Completed
· Chair: Sir Martin Moore-Bick
· Established August 2017
· Commissioned by Cabinet Office
Public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, which killed 72 people.
More about this inquiry
Public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, which killed 72 people. The inquiry examined the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire.
All fire and rescue services ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that delivery of the recommendation was complete, relaying National Fire Chiefs Council confirmation that all 43 fire and rescue services had reviewed training and trained all relevant staff using its products, while the London Fire Brigade had also trained all operational and control staff (Home Office, Feb 2025). In September 2024, the department had reported progress as ongoing, with Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service being the only service with the training still outstanding (Home Office, Sep 2024).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
The LFB review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633 to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in GRA 3.2.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office stated in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade had completed the recommendation (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department reported in that February 2025 update that guidance previously contained in the brigade's High-Rise Firefighting policy had been reviewed and incorporated into its Management of Operational Risk Information policy, with all operational staff completing mandatory training on the revision (Home Office, Feb 2025). It noted in February 2025 that this improved guidance assisted operational staff to understand risks within their station areas, alongside new National Operational Guidance maintained by the National Fire Chiefs Council (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade considered the recommendation complete, noting that all operational staff had completed mandatory training on the revised Management of Operational Risk Information policy to better understand risks within London's built environment (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department had previously recorded the brigade's position that the recommendation was complete in February 2024 (Home Office, Feb 2024).
All fire and rescue services be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the National Fire Chiefs Council considered the recommendation complete, with every fire and rescue service in England equipped to receive and store electronic plans and share high-rise residential building risk data with control room managers and incident commanders (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department also recorded in February 2025 that London Fire Brigade treated the recommendation as complete, using an interim solution while procurement and outstanding requirements workstreams for its One Risk project continued (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
The LFB review its policies on communications between the control room and the incident commander.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry recommended that the London Fire Brigade (LFB) review control room communications policies. In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the brigade considered the recommendation complete (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated that the brigade published a revised fire survival guidance policy in March 2021 following an extensive training programme for operational and control staff (Home Office, Feb 2025). This update describes enhancements to exchanging fire survival guidance information between control and the incident ground, while communications with the incident commander are not mentioned (Home Office, Feb 2025).
All officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade had completed this recommendation (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated that a revised policy on fire survival guidance was published in March 2021 and 95 percent of watch officers and senior officers had received face-to-face training (Home Office, Feb 2025). It added that this learning was being embedded through exercises involving residential high-rise fire scenarios (Home Office, Feb 2025).
All CROs of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the incident commander.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry recommended training senior control room operators on communicating with incident commanders. The Home Office stated in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade (LFB) reported the recommendation had been completed (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department noted that all control staff had received training on a revised Fire Survival Guidance policy issued in March 2021 and were taking part in residential high-rise exercises to embed learning (Home Office, Feb 2025). That update did not mention training directed to communications with the incident commander or staff of Assistant Operations Manager rank (Home Office, Feb 2025).
A dedicated communication link be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the London Fire Brigade considered this recommendation complete (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated in February 2025 that the brigade had published a revised fire survival guidance policy in March 2021, establishing procedures for a dedicated communication link between the control room and the bridgehead on the incident ground (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB's policies be amended to draw a clearer distinction between callers seeking advice and callers who believe they are trapped and need rescuing.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade considers this recommendation completed (Home Office, Feb 2025). According to the department, the brigade produced guidance to draw a clearer distinction between callers seeking advice and callers who believe they are trapped and need rescuing within Appendix 1 of Policy Number 790 on fire survival guidance (Home Office, Feb 2025). This guidance was published in March 2021 following a brigade-wide training programme (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB provide regular and more effective refresher training to CROs at all levels, including supervisors.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry recommended regular, effective refresher training for control room staff. In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the London Fire Brigade considered the recommendation completed (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated that control staff began training on revised Policy Number 790 on Fire Survival Guidance in December 2020 (Home Office, Feb 2025). It added that maintenance of competency requirements was set out within the control element of the brigade's Development and Maintenance of Operational Professionalism (DaMOP) framework established in July 2020 (Home Office, Feb 2025).
All fire and rescue services develop policies for handling a large number of FSG calls simultaneously.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry asked fire services to create policies for handling multiple simultaneous survival guidance calls. In February 2025, the Home Office reported that all fire and rescue services in England had completed the recommendation, based on a survey by the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated that services had reviewed their policies and training to manage multiple fire survival guidance calls, alongside adopting technological systems to share information simultaneously (Home Office, Feb 2025). It also recorded that London Fire Brigade (LFB) had completed the recommendation following the rollout of revised operational guidance and associated training (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
Electronic systems be developed to record FSG information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the recommendation was complete across fire and rescue services, relaying a National Fire Chiefs Council survey confirming that all 43 services in England had taken actions to effectively capture and share information, while the London Fire Brigade considered the measure complete following the launch of its application in March 2022 (Home Office, Feb 2025). Previously, in September 2024, the department had reported that Buckinghamshire and Royal Berkshire were the final two services completing assurance and testing of their new systems (Home Office, Sep 2024).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
Policies be developed for managing a transition from 'stay put' to 'get out'.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that action on the recommendation was complete across all fire and rescue services, citing a National Fire Chiefs Council survey confirming that every service in England had completed the necessary steps (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department also recorded that the London Fire Brigade had completed the recommendation, having published revised fire survival guidance and new evacuation and rescue policies in March 2021 and trained all operational and control staff (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
Control room staff receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that this recommendation had been completed across fire and rescue services (Home Office, Feb 2025). It recorded that a National Fire Chiefs Council survey found all 43 English services had completed the action, while the London Fire Brigade confirmed that training for control room staff was complete and embedded through exercises (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
Steps be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room.
Since then (summary written by this site)
Relaying assurances from the National Fire Chiefs Council, the Home Office reported in February 2025 that delivery across fire and rescue services was complete, with shared Airwave talk groups embedded across all 43 services (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department explained in the same February 2025 update that while the Multi Agency Incident Transfer electronic system was connected to 18 control rooms serving 26 services, ten further connections were anticipated by March 2025 and the final six would be connected "in slower time" due to local integration work (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
The LAS and the MPS review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify FSG calls (as defined by the LFB) and pass them to the LFB as soon as possible.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry asked ambulance and police services to review fire survival guidance call protocols. In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) had reviewed their protocols to ensure calls are passed to the London Fire Brigade (LFB), which shared its revised policy and briefing note, and the department considered the recommendation complete (Home Office, Feb 2025). Earlier, in October 2019, Paul Woodrow OBE, Director of Operations at the ambulance service, stated that it welcomed the findings and accepted the recommendations relating to it (Paul Woodrow OBE, Oct 2019).
The LFB develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade had completed the recommendation through its revised High-Rise Firefighting policy introduced in June 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department noted in February 2025 that this policy included guidance on crew deployments and Fire Survival Guidance calls, and that initial training in the new procedures had concluded in March 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room).
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry asked the London Fire Brigade to improve crew debriefing and information recording. In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the brigade considers the recommendation complete (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated that the brigade developed a structured briefing model to ensure information is consistently gathered and recorded during debriefings (Home Office, Feb 2025). It added that the model has been incorporated into incident command training as well as policies on high-rise firefighting, fire survival guidance, and evacuation (Home Office, Feb 2025). Making recorded information immediately available to command units and the control room is not mentioned in the update (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the London Fire Brigade considered this recommendation complete through its revised Fire Survival Guidance policy (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department also recorded in February 2025 that the brigade had issued guidance on effective communication at incidents, altered radio channels to allow for dedicated command channels, and introduced drones to livestream information to Brigade Control (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording FSG information and the results of deployments.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade considered this recommendation complete, having addressed it through the rollout of a Fire Survival Guidance application that went live in March 2022 (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated that the application enables information from fire survival guidance calls to be displayed simultaneously at an incident and in the control room (Home Office, Feb 2025). An earlier update in February 2024 noted that the introduction of the application had previously faced technical delays before those issues were resolved (Home Office, Feb 2024).
The LFB urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the recommendation was complete, stating that the London Fire Brigade launched new breathing apparatus sets on 11 March 2024 featuring integrated mask communications and higher power radios to improve contact between wearers and the bridgehead (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department had previously reported in February 2024 that the rollout had been delayed from January 2024 to resolve equipment quality assurance issues with the supplier and allow additional time for training (Home Office, Feb 2024).
Urgent steps be taken to ensure that the command support system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office stated in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade had completed the recommendation (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department explained in February 2025 that new hardware servers and 4G connectivity had been installed across all command units, two 4G-enabled laptops had been supplied to each unit to provide resilience, and all command unit staff had completed refresher training (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Fire and rescue services develop policies for partial and total evacuation of high-rise residential buildings and training to support them.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that this recommendation had been completed across England (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department stated in the same February 2025 update that a survey by the National Fire Chiefs Council confirmed every service had completed the necessary action on evacuation policies and training (Home Office, Feb 2025). It also recorded in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade had completed the recommendation after establishing its evacuation and rescue policy and training all operational personnel (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
All fire and rescue services be equipped with smoke hoods to assist in the evacuation of occupants through smoke-filled exit routes.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the recommendation was complete for both the London Fire Brigade and fire and rescue services across England (Home Office, Feb 2025). It relayed that an August 2022 National Fire Chiefs Council survey found all 43 responding services had acquired smoke hoods, made them operationally available, and trained staff, while the brigade reported introducing smoke hoods across all front-line appliances in November 2018 (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Addressed to National Fire Chiefs Council · Full record
Steps be taken to investigate the compatibility of the LFB systems with those of the MPS and the LAS with a view to enabling all three emergency services' systems to read each other's messages.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the London Fire Brigade had closed off the recommendation as complete after fully investigating the compatibility of its systems with the Metropolitan Police Service and London Ambulance Service (Home Office, Feb 2025). It stated that the brigade's mobilising system was Multi Agency Incident Transfer enabled, while noting that the brigade had committed to continuing work with partner services to deliver full capability (Home Office, Feb 2025).
The LFB, the MPS, the LAS and the London local authorities all investigate ways of improving the collection of information about survivors and making it available more rapidly to those wishing to make contact with them.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that this recommendation was complete, relaying progress from London's emergency services (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department noted in that February 2025 update that procedures for improving survivor information collection and sharing had been incorporated into London's Major Incidents Procedures Manual by the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel and the Humanitarian Assistance Working Group, with the revised manual published in November 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Grenfell Tower Fire (Written Ministerial Statement HCWS18)
Written Ministerial Statement HCWS18: "I am announcing today the appointment of Sir Martin Moore-Bick to head the Public Inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire." The Inquiry's own key-documents page separately lists a Prime Minister's appointment letter dated 28 June 2017 (title only, not independently fetched this pass).
Grenfell Tower Inquiry terms of reference published
Prime Minister's response accepting in full the Chairman's 10 August 2017 recommendation. Applies to the whole inquiry; both Phase 1 and Phase 2 operated under this single, unamended Terms of Reference (see grenfell_instruments.tsv).
First published core participants list: 532 individuals and organisations designated by that date (504 bereaved/survivors/residents, 28 organisations). Applies to the whole inquiry (pre-phase split).
Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report: government response
Phase 1. Joint response from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government and the Home Office, published 21 January 2020, responding to the 30 October 2019 Phase 1 report.
Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report: Government response
Phase 2. Command paper CP 1248, joint response from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Cabinet Office and Home Office, presented to Parliament 26 February 2025 (page last updated 2 June 2025). Government committed to reporting annually to Parliament on implementation.
Total inquiry costs Aug 2017 - Jan 2025. Inquiry Legal = Chairman (Sir Martin Moore-Bick), Panel and Counsel. Staff = Secretariat, Accommodation and Operations. Technology = Hearing Room and Legal Tech. Other = Assessors and Expert Witnesses. 619 core participants (585 BSR) funded through 24 solicitors firms and 59 counsel.
Signed resource-accounting correction recorded 9 October 2026: the FY2023/24 financial report publishes a £1.785m credit (−£1,785,000) for Core Participant Recognised Legal Representation, reflecting suppliers overestimating prior-year billing. The report separately states actual cash spend of £122,000 for FY2023/24; that cash observation is neither a substitute for nor additive to the resource credit. The £3.245m period total remains unchanged. The earlier note saying the negative adjustment is shown as £0 is superseded; the prior notes below remain unchanged for audit and any other valid statements remain in force.
Prior notes (unchanged): Calculated from cumulative financial reports. Inquiry Legal = Chairman, Panel and Counsel. Staff = Secretariat, Accommodation and Operations. Technology = Hearing Room and Legal Tech. Other = Assessors and Expert Witnesses. FY23-24 had negative CP Legal adjustment (-£1.8m) for prior over-estimates, shown as £0.
Total inquiry costs Aug 2017 - Jan 2025. Inquiry Legal = Chairman (Sir Martin Moore-Bick), Panel and Counsel. Staff = Secretariat, Accommodation and Operations. Technology = Hearing Room and Legal Tech. Other = Assessors and Expert Witnesses. 619 core participants (585 BSR) funded through 24 solicitors firms and 59 counsel.
Written Ministerial StatementHouse of CommonsFlorence Eshalomi · Labour
Statement: My Noble Friend the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Resilience (Baroness Blake of Leeds CBE) has today made the following statement:The Grenfell Tower fire was a preventable tragedy that claimed 72 lives and exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in the systems designed to keep people safe. …
Written Ministerial StatementHouse of LordsBaroness Blake of Leeds · Labour
Statement: The Grenfell Tower fire was a preventable tragedy that claimed 72 lives and exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in the systems designed to keep people safe. It remains a profound failure of oversight and accountability which should never have happened and the bereaved, survivors and local community …
Written QuestionHouse of LordsLord Bourne of Aberystwyth · Conservative
Asked: To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are continuing to enter into contracts with Arconic for the supply of cladding panels.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: The Government remains committed to holding organisations to account for the failings identified by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Officials across Government continue to consider what further commercial measures may be appropriate while safeguarding the integrity of the criminal investigation. MHCLG does not enter into direct contracts with Arconic for the supply of cladding panels.
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsSir James Cleverly · Conservative
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, with reference to the written statement of 20 May 2026, HCWS51, on Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report Update, which organisations are subject to the policy of not sharing a public platform; and …
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: The Government is committed to taking clear and proportionate action in response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s findings. The Public Engagement Policy and which companies it applies to is published on GOV.UK . Ministers and senior civil servants will decide how and when they engage with external bodies bearing in mind the principles of accountability, transparency and the balance of …
Written QuestionHouse of LordsLord Hunt of Wirral · Conservative
Asked: To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment it has made of the practical incentives, other than retention payments, available to ensure good building construction practices.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: Since 2023, dutyholders, including clients, principal contractors and principal designers, are regulated through the building control process. Prosecutions may be brought for breaches of the building regulations under Section 35 of the Building Act 1984 where appropriate. The government has also accepted a recommendation of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Report to introduce principal contractor licensing, to ensure principal contractors working …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsEdward Morello · Liberal Democrat
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what support is available to leaseholders in West Dorset facing costs associated with building safety remediation and compliance following the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: We recognise concerns about building safety costs and are clear that costs should be fair, transparent and represent value for money. Protections are in place to limit the costs of remediating historical building safety defects. Cladding remediation costs are met by Government funding programmes or developers, while further protections, including the Developer Remediation Contract, contribution caps for certain leaseholders, and …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsEdward Morello · Liberal Democrat
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what steps he is taking to ensure leaseholders are not required to meet the costs of remediation works arising from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: We recognise concerns about building safety costs and are clear that costs should be fair, transparent and represent value for money. Protections are in place to limit the costs of remediating historical building safety defects. Cladding remediation costs are met by Government funding programmes or developers, while further protections, including the Developer Remediation Contract, contribution caps for certain leaseholders, and …
Written Ministerial StatementHouse of LordsBaroness Taylor of Stevenage · Labour
Statement: My Honourable Friend the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy (Samantha Dixon MBE MP) has today made the following statement:The Grenfell Tower tragedy exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in the systems designed to keep people safe. The preventable loss of 72 lives remains a profound failure …
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was established following the fire on 14 June 2017 that resulted in 72 deaths. The inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, published its Phase 1 report in October 2019 focusing on the events of the night, and its Phase 2 report in September 2024 examining the causes of the fire.
The inquiry's Phase 1 recommendations led to documented changes in fire service operations. London Fire Brigade revised its policies for handling fire survival guidance calls and introduced new training on external wall fires. The National Fire Chiefs Council published guidance addressing evacuation strategies and external wall fire risks. Several fire services introduced electronic systems for recording emergency calls.
Two significant pieces of legislation followed the inquiry's work. The Fire Safety Act 2021 clarified that the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 applies to external walls and flat entrance doors. The Building Safety Act 2022 established the Building Safety Regulator and introduced new requirements for high-rise residential buildings, including the appointment of accountable persons and the maintenance of building safety information.
The inquiry's 104 recommendations span operational procedures, training requirements, regulatory reform, and building safety management. While legislative changes and operational reforms are documented in the public record, evidence of action on several specific recommendations, particularly those requiring inter-service coordination or standardised information systems, has not been identified in publicly available sources.
Reforms attributed to this inquiry · AI-generated• The Fire Safety Act 2021 extended the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 to cover external walls and flat entrance doors • The Building Safety Act 2022 established the Building Safety Regulator and introduced requirements for building safety information • London Fire Brigade introduced new policies for handling fire survival guidance calls following Phase 1 recommendations • National Fire Chiefs Council published new guidance on evacuation strategies and external wall fires • Fire and rescue services across England introduced training programmes on external wall fire risks • Electronic systems for recording fire survival guidance calls introduced by multiple fire servicesUnfinished business · AI-generated• No published evidence of legislation requiring building owners to provide external wall information to fire services in a standardised format • No published evidence of mandatory national standards for control room to incident commander communications • No published evidence of statutory requirements for regular refresher training intervals for control room operators • No published evidence of implemented protocols for inter-service control room information sharing between LFB, LAS and MPS
Findings about the inquiry's recommendations as a whole
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services(1 Nov 2024)
This site's summary of the finding: LFB rated "outstanding" for responding to major and multi-agency incidents. Significant improvements since January 2022 inspection. Understanding of risk improved.
The Summerland fire of 1973 demonstrated that combustible cladding materials can enable rapid and catastrophic fire spread. The same lesson was tragically repeated at Grenfell Tower 44 years later.
Ronan Point introduced the concept of resistance to disproportionate collapse in building regulations. The Grenfell Tower fire raised the same fundamental question about the gap between building regulation and safety in practice.