17th Report - The Remediation of Dangerous Cladding

We asked MHCLG how its new plan would speed up the remediation process. MHCLG told us that its Ministers were committed to speeding up the pace of remediation. The Plan introduced a target that by the end of 2029 all … Read more We asked MHCLG how its new plan would speed up the remediation process. MHCLG told us that its Ministers were committed to speeding up the pace of remediation. The Plan introduced a target that by the end of 2029 all buildings over 18 metres will have been remediated, and those between 11 and 18 metres will have been remediated, will have a date for completion, or owners will be liable for enforcement penalties. The target provides a means of assessing progress, as recommended by the NAO. However, 2029 is still 12 years on from the Grenfell fire and, as End Our Cladding Scandal pointed out, remediation works will only be completed for some buildings by then. MHCLG’s target did not set a date by which works on all 11–18 metre buildings should have started. The NAO found that MHCLG did not expect remediation works on some unsafe buildings to start until 2035.10 Show less

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Addressing some of these barriers will require legislative changes, for example, creating new obligations on landlords to remediate, and new enforcement powers for regulators to compel remediation or impose penalties. The Plan did not mention other barriers to pace highlighted … Read more Addressing some of these barriers will require legislative changes, for example, creating new obligations on landlords to remediate, and new enforcement powers for regulators to compel remediation or impose penalties. The Plan did not mention other barriers to pace highlighted by the NAO, such as the affordability of paying for defects that do not relate to cladding and are therefore ineligible for government funding.12 MHCLG assured us that although it needed to legislate for some of the activity in the Plan, it had “not held back” from taking action where it could in the meantime, for example through a joint plan it had agreed with developers. MHCLG explained that the purpose of the Plan had been to emphasise and 9 Qq 27, 30-31, 34; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Building Safety Remediation: monthly data release - December 2024, 23 January 2025; C&AG’s Report, para 19 10 Qq 1, 30; C&AG’s Report, recommendation a, para 2.16; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 11 Committee of Public Accounts, Progress in remediating dangerous cladding, Sixteenth Report of Session 2019-21, HC 406, 16 September 2020, paras 4 and 23; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 12 Qq 30, 39; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan; C&AG’s Report, para 1.14 11 enforce remediation responsibilities, particularly on freeholders, who it said had often been the blocker to progress.13 We therefore asked if enforcement action would be taken in the next 12 months against uncooperative freeholders and developers. MHCLG told us that it had no power over regulators, but it was equipping them to take action. MHCLG told us that it was putting £33 million additional funding into enforcement. MHCLG also explained that it was legislating for backstop dates for remediation, to introduce more severe penalties for landlords who did not act, tighter assessment standards and more rigorous duties on building owners. We therefore asked MHCLG about its timetable for introducing this legislation. MH Show less

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MHCLG’s Plan acknowledged that uncertainty around how many 11–18 metre buildings needed to be remediated meant that many residents were unsure about the safety of their homes and the timeline for getting them fixed.15 When asked what it was doing … Read more MHCLG’s Plan acknowledged that uncertainty around how many 11–18 metre buildings needed to be remediated meant that many residents were unsure about the safety of their homes and the timeline for getting them fixed.15 When asked what it was doing to identify remaining unsafe buildings, MHCLG said Homes England was investigating unique building records. Homes England explained that, in autumn 2024, it had started investigating around 220,000 unique records of four storey buildings to create a register of buildings over 11 metres. We heard that it would shortly start reviewing around half a million further unique records for three–storey buildings. Homes England told us that it was checking the height of these buildings, and their cladding materials using tools such as Google Earth, and that it was reviewing Land Registry data and leases to obtain ownership details. Homes England said it intended to complete its investigations by December 2025. Registration of all high–rise residential buildings was made mandatory under the Building Safety Act 2022, but MHCLG told us that mandatory registration for 11-18 metre buildings, as promised in its Plan, was contingent on legislation, for which timescales were uncertain.16 Show less

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End Our Cladding Scandal (EOCS) told us it was not confident that MHCLG’s Plan would deliver for residents. It explained that too many barriers and issues remained, that MHCLG’s 2029 target was still five long years away and that it … Read more End Our Cladding Scandal (EOCS) told us it was not confident that MHCLG’s Plan would deliver for residents. It explained that too many barriers and issues remained, that MHCLG’s 2029 target was still five long years away and that it would only mean remediation was complete for some buildings–high rise buildings within the government’s grant programmes. EOCS said the target date, without an indication of when all buildings will be made safe, was essentially meaningless. It also told us that there were 13 Qq 30, 37; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Joint plan to accelerate developer-led remediation and improve resident experience, Policy paper, published 2 December 2024 14 Qq 34, 36-37, 39; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 15 MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 16 Qq 31, 40; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan; C&AG’s Report para 2.2 12 still too many issues that were not being addressed by the Government’s programmes, including non–qualifying leaseholders, shared ownership and buildings under 11 metres and that non-cladding fire safety defects were holding up remediation.17 Show less

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In their written evidence to us, the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) and The Property Institute also raised concerns about the exclusion of non– cladding defects from government funded programmes. The NFCC told us there was a “large proportion” of … Read more In their written evidence to us, the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) and The Property Institute also raised concerns about the exclusion of non– cladding defects from government funded programmes. The NFCC told us there was a “large proportion” of buildings needing temporary measures— such as waking watches—to ensure life safety for serious internal fire safety issues other than cladding, and it was unclear who would pay to remediate them.18 The Property Institute told us that the exclusion of non– cladding issues undermined the integrity of building safety standards, failed to protect resident communities and placed a heavy burden on property owners and leaseholders.19 Show less

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We asked MHCLG about what it was doing to support residents with non– cladding defects. MHCLG told us that it was developing a new standard with the British Standards Institute to give the sector more certainty over what work needed … Read more We asked MHCLG about what it was doing to support residents with non– cladding defects. MHCLG told us that it was developing a new standard with the British Standards Institute to give the sector more certainty over what work needed to be done to address non–cladding issues. It told us that owner-occupiers were protected from the costs of non-cladding defects, but that freeholders may have to meet them.20 Following the evidence session, EOCS wrote to us and reiterated situations where leaseholders were not protected.21 In written evidence, EOCS told us that non–cladding defects such as internal compartmentation, fire-stopping, fire doors or structural defects were defined as “life-critical” under the developer remediation contract and that costs to remediate them would be met by the developer. However, it told us that life-critical non-cladding defects were not within scope for buildings remediated through the government funded programmes, noting that the developer contract covered only 15–20% of all estimated buildings to be remediated.22 As the NAO’s report set out, where problems fall outside the scope of government programmes, costs may be passed on to leaseholders, who may be unable to afford them. The NAO’s report noted that the amount that could be charged to leaseholders was 17 Qq 1, 2 18 RDC0099, Written evidence submitted by the National Fire Chiefs Council, 4 February 2025 19 RDC0003, Written evidence submitted by The Property Institute, 4 February 2025 20 Q 46 21 Letter from End Our Cladding Scandal to Chair, Committee of Public Accounts, 17 February 2025 22 Q 1; RDC0145, Written evidence submitted by End Our Cladding Scandal, 4 February 2025 13 normally capped at £15,000 within Greater London and £10,000 elsewhere. EOCS told us in its letter that such costs were “life-changing” for most ordinary people, and they would not consider themselves “protected.” 23 Show less

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Despite promises in 2022 of tough new measures to force industry to pay to remove cladding, MHCLG accepted that it has yet to find a way to secure a financial contribution from manufacturers. We observed that while developers were contributing … Read more Despite promises in 2022 of tough new measures to force industry to pay to remove cladding, MHCLG accepted that it has yet to find a way to secure a financial contribution from manufacturers. We observed that while developers were contributing to the costs of remediation, manufacturers of non–compliant products had yet to pay anything. MHCLG told us that the Grenfell Tower Inquiry had found “stomach–churning approaches to public safety” by manufacturers. We asked about its strategy for securing compensation payments from those product manufacturers. MHCLG told us that Ministers were disappointed that the sector had not come forward with funding and that it would be setting out its views on this matter in due course. MHCLG explained that the Building Safety Act allowed building owners, developers and leaseholders to make direct claims for compensation against manufacturers and suppliers of construction products.24 Under the Act, manufacturers are liable to pay damages if, for example, their product is found to be inherently defective or if a misleading statement had been made in the supply or marketing of that product.25 Skills and capacity to deliver accelerated remediation Show less

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The Home Builders Federation (HBF) told us that there remained a lack of skills within the industry, making it difficult to find qualified people to undertake remediation work. It explained that addressing this issue was challenging, but could, and was, … Read more The Home Builders Federation (HBF) told us that there remained a lack of skills within the industry, making it difficult to find qualified people to undertake remediation work. It explained that addressing this issue was challenging, but could, and was, being accelerated. We therefore asked MHCLG if it was confident that there were sufficient skills and capacity in the market to undertake remediation activity at the pace it was looking for. MHCLG assured us that it was something it monitored “extremely closely”, starting with the ability to access fire assessors, to creating capacity to ensure people can get access to assessments quickly.28 Show less

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The Home Builders Federation told us that it was concerned that a shortage of “Chartered Fire Engineers” was a barrier to speeding up developer self– remediation. MHCLG assured us that it did not currently see a shortfall of fire engineers, … Read more The Home Builders Federation told us that it was concerned that a shortage of “Chartered Fire Engineers” was a barrier to speeding up developer self– remediation. MHCLG assured us that it did not currently see a shortfall of fire engineers, and that it had access to additional capacity that that could be used if needed, observing that some of its offer was currently underutilised. MHCLG said it had offered this capacity to developers to get buildings assessed quickly, but the HBF told us that only a third of assessors on the government’s panel were the most experienced, well– qualified engineers of the calibre its members chose to use.30 Since we took 27 HM Treasury, Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Sixteenth report from Session 2019-21, CP 316, November 2020, page 14 28 Qq 18-19, 42 29 Qq 3, 20; RDC0099, Written evidence submitted by the National Fire Chiefs Council; RDC0145, Written evidence submitted by End Our Cladding Scandal 30 Q5, 15, 42; RDC0006, Written evidence submitted by the Home Builders Federation, 4 February 2025 15 evidence, the Government, in its response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, has announced its intention to bring in mandatory competence requirements for fire risk assessors.31 Show less

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When buildings are stuck in the remediation process, regulators (local authorities, fire and rescue authorities, and the Building Safety Regulator– for higher-risk buildings33 ) take enforcement action to get the process moving. MHCLG’s Plan recognised that constraints around the capacity … Read more When buildings are stuck in the remediation process, regulators (local authorities, fire and rescue authorities, and the Building Safety Regulator– for higher-risk buildings33 ) take enforcement action to get the process moving. MHCLG’s Plan recognised that constraints around the capacity of regulators was a barrier to the pace of remediation. It explained that in many areas, enforcement officers were too stretched, and expertise was too scarce when compared with the scale of the challenge.34 The Local Government Association told us that local authorities’ enforcement work was facing issues of funding, skills, as well as a lack of clarity over the money available and the regulatory environment, which made it difficult for local authorities to plan. It explained that local authorities were trying to train Environmental Health Officers to undertake enforcement activity as quickly as possible, but said there was a risk of losing them to other parts of the construction sector. MHCLG told us that it had published additional guidance to help regulators to understand the enforcement tools that the Building Safety Act 2022 had made available and that it had put additional funding into enforcement.35 Show less

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MHCLG’s Remediation Acceleration Plan (the Plan) commits to publishing guidance to help where disputes between parties are delaying remediation. However, in written evidence, the Home Builders’ Federation (HBF) noted that MHCLG made this commitment over 18 months ago and it … Read more MHCLG’s Remediation Acceleration Plan (the Plan) commits to publishing guidance to help where disputes between parties are delaying remediation. However, in written evidence, the Home Builders’ Federation (HBF) noted that MHCLG made this commitment over 18 months ago and it was yet to be delivered.39 MHCLG described how it had tried to resolve disputes in the meantime, undertaking its own assessments of the scope of work required and brokering arrangements both sides will accept. However, it noted that where disagreements persist it remained reliant on existing enforcement routes.40 The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) warned how existing enforcement and litigation can hinder rather than speed up the pace of remediation. The National Housing Federation (NHF) similarly described an example where litigation on a disputed building will not reach court until 2026 despite residents having been evacuated from the building as long ago as 2019.41 38 C&AG’s Report, para 1.6; RDC0145, Written evidence submitted by End Our Cladding Scandal 39 RDC0006, Written evidence submitted by the Home Builders Federation; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 40 Qq 48, 49 41 Q 21; RDC0099, Written evidence submitted by the National Fire Chiefs Council 18 Show less

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MHCLG’s Plan commits to driving compliance with the Code of Practice to ensure residents are kept informed throughout the remediation process and disruption from works on site is minimised.46 Homes England told us that communication with residents was far more … Read more MHCLG’s Plan commits to driving compliance with the Code of Practice to ensure residents are kept informed throughout the remediation process and disruption from works on site is minimised.46 Homes England told us that communication with residents was far more embedded in its Cladding Safety Scheme, which requires evidence of good quality communication from those responsible for remediation before it releases funds at each 42 Committee of Public Accounts, Progress in remediating dangerous cladding, Sixteenth Report of Session 2019-21, HC 406, 16 September 2020, recommendation 3 43 Q 32 44 Q 33; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 45 Qq 7–9, 12; C&AG’s Report, para 2.14 46 MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 19 stage of the process. Homes England said it also required applicants to conduct a survey of residents every four months while on site. It was too early to judge the effectiveness of these measures as the Cladding Safety Scheme only had 53 buildings start the remediation process by December 2024.47 Tackling insurance costs Show less

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The Home Builders Federation (HBF) raised concerns that insurance companies were seeking to profit from the building safety crisis. The Shared Owners Network similarly wrote that many shared owners were struggling to pay housing-related costs such as insurance. End Our … Read more The Home Builders Federation (HBF) raised concerns that insurance companies were seeking to profit from the building safety crisis. The Shared Owners Network similarly wrote that many shared owners were struggling to pay housing-related costs such as insurance. End Our Cladding Scandal (EOCS) raised exorbitant insurance as one of the many costs that risked putting residents “at risk of life-changing debt or forfeiture”.49 MHCLG’s Plan acknowledged that as well as needing to find thousands of pounds to pay for insurance, high insurance can make it difficult for people to sell their properties. We asked what efforts had been made to discuss the issue with insurance companies. MHCLG recognised that this was “a very serious problem”. It told us that it had asked the Financial Conduct Authority to undertake research into the high-rise buildings market in 2022. This found that the price of insurance premiums in high-rise buildings had doubled between 2016 and 2021. In its plan, MHCLG noted and that some individuals were facing annual bills of over £3,000.50 47 Q 117; MHCLG, Building Safety Remediation: monthly data release - December 2024, 23 January 2025 48 Committee of Public Accounts, Progress in remediating dangerous cladding, Sixteenth Report of Session 2019-21, HC 406, 16 September 2020, recommendation 4 49 RDC0006, Written evidence submitted by the Home Builders Federation; RDC0143, Written evidence submitted by the Shared Owners’ Network; RDC0145, Written evidence submitted by End Our Cladding Scandal 50 Q 50; Financial Conduct Authority, Report on insurance for multi-occupancy buildings, September 2022 para 1.16; MHCLG Remediation Acceleration Plan 20 Show less

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MHCLG told us that, as well as options for intervening in the market to reduce premiums while buildings are awaiting remediation, it expected the insurance industry to hold to its word in reducing premiums as risk is reduced. It said … Read more MHCLG told us that, as well as options for intervening in the market to reduce premiums while buildings are awaiting remediation, it expected the insurance industry to hold to its word in reducing premiums as risk is reduced. It said it would monitor if premiums were falling as buildings remediated through the PAS 9980 standard came through the process. However, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) indicated that without significant changes to the government’s remediation approach, premiums may remain high even after remediation.53 The PAS 9980 standard takes a more proportionate approach to remediation that prioritises risk to life and not risk to the building. This approach calls for greater use of lower cost mitigations such as sprinklers and in some cases, where the risk to life is deemed low or ‘tolerable’, it can mean some flammable material staying in place.54 Show less

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Almost eight years on from the Grenfell Tower fire, MHCLG’s latest estimate, in February 2024, was that there were between 9,000 and 12,000 residential buildings in England taller than 11 metres that will need remediating. Based on this modelling, MHCLG … Read more Almost eight years on from the Grenfell Tower fire, MHCLG’s latest estimate, in February 2024, was that there were between 9,000 and 12,000 residential buildings in England taller than 11 metres that will need remediating. Based on this modelling, MHCLG estimated that it would cost the Government, developers and building owners (including social housing providers) between £12.6 billion and £22.4 billion to complete the works. The NAO reported in November 2024 that MHCLG intended to refresh its model every six months. But at the time of our evidence session MHCLG had not yet published any further estimates. MHCLG told us it was keen to narrow the range down and that it hoped to publish updates over the course of this year.56 Show less

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In written evidence, the Home Builders’ Federation (HBF) was very sceptical about the basis of MHCLG’s estimates of building numbers and the lack of any updates. It told us that MHCLG’s estimate of the likely number of buildings in need … Read more In written evidence, the Home Builders’ Federation (HBF) was very sceptical about the basis of MHCLG’s estimates of building numbers and the lack of any updates. It told us that MHCLG’s estimate of the likely number of buildings in need of remediation was based on assumptions that were “long outdated and highly questionable”. EOCS also highlighted the importance of collating data on the remaining buildings in need of remediation, without which it described MHCLG’s Remediation Acceleration Plan as “a plan to make a plan.” 61 Show less

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Based on its central estimate of £16.6 billion for total remediation costs, MHCLG anticipated that around £7.5 billion would be paid for directly by private building owners, developers and social housing providers, and the remaining £9.1 billion would be funded … Read more Based on its central estimate of £16.6 billion for total remediation costs, MHCLG anticipated that around £7.5 billion would be paid for directly by private building owners, developers and social housing providers, and the remaining £9.1 billion would be funded through MHCLG’s grant programmes. MHCLG planned to cap the amount of public money spent on remediation at £5.1 billion, and to recoup any spending over this amount from developers through a new Building Safety Levy (the Levy) on new developments. MHCLG told us it was keen to reduce the uncertainty around building numbers and how much will need to be paid out through government grant programmes but explained that the duration of the Levy could be changed as needed to ensure it covered the final bill.62 Show less

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The NAO report found that previous attempts by MHCLG to accelerate remediation resulted in it relaxing some of its safeguards and the taxpayer being exposed to an increased risk of fraud. This included moving from making payments in arrears to … Read more The NAO report found that previous attempts by MHCLG to accelerate remediation resulted in it relaxing some of its safeguards and the taxpayer being exposed to an increased risk of fraud. This included moving from making payments in arrears to making up–front payments of between 30% and 80%.65 We asked MHCLG whether it should have been obvious that relaxing funding criteria as dramatically as it did in 2020 would lead to increased fraud, noting that one potential loss of over £500,000 had already been identified. MHCLG told us that the priority for the early schemes had been to get funding out as quickly. It stressed that the system was never without checks at all, and that there were, for example, checks by experts around the scope of the work. It explained that it had made a series of changes over the last few years in response to a fraud risk assessment by the Government Internal Audit Agency, including benchmarking costs and a reduction in single–tender actions.66 Show less

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MHCLG told us how the design of Homes England’s Cladding Safety Scheme would help reduce fraud in future. It explained that the new scheme captures information centrally, rather than relying on one team to pull together more disparate sources of … Read more MHCLG told us how the design of Homes England’s Cladding Safety Scheme would help reduce fraud in future. It explained that the new scheme captures information centrally, rather than relying on one team to pull together more disparate sources of intelligence. The Cladding Safety Scheme has also restored the practice of payment in arrears. MHCLG wrote to us after the hearing and provided further information on ways in which it is improving fraud prevention and detection on the Building Safety Fund, including increased counter fraud training and stronger fraud referral and investigation processes. MHCLG also told us it was working with the Public Sector Fraud Authority to keep its fraud risk assessments under review. MHCLG also confirmed that, in response to the NAO’s recommendation, it had started a feasibility study for a fraud measurement exercise.70 Managing impact of remediation on other housing priorities Show less

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We asked MHCLG about its understanding of the impact that £3.8 billion of self–remediation costs might have on social sector housebuilding, and whether it had undertaken any assessment of how many houses would not be built because money was being … Read more We asked MHCLG about its understanding of the impact that £3.8 billion of self–remediation costs might have on social sector housebuilding, and whether it had undertaken any assessment of how many houses would not be built because money was being spent on remediation. MHCLG told us that it was “certainly the case” that social housing providers were having to balance a range of obligations. We therefore asked if it was reasonable to conclude that when local authorities were deciding whether and when to complete remediation works, they were having to cut back on their commitments on new homes. MHCLG accepted that where a social housing provider was spending money on one type of activity, it would not be able to spend money on another type of activity. It told us that this was one of the reasons why Ministers planned to take stock of the overall position of the sector ahead of a strategy in the spring.76 MHCLG wrote to us after our evidence session to tell us about its response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report, and that it was taking forward an “ambitious programme of social housing reform” to change how residents’ voices are heard and acted on, to “keep people at the heart of policy and practice.” 77 73 Qq 21,60, 62; C&AG’s Report, para 3.11 74 Qq 28, 64 75 Q 28; Letter from National Housing Federation to Committee of Public Accounts, 11 February 2025 76 Qq 62-64, 74 77 Letter from Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to Committee of Public Accounts, 18 February 2025 26 Show less

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Insufficient capacity and skills across regulators, local authorities and the construction sector risks undermining MHCLG’s acceleration plans. In 2020, the previous Committee warned that skills needed for remediation work would come under pressure as the scope of government’s programmes increased. With MHCLG now planning to accelerate remediation, there are risks …

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We are appalled that those living in affected buildings continue to suffer an unacceptable financial and emotional toll. Far too many people continue to feel trapped in unsafe homes, many facing financial uncertainty and many unable to sell their homes and move on with their lives. Residents face ongoing delays …

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MHCLG is not doing enough to manage the risk that residents in affected buildings face exorbitant insurance premiums in the long term. The previous Committee raised concerns in 2020 about the spiralling insurance costs faced by residents awaiting remediation and MHCLG committed to working with insurers to address them. MHCLG …

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Eight years on from Grenfell, we are concerned that MHCLG still does not know how many buildings have dangerous cladding, how much it will cost to address, or how long it will take. MHCLG’s latest estimate, that 9,000 to 12,000 buildings will need remediating at a total cost of between …

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MHCLG’s previous attempts to speed up remediation exposed the taxpayer to increased risk of fraud. When MHCLG launched its high–rise Building Safety Fund in 2020 it relaxed a range of taxpayer protections in order get money out to projects quickly. While this approach has since been reversed, a potential loss …

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We are not convinced that MHCLG is taking the potential impact of its remediation plans on wider housebuilding targets seriously enough. The government has pledged to build 1.5 million homes during this Parliament. The construction sector is reporting workforce shortages. There is a risk that MHCLG’s approach to remediation could …

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On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry for Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) and Homes England on remediating dangerous cladding.1 We also heard evidence from the Home Builders’ Federation, The National Housing Federation, the Local Government Association and …

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The Plan identified several barriers to remediating at pace and outlined the steps MHCLG was taking to address them. Some of these barriers are those MHCLG told the previous committee about in 2020, including landlord reluctance to come forward, limited supply chains of skilled workers needed for remediation and constrained …

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In 2020, the previous Committee warned that shortages of specialist skills to support remediation would increase owing to an expected increase in the number of buildings included in the government’s remediation programmes. Following the creation of the Building Safety Fund in 2020, this rose from around 450 buildings with ACM …

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The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) told us that the PAS 9980 standard for assessing the fire safety risk of external walls relied on specialist knowledge of building construction, fire engineering principles and material performance. The NFCC warned that there was limited availability of qualified professionals, and that its members …

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We asked witnesses if the construction industry had the capacity to support the acceleration of remediation. The HBF told us acceleration was happening, but that it would be challenging. It outlined some of the challenges facing the sector, including an ageing construction workforce and Brexit, where stricter visa requirements have …

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We heard concerns about insufficient capacity and capability at the Building Safety Regulator (BSR), which oversees the safety and standards of buildings over 18 metres. The HBF told us that the BSR was continuing to hold up development, including self-remediation work, for buildings over 18 metres. In written evidence, the …

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As many as 3 million people may have been affected by the cladding crisis. The NAO found that residents continue to suffer ongoing financial and emotional consequences. In its written evidence to us, End Our Cladding Scandal (EOCS) told us that the lives of thousands of ordinary people had been …

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In 2020 the previous Committee noted that many residents were not being kept informed about the process of remediation and requested that MHCLG set out how it would improve transparency.42 We therefore asked whether government was now doing enough to help residents whose lives felt on hold while they waited …

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In 2023, MHCLG launched a Code of Practice to support improved communications during remediation. The HBF and the NHF told us that developers and social housing providers had agreed to follow the code. EOCS told us the code was “a long time coming” and had been heavily revised at the …

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In 2020 the previous Committee concluded that MHCLG had not done enough to address spiralling insurance costs affecting leaseholders and ‘nil’ mortgage valuations. It found that private leaseholders in blocks with dangerous cladding had received ‘nil’ valuations for their properties, meaning they had found it impossible to sell or remortgage, …

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MHCLG told us that it was bringing forward statutory changes to ban insurance brokers from paying commissions to freeholders and managing agents, and capping what freeholders can charge leaseholders for arranging insurance.51 MHCLG told us that the risk–pooling arrangements it had brokered with the insurance industry to reduce rates had …

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In written evidence, the ABI called on government to adopt an approach that priorities property protection and building resilience alongside risk to life. It said that without a standard requiring the removal of combustible material in external walls (insulation and cladding), the risk of significant fire spread would remain after …

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Under the PAS 9980 methodology, competent professionals conduct Fire Risk Appraisals of External Walls (FRAEWs) in which they make conclusions about the risk to life posed by a building’s cladding and make proposals about remedial measures to reduce the level of risk to ‘tolerable’,57 The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) …

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In December 2024, MHCLG published remediation cost information per square metre for high–rise buildings over 18 metres in the Building Safety Fund with a view to helping building owners understand the expected 56 Qq 31, 93, 93, 118; CA&G’s Report paras 13, 3.1, Appendix One 57 Ministry of Housing, Communities …

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HM Treasury has agreed to provide short–term funding that would allow remediation to progress in advance of the Levy recouping funds in later years. Based on MHCLG’s financial planning, the NAO highlighted that total taxpayer exposure could reach a maximum of £6.3 billion in 2030-31 before all Levy receipts are …

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The NAO report also highlighted how MHCLG was late to produce a full fraud risk assessment on the Building Safety Fund, only completing one in

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The National Housing Federation (NHF) told us that the government’s approach to funding remediation for non–ACM cladding allocated public funding in a way that prioritised tenure over risk. It said that the arrangements meant that, in reality, 90% of public funding for remediating non–ACM type cladding had gone to private …

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The Government has pledged to build 1.5 million homes during this Parliament and expects social housing to be at the heart of the UKs’ housing supply. Against a backdrop of the construction sector reporting workforce shortages (paragraph 20), we asked the NHF how the government’s approach to remediation in the …

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In its written evidence to us, the Home Builders Federation (HBF), which represents the home building industry, told us of its concerns about the possible impact of the Building Safety Levy on new housing delivery. MHCLG currently expects to raise £3.4 billion over 10 years from the new levy. The …

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We asked MHCLG about the potential impacts of the Building Safety Levy on housing provision. MHCLG said it had not published any impact assessment or produced specific numbers, but believed the impact would be relatively small. It told us that it had deliberately designed the Levy to take into account …

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