to capabilities which would become extinct, a point supported by the Secretary of State. However, he also acknowledged that mass would still be a requirement in future conflicts.224 The Minister for the Armed Forces emphasised that it was “inescapably the case that no one platform can be in two places at one time”225—leaving little room for attrition of capabilities. We have seen that Russia, having lost significant numbers of more modern main battle tanks (MBT) in Ukraine, has deployed T-62 MBTs which are 60 years old. Whilst the capabilities are inferior to more modern alternatives, the T-62s were upgraded and deployed less than a year after being removed from storage.226 Conclusions and recommendations
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterates that decisions on equipment retirement lie with Front-Line Commands, citing obsolescence, maintenance costs, and lack of spares as key factors against long-term storage. It explains that long-term storage is often not viable due to expense and unsupportability, and that equipment may be …
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Ministry of Defence
112
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Rejected
We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not need to be fully maintained—in a war of existence, a …
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We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not need to be fully maintained—in a war of existence, a platform which is even halfway viable for regeneration is better than none at all. Given the long lead times to build complex platforms (such as warships, tanks or combat aircraft) combined with the importance of mass and resilience on the battlefield (as demonstrated on both sides of the war in Ukraine), we question whether less expensive alternative storage solutions could be sought, for example through access to US desert facilities. In this context it is worth noting that the United States, China and Russia have for many decades had a policy for mothballing warfighting equipment, whereas the UK policy has been to dispose of it—often at a fraction of its original acquisition cost. Russia has been able to draw on these reserves to add to its capacity to fight in Ukraine. 44 Ready for War? 4 Strategic Readiness
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the premise of alternative long-term storage, explaining that equipment disposal decisions consider obsolescence, lack of spares, high maintenance costs, and the 'reduce to produce' policy for maintaining existing fleets.
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Ministry of Defence
12
Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Rejected
We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not need to be fully maintained—in a war of existence, a …
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We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not need to be fully maintained—in a war of existence, a platform which is even halfway viable for regeneration is better than none at all. Given the long lead times to build complex platforms (such as warships, tanks or combat aircraft) combined with the importance of mass and resilience on the battlefield (as demonstrated on both sides of the war in Ukraine), we question whether less expensive alternative storage solutions could be sought, for example through access to US desert facilities. In this context it is worth noting that the United States, China and Russia have for many decades had a policy for mothballing warfighting equipment, whereas the UK policy has been to dispose of it—often at a fraction of its original acquisition cost. Russia has been able to draw on these reserves to add to its capacity to fight in Ukraine. (Paragraph 112) Strategic Readiness
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Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation for alternative mothballing solutions, explaining that decisions on equipment disposal are made based on obsolescence, lack of spares, high maintenance costs, and the need to use components from retired platforms.
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Ministry of Defence