Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service

MoJ and HMPPS do not know how probation performance affects outcomes such as reoffending. The overall aims of the Probation Service are to protect the public and to reduce reoffending. MoJ estimates that the economic and social cost of reoffending by adult offenders was £20.9 billion in 2024–25. HM Inspectorate of Probation’s 2023 research indicates that high-quality probation supervision significantly reduces reoffending. Given the service’s poor performance, it is unsurprising that reoffending outcomes have deteriorated since 2021. The reoffending rate for adults supervised by the Probation Service was 5% higher in 2023 (latest data 3 available) than in 2021, and the number of offenders charged with a Serious Further Offence while under probation was 55% higher in 2023–24 than in 2020–21. Additionally, the number of prisoners recalled to prison is at an all- time high. Offender outcomes can be influenced by many factors, including whether people leave prison into safe housing and employment. However, at our evidence session in December, HMPPS did not accept that its poor performance in probation was linked to the rise in reoffending. HMPPS is evaluating the impact on recall rates of reduced supervision for most offenders in the last third of their sentence (‘Reset’). It is important that the effect on reoffending and public protection is also examined. recommendation In their Treasury Minute response, MoJ and HMPPS should set out: a. what more they could do to monitor and understand the impact of Probation Service changes on reoffending and recall; and b. when they will be able to share their findings from their evaluation of the ‘Reset’ initiative, including its impact on recall rates.

Longstanding staff shortages have left probation staff dealing with excessive and unmanageable workloads. At March 2025, there were 5,636 full-time equivalent probation officers in post, 79% of target staffing. According to HMPPS’s data, probation officers have been working on average at 118% capacity for several years, with highs of 126% in some regions, including London. However, actual workloads will have been higher than this as HMPPS’s recent refresh of probation activity timings showed it had seriously underestimated the time needed for staff to complete tasks. This underestimation, on top of existing staff vacancies, meant that it had been operating the service with just half the number of sentence management staff required. Probation staff have also had to deal with a high level of change to probation processes, which adds to their workloads. Researchers told us that probation staff have felt alienated by frequent changes and that the Probation Service’s culture is built on ‘emotional strain’ and ‘trauma’. Staff sickness and staff turnover has risen or remained high - in the year ending March 2025, the leaving rate for probation staff was 9.3% (6.2% in 2021) and sickness rate was 13.2 working days (8.9 in 2021). The most common cause of staff sickness is mental ill health. 4 recommendation HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out: a. when and how it expects to be able to provide clarity to staff on when their workloads will reduce to acceptable levels; and b. the volume of changes it expects staff will need to introduce and how it plans to make this manageable for staff.

We are not confident that MoJ and HMPPS can successfully manage the risks associated with the new probation programme. Over an 18-month period, HMPPS’s new programme - Our Future Probation Service - aims to introduce new digital tools, changes to probation processes and changes to the level of supervision for some offenders. Its plans include implementing over 30 digital initiatives to help reduce the time probation staff need to spend on tasks. For example, Transcribe is an AI tool to help staff capture meeting notes. However, there is a risk that constant changes can disrupt services, contribute to poor outcomes and staff stress. While HMPPS plans to implement new digital tools incrementally, the short time- frame carries a high level of risk and MoJ does not have a strong history of implementing digital change programmes well. Additionally, MoJ and HMPPS are still deciding on some of the changes they plan to make to the level of supervision some offenders receive, which may pose risks to public protection. Given these risks, we are very concerned that MoJ and HMPPS have not yet set clear thresholds for the level of risk they are willing to accept, to help monitor operational and public protection risks. recommendation HMPPS should set out, in its Treasury Minute response: a. how it will assess when digital tools are sufficiently developed to roll out to staff; b. its risk thresholds for rolling out digital and process changes/scope changes; and c. how it will monitor if thresholds are breached.

We are not satisfied that HMPPS’s new programme will free up sufficient capacity to improve performance. HMPPS aims to close the current shortfall of 3,150 probation staff by March 2027, by freeing up operational capacity by 25% through its ‘Our Future Probation Service’ (OFPS) programme. However, we are sceptical that HMPPS has a real understanding of how many staff it needs to sufficiently improve performance. While its estimates of the staffing shortfall are based on its updated activity timings, it reduced these timings down from staff-reported 5 averages in many cases. HMPPS reduced these averages because it judged staff could complete tasks more quickly with additional training. It also later dismissed its own internal review which suggested that it needed to go beyond its planned 25% reduction in workloads to allow staff sufficient time for the learning needed to improve performance. Its estimate of the shortfall takes into account the Sentencing Bill, but does not account for the impact of some wider policy changes, for example, the Independent Review of Criminal Courts, which is likely to create additional demands on probation staff. It will also be important for HMPPS to develop a contingency plan if the OFPS programme does not reduce workloads as planned recommendation HMPPS should, in its Treasury Minute response, set out: a. how it plans to keep the scale of the staffing shortfall in view following future policy decisions which may further increase demands on the service; b. how it will ensure that staff will have capacity to undertake sufficient training to improve performance, including the number of training days factored into its modelling of staffing shortfalls; and c. its contingency plans, if its programme does not reduce workloads sufficiently

Sufficient third sector and private sector capacity is required to meet offender needs, but decisions around funding are still unclear. HMPPS’s planned changes to the scope of the Probation Service will likely reduce probation supervision for many offenders assessed to be at lower risk of harm and reoffending. As highlighted to us by the Prison Reform Trust, low-risk individuals often require support for mental health, financial and drug treatment to prevent them becoming high-risk and reoffending. HMPPS’s plans will therefore require increased community support from Commissioned Rehabilitative Services (CRS) and other third sector organisations. The government has committed to providing an additional £700 million funding for the Probation Service over the next five years, but MoJ and HMPPS have not clarified how much of this funding will be available to cover additional demand for rehabilitative services. HMPPS’s plans also involve a significant increase in the use of electronic monitoring. Currently around 26,600 people are electronically monitored in the community but MoJ expects this to increase by up to 22,000 people. However, there have been serious performance issues with the electronic monitoring service, including delays by Serco in fitting tags. 6 recommendation MoJ and HMPPS should write to the Committee within six months setting out how Serco is performing against its key performance indicators, with regard to the electronic monitoring service and fitting tags. recommendation Once MoJ and HMPPS have clarified the role that they intend third sector and private sector organisations to play in the future Probation Service they should write to the Committee setting out: a. estimates of the proportion of individuals who will need access to this support and how that will be funded; b. what assurance they have that those no longer supervised by the Probation Service will be sufficiently supported to reduce reoffending, including providing details about the asse

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) on the efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service.1

HMPPS monitors performance against a range of targets to indicate whether the Probation Service is meeting its aims. Metrics for these targets measure activities at each stage of supervision against HMPPS’s target operating model, for example, the timeliness of appointments, and the proportion of individuals in employment at six months post release for custodial sentences.8 HMPPS’s data show that the performance of its Probation Service has worsened since unification in 2021. In 2024–25, it only met seven of its 27 (26%) performance targets, a decrease of 24 percentage points since July 2021 to March 2022 when it met eight out of the 16 targets (50%) it had at that time. HM Inspectorate of Probation’s (HMIP’s) inspections also 5 C&AG’s Report, para 3.2 6 C&AG’s Report, para 3.7 7 Committee of Public Accounts, Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service Written Evidence 8 C&AG’s Report, para 1.9, Figures 4, 5 9 suggest a deterioration in quality. For example, in 2024, HMIP found that probation practitioners adequately assessed risk of harm in just 28% of cases, compared with 60% in 2018–19.9

We pressed MoJ on why performance had worsened over the last few years. MoJ explained that workforce shortages, which it inherited upon unification, exacerbated by high staff turnover, were the main reason for poor performance.10 Written evidence from the Rehabilitating Probation Project Team and from Crest Advisory stressed that continuing workforce shortages and the resulting high workloads had undermined the quality of, and confidence in, the service.11 MoJ told us that the decline in performance is also linked to the increased complexity of cases.12 We challenged MoJ on why it had failed to address staff shortages sufficiently to date, given unification was almost five years ago. MoJ and HMPPS argued that they had been working hard to address the shortages by recruiting large numbers of staff. MoJ explained that overall staffing numbers had increased by 22% since 2021.13 However, despite this, the vacancy rate for probation officers had increased to 21% in March 2025, seven percentage points higher than in September 2021, when it was 14%.14

HMPPS first introduced a prioritisation framework to help reduce staff workloads in 2022. But workloads remained high, in particular for probation officers, who were working at around 118% capacity on average, with highs of 126% in some regions including London and East of England.15 Despite this, HMPPS did not introduce further prioritisation measures until its ‘Reset’ scheme in April 2024, and then its ‘Impact’ scheme in April 2025.16 HMPPS stressed that its Reset and Impact schemes, which involved reducing supervision for lower-risk individuals to allow probation officers to focus on higher-risk offenders, were aimed at improving performance.17 HMPPS explained that it took time for trainee probation officers to become fully qualified, but that the flow of new probation officers, coupled with ‘Reset’ and ‘Impact’, was starting to make a difference.18 It also pointed to its Our Future Probation Service programme, which it hopes will reduce workloads to a manageable level by March 2027.19 9 C&AG’s Report, para 5, Figure 5 10 Qq 3, 6 11 RPS002; RPS0003 12 Qq 3, 10 13 Qq 10–15, 37 14 C&AG’s Report, para 2.6 15 C&AG’s Report, paras 2.14–2.15 16 Qq 5, 28, 45, 64 17 Qq 22, 44, 45, 51; C&AG’s Report, para 2.16 18 Qq 35, 37,38 19 Qq 63, 80 10

We asked MoJ whether it accepted responsibility for the poor performance of the service following unification. MoJ told us that it had started to see improvements in performance, particularly in relation to risk assessment and management. It said that this followed steps it had taken such as updating its performance system and introducing ministerial oversight of probation performance. However, we had to ask a second time before MoJ accepted that it was responsible for the service’s performance.20 Impact of probation performance on offender outcomes

MoJ estimates that the economic and social cost of reoffending by adult offenders was £20.9 billion in 2024–25.21 The Probation Service aims to reduce reoffending and protect the public. However, offender outcomes, such as reoffending rates, have deteriorated since unification of the service in 2021. The reoffending rate for adults supervised by the Probation Service, either released from custody or starting a court order, was 36% for the cohorts supervised in July to September 2023 (latest data available), five percentage points higher than 31% for the cohorts supervised in April to June 2021. The average number of reoffences per reoffender also increased from 3.8 to 5.0 reoffences across the same period. There were 770 offenders charged with a Serious Further Offence while under probation in 2023–24, 55% more than in 2020–21. And the number of prisoners recalled to prison is at an all-time high. At the end of March 2025, the recall prison population was 13,583, accounting for 15% of the prison population, a 49% increase since June 2021.22

HM Inspectorate of Probation’s 2023 research indicates that high-quality probation supervision by a probation practitioner can significantly improve sentence completion rates and reduce reoffending.23 We asked MoJ about the extent to which poor probation performance has influenced worsening outcomes, including reoffending and recalls. HMPPS told us that that there was no evidence that probation staff were recalling people inappropriately, and the numbers had risen because of “the crisis in prisons”, as more people had been released from prison and were on probation, and probation had a higher-risk caseload. On reoffending it argued that other factors such as housing, employment, drugs treatment are all important. It told us that MoJ and HMPPS have been working with other partners, including the Department for Work and Pensions and businesses on employment support, and had made progress in all these areas. However, despite 20 Qq 2, 16 21 C&AG’s Report, para 1 22 Qq 20, 22; C&AG’s Report, para 1.7 23 C&AG’s Report, para 1.8 11 repeated probing, MoJ and HMPPS did not acknowledge any link between the poor performance of the Probation Service and deteriorating offender outcomes.24

We asked MoJ whether it has evaluated the impact of prioritisation measures such as ‘Reset’ and ‘Impact’, on rehabilitation outcomes. It told us that it is hard to attribute changes in reoffending rates to particular schemes, and it is too early to look at the effect of ‘Impact’. However, it explained that it is currently doing an evaluation of the ‘Reset’ scheme, which will look at how the scheme was implemented and the impact on the criminal justice system, and that it would include some quantitative data on contact time and recall rates. However, it did not confirm that the evaluation would include an assessment of the effect on reoffending and public protection.25 Probation staff

Persistent staff shortages mean that probation staff have been working at a level that is unsustainable for years.26 At March 2025, there were 5,636 full-time equivalent probation officers in post, 79% of HMPPS’s target staffing level - a shortfall of 1,479 probation officers. HMPPS’s data shows that probation officers, at a national level, have been working on average at 118% capacity from January 2022 to April 2024. In some regions, for example, London and East of England, probation officers had to deal with even higher workloads - working on average at 126% capacity.27 In 2024, HMPPS found that it had significantly underestimated the number of staff it needed for its Probation Service and had been operating with around only half of the staff needed to run sentence management as intended. This means that HMPPS’s data on staff capacity will have been a significant underestimate of the actual pressure practitioners have been under.28

In addition to high caseloads, staff have also had to deal with a high level of change. In 2023–24, HMPPS estimated there were around 100 new national proposals to change probation processes—84% of which were business- as-usual changes, such as those required to meet ministerial commitments, and not linked to major change programmes. It estimated that it would take probation practitioners a week to read the associated guidance and policy frameworks.29 Written submissions that we received from academics, think tanks and charities also highlighted their concerns over the additional 24 Qq 17–22,101 25 Qq 43–44 26 Q15; C&AG’s Report 2.13–2.14 27 Qq 56–57 28 Qq 27, 29, 31, 35, 50; C&AG’s Report, para 12 29 Qq 58–59; C&AG’s Report, para 2.11 12 pressures probation staff have faced from disruptions caused by recent major reorganisations and the constant changes to probation processes. They told us that probation staff have felt alienated by these frequent changes, and that there is a “culture of emotional strain”. The cumulative impact of ongoing disruption fostered a sense of crisis, with staff reporting heightened anxiety linked to rapid policy changes and long-serving staff frequently describing their experiences in terms of ‘trauma’.30

MoJ and HMPPS stated that they were focussing on improving staff retention as well as recruiting more staff. In the year ending March 2025, the leaving rate for probation staff was 9.3%, up from 6.2% in 2021, and sickness rate was 13.2 working days, up from 8.9 in 2021. Poor mental ill health accounted for the largest proportion of working days lost, 41% for all HMPPS staff and 58% for probation officers.31 HMPPS agreed that “it would be futile” to “hugely recruit just to see people leaving”. It told us that the most recent statistics suggest that there has been an improvement in retention rates, for example, the overall leaving rate for probation went down to 8.5% for the 12 months to the end of September 2025, one percentage point lower than for the year to March 2025.32 30 RPS002; RPS003; RPS004 31 C&AG’s Report, para 2.6; HM Prison & Probation Service, HM Prison and Probation Service workforce quarterly: March 2025 32 Qq 38,42; HM Prison and Probation Service workforce quarterly: March 2025 13 2 Future of probation services HMPPS’s Our Future Probation Service (OFPS)

MoJ told us that HMPPS’s ‘Our Future Probation Service’ programme is a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to address the root causes of the problems faced by the Probation Service, including shortfalls in staff.33 The programme will introduce new digital tools - over thirty digital initiatives are currently planned - to help reduce the time probation staff need to spend on tasks, to free up their time. These tools include ‘Justice Transcribe’, an AI tool to help staff capture meeting notes.34 Through the programme, HMPPS also plans to introduce changes to optimise processes and to implement policy changes such as the level of supervision required for different groups of offenders. This includes implementing policy changes set out in the Sentencing Bill, which are aimed at reducing prison capacity pressures.35 In June 2025, HMPPS set its risk appetite for the programme as ‘open’, the second highest on the five-point risk appetite scale, indicating that it is willing to take on a high level of risk.36

Written evidence from the Prison Reform Trust raised concerns over potential risks to public safety from some of the proposed changes . In particular, they were concerned that reducing rehabilitative activity for lower-risk individuals, while necessary and pragmatic in the short term, could undermine long-term public safety and perpetuate cycles of reoffending.37 Given the pace and nature of the planned changes, we asked MoJ whether the programme poses a risk to public protection. MoJ told us that public safety is its “absolute top concern”. It stressed that it wants to ensure people have the right level of supervision and that the planned changes will enable practitioners to focus on high-risk individuals. HMPPS also told us that it has a new public protection strategy and taskforce, and 33 Qq 11, 34 34 Qq 37, 42, 50, 60, 62, 63; C&AG’s Report, para 3.9 35 Qq 39, 56, 60–61, 64, 67; C&AG’s report, para 15 and Figure 14 36 Qq 48–50; C&AG’s Report, para 3.14 37 RPS0004; RPS0006 14 that it plans to refine its performance metrics to focus on a core number of protection measures that matter most. HMPPS did, however, note that risk can never be eliminated from the service.38

Crest Advisory and the Rehabilitating Probation Project Team also highlighted concerns that the programme will cause further disruption to the service, exacerbating pressures on already over-stretched staff.39 HMPPS told us that it was conscious that the service had been through successive structural changes and that it therefore needs to be more careful than usual as it rolls out changes. It explained that changes including new digital tools would be introduced incrementally over the next 18-months and that it is not taking a “big-bang” approach.40 We asked HMPPS whether the OFPS programme was on track. It explained that there had been some movement from its original timetable as it has had to manage several uncertainties, including financial allocation decisions, which it had hoped would have been resolved at this point.41 We asked if some of this slippage was due to difficulties delivering digital change. HMPPS acknowledged that previous digital change programmes had not always gone as planned within MoJ, but explained that this had not been an issue for its current programme. It stressed that it is focused on ensuring that the digital aspects of the programme are not seen as digital projects but as business change initiatives that result in tools that staff see value in and can use.42

Given the importance of the programme for the future of probation services and the associated risks, we asked MoJ and HMPPS what progress they had made in setting clear risk thresholds for the programme. HMPPS explained that, given the scale of the challenge, it had to take bold measures and argued that having a high risk appetite did not mean that it would not be cautious during implementation. MoJ told us that the programme would have good governance arrangements, the programme board would follow government standards and it would not take inappropriate risks. However, neither MoJ nor HMPPS were able to explain to us what the “red lines” are, in terms of the level of risk they are willing to accept, to help monitor operational and public protection risks.43 38 Qq 22, 44–46, 51–54,56 39 RSP0002, RSP0003 40 Qq 56–59 41 Qq 60–61 42 Q 62 43 Qq 48–50 15 Closing the capacity gap

In July 2025, HMPPS estimated that there would be a shortfall of 3,150 full- time equivalent probation staff in 2026–27, out of approximately 15,000 full-time equivalent sentence management staff required, even after its recruitment and prioritisation measures.44 Through its OFPS programme, HMPPS aims to free up operational capacity by 25% to close this shortfall. It explained that one third of the additional capacity will come through digital measures such as the AI transcribing tool, one third through process optimisation and one third through policy changes to the scope of probation services provided, for example, revisiting the scope of its ‘Reset’ programme.45

We asked whether freeing up 25% of capacity will be sufficient to improve performance. HMPPS told us that this is its estimate of what is needed to bring the service back into balance by April 2027, and which will allow staff to deliver a high-quality service.46 However, while its estimated capacity shortfall is based on its updated activity timings, it acknowledged that it reduced these timings down from staff-reported averages. HMPPS said this was because it found that staff were doing more than they needed to do and has issued staff with new guidance to help them complete tasks more quickly.47 Given that HMPPS’s internal review indicated that it needed to reduce workload by more than 25% to allow staff time needed for learning, we asked HMPPS why it did not agree with its own review. HMPPS explained that it agreed with the review’s broad conclusion that staff needed to be spending more time on training, but argued that additional time for this was already factored into its modelling.48 We challenged HMPPS on how it can be certain of the number of staff it needs if it does not yet know what the optimal caseloads for staff will be. HMPPS stressed that it is confident that its estimate of the shortfall is correct and that it knows what the optimal caseloads are at this point in time. However, it explained that it will need to reassess optimum caseloads as it introduces new ways of working.49

It is not yet clear whether the 25% reduction in capacity can be achieved as planned, as HMPPS acknowledged that there remain many uncertainties within the programme, and that it does not yet have a full set of measures in place to address the 25% gap.50 It explained that, even if the programme delivers on its objective, it still needs to close a residual staffing gap of 1,950 44 C&AG’s Report, para 13 45 Qq 63–65 46 Qq 65–7 47 Qq 87; C&AG’s Report, para 2.18 48 Qq 72–75; C&AG’s Report, para 3.16 49 Qq 67–71,78–79 50 Qq 60,61,67 16 staff through measures that it is still considering.51 HMPPS also confirmed that it had considered the impact on probation workload from the upcoming Sentencing Bill (a net 500 full-time equivalent increase in probation staff required) in its modelling.52 However, its modelling does not yet account for additional staff needed for other areas of probation, or for the impact of some wider policy changes, for example, the Independent Review of Criminal Courts, which is likely to create additional demands on probation staff.53 MoJ stated that it will need to keep evaluating the programme as it is rolled out, to make sure it is introducing the right measures.54 Electronic monitoring, third sector and private sector capacity

HMPPS’s planned changes to the scope of the Probation Service are likely to reduce probation supervision for many offenders assessed as at a lower risk of harm and reoffending.55 Written evidence from the Prison Reform Trust highlighted that low risk individuals often have higher rates of identified need, including housing, mental health and drug treatment and financial support. It warned that if the needs of these individuals are not met, their risk profile could increase overtime, adding further pressure to the service.56 Probation practitioners can draw on contracted-out Commissioned Rehabilitative Services (CRS) to support offenders’ rehabilitative needs. HMPPS’s plans are likely therefore to require increased support from its CRS contracts and other third sector organisations.57

We asked HMPPS whether there is sufficient capacity in the third sector to provide this support. HMPPS said that it already has more than 100 contracts in place for its CRS across the country, about two thirds of which are with not-for-profit organisations. HMPPS also stated that this indicates there is already the capacity in the sector and that it intends that the not-for-profit sector would continue to be a significant provider of its rehabilitative services. It also told us that it is in the process of re-procuring those contracts and in doing so, it is considering how to define these contracts differently to make them more resilient.58 51 Q 83 52 Q 64 53 C&AG’s Report, para 3.16 54 Qq 66–67 55 C&AG’s Report, Figure 12 56 RPS0006 57 Q 102; C&AG’s Report, para 17 58 Q 102 17

In written evidence The Prison Reform Trust told us that it welcomed the government’s commitment to increase probation funding by up to £700 million by 2028–29, but raised concerns that it is not clear how much will be allocated for third sector providers.59 We asked MoJ and HMPPS how much funding will be made available to ensure there is sufficient funding for rehabilitative services provided by third sector. They stated that there was additional policy work ongoing to further consider the role of the third sector, but did not clarify whether funding will be sufficient to meet demand. MoJ also clarified that its thinking on whether there are particular groups or individuals who might benefit from shorter probation and more support from third-sector providers is still at an early stage.60

MoJ and HMPPS’s plans also involve a significant increase in the use of electronic monitoring. MoJ told us that the number of people on electronic monitoring has doubled in recent years, from around 10,000 people in 2020 to 26,600 in September 2025.61 It expects the number of people monitored to increase by up to 22,000 people.62 However, MoJ and HMPPS confirmed that the performance of Serco, its main contractor providing the electronic monitoring service, had not met expectations since May 2024. They explained that there was a backlog in fitting tags, but that the backlog was cleared by November 2024. They told us that Serco’s performance had “dramatically improved” since, and told us that they expect Serco to meet its key performance indicators by February 2026.63 59 RPS0006 60 Qq 102, 103 61 Qq 47, 90 62 GOV.UK, Press release, Tens of thousands more to be tagged under biggest ever expansion 63 Qq 90–95 18