Recommendations & Conclusions
27 items
2
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
We are deeply concerned that there was so little early access to testing for Covid-19 for asylum seekers housed in shared facilities, whether IA or dispersal, given the higher risk of spreading infection in accommodation where it is often difficult to self-isolate, and where there are other residents who are …
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We are deeply concerned that there was so little early access to testing for Covid-19 for asylum seekers housed in shared facilities, whether IA or dispersal, given the higher risk of spreading infection in accommodation where it is often difficult to self-isolate, and where there are other residents who are shielding. We heard from accommodation providers on 7 May that they had significant numbers of asylum seekers who were currently self-isolating but were not being tested. Testing and tracing should have been readily available and organised through accommodation providers from early on in the pandemic for anyone housed in institutional accommodation.
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Government response AI summary
The government's response is a truncated title and provides no substantive information regarding early access to Covid-19 testing for asylum seekers in shared facilities.
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Home Office
3
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
At this point in the response, testing is widely available: any symptomatic person can apply for a test, including a home test kit, and live translation services are now available in more than 200 languages including British Sign Language to support those wishing to access test and trace services. These …
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At this point in the response, testing is widely available: any symptomatic person can apply for a test, including a home test kit, and live translation services are now available in more than 200 languages including British Sign Language to support those wishing to access test and trace services. These provisions are available to asylum seekers as they are to other members of the population, and this is very welcome. We are however concerned that there is no readily accessible guidance online to support local health managers in maintaining a clear and consistent approach to testing wider resident communities in asylum accommodation where a resident is symptomatic of Covid-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided no substantive response to the committee's concern regarding the lack of readily accessible online guidance for local health managers on COVID-19 testing in asylum accommodation.
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Home Office
4
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
The Government must urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing if there are outbreaks. This must be put in place immediately to ensure that accommodation providers are prepared for all potential scenarios in the next phase of the pandemic.
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The Government must urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing if there are outbreaks. This must be put in place immediately to ensure that accommodation providers are prepared for all potential scenarios in the next phase of the pandemic.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided no substantive response to the recommendation to urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing for outbreaks.
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Home Office
6
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Vulnerable people such as pregnant women, victims of abuse and people with PTSD should never be placed in accommodation in which they have to share a room with an unrelated adult, nor should they be required to use shared bathroom/toilet facilities which may have a detrimental impact on their mental …
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Vulnerable people such as pregnant women, victims of abuse and people with PTSD should never be placed in accommodation in which they have to share a room with an unrelated adult, nor should they be required to use shared bathroom/toilet facilities which may have a detrimental impact on their mental and physical health. (Paragraph 37) 54 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation
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Government response AI summary
The government response is a page reference and does not address the recommendation that vulnerable people should not be placed in shared accommodation or facilities.
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Home Office
7
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
We recognise that once the lockdown started in March it was more difficult to move people into alternative accommodation, both because of public health requirements and because of the increased demand overall for accommodation. However, that only makes resolution of this issue more pressing as scientists warn of the possibility …
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We recognise that once the lockdown started in March it was more difficult to move people into alternative accommodation, both because of public health requirements and because of the increased demand overall for accommodation. However, that only makes resolution of this issue more pressing as scientists warn of the possibility of a second national outbreak peaking in January–February 2021.
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Government response AI summary
The government response was a reference to another document and did not address the committee's conclusion regarding the pressing need for resolution of accommodation issues due to the potential for a second COVID-19 outbreak.
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Home Office
8
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Our predecessor Committee recommended that shared accommodation should be phased out across the estate as a whole. While we welcome the progress towards ending this practice, we are extremely disappointed that the Home Office did not take the opportunity of contract replacement in 2019 to make this change in full. …
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Our predecessor Committee recommended that shared accommodation should be phased out across the estate as a whole. While we welcome the progress towards ending this practice, we are extremely disappointed that the Home Office did not take the opportunity of contract replacement in 2019 to make this change in full. It is deeply concerning that the contract for dispersed accommodation in London and the South East until 2029 was tendered on the basis of non-related adults sharing rooms. Further, the argument that room sharing is more acceptable in short term initial accommodation is unsustainable, given the increasing duration of service users’ stays in these facilities.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided no substantive response to the committee's concerns regarding the continued use of shared accommodation for unrelated adults in asylum dispersal contracts.
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Home Office
12
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
All Home Office contracted housing providers must ensure that any vulnerable adults are accommodated appropriately. Where the Home Office has explicitly authorised an individual to have a single room, this must be implemented without question or delay. To ensure that this is enforced in practice, the Home Office must write …
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All Home Office contracted housing providers must ensure that any vulnerable adults are accommodated appropriately. Where the Home Office has explicitly authorised an individual to have a single room, this must be implemented without question or delay. To ensure that this is enforced in practice, the Home Office must write to us within 4 weeks of receiving this report outlining how it will require providers to account for their response to such individual cases both during the pandemic and for the long- term.
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Government response AI summary
The government outlined its expectations for contractors and existing measures for supporting vulnerable individuals during the pandemic, including the Migrant Help service, but did not commit to writing to the Committee within 4 weeks to detail provider accountability mechanisms for individual cases.
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Home Office
18
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Following the National Audit Office’s report that asylum seekers are now expected to remain in initial accommodation for up to five weeks, with many staying for nearly three months, the Home Office must urgently reconsider the provision of medical services, subsistence payments and children’s educational support in initial accommodation. We …
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Following the National Audit Office’s report that asylum seekers are now expected to remain in initial accommodation for up to five weeks, with many staying for nearly three months, the Home Office must urgently reconsider the provision of medical services, subsistence payments and children’s educational support in initial accommodation. We appreciate the reasons for the current lengthy stays in IA as a result of lockdown and delays in being able to move people on. However, we are very concerned that so little progress had been made before lockdown in addressing the 56 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation shortfall of dispersal accommodation, making it harder to respond to Covid-19. It is vital that swift progress is made now in advance of any second wave this winter.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that extended stays in initial accommodation are not a long-term solution and they prioritize moving vulnerable service users. They are monitoring stays and inviting local authorities to collaborate on increasing dispersal accommodation, but do not commit to reconsidering medical services, subsistence payments, …
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Home Office
37
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
The Government said that it would review its policy of temporarily pausing all evictions from asylum accommodation and continuing the provision of asylum support before the end of June. In a Parliamentary debate on 17 June, a number of MPs expressed concern about the Home Office’s intention to end the …
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The Government said that it would review its policy of temporarily pausing all evictions from asylum accommodation and continuing the provision of asylum support before the end of June. In a Parliamentary debate on 17 June, a number of MPs expressed concern about the Home Office’s intention to end the temporary additional support for asylum seekers and to recommence moving on those who have been granted refugee status and those who have been refused asylum. At the time of writing in July, we understand that the temporary support remains in place. This is welcome.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that following careful discussion and planning, cessations of support resumed in a phased approach starting in August, with those granted refugee status moving first, and cessations for refused claims to follow later.
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Home Office
39
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
We welcome the substantial reduction in the number of individuals detained in IRCs since the beginning of the lockdown. This was a sensible response to Covid-19 and will have helped prevent infections.
Government response AI summary
The government response provides only a reference number and does not address the committee's observation or welcome regarding the reduction in individuals detained in IRCs.
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Home Office
41
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
It is troubling that nearly 40% of those remaining in immigration detention should have been categorised as meeting Levels 2 or 3 of the Adults at Risk policy indicating significant vulnerability and, potentially, that they are at high risk from Covid-19. Government guidance on the operation of the adults at …
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It is troubling that nearly 40% of those remaining in immigration detention should have been categorised as meeting Levels 2 or 3 of the Adults at Risk policy indicating significant vulnerability and, potentially, that they are at high risk from Covid-19. Government guidance on the operation of the adults at risk policy indicates that evidence meeting the standard for Level 2 in the AAR policy “should normally be accepted and consideration given as to how this may be impacted by detention”, while evidence at Level 3 “stating that the individual is at risk and that a period of detention would be likely to cause harm … should be afforded significant weight… and any detention reviewed in light of the accepted evidence”. On this basis, serious consideration must be given to moving these individuals back into the community. However, we recognise that, as the Home Office has stated, 97% of those remaining in immigration detention are foreign national offenders and that therefore where it is not possible to remove them from detention all possible precautions must be given to enable detainees to self-isolate safely within IRCs. (Paragraph 171) 60 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation
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Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the committee's recognition and cites a High Court ruling endorsing its existing COVID-19 precautionary measures within immigration detention centres. It details various measures already in place to protect detainees, but explicitly states "no change" has been made to the Adults at Risk …
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Home Office
43
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
The Home Office and its providers must communicate timely and accurate information to NGOs as well as to service providers working to support people in immigration detention.
Government response AI summary
The government's response details measures taken in immigration detention regarding COVID-19, including detainee numbers and health precautions, but does not address the recommendation to communicate timely and accurate information to NGOs and service providers.
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Home Office
44
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Some of the temporary measures introduced by the Government in response to Covid-19 hold open the prospect of future improvements in the operation of both the asylum and immigration removal processes. Among these, the decision to extend asylum support for refugees until their first welfare benefit payment is received was …
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Some of the temporary measures introduced by the Government in response to Covid-19 hold open the prospect of future improvements in the operation of both the asylum and immigration removal processes. Among these, the decision to extend asylum support for refugees until their first welfare benefit payment is received was a simple and sensible as well as a compassionate measure and should be made permanent. Within the immigration removal process, the decision to remove from immigration detention people who did not need to be there, who were not a danger to the public, and who had no prospect of imminent removal was equally sensible. We are encouraged to note that this action was in line with the Home Office’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, which stipulate that detention should only be maintained when removal is imminent (i.e. within 28 days (four weeks)), and which our predecessors in 2019 urged should be formalised through creation of a statutory time limit.
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Government response AI summary
The government provides a generic response about its ongoing work during the pandemic to support people in asylum accommodation and immigration removal centres, but does not address the specific recommendation to make the extension of asylum support permanent.
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Home Office
54
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
As part of this Covid-19 strategy, the Home Office should publish the Public Health England guidance that it has taken to inform its decisions about ending the current 62 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation measures to support asylum seekers. The Home Office should also confirm how it …
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As part of this Covid-19 strategy, the Home Office should publish the Public Health England guidance that it has taken to inform its decisions about ending the current 62 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation measures to support asylum seekers. The Home Office should also confirm how it has adhered to the relevant Public Sector Equality Duty requirements in taking these decisions.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the premise of a single COVID-19 strategy across different institutional settings and refers to general availability of PHE guidance. It does not commit to publishing the *specific* guidance that informed its decisions for asylum seekers or provide detailed confirmation of PSED adherence …
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Home Office
15
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the scientific advice behind the decision to withdraw special measures for international arrivals on 13 March despite their repeated promises to do so is completely unacceptable. Despite many appeals for this information, the Government has only …
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The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the scientific advice behind the decision to withdraw special measures for international arrivals on 13 March despite their repeated promises to do so is completely unacceptable. Despite many appeals for this information, the Government has only drawn our attention to SAGE advice and analysis on 22 and 23 March, ten days after the decision, and to SAGE papers from 3 and 4 February, nearly six weeks before the decision. Given the rapidly changing circumstances of the epidemic, we do not accept that these SAGE discussions adequately explain or justify decisions made on 13 March.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions regarding March 13th guidance and defends its decision-making as scientifically informed, but does not address the Committee's specific complaint about the repeated failure to provide the requested scientific advice for that decision.
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Home Office
16
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence behind the withdrawal of guidance on 13 March. These appeals have been made to three members of the Cabinet, to one further Minister, and to three of the Home Office’s most senior officials. It is …
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The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence behind the withdrawal of guidance on 13 March. These appeals have been made to three members of the Cabinet, to one further Minister, and to three of the Home Office’s most senior officials. It is unacceptable that the information we requested concerning the decision to withdraw measures for international arrivals on 13 March has not yet been made available to us. The Committee has been reassured time and again that it would receive copies of the advice it had requested. After more than three months of being repeatedly promised this information, it will be difficult for this Committee to accept that there are any grounds why the Government cannot provide it to us; if there were such grounds, it has had ample time and opportunity to explain what these might be. It could at any previous juncture over this period have offered reasons for non-compliance or agreed terms for information to be given privately or with redaction. In such circumstances as these, the Committee could quite reasonably conclude that the advice we have requested simply does not exist.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were scientifically informed. However, it fails to address the Committee's specific complaint about the continued non-provision of evidence for the March 13th decision.
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Home Office
23
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance on 13 March, or on what basis. It is hard to reconcile Professor Aston’s suggestion that advice was provided at the time the decision was made with either his own indication that he was not …
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It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance on 13 March, or on what basis. It is hard to reconcile Professor Aston’s suggestion that advice was provided at the time the decision was made with either his own indication that he was not involved in the decision, or his later emphasis on advice given six weeks prior to the decision, on 3 and 4 February. Urgent clarity is needed on what scientific evidence was considered and advice provided in relation to self-isolation measures in the days preceding the decision of 13 March, given its likely significant impact in the number of cases imported into the UK in mid- March. Despite this, no Cabinet Minister or official whom we have asked has been able to provide any explanation for the process by which, and the basis on which, the decision was made. It is not clear who was responsible for gathering the evidence, formulating policy options or scrutinising and testing the advice. It is not clear 78 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders whether there was a lead department or a lead institution, or which Minister took lead responsibility for the decision. The lack of clarity about the responsibility for decision making in this crucial area is very serious and may well have contributed to mistakes being made.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions about the 13 March decision but fails to address the specific call for urgent clarity on who was responsible for the decision-making process and on what basis. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.
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Home Office
24
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that were produced at any point of the cardinal number of imported cases during March. The Home Office should have requested advice on the estimated number of importations, and the rough proportion of overall arrivals which …
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It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that were produced at any point of the cardinal number of imported cases during March. The Home Office should have requested advice on the estimated number of importations, and the rough proportion of overall arrivals which that estimated figure represented. While the figure of 0.5% of circulating cases resulting from importation is a useful one and indeed may still be reliable as of 15 July, evidence to us demonstrates that these other figures are also crucially important to deciding border policy and should have been made available to Ministers. Nothing the Home Office had told us demonstrates beyond doubt that these other figures were asked for or made available. Having actual estimates of the number of people likely to be affected by any decision is important and can lead to qualitatively different decision- making processes than just relying on figures expressed as small proportions. Estimates should have been available to Ministers throughout March to allow them to make fully informed decisions.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's general assertions but fails to address the specific recommendation that the Home Office should have requested and made available estimates of imported cases during March to inform ministerial decisions. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.
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Home Office
25
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested and to build trust and confidence. We welcome the decision to publish SAGE papers. However, transparency cannot be selective without clear explanation, particularly when the advice relates to policy decisions as important as those concerning …
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In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested and to build trust and confidence. We welcome the decision to publish SAGE papers. However, transparency cannot be selective without clear explanation, particularly when the advice relates to policy decisions as important as those concerning the introduction of border measures, which affects wide swathes of the economy and disrupts millions of peoples’ plans. Where it has not been able to meet the commitment to publish papers within a month of the relevant meeting, the Government should explain clearly why.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that SAGE minutes and papers are now published on www.gov.uk, but it does not address the recommendation to explain clearly why there have been delays in publishing papers within a month of relevant meetings.
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Home Office
30
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the same time as getting the economy moving, including international travel, in the safest possible way. It will build more support for the difficult balancing judgements it has to take if it is open about the …
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The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the same time as getting the economy moving, including international travel, in the safest possible way. It will build more support for the difficult balancing judgements it has to take if it is open about the evidence behind them.
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not address the committee's call for transparency regarding the evidence behind its decisions to build public support.
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Home Office
36
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in Spain following the FCO and DfT guidance in the expectation that they would be able to return to work, caring responsibilities, medical appointments and family events on their return, which will now be impossible. Many …
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However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in Spain following the FCO and DfT guidance in the expectation that they would be able to return to work, caring responsibilities, medical appointments and family events on their return, which will now be impossible. Many will face significant financial difficulties as a result of losing pay. Such sudden changes in policy make it even more difficult for businesses in the travel industry which are already under huge pressure. Given the continued risk from COVID-19 and the pace at which it can spread, travel corridors can only work as part of a plan to control the virus if they can also be lifted swiftly based on data when cases rise. However, the Government needs to be much more sensitive to the serious consequences for families and businesses of changing policy with no warning in this way. There should be significant changes to the way such decisions are handled and communicated.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated it agrees swift action is needed for COVID-19 risk and detailed its process for adjusting travel corridor exemptions based on Joint Biosecurity Centre assessments, but did not address the recommendation for greater sensitivity or changes in communication regarding the impact of sudden …
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Home Office
37
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”. However, stronger warnings should have been given at the time the travel corridors were first introduced in early July. The Government’s mixed messages at that time were regrettable. In the case of Spain, it appears from the First …
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The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”. However, stronger warnings should have been given at the time the travel corridors were first introduced in early July. The Government’s mixed messages at that time were regrettable. In the case of Spain, it appears from the First Minister of Scotland’s statements that the Joint Biosecurity Centre had already concluded that prevalence rates there were significant higher than in the UK at the time when the travel corridor was established—but that information has not been published. It should have been, both so that individual travellers could be aware of the risks and so that the decision to include Spain at all could be scrutinised. The Government should publish these prevalence rates now and explain why Spain was included on the travel corridors list. (Paragraph 194) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 81
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Government response AI summary
The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, and explains its swift action to remove/reinstate countries. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific prevalence rates or provide a detailed explanation for why Spain …
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Home Office
40
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the management of the pandemic, establishing clear responsibility for regular surveillance of travel risks from different countries and publishing clear and transparent analysis, including of international prevalence rates. It should also be responsible for assessing the …
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The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the management of the pandemic, establishing clear responsibility for regular surveillance of travel risks from different countries and publishing clear and transparent analysis, including of international prevalence rates. It should also be responsible for assessing the combined public health impact of all the border measures including assessments of the number of people likely to be arriving with COVID-19. However there has so far been a concerning lack of transparency about the analysis produced by the Joint Biosecurity Centre as even basic assessments of prevalence rates have not been published.
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Government response AI summary
The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's role and methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, but it does not address the committee's concern about the lack of transparency regarding JBC analysis or commit to publishing prevalence rates.
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Home Office
43
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public health crises. That is why the Government must now ensure that the analysis behind the introduction of quarantine rules and the introduction of travel corridors is all 82 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management …
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As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public health crises. That is why the Government must now ensure that the analysis behind the introduction of quarantine rules and the introduction of travel corridors is all 82 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders published—including JBC assessments of the prevalence of COVID-19 in different countries, and the Government’s overall estimates of the number and proportion of people arriving in the UK who are likely to have COVID-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government describes the methodology used by the Joint Biosecurity Centre for assessing risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, noting a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific analysis, JBC assessments of prevalence rates, or government …
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Home Office
46
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the UK over which travel corridors should be implemented. While we respect that matters of public health are devolved, we encourage the UK and devolved governments to work more closely together to ensure there is a …
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We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the UK over which travel corridors should be implemented. While we respect that matters of public health are devolved, we encourage the UK and devolved governments to work more closely together to ensure there is a single, four-nations approach to measures at our border. Disjointedness risks deepening damage to the aviation industry and inhibiting public confidence. It is, however, notable that the Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 83 First Minister of Scotland has quoted figures from the Joint Biosecurity Centre, to explain the decisions her Government had made to extend, or refuse, travel corridors. The UK Government should do the same.
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed on the importance of clear communication and outlined how it ensures gov.uk is the single source for policy changes, but did not address the recommendation for a single four-nations approach to border measures or publishing Joint Biosecurity Centre figures.
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Home Office
48
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is limited. The suddenness and lack of transparency behind the decisions about Spain may have consequences for enforcement if travellers remain sceptical about the policy or face financial pressures as a result of not being able …
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Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is limited. The suddenness and lack of transparency behind the decisions about Spain may have consequences for enforcement if travellers remain sceptical about the policy or face financial pressures as a result of not being able to return to work as planned. It is important for Government to build confidence in the decisions it has taken and the justification for them, and also to make sure that people can afford to comply.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the need for swift action and explains its methodology for determining travel corridors and the decision regarding Spain, acknowledging the impact on travellers. However, it does not outline specific plans to build confidence in its decisions or ensure that people can …
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Home Office
52
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising number of infections toward and during winter, it is likely that some form of border quarantine mechanism will be required for the foreseeable future to avoid the possibility that imported cases and strains could compound …
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Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising number of infections toward and during winter, it is likely that some form of border quarantine mechanism will be required for the foreseeable future to avoid the possibility that imported cases and strains could compound these challenges. Professor Teo Yik-Ying predicted that Singapore would maintain border restrictions at least until 2021.
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not engage with the committee's conclusion that some form of border quarantine mechanism would likely be required for the foreseeable future.
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Home Office