Recommendations & Conclusions
28 items
9
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
The risks posed to vulnerable individuals by Covid-19 make more urgent the necessity of a complete end to room sharing by unrelated adults. While the first peak of infection has passed in some parts of the UK, there continues to be a real and substantial threat of further outbreaks. Providers …
Read more
The risks posed to vulnerable individuals by Covid-19 make more urgent the necessity of a complete end to room sharing by unrelated adults. While the first peak of infection has passed in some parts of the UK, there continues to be a real and substantial threat of further outbreaks. Providers must move people out of shared rooms now in advance of a possible second major national outbreak
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to end room sharing for unrelated adults, stating that existing contractual criteria prohibit it for vulnerable persons and that further restrictions would not assist providers.
Read full response →
Home Office
10
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
The Home Office must take appropriate action, including contract variation if necessary, to ensure room sharing across the whole estate is phased out. The Department must also ensure that additional accommodation obtained to meet this requirement is of a high quality and fit for purpose. Fulfilment of this recommendation will …
Read more
The Home Office must take appropriate action, including contract variation if necessary, to ensure room sharing across the whole estate is phased out. The Department must also ensure that additional accommodation obtained to meet this requirement is of a high quality and fit for purpose. Fulfilment of this recommendation will provide an opportunity for the Home Office to pursue its commitment to a more equitable and sustainable system by expanding the areas participating in dispersal.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to phase out room sharing for unrelated adults, stating there are no plans for contractual changes and they do not agree further restrictions would assist providers in securing accommodation.
Read full response →
Home Office
14
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
We are appalled that the Home Office response to the communication support requirements of service users who are not accommodated in hotels or large IA facilities was simply to gather information about where free Wi-Fi might be provided locally—thus encouraging vulnerable people to go to public places—especially at a time …
Read more
We are appalled that the Home Office response to the communication support requirements of service users who are not accommodated in hotels or large IA facilities was simply to gather information about where free Wi-Fi might be provided locally—thus encouraging vulnerable people to go to public places—especially at a time when many such places might be closed or restricting public access. If there is a second major national outbreak and lockdown, the Home Office must not repeat this advice.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that it encouraged vulnerable people to access public Wi-Fi, stating such information was part of general induction and that Wi-Fi or SIM cards are provided in initial accommodation and hotels.
Read full response →
Home Office
31
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
We support the NAO’s recommendation that the Government should consider whether its performance framework effectively incentivises providers to move service users into dispersal accommodation within agreed timescales; the Government should also reassess the value for money provided by contingency accommodation in hotels and the contractual requirement for initial accommodation provision …
Read more
We support the NAO’s recommendation that the Government should consider whether its performance framework effectively incentivises providers to move service users into dispersal accommodation within agreed timescales; the Government should also reassess the value for money provided by contingency accommodation in hotels and the contractual requirement for initial accommodation provision within the asylum establishment, in light of demand. The Government should consult service users, local authorities, health service and third sector partners as part of this review, to ensure that lived experience of the service is taken into account in this review.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to review its performance framework, reassess value for money, and consult stakeholders, stating existing KPIs and time limits are in place and there are no plans to review or redesign asylum contracts at this point.
Read full response →
Home Office
34
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
In 2018 our predecessors recommended that the Government “must provide dispersal authorities with dedicated funding to better manage dispersal and the related impact on services” and to give currently non-participating authorities confidence that they would be fully supported were they to take an equitable share of this population. We are …
Read more
In 2018 our predecessors recommended that the Government “must provide dispersal authorities with dedicated funding to better manage dispersal and the related impact on services” and to give currently non-participating authorities confidence that they would be fully supported were they to take an equitable share of this population. We are both concerned and disappointed that the Home Office has failed to make better progress on this fundamental issue, which could compromise the Government’s ability to meet its statutory responsibilities under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. We repeat that, to achieve increased voluntary participation in the dispersal scheme, the Government must directly fund all dispersal local authorities to take account of the competing financial and capacity challenges that they face.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that lack of direct funding is an issue but rejects the recommendation to directly fund local authorities, instead focusing on collaborative work to increase dispersed accommodation procurement.
Read full response →
Home Office
53
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
We urge the Home Office to set out a full, public, Covid-19 strategy which addresses the key concerns outlined in this chapter in relation to asylum accommodation and immigration detention. The strategy should cover further periods of local or national lockdowns and the period afterwards and should be published on …
Read more
We urge the Home Office to set out a full, public, Covid-19 strategy which addresses the key concerns outlined in this chapter in relation to asylum accommodation and immigration detention. The strategy should cover further periods of local or national lockdowns and the period afterwards and should be published on the Government website. The strategy must recognise the need to ensure individuals’ access to clear and timely information about any changes to the Government’s current temporary measures. It should also ensure that support organisations, local authorities and statutory bodies which formally contribute to individuals’ support are appropriately resourced for these responsibilities.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation for a single, consolidated COVID-19 strategy for asylum accommodation and immigration detention, stating it does not believe a combined approach is appropriate or helpful.
Read full response →
Home Office
55
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
The Home Office should conduct a full review of its management of Covid-19 impacts on asylum accommodation and immigration detention in conjunction with its providers and other government departments. It should evaluate the impact of the temporary measures put in place and incorporate this learning into the development of future …
Read more
The Home Office should conduct a full review of its management of Covid-19 impacts on asylum accommodation and immigration detention in conjunction with its providers and other government departments. It should evaluate the impact of the temporary measures put in place and incorporate this learning into the development of future process and policy interventions before the end of 2020. This will be an important safeguard in the event of further outbreaks. (Paragraph 208) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 63
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects conducting a consolidated review of its COVID-19 management across both asylum accommodation and immigration detention, stating it is not helpful to compare them. They instead refer to ongoing daily management and review of temporary measures and published guidance by UKVI and IE.
Read full response →
Home Office
1
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that the Government had to respond swiftly in circumstances of great uncertainty. We also recognise and are grateful for the hard work of all those responding to the crisis to ensure safety at the border at …
Read more
In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that the Government had to respond swiftly in circumstances of great uncertainty. We also recognise and are grateful for the hard work of all those responding to the crisis to ensure safety at the border at a time of considerable pressure, from Border Force staff to Government officials and scientific advisers. We recognise too that border measures in isolation are not effective in controlling the virus and must be considered alongside a suite of other measures such as social distancing and lockdowns. However, as one witness told us, all measures are “additive” and the relative absence of firm border measures in the UK earlier during the pandemic is notable.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
2
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on the trajectory of the pandemic, almost every country in the world including the UK has used border measures at some point to try to control or manage the spread of the virus. As well as …
Read more
While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on the trajectory of the pandemic, almost every country in the world including the UK has used border measures at some point to try to control or manage the spread of the virus. As well as important public health consequences of those decisions, there are also significant economic consequences. For that reason, we have looked not only at the decisions that were taken and their consequences but also the reasons behind them and the lessons that should be learned. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, and as patterns of infection in different countries keep changing, governments across the world are likely to keep drawing upon border measures to help control the spread of the virus. We want to be assured that everything possible is being done here in the UK to ensure that the most effective measures are put in place at the right stage. (Paragraph 5) Government decisions on the border up to and during lockdown
Show less
Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
3
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a fast-moving virus in circumstances where information was changing constantly and decisions about borders had to be made at pace. Inevitably those decisions were difficult, and some will look different in hindsight. However, scrutiny is important …
Read more
The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a fast-moving virus in circumstances where information was changing constantly and decisions about borders had to be made at pace. Inevitably those decisions were difficult, and some will look different in hindsight. However, scrutiny is important to ensure lessons are learned. As COVID-19 has not gone away, many of these challenges could recur.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
4
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early March corresponded to the practice in other countries during this time and reflects the great uncertainty with which governments were grappling. It was right to adjust and extend self-isolation provisions as the virus became established, …
Read more
The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early March corresponded to the practice in other countries during this time and reflects the great uncertainty with which governments were grappling. It was right to adjust and extend self-isolation provisions as the virus became established, starting with Wuhan and China, but also extending provisions to cover places like Italy as the virus spread. Many other European countries were beginning to be affected by coronavirus in the same way, and many took a similar incremental approach as the UK. Evidence shows that the number of cases of direct transmission from China into the UK was extremely small, and that the number of cases from Italy started to fall after 25 February when border measures were 74 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders introduced. However, it is impossible to distinguish between the impact of border measures and other factors such as lockdowns in Wuhan and Italy or falling overall passenger numbers which may have had a much bigger effect.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, defending its past decisions regarding border measures in March. They state that isolation guidance was superseded, decisions were science-led, and that imported cases made a marginal impact when domestic transmission was high, while maintaining open borders was crucial.
Read full response →
Home Office
5
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other European countries in early March were not sufficient to contain the cross-border spread of the virus. Had stronger early measures been taken—such as requiring legally-enforceable quarantine for arrivals—it is likely that the spread of the …
Read more
It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other European countries in early March were not sufficient to contain the cross-border spread of the virus. Had stronger early measures been taken—such as requiring legally-enforceable quarantine for arrivals—it is likely that the spread of the virus could have been slowed. The UK Government did not recognise soon enough the increased risk of importations from European countries owing to the greater amount of travel between these countries and the UK, and the speed at which case numbers were increasing. Many of those returning to the UK during that period were British residents, and we agree with the SAGE assessment that border closures would not have been appropriate.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that border measures were insufficient and that they did not recognise the risk from Europe. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national guidance, decisions were science-led, and enhanced monitoring was in place for high-risk areas during the …
Read full response →
Home Office
6
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate for 14 days (in line with category 1) or, at the very least, to monitor symptoms and call NHS 111 (in line with category 2) was a mistake. With border measures in mind, there should …
Read more
However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate for 14 days (in line with category 1) or, at the very least, to monitor symptoms and call NHS 111 (in line with category 2) was a mistake. With border measures in mind, there should have been particular surveillance focus on the countries that have high levels of travellers into the UK, particularly Spain and France. We are concerned that we have not seen evidence of that happening during the early stages of the crisis, and that, as a result, Spain was not added to the list of countries for self-isolation measures when it should have been. As a result, large numbers of passengers from Spain continued to arrive, including to attend the Atletico Madrid-Liverpool football match, without any requirements being placed upon them.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
9
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of controlling importation from overseas as a method for containing the virus or delaying its spread. The decision by SAGE only to consider measures that could deliver a full month’s delay to the spread of the …
Read more
Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of controlling importation from overseas as a method for containing the virus or delaying its spread. The decision by SAGE only to consider measures that could deliver a full month’s delay to the spread of the virus was a mistake and it is very hard to understand why that approach was taken. Additive measures that Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 75 could have contributed to more effective containment should have been considered, and delays even of a few days alongside the introduction of other domestic measures such as social distancing and lockdown could have had a significant impact on the scale of the outbreak in the UK.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, stating its isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and SAGE advice, including enhanced border monitoring during the contain phase.
Read full response →
Home Office
10
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their strength that could have made a significant contribution and potentially mitigated the scale of domestic restrictions that were later needed. SAGE papers suggest that prioritising delay of spread rather than suppression of cases was influenced …
Read more
Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their strength that could have made a significant contribution and potentially mitigated the scale of domestic restrictions that were later needed. SAGE papers suggest that prioritising delay of spread rather than suppression of cases was influenced by the conclusion that the virus ought to be treated similarly to pandemic influenza, but this has been retrospectively proved wrong.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, maintaining that isolation guidance was replaced by national stay-at-home rules and that its decisions were consistently informed by scientific advice from SAGE during the pandemic.
Read full response →
Home Office
11
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13 March to 8 June was very different from countries in similar circumstances. This should have raised serious questions within the Government about whether it was taking the correct decisions. We have not seen any evidence …
Read more
We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13 March to 8 June was very different from countries in similar circumstances. This should have raised serious questions within the Government about whether it was taking the correct decisions. We have not seen any evidence that, at the time it was making its own decisions, the UK Government was examining and evaluating the approaches taken by other countries to controlling importations of the virus from abroad.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's concerns about the UK's border approach differing from other countries and their lack of evidence for evaluating those approaches. They reiterate that their decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
Read full response →
Home Office
12
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from Europe in mid-March than was estimated at the time, when, with the exception of Italy, the focus remained largely on potential importations of the virus from Asia. As evidenced by genomic studies and referenced by …
Read more
It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from Europe in mid-March than was estimated at the time, when, with the exception of Italy, the focus remained largely on potential importations of the virus from Asia. As evidenced by genomic studies and referenced by Sir Patrick Vallance in oral evidence, a large number of instances of the virus—up to 1,356 importation strains and up to 10,000 cases—were imported during the period leading to, and following, the abandonment of special measures for international arrivals on 13 March, even though the overall number of people arriving in the UK was decreasing. Evidence shows it is highly likely that uncontrolled importations of the virus from European countries contributed to the rapid increase in the spread of the virus in mid-March, and the overall scale of the outbreak in the UK.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that uncontrolled importations significantly contributed to the rapid spread of the virus in mid-March. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
Read full response →
Home Office
13
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during March, and only having time-limited self-isolation measures for arrivals from Italy, therefore had a material effect on the number of cases circulating within the UK. Border measures in the UK were lifted rather than extended …
Read more
Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during March, and only having time-limited self-isolation measures for arrivals from Italy, therefore had a material effect on the number of cases circulating within the UK. Border measures in the UK were lifted rather than extended on 13 March at a time when the number of infections being imported from abroad was still rising. Evidence suggests that thousands of new infections in the UK resulted from cases arriving from Europe in the ten days between this decision and the introduction of lockdown on 23 March. The failure to have any special border measures during this period was a serious mistake that significantly increased both the pace and the scale of the epidemic in the UK, and meant that many more people caught COVID-19.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, clarifying that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all pandemic decisions were scientifically informed by SAGE advice, including enhanced border monitoring.
Read full response →
Home Office
14
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not properly known in mid-March, that is not a justification for the lifting of border measures. Evidence of the epidemic escalating, especially in Spain, was already available. Other countries with the same information as the UK …
Read more
Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not properly known in mid-March, that is not a justification for the lifting of border measures. Evidence of the epidemic escalating, especially in Spain, was already available. Other countries with the same information as the UK introduced stronger measures—for example, quarantine or limiting international arrivals so that only residents could 76 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders enter the country—and proved justified in doing so. The UK was extremely unusual in choosing not to introduce measures of this kind; it is evident that this was the wrong approach.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that its approach to border measures in mid-March was wrong. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by science and appropriate for the time.
Read full response →
Home Office
17
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the Committee immediately a full account of the scientific evidence and advice leading to its decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. If this does not exist in written form, the Committee should …
Read more
The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the Committee immediately a full account of the scientific evidence and advice leading to its decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. If this does not exist in written form, the Committee should receive a full account of what considerations were made and a summary of orally tendered advice, including the dates on which it was provided.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government refutes the committee's assertion that isolation guidance was dropped, explaining it was superseded by national guidance and decisions were based on scientific advice. It implicitly rejects the request to publish specific evidence by explaining its reasoning without committing to provide the requested account.
Read full response →
Home Office
18
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as other countries were expanding their border measures, is inexplicable. The Committee does not accept the argument that the introduction of voluntary ‘stay at home’ guidance for households with possible coronavirus infection on 13 March was …
Read more
The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as other countries were expanding their border measures, is inexplicable. The Committee does not accept the argument that the introduction of voluntary ‘stay at home’ guidance for households with possible coronavirus infection on 13 March was enough reason to withdraw all guidance for returning travellers or visitors. Advice to stay at home applied only to those households with a suspected case of COVID-19 and was not legally enforceable for another 13 days. The Government stated that its priority in mid-March was buying time for the NHS. Imposing firmer measures on all international arrivals—including travellers from parts of Europe that had never been subject to specific guidance—would have contributed to this to some degree, as part of a cumulative or “additive” approach. Removing measures for international arrivals rather than extending them was the wrong thing to do. (Paragraph 100) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 77
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's claim that lifting guidance for international arrivals on 13 March was inexplicable. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
Read full response →
Home Office
19
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures in mid-March. Although passenger numbers started to fall, a further one million people were to arrive between 13 March and lockdown on 23 March, and possibly hundreds of thousands more by mid-April. That is likely …
Read more
Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures in mid-March. Although passenger numbers started to fall, a further one million people were to arrive between 13 March and lockdown on 23 March, and possibly hundreds of thousands more by mid-April. That is likely to have included thousands of people with COVID-19.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that falling arrival numbers did not justify lifting border measures, stating the committee is incorrect. It explains that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by scientific advice and the progression of the …
Read full response →
Home Office
20
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after 13 March because imported cases made up only 0.5% of total UK infections. That figure was not calculated until 22 March by which time a million more people had arrived and the epidemic had rapidly …
Read more
We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after 13 March because imported cases made up only 0.5% of total UK infections. That figure was not calculated until 22 March by which time a million more people had arrived and the epidemic had rapidly escalated in the UK. It is likely to have been substantially higher at the time when guidance was lifted. We set out further concerns about the Home Office reliance on this measurement from paragraph 108.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that it was incorrect to argue no border measures were needed after 13 March. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by science and appropriate for the given phase of …
Read full response →
Home Office
21
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting international travel and considered their additive effect. It is understandable that the Government did not consider it practical or effective to simply restrict flights, not least because of large numbers of British residents seeking to …
Read more
The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting international travel and considered their additive effect. It is understandable that the Government did not consider it practical or effective to simply restrict flights, not least because of large numbers of British residents seeking to return home. However, the failure to properly consider the possibility of imposing stricter requirements on those arriving—such as mandatory self-isolation, increased screening, targeted testing or enforceable quarantine—was a serious error. In mid- March, the Government had a limited sense of how many infectious people were arriving in the UK, or where they were arriving from, and had limited means of controlling the onward spread of the virus from such cases. In the circumstances, a precautionary approach aimed at continuing suppression of imported cases of the virus should have included more comprehensive measures for passengers arriving from places which had significant numbers of infections.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by scientific advice and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
22
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’ guidance and lockdown restrictions imposed in mid-March. Indeed, they were exactly the “draconian” measures initially rejected by SAGE, enforceable in law. Justifying the decision to lift measures on 13 March on the basis that, at …
Read more
Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’ guidance and lockdown restrictions imposed in mid-March. Indeed, they were exactly the “draconian” measures initially rejected by SAGE, enforceable in law. Justifying the decision to lift measures on 13 March on the basis that, at that time, measures applying to international arrivals were at parity with ‘stay at home’ guidance issued the same day is not consistent with the Government’s eventual chosen strategy. That later strategy, discussed in the next chapter, places more onerous legal restrictions on arrivals from overseas than have been placed on any other group in the UK, at any point over the course of the pandemic.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion of inconsistency in its border strategy. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded by national guidance on 13 March and that decisions were informed by scientific advice and were appropriate for the phase of the pandemic.
Read full response →
Home Office
27
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from its own Scientific Adviser ahead of the Government’s decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. By the same measure, the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser has been clear that advice from SAGE includes …
Read more
The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from its own Scientific Adviser ahead of the Government’s decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. By the same measure, the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser has been clear that advice from SAGE includes an inherent degree of uncertainty. This is reasonable, particularly in a rapidly evolving situation such as COVID-19. However, we have heard no evidence to suggest that the Home Office requested additional information that could have fed into its border policy, nor that it interrogated the inherent uncertainties around SAGE’s advice or around the limited figures it was given. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that the Department took at face value the advice provided; it should not have done so. (Paragraph 129) The introduction of border quarantine requirements
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by scientific advice and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
29
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism in June. Having removed country-specific guidance in March when other countries were imposing compulsory quarantine arrangements for arrivals, the Government then found itself increasing restrictions just as other countries were loosening them in June—something which …
Read more
It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism in June. Having removed country-specific guidance in March when other countries were imposing compulsory quarantine arrangements for arrivals, the Government then found itself increasing restrictions just as other countries were loosening them in June—something which was hard to explain, and which appeared inconsistent. This has been exacerbated by the Government’s continued defence of the previous lack of quarantine at the border from March until June rather than acknowledging that, in hindsight, firmer measures should have been in place. Building up credibility requires transparency. The Government should publish the analysis that informed its decision to introduce quarantine measures and explain how it relates to the Government’s wider strategy for overcoming the pandemic.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government explicitly rejected the committee's assertions, stating that its decisions were consistently informed by scientific advice and SAGE, and detailed past measures without committing to publishing new analysis or explaining its relation to the wider pandemic strategy.
Read full response →
Home Office
41
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of the numbers of people who have come into the UK carrying COVID-19 does not inspire us with confidence about its ability to assess the scale of the risk from likely infectious people coming into the …
Read more
The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of the numbers of people who have come into the UK carrying COVID-19 does not inspire us with confidence about its ability to assess the scale of the risk from likely infectious people coming into the country in the future.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office