UK trade with the US, India and EU

The United States is expanding the use of trade policy to advance its strategic and security objectives. It is therefore welcome that the United Kingdom has achieved the Economic Prosperity Deal representing a new phase of UK-US economic engagement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 26)

The UK must integrate economic engagement with the US into our broader geopolitical dialogue and minimise the risks of ad hoc, zero-sum bargaining with a far larger partner by now turning paper promises into binding bargains. The UK should de-risk future volatility in US-UK trade by developing deeper long-term industry partnerships in priority Industrial Strategy sectors and maximising alignment in our shared economic security objectives. In particular it is important the UK leverages the potential for a deeper US-UK partnership to ensure Western leadership over China in the race for technological supremacy—particularly in AI and defence tech, de- risked supply chains, and greater security for supplies of critical minerals. (Recommendation, Paragraph 27) General Terms of the Economic Prosperity Deal

We welcome the Government’s work to date in securing swift tariff relief for key sectors under the GT-EPD and acknowledge the progress made in challenging circumstances. However, we must acknowledge that UK exporters are now trading with our most significant single trading partner on terms which are worse than before President Trump came to office. Because ministers have not published an economic impact analysis—or a framework for assessing potential impacts—we cannot yet estimate the economic loss or gains from the GT-EPD. While implementation of some aspects of the agreement has commenced, many of the UK’s critical industries remain in a state of uncertainty about the future tariffs regimes they may face. It is also now clear that the UK has secured less favourable terms for some sectors than our much larger neighbours in the EU. Finally, 52 the future timetable for implementing measures that might be agreed in the GT-EPD is unclear. Together, these risks are increasing uncertainty for business. Uncertainty risks hurting, not helping, the appetite of business and investors to invest. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48)

We welcome the extension of the treaty parliamentary scrutiny period from 10 to 20 sitting days, as set out in the Trade Strategy. However, we regret that scrutiny of the GT-EPD are limited due to the trade-related provisions having been negotiated outside a formal treaty process, and that an economic impact analysis or framework has not been published. It remains unclear when the House will be able to debate the individual measures already implemented ahead of the finalisation of the Economic Prosperity Deal. (Conclusion, Paragraph 49)

Going forward, we recommend the Government now maximises pressure on the US, beginning during and continuing after the President’s State Visit, to agree final terms for a lasting, Economic Prosperity Deal that de-risks the threat of future sectoral tariffs, maximise predictability and that where the UK has secured terms which are second best to the EU, we aim to improve them. (Recommendation, Paragraph 50)

We recommend that whenever the Government makes substantive trade commitments, whatever form this takes, it must ensure that they are subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)

We further recommend that the Government set out, in advance of ratification, a clear timetable for parliamentary scrutiny and stakeholder engagement and of any implementing measures, so that Members and affected sectors can assess the implications of the deal before it comes into force. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)

Given the significance of the Economic Prosperity Deal for UK trade policy, the Government must ensure that time is made available in the House of Commons for a full debate on a substantive motion. (Recommendation, Paragraph 53) National and Sectoral Impact of the General Terms of the Economic Prosperity Deal

We agree with the UK automotive industry that the tariff reductions secured under the Economic Prosperity Deal are to be welcomed, but the benefits are constrained by the 100,000-vehicle quota and uncertainty around how it will be allocated. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61) 53

The Government must work with industry to closely monitor use of the 100,000-vehicle automotive quota under the GT-EPD, agree a clear, fair mechanism for its allocation and management, and, given the complementary nature of the US and UK automotive industries, ministers should advance arguments to expand the quota. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

While the General Terms of the Economic Prosperity Deal outline an intention to establish a tariff-reducing quota for UK steel and aluminium exports, no detailed agreement has yet been reached. Key issues remain unresolved including the size of the quota, which products will qualify and the conditions attached. This continued uncertainty is affecting planning and investment decisions in the sector. (Conclusion, Paragraph 73)

The Government must maximise pressure on the US to minimise tariffs for UK steel and aluminium producers and work to ensure that any final agreement reflects the realities of UK supply chains and the sector’s transition to low- carbon production. (Recommendation, Paragraph 74)

Furthermore, the Government must bring forward reforms to the operation of the Trade Remedy Authority in order to ensure that is capable of moving at the same speed as the EU in implementing trade defences against diverted products into the UK market. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75)

The Government must also continue to urgently engage with UK industry, and the US administration, to understand and address the full impact of steel and aluminium derivative products being subject to a 25% tariff. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)

The Government should continue to press for clarity from the United States on the conditions attached to future preferential access for UK pharmaceutical exports, and, where appropriate, secure wider tariff relief for scientific and medical products. Given the positive outcome secured for the aerospace sector, the Government should seek a similar resolution for pharmaceuticals, recognising that both are traditionally tariff-free sectors. (Recommendation, Paragraph 82)

We were disappointed to hear that the Government were unable to provide support to the bioethanol industry to prevent the closure of the Vivergo plant. This has already had a substantial impact on domestic production capacity of bioethanol, associated supply chains, and the UK’s ability to produce CO₂ and animal feed as by-products. The Committee will continue to monitor the impacts of the GT-EPD closely, including the impact on the agriculture and bioethanol industry. (Conclusion, Paragraph 98) 54

We recommend that the Government continue to work urgently with the remaining UK bioethanol industry to co-design appropriate support measures. These should protect domestic production capacity and associated supply chains while medium-term supply side policies take effect. (Recommendation, Paragraph 99) Building towards the Economic Prosperity Deal

The Government must now drive forward further negotiations with the US to de-risk the threat of future tariffs, seek to match EU terms where those are preferential to those for the UK, lock in agreed tariff reductions and expanding co-operation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 104)

Further negotiations could benefit from being mission-focused, in order to avoid the pit-falls of ad-hoc zero sum negotiations. This should include, for example, fostering deeper integration of US and UK science, research and universities communities and convening the investment community to understand where potential new investment is greatest. The Government should commence use of the Industrial Strategy Council to convene business and industry partners and craft an ambitious vision for future US-UK trade cooperation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 105)

It is vital that the UK approaches the EPD not merely as a trade arrangement, but as a component of an economic and foreign policy strategy focused on ensuring Western leadership in the face of global competition, particularly from China. This strategy should be shaped by three frameworks: a. the priorities for growing the eight strategic sectors identified in the Industrial Strategy and Trade strategy; b. the Defence Industrial Strategy, which as we have recommended must contain a clear definition of the sovereign capabilities the UK seeks to on-shore, the capabilities we are content to trade for; and c. a clear-eyed assessment of risks to (i) critical supply chains, (ii) critical minerals, (iii) investment and (iv) export security as part of a wider economic security strategy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 106)

Any future digital trade provisions negotiated under the Economic Prosperity Deal should strike a careful balance: promoting AI adoption and cross-border collaboration to strengthen the Western technological 55 alliance, while safeguarding intellectual property, ensuring fair taxation, and enabling the development of sovereign UK AI capabilities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 116)

The Government should work closely with industry to ensure that closer UK– US alignment on economic security measures, such as investment screening and export controls, does not create unintended obstacles for legitimate trade and collaboration. It should provide clear guidance and consult widely with sectors most affected, including advanced technology and quantum industries. (Recommendation, Paragraph 124)

In line with the previous recommendations of this Committee, the Government should align with other countries to introduce mandatory human rights due diligence legislation, and consider new levers such as import bans on products from regions where forced labour prevails, as being introduced in the US and the EU. (Recommendation, Paragraph 129)

We recognise that the GT-EPD lays important foundations for reducing non- tariff barriers. The Committee urges Government to engage stakeholders early to ensure that future commitments protect UK standards while unlocking market access opportunities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 135)

The Committee will continue to monitor developments closely and expects the Government to ensure that the UK’s economic and strategic interests remain central to the negotiation of the full Economic Prosperity Deal. (Conclusion, Paragraph 140)

Looking ahead, future commitments in the potential Economic Prosperity Deal must balance opportunities for growth in digital trade, AI, and services with strong protections for UK standards, tax sovereignty, and critical domestic industries. (Recommendation, Paragraph 141) 56

The most immediate benefits are concentrated in goods sectors facing historically high Indian tariffs, particularly spirits and automotives, where the Agreement delivers commercially significant and predictable market access for the first time. The Agreement also delivers new market access in government procurement, with India opening its central government procurement market for the first time. At the same time, the Agreement preserves the UK’s existing sanitary and phytosanitary protections, does not compromise a closer SPS deal with the EU and ensures that market access gains are not achieved at the expense of domestic standards. (Conclusion, Paragraph 50)

There remain important issues that will require resolution and ongoing monitoring if the full benefits of the Agreement are to be realised. The Committee heard that the key bulk whisky tariff line has not been liberalised to the same extent as the Scotch-specific tariff codes. The automotive sector will also require support to make effective use of tariff rate quotas, and consideration should be given to the introduction of core food production standards. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)

The Government must ensure that the remaining issues which risk undermining the Agreement’s benefits for key sectors are addressed. Ratification should not be treated as the conclusion of the process. Ministers must be held accountable for ensuring that businesses are able to use the Agreement effectively to drive growth and contribute to the Government’s wider growth mission. The Government should keep the details of the terms under review to make the most of opportunities of mutual benefit. The Government must regularly report to Parliament on rates of business 75 utilisation of the Agreement, particularly in priority sectors, including providing evidence of increased exports and progress in resolving key barriers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52) Constraints on services access

While the Agreement provides greater certainty and stability for UK services providers, it delivers limited new market access into India. The practical value of the services provisions will therefore depend largely on effective implementation, particularly progress on mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Notwithstanding the Agreement’s commitments and the establishment of frameworks to support further UK–India mutual recognition of professional qualifications dialogue, the Committee is sceptical about the likelihood of how much will be delivered in practice. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)

The Government should identify sectors where mutual recognition of professional qualifications would benefit both parties and use the Professional Services Working Group to seek progress within twelve months of the Agreement taking effect. It should set out how it intends to progress priority arrangements within the timetable established by the Agreement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59) Intellectual property protection

The Committee concludes that the Agreement does not introduce significant changes to India’s intellectual property regime that are likely to support growth in UK pharmaceutical exports. At the same time, the Committee recognises India’s role as a major producer of generic medicines and the importance of retaining some flexibility within its IP framework. The Committee welcomes the establishment of the Working Group on Intellectual Property established under the Agreement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 64)

The Government should use the Working Group on Intellectual Property to pursue further progress with India in areas of mutual benefit and UK strategic importance, including in sectors identified in the Industrial Strategy. This should include continued dialogue on issues raised by industry, such as regulatory data protection, patentability and enforcement, while recognising the constraints on legislative change. (Recommendation, Paragraph 65) 76 Business mobility

The Agreement locks in and modestly extends existing arrangements for mobility. The Government maintains that the provisions are limited in scope and will not have a material impact on the UK labour market. (Conclusion, Paragraph 70)

The Government should closely monitor labour market impacts arising from the Agreement and report back to Parliament on its assessment. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71) Sustainability and labour standards

The Committee concludes that the Agreement establishes useful environmental, social and governance (ESG) frameworks. However, while the inclusion of standalone chapters on anti-corruption, labour rights, environment, gender equality and development represent a step forward in India’s trade agreements, their impact is significantly constrained by the absence of enforceable dispute settlement mechanisms. (Conclusion, Paragraph 79)

The Government should ensure that its ongoing Responsible Business Conduct Review results in clear and enforceable expectations on UK businesses, including respect for human rights and labour rights within their supply chains. The Government should report to Parliament on the outcome of the Review. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80) UK-Indian investment

The absence of a concluded bilateral investment treaty means that greater certainty for investors remains an ambition rather than a secured outcome. Ministers should set to the work of creating an ambitious compelling vision for the potential of a BIT to help re-energise these talks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84) Implementation challenges

The Committee notes evidence that uncertainty during the ratification period risks delaying commercial decisions, particularly in sectors where tariff reductions under the Agreement are commercially significant. Given the absence of provisional application, timely ratification and clear communication on implementation timelines will be critical to minimising disruption for UK businesses. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87) 77

Tariff liberalisation under the Agreement is commercially meaningful for key UK exports. However, long staging periods, complex rules of origin and administrative burdens risk limiting utilisation, particularly among SMEs. The Committee notes that some sectors, including textiles, ceramics and potentially dairy, may face increased competitive pressures as a result of the Agreement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 98)

Concerns about remaining barriers to trade undermining UK exports to India despite the Agreement are well-founded. The Government should publish utilisation data for tariff preferences under the Agreement, consistent with its approach for other UK free trade agreements, and report regularly to Parliament on uptake. In doing so, it should explain where utilisation is lower than expected, including where this reflects the complexity or restrictiveness of rules of origin under this Agreement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 99)

The Government should ensure that UK trade remedies and bilateral safeguard mechanisms are accessible, timely and proportionate for sectors facing increased import competition as a result of the Agreement. This should include clear guidance for businesses, particularly SMEs, on how to raise concerns and trigger investigations, active monitoring of import trends in sensitive sectors, such as textiles and ceramics, once the Agreement is in force, and work to ensure that UK producers are able to compete on a more level playing field. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)

The Committee notes that UK businesses face significant non-tariff barriers in the Indian market, including regulatory complexity, inconsistent implementation, limited transparency and state-level frictions, as well as specific barriers such as export health certification requirements and India’s expanding use of Quality Control Orders. The Committee would like to see these barriers reduced and this will be most effectively done by using the new mechanisms established. This will require adequate staffing, resourcing and prioritisation by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade. (Conclusion, Paragraph 103)

To address non-tariff barriers, the Government should open structured, sector-focused discussions with India to reduce the most trade-distorting barriers identified by industry, using the Sub-Committee on Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment. The Government should clearly identify priority issues and set out a timetable for their resolution and protect the appropriate resourcing of Foreign Office and Department for Business and Trade staff for deal implementation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 104)

Implementation of CETA is critical to success of the deal and real benefits for UK businesses and growth in the UK economy. Tariff reductions and legal commitments alone will not translate into increased exports or investment 78 unless they are supported by effective delivery. The Committee sees CETA as a starting point for further barrier reductions. The Agreement should be treated as a floor, not a ceiling. There needs to be sustained political attention, sufficient resourcing, clear accountability within Government, and active regulatory engagement with India to continue to reduce barriers to trade. The Committee will monitor the Government’s implementation of the Agreement on an ongoing basis. (Conclusion, Paragraph 109)

The Government should assign clear Ministerial responsibility for FTA implementation, which should be identified in the portfolio of the Minister for Trade and listed as one of their ministerial responsibilities. The Minister must ensure that implementation of FTAs, including CETA, is supported by appropriate resources and explore the benefits of a trade promotion campaign. (Recommendation, Paragraph 110)

The Government should publish a detailed CETA implementation plan, no later than three months before entry into force, including routes for businesses to raise market access problems; points of contact in the UK and in India; sector-specific guidance (including for SMEs); and how the Joint Committee and sub-committee system, set out in the Agreement, will be used to resolve barriers. This implementation plan should include clear resourcing commitments and a plan for joint work with the nation’s chambers of commerce. The budget for this resourcing should be provided to this Committee. (Recommendation, Paragraph 111) Parliamentary scrutiny

The Committee welcomes the Government’s commitment to make time available in the House of Commons for a debate on the Agreement during the CRaG period. However, we are disappointed that the Government intends to seek only a general debate. Given the limitations of CRaG scrutiny in practice, the Committee recommends that the Government should instead seek to schedule a debate on a substantive motion, in order to enable meaningful parliamentary scrutiny ahead of ratification. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115)

The Government should commit to making time available in the House of Commons to debate all FTAs it agrees with other countries. (Recommendation, Paragraph 118) 79