2nd Report - The work of the UK Statistics Authority

The transition from the Labour Force Survey to the Transformed Labour Force Survey has not been handled well enough and the result has been significant reputational damage to the ONS. Project management for the Transformed Labour Force Survey was poor. Churn amongst Senior Responsible Owners was notable and the ONS seemed to lose sight of the original aim for a slimmed down survey to supplement greater use of administrative data. The project appears to be back on track but only following a reset. (Conclusion, Paragraph 26)

Until the transition to the Transformed Labour Force Survey, the Labour Force Survey remains the primary measure of UK employment and considerable efforts have been taken to improve its robustness. We are pleased to see that response rates have returned to near the pre- pandemic rate. However, achieving this appears to have been resource intensive. The sustainable solution remains a successful transition to the Transformed Labour Force Survey, with a shorter, more focussed survey component supplementing administrative data, as soon as possible. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

The UKSA should keep us informed of progress towards the successful delivery of the Transformed Labour Force Survey on a quarterly basis. The UKSA and the Cabinet Office should also update us on efforts to explore the consequences of mandatory completion of the Labour Force and other surveys to date in their responses to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

The Integrated Data System’s aim of providing a growing range of data from across government to a range of users via a single access point remains laudable. While there are legitimate questions about the quality of project management within the ONS, much of the problem lay with the inability or unwillingness of government departments to allow access to their data; an issue that goes beyond the IDS project. UK governments continue to be unwilling or unable to ensure departments and agencies share data sufficiently. (Conclusion, Paragraph 33) 38

The Cabinet Office and the UKSA should update us on the long-term plan to improve data sharing across government in light of the failure of the Integrated Data System in its response to this report and quarterly thereafter. In particular, the Government should clarify where responsibility for integration of the work of the IDS with the National Data Library’s Kickstarter Programme now sits, following the closure of the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT). (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)

While there have been enormous problems at the ONS, we also note that not all the commentary about the ONS’s performance has been well-informed, or constructive. Attempts to right long-standing, historical problems have sometimes been used as evidence of the ONS’s ineptitude, rather than as necessary steps which help us better understand the UK economy and society. Good news stories, such as the immense transformation of migration statistics or the introduction of new data sources into inflation data, have attracted far less attention. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)

The need for immediate consolidation and prioritisation is a legitimate response to the short-term problems the ONS faces. It is essential in rebuilding trust with its key stakeholders. Nonetheless, there is a risk that this approach leads to stagnation, with projects sat in the ONS’ “waiting room” indefinitely. Experience has shown that the ambition of the ONS has not always matched its capacity. The “waiting room” cannot be a mechanism for avoiding decisions about priorities, with demands for new work simply parked until an unspecified time in the future. We expect to see clear evidence of projects moving out of, as well as into, the “waiting room”. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

Longer term, the ONS must still evolve to address the pressures it faces, including the need to make greater use of administrative data, the difficulties of relying on traditional surveys, demands for new data in policy responses, and the impact of AI. The organisation will need to demonstrate how it builds from addressing its short-term problems to consider the challenges ahead, showing realistic ambition in seizing the opportunities of the future. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44) Senior Leadership

The appointment of a Permanent Secretary to run the ONS was a reasonable response to the predicament the ONS was in, particularly as it allowed for swift action to be taken to address the issues facing the organisation. Importantly, though, the current arrangements are temporary. The 39 Permanent Secretary, Darren Tierney, has been appointed to a two-year post, there is no National Statistician at the time of writing, and only an interim Chair of the UKSA Board. (Conclusion, Paragraph 52)

While there is probably an optimal structure for the organisation, there is none that would fully protect it against poor leadership and management. Conversely, the right appointments can help an organisation succeed despite structural challenges. There is no evidence that the structure of the organisation has, to this point, been detrimental to the success of previous National Statisticians in running the organisation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 53)

As and when a National Statistician is appointed, the Government and the UKSA Board will need to clarify the structure, including who ultimately leads the ONS, and how the arrangement aligns with the relevant legislation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 54)

That the leadership of the ONS is at arm’s length from government is an important protection designed to ensure the integrity of official statistics. Should the Government wish to make permanent changes to the National Statistician’s role leading the ONS, it will have to change legislation. Should it do so, we expect it to demonstrate suitable protection for the integrity of official statistics in any change. (Recommendation, Paragraph 55)

Appointing strong leaders for the long-term, with a united vision for the statistical system, might have helped the ONS to navigate its increasingly challenging operating environment. Instead, the ONS and the Cabinet Office seemed to create, advertise for and fill senior posts, while allowing others to remain vacant, with an apparent disregard for strategy or best practice. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)

An organisational culture in which challenge was apparently resented and in which bad news was not escalated appropriately until it was too late lay at the heart of many of the ONS’s problems. This appears to have been addressed by the senior leadership which has been proactive in communicating not only good news, but also ongoing challenges, with us and with the wider statistics community. We welcome this and expect it to persist as the organisation returns to ‘business as usual’. (Conclusion, Paragraph 63) The UKSA Board

The Board of the UKSA exists to oversee the production of reliable statistics. That the Board seemed unaware of issues within the ONS until they reached crisis point, notably, though not only, with the Labour Force Survey, suggests it failed in its core purpose. Its reluctance to involve itself in the 40 ONS operations appears to have extended to a lack of oversight, of scrutiny, and of challenge. The Board was repeatedly taken by surprise by problems with the ONS’s culture and its outputs. It is difficult to understand why the Board, who must have understood that they were not receiving full and accurate accounts from their executive as far back as 2023, did not move more quickly to address the problem. They would have been well within their rights to demand copies of damning reports on culture and closely monitor the ONS’s response. At any point, they could have made clear that senior executives no longer held the Board’s confidence. They might have, as other boards before them had, reported publicly to Parliament about their concerns. Instead, they waited until early 2025 to jointly commission with the Cabinet Office an independent review of the ONS, a review that set out things a board should already have known. The Board’s delay and inaction have cost the statistical system, as well as the very many of us who depend on official data. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)

The Cabinet Office’s decision to disregard the Chair’s request to reappoint experienced non-executive directors significantly weakened the UKSA Board at a crucial time. It is the responsibility of the Cabinet Office to ensure an UKSA Board that is equipped to perform its role, not least by ensuring that it has a full complement of appointments and proper and timely succession planning to maintain capability as its membership evolves. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76)

We are grateful to Penny Young for her work as interim Chair of the UKSA since September 2025 and her role in leading recovery plans for the ONS. We find the priorities set out by the Board to be a balanced mix of recovery and building for the future in a way that will rebuild trust. We are particularly pleased to see a focus on technological resilience and legacy system reduction. (Conclusion, Paragraph 80)

It appears that the appointment of a new National Statistician will precede the appointment of a new permanent Chair of the UKSA. This means the appointment of the next National Statistician has been overseen by the interim Chair, and, while the role is split with the ONS Permanent Secretary, will have to ensure clear responsibilities and lines of accountability for both. That the Government has left responsibility for this in the hands of an interim appointment is regrettable. A permanent chair of the UKSA should be appointed as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)

The UKSA is responsible for overseeing the work of the ONS, but it is the Cabinet Office’s responsibility to ensure that it is equipped to do so. We are pleased to see the Board of the UKSA is fully constituted and that the process to ensure timely succession for departing members is in place. It is important that this is maintained, even as impetus provided by the recent crises fades. (Conclusion, Paragraph 82) 41

An updated Framework Document should make clear the Cabinet Office’s responsibility for ensuring a properly functioning UKSA Board. (Recommendation, Paragraph 83)

As the regulator for UK statistics, it would have been reasonable to expect the Office for Statistics Regulation to have sounded the alarm over issues such as the problems with the Labour Force Survey more loudly than was the case. It was ultimately concerns from consumers of statistics such as the Bank of England, the Office for Budget Responsibility, and HM Treasury that prompted action. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

The OSR’s responsibility for escalating concerns to the UKSA Board with greater urgency needs to be made clearer and its leadership held accountable for doing so. While it is proper that the OSR works through the UKSA Board, this committee remains an appropriate mechanism through which concerns can also be raised. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)

The integrity of official statistics is underpinned by the independence of their production. International experience demonstrates the potential consequences of that statistical independence being undermined. Politically compromised statistics can have real economic consequences, including higher borrowing costs, policy errors and lasting reputational damage. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

The principle that official statistics are produced in a system designed to protect from political intervention remains an important one. We do not recommend changes to the relevant legislation nor to the structure of the UKSA or the ONS at this stage. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92) Funding

While all similar public sector organisations can make a case for increased funding to deliver more, we conclude that poor internal processes, particularly around prioritisation, were more of an issue for organisational failings than the total funding envelope. Resource constraints were exacerbated by the failure to prioritise the production of core statistics adequately. (Conclusion, Paragraph 97)

The removal of much of the ringfencing around specific pots of money is sensible. However, if demand for statistics from government is not accompanied by discussion about resource or trade-offs, it will mean little. We expect the revised Framework Document between the Cabinet Office and the UKSA to include clear mechanisms to reconcile demands for statistics with funding to provide them. (Recommendation, Paragraph 98) 42

To support better prioritisation, we reiterate the recommendation made in the Office of Statistics Regulation’s report on the State of the Statistical System 2026, that the National Statistician, once appointed, should publish a baseline view of capacity across the statistical system. This should include workforce data and identify any relevant skills gaps and constraints. It should be updated regularly. This will ensure that future discussions about funding, prioritisation, and demands for new statistics, are supported by a clear picture of existing resources. (Recommendation, Paragraph 99) 43