Rail Industry Fragmentation
Fragmentation within the rail industry leading to siloed decision-making and misaligned incentives, hindering integrated investment.
Source spread
Where this theme appears
This theme appears across 7 independent accountability sources, so the source mix matters as much as the headline total.
59 inquiry recs
6 PFD reports
86 committee recs
1 NAO rec
3 IMB recs
14 LGO/SPSO decisions
Browse by source
Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Inquiry recommendations(59)— showing 50 strongest matches
10 — Rules and Group Standards clear and unambiguous
Recommendation: Railtrack must ensure that Rules and Group Standards applicable to operators, including drivers, are clear and unambiguous. In particular, Railtrack should urgently complete the review of operating Rules to ensure they are workable in the privatised, fragmented industry (para 16.6).
Unknown
8 — Monitor driver transfers and numbers trained
Recommendation: Railtrack and ATOC should monitor the transfer of drivers between operators and the numbers of drivers trained by each TOC and consider whether there are any safety implications involved (paras 5.5, 16.5).
Unknown
7 — National qualification and accreditation system for drivers
Recommendation: Railtrack together with ATOC should establish a national qualification and accreditation system for drivers including centrally held records to be available to the current employer (paras 5.5, 16.5).
Unknown
1 — Co-operate on research into driver behaviour
Recommendation: All parties in the rail industry should co-operate in the collection of evidence to support reliable research into human behaviour studies relating to driver performance. Railtrack should co-ordinate this work and TOCs incorporate the results into training programmes (paras 1.25, …
Unknown
LADB-81 — Research removable windows and window adequacy for emergency egress and spacing.
Recommendation: There should be research into the feasibility of, and risks associated with, removable windows, the adequacy of windows as a means of emergency egress, the number of dedicated windows which are necessary and the provision as to the maximum distance …
Unknown
LADB-80 — Review emergency hammer adequacy, signage, and illuminated location with backup power.
Recommendation: There should be a thorough review of the adequacy of the number of, and signage relating to, emergency hammers. This should include the provision of means of illuminating the location of hammers in an emergency, with a back-up power supply …
Unknown
LADB-79 — Ensure emergency ladders are readily usable and quickly releasable on trains.
Recommendation: The daily routine check of every train should include confirming that all ladders can readily be used. A mechanism to enable ladders to be released quickly should be devised and fitted (para 14.35).
Unknown
LADB-78 — Develop illuminated pictogram signage for emergency door mechanisms, conforming to standards.
Recommendation: Signage primarily in the form of pictograms similar to those used on aircraft, and depicting the correct operation of emergency door mechanisms, should be developed. The signage should conform to current human factors standards on signage and be displayed prominently …
Unknown
LADB-77 — Install override devices on staff-only doors for passenger emergency use.
Recommendation: The staff-only doors on all trains should have an override device to enable them to be used by passengers in an emergency (para 14.29).
Unknown
LADB-76 — Modify internal coach doors to facilitate emergency egress by December 2003.
Recommendation: In the case of every coach (on any train) which has internal doors which slide in the same direction one of the following should be carried out by 31 December 2003: (i) the coach should be fitted instead with opposite- …
Unknown
LADB-75 — Consider providing "snap wands" as supplementary emergency lighting on trains.
Recommendation: The provision of “snap wands” should be considered as a supplementary means of providing lighting in an emergency (para 14.22).
Unknown
LADB-74 — Research methods to safeguard emergency lighting systems from sudden deceleration forces.
Recommendation: Research should be carried out into the means of safeguarding emergency lighting systems from disablement by the forces involved in sudden deceleration (para 14.21).
Unknown
LADB-73 — Research and implement a common emergency signage system across all Great British trains.
Recommendation: There should be research with the aim of arriving at a system of signage which is common to all trains in Great Britain (para 14.20).
Unknown
LADB-72 — Develop universally understandable emergency signs for all trains, without text.
Recommendation: So far as is feasible, emergency signs on all trains should be capable of being understood by passengers without the necessity to read text (para 14.19).
Unknown
LADB-71 — Make luminous emergency sign requirement retrospective for all trains
Recommendation: The requirement for emergency signs to be luminous should be made retrospective (para 14.18).
Unknown
LADB-70 — Endorse using onboard announcements to highlight passenger safety information
Recommendation: The use of on-board announcements to draw attention to safety information is endorsed (para 14.16).
Unknown
LADB-69 — Endorse providing onboard explanatory information about individual train emergency facilities
Recommendation: The provision on board of explanatory information about the emergency facilities of individual trains is endorsed (para 14.14).
Unknown
LADB-68 — Obtain expert advice on passenger actions during known serious onboard dangers
Recommendation: Expert assistance should be obtained on the advice which should be given to passengers as to what to do in the event of there being a known threat of serious danger to them in remaining on board (para 14.14).
Unknown
LADB-67 — Provide general safety advice to passengers before and after boarding trains
Recommendation: Passengers should be given general safety advice both before and after they have boarded their train (para 14.14).
Unknown
LADB-66 — Establish system to collect human factors data on passenger safety after rail accidents
Recommendation: A system should be established for the collection of human factors information pertinent to issues of passenger safety following rail accidents (para 14.8).
Unknown
LADB-65 — Standardise passenger safety information and train evacuation and escape procedures
Recommendation: So far as is feasible, the safety information issued to passengers and the means by which they can be evacuated or escape from a train should be standardised (para 14.8).
Unknown
LADB-64 — Keep public information code of practice on train safety and emergencies updated
Recommendation: The code of practice on public information on train safety and emergencies should be kept up to date (para 14.6).
Unknown
LADB-63 — Ensure HSE provides adequate guidance for evacuation and escape provisions
Recommendation: The provisions in the schedule as to evacuation and escape should be supported by adequate guidance from the HSE (para 14.3).
Unknown
LADB-62 — Extend Railway Safety Case Regulations to include emergency escape arrangements explicitly
Recommendation: The scope of Schedule 1 to the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 should be extended so as to include explicitly the arrangements which the duty holder has established in regard to facilities, instructions and signs for the escape of persons …
Unknown
LADB-61 — Enhance fire protection by reviewing fuel tank standards and repositioning vulnerable tanks
Recommendation: The following measures should be considered with a view to enhancing protection against fire: (i) a review of Group Standards in respect of improved crash resistance of fuel tanks; (ii) consideration of the feasibility of reducing fuel inventories and of …
Unknown
LADB-60 — Conduct market research on safety measures to include informed passenger views
Recommendation: Comprehensive market research in regard to safety related measures should be carried out in order to take account of the views of informed passengers (para 13.20).
Unknown
LADB-59 — Consider retrofitting enhanced security for seating in Turbos and tables in HSTs
Recommendation: The enhancement of the security of seating in Turbos and of tables in HSTs should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting (para 13.19).
Unknown
LADB-58 — Revise crashworthiness Group Standard for realistic scenarios and high-speed testing
Recommendation: The revision of the Group Standard for crashworthiness should be pursued with particular reference to: (i) the design requirements for more realistic scenarios; (ii) high speed accidents; and (iii) dynamic verification testing (para 13.17).
Unknown
LADB-57 — Consider improved welding and aluminium grades for new aluminium vehicles
Recommendation: In the case of new vehicles constructed of aluminium, consideration should be given to: (i) the use of alternatives to fusion welding; (ii) the use of improved grades of aluminium which are less susceptible to fusion weld weakening; and (iii) …
Unknown
LADB-56 — Review crashworthiness standard to safeguard survival space after Ladbroke Grove crash
Recommendation: The current standard for crashworthiness should be reviewed, in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove, in order to ensure that there are adequate measures for safeguarding survival space (para 13.5).
Unknown
LADB-55 — Consider retrofitting Turbos with enhanced welds, couplers, and anti-overriding devices
Recommendation: In the case of Turbos, the enhancement of end pillar weld connections, the possible enhancement of crashworthiness by weakening the ends and strengthening the saloon of the cars, and the fitting of shear-out couplers and anti-overriding devices should be considered, …
Unknown
LADB-54 — Review crashworthiness standard for new vehicles after Ladbroke Grove crash
Recommendation: The current standard for crashworthiness in respect of new vehicles should be reviewed in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove with respect to the objectives referred to in Recommendation 53 (para 13.4).
Unknown
LADB-53 — Consider HST cab and bogie enhancements for improved driver protection and safety
Recommendation: The enhancement of the cabs on HSTs to improve driver protection along with energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs, should be considered, subject to …
Unknown
LADB-52 — Instruct IECC staff to preserve CSR data disks following SPAD incidents
Recommendation: Signallers, managers and maintenance staff working at IECCs should be instructed as to the need to preserve CSR data disks in the event of a SPAD taking place (para 12.30).
Unknown
LADB-51 — Establish national direct radio communication system between trains and signallers
Recommendation: There should be a national system of direct radio communication between trains and signallers (para 12.29).
Unknown
LADB-50 — Introduce automatic audible cab warning for CSR trains passing danger signals
Recommendation: Subject to satisfactory risk assessment, an arrangement should be made whereby, when a train which is fitted with the CSR passes a signal at Danger, an audible warning automatically sounds in the cab (para 12.28).
Unknown
LADB-49 — Investigate automatic signal replacement to Danger after SPADs to prevent collisions
Recommendation: There should be a study of the possibility of the automatic replacement of a signal to Danger where a SPAD has occurred and the layout is such that there is a significant danger of collision (para 12.27).
Unknown
LADB-48 — Enhance signaller speed for emergency point movement actions
Recommendation: The speed with which signallers can take action to move points in an emergency should be improved (para 12.22).
Unknown
LADB-47 — Implement unique, persistent alarm for all SPAD occurrences
Recommendation: There should be a unique alarm for SPADs, which should sound until it is turned off (para 12.21).
Unknown
LADB-8 — Railtrack to complete signal risk assessments for the Paddington area promptly.
Recommendation: Railtrack should ensure that the risk assessments and any consequent actions required under Group Standard GK/RT 0078 in respect of the signals in the Paddington area are carried out as soon as possible (para 7.125).
Unknown
LADB-7 — Extend recommendation implementation monitoring to include Train Operating Companies
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to extending sub-para (ix) of Recommendation 6 to recommendations which are directed to one or more of the TOCs and others (para 7.106).
Unknown
LADB-6 — Improve Railtrack procedures for implementing and monitoring accepted recommendations with clear accountability
Recommendation: Railtrack procedures, and the actions of management to enforce them, should be directed to ensuring that: (i) a recommendation which is accepted is implemented according to a defined timescale; (ii) the person to whom a recommendation is allocated for implementation …
Unknown
LADB-5 — Require holistic safety and risk assessment for all track or signalling changes
Recommendation: Where a material change to track or signalling or both is proposed, there should be an express consideration of all relevant safety issues by an analysis of the material factors, if necessary by means of a risk assessment. This should …
Unknown
LADB-34 — Reconsider the use of "disregard" in the SPAD Group Standard
Recommendation: The use of the word “disregard” in the Group Standard on SPADs and its associated documentation should be reconsidered (para 11.29).
Unknown
LADB-16 — Consider applying NVQs to the driver licensing scheme by ATOC
Recommendation: ATOC should consider the application of NVQs to the driver licensing scheme presently under their consideration (para 9.52).
Unknown
LADB-15 — Expeditiously progress ATOC study on central licensing of drivers
Recommendation: The ATOC study on the central licensing of drivers should be progressed expeditiously (para 9.50).
Unknown
FENN-150 — Consider establishing a single passenger safety inspectorate for all transport
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the establishment of a single passenger safety inspectorate charged with monitoring and supervising standards in all passenger transport.
Unknown
LADB-88 — Ensure unrestricted availability of all standard emergency equipment on passenger trains.
Recommendation: The availability on trains carrying passengers of the items of emergency equipment mentioned in the standard on emergency and safety equipment should be unrestricted (para 14.74).
Unknown
LADB-87 — Investigate implementing remote broadcasting from outside the train where unavailable.
Recommendation: The possibility of remote broadcasting from outside the train, where it is not already available, should be investigated (para 14.68).
Unknown
LADB-86 — Examine feasibility of a "roaming" communication system for train staff.
Recommendation: The feasibility of a “roaming” communication system for train staff should be examined (para 14.68).
Unknown
Prevention of Future Deaths reports(6)
Lauris Kodors
Concerns: The RSSB Rule Book permits stopping trains only if a person may cause damage to a train, but not when a person is in danger from a train.
Overdue
Robert Mullis
Concerns: A vulnerable, partially sighted passenger with dementia was able to disembark a train unsupervised at an intermediate station, subsequently accessing railway tracks and being struck by trains.
Response (Robert Mullis): • Platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels have been installed at both ends of platforms 2, 5, and 6, and the London end of platform 1 at Ashford International Station. • … (AI summary)
Overdue
Richard Hill
Concerns: The coroner identified a lack of telephones and Network Rail contact information at the crossing, noting the possibility of repeat incidents at or near this location.
Response (Richard Hill): • Network Rail maintains a widely publicised 24-hour emergency number for reporting safety incidents on or near the railway. • A team of patrollers was implemented in October 2018 to … (AI summary)
Responded
Christopher McGuffie
Concerns: The coroner noted the absence of immediate and effective alert systems at railway stations for persons on the line, as well as alternative detection methods to trigger appropriate responses.
Response (Arriva): • Arriva Rail North provides suicide intervention training to all frontline staff and is revising induction training to include a module in this area. • The company is installing Ticket … (AI summary)
Responded
Carl Klimaytys
Concerns: The coroner raised concerns for the Three Bridges Regional Operating Centre (ROC) about the discovery of a body by a member of the public at Preston Park Station.
Response (Network Rail): • Network Rail supports safety awareness programmes, including the 'You vs Train' film and educational resources for schools and communities. • Network Rail regularly conducts seasonal publicity campaigns warning the … (AI summary)
Response (GTR): • New training for Help Point Assessment was established in February 2019, including functional tasks and a knowledge quiz. • Information resources now include access to a 'Track Access' system … (AI summary)
Responded
Croydon Tram Incident
Concerns: The coroner noted the absence of a centrally funded national tram safety passenger group.
Response (Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd): • An international team including experts from ALSTOM and IFE has been assembled. • The team will investigate changes to current and future tram door design. (AI summary)
Response (Transport for London): • Transport for London (TfL) commissioned an engineering study with Alstom to investigate strengthening existing door mechanisms on the CR4000 fleet, with this work already underway. • TfL committed to … (AI summary)
Response (Tram Operations Ltd): • Tram Operations Ltd stated that the PFD report concerning a centrally funded national tram safety passenger group was not addressed to tramway operators. • The company therefore did not … (AI summary)
Response (Transport Focus): • Transport Focus stated it would engage with tram service operators and/or the Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) regarding passenger safety issues brought to its attention by users. … (AI summary)
Response (Department for Transport): • The Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) published guidance documents addressing driver inattention and speed management, including automatic braking systems. • All tram networks in England now subscribe … (AI summary)
Response (Light Rail Safety and Standards Board Auto Braking): • The Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) was incorporated in August 2018 and received initial funding from the Department for Transport to enable UK-wide cooperation on safety and … (AI summary)
Response (Light Rail Safety and Standards Board Anonymous reporting CIRAS): • LRSSB confirmed that all seven UK Tramways subscribe to a confidential reporting scheme. • LRSSB participates in the CIRAS committee and communicates relevant information to the light rail sector. … (AI summary)
Response (Light Rail Safety and Standards Board Doors): • The Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) was established as the safety and standards body for light rail and tramways in the UK. • LRSSB is actively engaged … (AI summary)
Responded
Select committee recommendations(86)— showing 50 strongest matches
#7 —
Recommendation: The sheer scale of variation in standards across different licensing authorities has created an inconsistent and confusing landscape for trade and passengers alike. (Conclusion, Paragraph 41)
Response status not verified
#1 — Committee supports the Railways Bill's purpose to establish Great British Railways as the 'directing mind'.
Recommendation: We recognise the need for structural change on the railways. We support the main purpose of the Railways Bill: to establish Great British Railways as a single organisation overseeing both track and train, and capable of acting as a ‘directing …
Response attribution not verified
#24 — Government acknowledges rail industry fragmentation and commits to Great British Railways for integration.
Recommendation: We welcome the Government’s recognition that industry fragmentation has contributed to siloed decision-making and misaligned incentives between stakeholders, and its commitment to establishing a whole- system organisation, Great British Railways, to tackle this. We look forward to holding GBR and …
Response attribution not verified
#1 — Uncertain and uneven rail investment cycles weaken the UK rail industry sector.
Recommendation: The UK rail network is a core national asset, supporting its own industrial ecosystem and underpinning broader economic growth and employment. The message from the rail industry has been clear: investment in that asset has too often been characterised by …
Response attribution not verified
#9 —
Recommendation: The proliferation of regulators in the higher education sector has caused duplication and red tape, increasing the burdens on providers—particularly in the area of graduate apprenticeships, where at least four other regulators have responsibilities in addition to the OfS. This …
Response attribution not verified
#15 —
Recommendation: The government should review the effectiveness of the current institutional landscape for heritage, including the division of responsibilities between Historic England, English Heritage and other funding bodies. It should assess the case for greater streamlining, or even the merging of …
Response status not verified
#6 —
Recommendation: Following the conclusion of its consultation on transferring taxi and PHV licensing to local transport authorities, the department should publish a comparative appraisal of licensing models, including the local transport authority approach and a potential national licensing model. This appraisal …
Response status not verified
#13 —
Recommendation: The Rail white paper outlines government’s plans for a new rail system, with one body responsible for overseeing infrastructure and passenger services and with less complex financial transactions.32 The Office of Rail and Road told us that such a “guiding …
Response attribution not verified
#11 —
Recommendation: After our evidence session, on 20 May, the Department published its long-delayed Rail white paper, which outlines its “once-in-a-generation” reforms planned for the rail system, including replacing franchising and better integrating infrastructure with passenger services.25 The Department acknowledges that it …
Response attribution not verified
#10 —
Recommendation: We were interested to hear the Department’s views on the main issues caused by the rail system’s current structural organisation. The Department recognised that problems have emerged over a number of years, partly the result of poor alignment between Network …
Response attribution not verified
#9 —
Recommendation: We have previously reported on the problems inherent in the rail system which have led to poor performance and reliability of the network. Even before the pandemic, we and the Transport Committee had reported on the Department’s franchising model and …
Response attribution not verified
#3 —
Recommendation: Published information from the Department and the Office of Rail and Road on whole-system costs and revenues is not sufficient to inform proper oversight of the rail system, given the extent of taxpayer exposure. The arrangements for delivering rail services …
Response attribution not verified
#2 —
Recommendation: In recent years, we have identified serious failings in the rail system, and the Department must now overcome significant long-standing issues to bring about complex reform. We have previously reported on the problems inherent in the rail system, such as: …
Response attribution not verified
#13 —
Recommendation: The Williams-Shapps review said that the UK Government wishes to establish a new working agreement between Great British Railways (GBR) and Transport for Wales. We believe that the Wales Rail Board we have recommended would be the correct setting in …
Response attribution not verified
#11 —
Recommendation: If clear benefits for both passengers and freight users could be delivered by devolving rail infrastructure to the Welsh Government then the case for further devolution would be compelling. However, few benefits to rail users have been identified and the …
Response attribution not verified
#17 —
Recommendation: The Department recognised two primary risks in relation to railway systems: the physical practicalities of different contractors working on the ground together; and, systems not integrating effectively.41 We asked HS2 Ltd how it planned to avoid the issues with railway …
Response attribution not verified
#16 —
Recommendation: The High Speed 2 programme has many interdependent elements, including stations, infrastructure and railway systems. We raised concerns in our previous report that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the Department …
Response attribution not verified
#3 —
Recommendation: HS2 Ltd has started planning how it will integrate its systems for Phase One to ensure the railway works, but this is an inherently risky part of the programme. We previously raised concerns that, given the scale of the programme …
Response attribution not verified
#26 —
Recommendation: In 2020, the Office of Rail and Road reported inherent uncertainty in the value of some of the efficiency savings made by Network Rail in 2019–20.69 The Office of Rail and Road told us that it has now agreed a …
Response attribution not verified
#25 —
Recommendation: But Network Rail recognised that there “is still a mountain to climb” to achieve the full efficiency improvements it has committed to, and that it will need to continue to increase savings.63 Network Rail estimated that 60% of remaining planned …
Response attribution not verified
#24 —
Recommendation: In the first year of Control Period 6 (2019–20), Network Rail exceeded its planned efficiency savings; achieving £385 million compared to £316 million expected.61 The Office of Rail and Road told us that Network Rail has improved its efficiency through …
Response attribution not verified
#23 —
Recommendation: The Office of Rail and Road told us that in Control Period 5 (2014–15 to 2018–19), Network Rail became less efficient and failed to meet efficiency targets.58 Indeed, in contrast to assumptions made by the Office of Rail and Road …
Response attribution not verified
#22 —
Recommendation: The Department acknowledged that long-term, strategic direction on electrification is needed to provide market certainty for operators, rolling stock companies and the procurement of trains that will be able to operate on the network and to drive innovation. It also …
Response attribution not verified
#21 —
Recommendation: The Department told us that electrifying the rail network is a key part of decarbonising and achieving net zero on the railway and that to ensure success, a steady long-term plan for electrification is needed. However, the Department acknowledged that …
Response attribution not verified
#19 —
Recommendation: We were concerned that the short-term nature of these new contracts could fail to incentivise operators to make cost savings and improve performance, and asked the Department to explain how operators would be incentivised to keep costs down. The Department …
Response attribution not verified
#18 —
Recommendation: Following our session on 13 May 2021, the Department told the Transport Committee that negotiations with all train operators have concluded around terminating the underlying franchise agreements, which is necessary to enable the transition of operators 37 Qq 19, 31 …
Response attribution not verified
#17 —
Recommendation: The Department updated us on the Emergency Recovery Measures Agreements (ERMAs), which it put in place as an overlay to franchising agreements in response to the dramatic loss in passenger revenue caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The ERMAs transferred all …
Response attribution not verified
#16 —
Recommendation: Our previous reports have covered some of the commercial difficulties caused by the Department’s franchising model. In the worst-case scenarios, issues such as over- optimistic assumptions of passenger growth led to severe operator losses and early contract terminations.39 These contract …
Response attribution not verified
#15 —
Recommendation: The Department acknowledged that there were significant challenges inherent in its franchising model used prior to the pandemic. It told us that the previous surplus in franchising costs had become a deficit prior to the pandemic.37 During the final four …
Response attribution not verified
#14 —
Recommendation: Specifically in relation to passenger service operations, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, private sector companies operated passenger services under a franchise model but still received some level of government funding. The amount of government funding provided to train operators has …
Response attribution not verified
#12 —
Recommendation: Since privatisation in the 1990s, cash flows in the rail system have become increasingly complex. Although the rail system is privatised, government still provides significant funding for infrastructure operations, maintenance and renewals, and ongoing subsidy for passenger service operations. The …
Response attribution not verified
#8 —
Recommendation: The Department referred to its recently published strategies on bus travel18 and cycling and walking19 and told us that integration between modes of transport is “critical” to make public transport an attractive and practical choice for passengers.20 However, in these …
Response attribution not verified
#7 —
Recommendation: As well as providing critical revenue for the rail system, passenger rail travel supports wider government objectives around transport decarbonisation and achieving net zero. We asked the Department how they planned to encourage people out of their cars onto rail. …
Response attribution not verified
#20 —
Recommendation: Net government funding increased 99.7% in real terms between 2015–16 and 2019–20 from £2.6 billion to £5.1 billion. This reflects increases in expenditure on operating and maintaining rail network infrastructure and the pre-COVID-19 deterioration in the passenger rail market as …
Response attribution not verified
#6 —
Recommendation: It is not clear to us how Network Rail expects to achieve the remaining efficiencies planned in Control Period 6. In Control Period 5 (2014–15 to 2018–19), Network Rail failed to achieve its efficiencies target as agreed with the Office …
Response attribution not verified
#5 —
Recommendation: We are disappointed at the lack of progress in agreeing a specific and funded plan for the electrification required to achieve the government’s own net zero targets. Electrification of the network is the key mechanism for delivering rail decarbonisation. It …
Response attribution not verified
#4 —
Recommendation: It is not yet clear that the interim National Rail contracts fairly distribute risks between government and operators, or provide incentives for operators to deliver efficient, high-quality, and value-for-money passenger services. In previous reports the Committee highlighted failings in the …
Response attribution not verified
#10 —
Recommendation: Network Rail’s revised structure has helped Network Rail respond to incidents in Wales, build relationships with Transport for Wales (TfW) and sharpen its focus on Wales and borders services. However, Network Rail should be alive to concerns that its regional …
Response attribution not verified
#18 —
Recommendation: HS2 Ltd recognised that the integration of railway systems would be crucial and explained that it planned to establish a collaborative alliance amongst the main railway systems contractors to encourage them to work together to deliver the integrated systems. Although …
Response attribution not verified
#19 — Significant disagreements persist between the Department and HM Treasury regarding GBR's remit and future commercial model.
Recommendation: We asked the Department about the challenges presented by not having agreement with HM Treasury from the outset of the programme about some of these aspects. The Department told us that the white paper had the collective agreement of ministers …
Response attribution not verified
#18 — Department and HM Treasury fundamentally disagreed on GBR's remit, independence, and commercial model from the outset.
Recommendation: The Department intended that Great British Railways (GBR) would act as the ‘guiding mind’ for the railways, with responsibility for the whole rail system.40 But the Department and HM Treasury disagreed on key areas of rail reform from the start, …
Response attribution not verified
#11 — Risk of cutting passenger services due to cost focus, reducing revenue and customer experience.
Recommendation: Rail Partners highlighted to us the risk that the Department may look to cut passenger services to save costs which would make the railway less attractive for passengers, mean lower revenues flowing into HM Treasury, and add to cost pressures. …
Response attribution not verified
#10 — Pandemic exposed rail cost challenges and created conflicting priorities for financial framework.
Recommendation: The Department told us that the pandemic presented a fundamental challenge to sustainably funding the railways and that the financial pressures have driven a stronger focus to look at the whole system and improve performance, both financially and for passengers.21 …
Response attribution not verified
#5 — Urgently resolve fundamental disagreements with stakeholders on Great British Railways' role and commercial model.
Recommendation: Six years since the Department started work on rail reform, it has failed to resolve fundamental disagreements and clarify key aspects of reform. The Department acknowledges that, while its white paper set the broad direction and detail for some areas …
Response attribution not verified
#15 —
Recommendation: In responding to this Report, if not earlier, the Department should publish the list of “no regret” electrification schemes identified by Network Rail and confirm which schemes they intend to deliver as a priority, the costs of doing so, and …
Response attribution not verified
#14 —
Recommendation: We recommend that Network Rail and the ORR continue to explore the potential for an extension in third-rail electrification capability and that the Department, as the overall sponsor of rail decarbonisation, proactively monitors this development in Trains fit for the …
Response attribution not verified
#12 —
Recommendation: However, even if one puts aside the question of affordability and liabilities, there is the issue of how closely connected and densely populated the border between Wales and England is. The mainline connecting north and south Wales runs through England …
Response attribution not verified
#17 —
Recommendation: Construction work on the programme started in 2009 and tunnelling began in 2012.47 The majority of major construction work is complete and Crossrail Ltd is now transferring assets, such as stations, to Rail for London Infrastructure (RfLi) and London Underground …
Response attribution not verified
#23 —
Recommendation: We welcome the steps the Government have taken to get more freight off our roads and on to our railways. We hope this is a process the establishment of Great British Railways will accelerate. The current model which sees freight …
Response attribution not verified
#5 — Develop a clear and consistent approach to integrate active travel with public transport.
Recommendation: DfT has not ensured that active travel schemes are sufficiently joined-up with wider transport infrastructure, for example enabling people to safely walk to bus stops or take their bike on the bus or train. DfT recognises the importance of integrating …
Response attribution not verified
NAO audit recommendations(1)
IMB individual recommendations(3)
Hollesley Bay (2022)
That the transport arrangements currently in operation at the prison are explored and developed;
Governor / Director
Hollesley Bay (2022)
That the transport arrangements currently in operation at the prison are explored and developed;
Governor / Director
Wymott (2023)
The Board considers the proposal to build a new prison next to HMPs Wymott and Garth will have a detrimental effect on the local infrastructure. Prison staffing and IMB recruitment are already stretched, and this will further impact upon them.
HMPPS
Independent reviews(17)
Cunliffe Water Commission — Rec 64
Recommendation 64: The Commission believes the UK government should monitor NAV market size and risk of fragmentation.
Other
McNulty Rail Review — Rec 27-regulation
Recommendations for regulation: Move towards the industry having a single regulator, the ORR, with a new focus on whole-system outputs and with the necessary resources, skills and standing to support an expanded role. The DfT to undertake a full review of fares policy and structures, aiming to move towards a …
Other
McNulty Rail Review — Rec 26-incentives
Recommendations for more effective incentives: Reform of franchising, along the lines already announced by Government with much stronger incentives for TOCs to reduce costs, and to co-operate more effectively with NR. Closer alignment of NR and TOC incentives through the structural changes indicated above. In relation to NR: comparative regulation …
Other
McNulty Rail Review — Rec 25-structures
Recommendations for changes to structures and interfaces: Devolution and decentralisation within NR. Introduce diverse ownership of some infrastructure management concessions. Closer alignment of route-level infrastructure management with TOCs, at one or other of the following levels: minimum – cost and revenue sharing, and joint targets; or intermediate – joint ventures …
Other
McNulty Rail Review — Rec 24-devolution
Recommendations for devolved decision-making: Less prescriptive franchises to allow TOCs more freedom to respond to the market. Decentralisation and devolution within Network Rail. A greater degree of local decision-making by PTEs, and/or local authorities, brought more closely together with budget responsibility and accountability.
Other
McNulty Rail Review — Rec 23-objectives
Recommendations for clearer objectives: Government to provide greater clarity about what Government policy is, how different strands of policy are harmonised, and make clearer the links between the different levels of policy, objectives, strategies and implementation. The High Level Output Specification (HLOS)/Statement of Funds Available (SoFA) process to include specific …
Other
McNulty Rail Review — Rec 22-leadership
Recommendations for leadership from the top: The Department for Transport (DfT) to develop a clearer definition of the roles of Government and industry, with Government focused primarily on setting the overall vision for the industry, the direction of rail policy, the objectives for the industry, the level of funding available, …
Other
Shaw Review of Network Rail — Rec 3
Recommendation 3: Create a route for the North. This new route will work closely with the customers there and in particular the new regional government body, Transport for the North. Network Rail should also work closely with other integrated transport authorities, city regions, and London, as funding and delivery models …
Other
Shaw Review of Network Rail — Rec 2
Recommendation 2: Focus on the customer through deeper route devolution, supported by independent regulation. Building on the current Network Rail move to greater devolution to its routes, there should be a step-change in the degree of autonomy of these routes to deliver more flexibly and responsively for their customers, passengers …
Other
Shaw Review of Network Rail — Rec 1
Recommendation 1: Place the needs of passengers and freight shippers at the heart of rail infrastructure management. Train operators should drive this customer focus into Network Rail through scorecards and agreed action plans, recognising they are sharing use of the network with others and operating within a national (and international) …
Other
Shaw Review of Network Rail — Rec 5
Recommendation 5: Plan the railway based on customer, passenger and freight needs. Enhancement planning should be generated from passenger and freight shipper requirements. Routes should be given the freedom to build up their plans based on these needs and recognising the role of the railway in the wider transport, economic …
Other
Oakervee Review — Rec 46
Conclusion 46: The overall governance of the HS2 project, including the future planning of Phase Two along with the delivery and operation of HS2, should be reframed in light of the recommendations of the Williams Review, including any new body or bodies that are established by government following the Williams …
Other
Oakervee Review — Rec 39
Conclusion 39: HS2 Ltd should work closely with the Shadow Operator and Network Rail to ensure its decisions consider and reflect the operational perspectives of both organisations. Cost estimation, management and control
Other
Oakervee Review — Rec 34
Conclusion 34: There needs to be a single plan for the overall Euston project. In order to help deliver this single Euston plan, one organisation should bring together all the stakeholders and be responsible for the overall development and governance of the Euston project. Given the complexity of the Euston …
Other
Oakervee Review — Rec 31
Conclusion 31: Governance arrangements for the development of the HS2 stations need to be streamlined with HS2 stations closely integrated with the existing transport network and the local area.
Other
Oakervee Review — Rec 11
Conclusion 11: Transport for the North and Midlands Connect, together with Network Rail, HS2 Ltd and the DfT, should develop a plan to maximise the benefits of Phase 2b and ensure an optimised delivery model. This could be the first step in an integrated rail plan for the GB rail …
Other
Oakervee Review — Rec 4
Conclusion 4: HS2 can be part of transformational economic change, but only if properly integrated with other transport strategies, especially those seeking to improve inter-city and intra-regional transport, and also with National, regional and local growth strategies. Transport investment alone will not ‘rebalance’ the UK economy. Wider environmental considerations
Other
LGO / SPSO decisions(14)
21-013-597 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about the cancellation of tube train services. This is because the complaint does not meet the tests in our Assessment Code on how we decide which complaints to investigate. Any injustice is not significant enough to justify our involvement and we could not …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jan 2022
21-014-830 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a disrupted tube journey in 2017 because it is a late complaint.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Feb 2022
21-013-023 — Transport for London
Summary: Mr X complained Transport for London (TfL) refused to issue a refund for his cycle hire. NHS staff were offered a discount code to use bikes for free during Covid, but Mr X was charged £2 per use when he had originally sought to purchase annual membership. We find …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Upheld
Mar 2022
22-011-402 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about problems with public transport. This is because there is another body better placed to consider the issues raised.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Dec 2022
24-001-966 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about Mrs X’s train journey on a TfL line. This is because an investigation would be unlikely to lead to a different outcome.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jun 2024
24-008-920 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint that a rail replacement bus service operated on behalf of Transport for London damaged his car. This is because it would be reasonable for Mr X to make a claim against Transport for London at court if he believes it is responsible …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Sep 2024
25-005-834 — Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority & Exec
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint about the Authority telling him he is not entitled to a concessionary travel pass. This is because there is not enough evidence of fault.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Sep 2025
25-007-569 — Liverpool City Region Combined Authority
Summary: We will not investigate Ms X’s complaint about the Authority’s handling of her transport survey complaint. This is because there is not enough remaining injustice and an investigation would be unlikely to reach a different outcome.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Oct 2025
24-012-797 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about Transport for London issuing traffic Penalty Charge Notices and failing to provide reasonable adjustments. This is because further investigation would not lead to a different outcome.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Dec 2024
NIPSO-202005280 — Northern Ireland Housing Executive
We upheld a man's complaint about the Housing Executive's failure to deal with his enquiries about emergency accommodation.
NIPSO (NI Public Service…
Housing
Upheld
Oct 2024
22-002-190 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a personal injury claim. This is because the courts are better placed to consider this complaint.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
May 2022
22-002-699 — London Travelwatch
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint that London Travelwatch failed to resolve his complaint against Transport for London. This is because its actions did not cause him significant injustice.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jun 2022
23-014-202 — West Yorkshire Combined Authority
Summary: Mr X complained the Authority failed to keep a disabled toilet facility at a bus station in a clean and usable condition. We have found fault by the Authority in failing to ensure the facility was kept clean when Mr X used it, causing injustice. The Authority has agreed …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Upheld
Jun 2024
24-001-985 — Kent County Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a delay by the Council in renewing the complainant’s bus pass. This is because there is insufficient evidence of fault by the Council.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jun 2024