Recommendations & Conclusions
108 items
2
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
We are deeply concerned that there was so little early access to testing for Covid-19 for asylum seekers housed in shared facilities, whether IA or dispersal, given the higher risk of spreading infection in accommodation where it is often difficult to self-isolate, and where there are other residents who are …
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We are deeply concerned that there was so little early access to testing for Covid-19 for asylum seekers housed in shared facilities, whether IA or dispersal, given the higher risk of spreading infection in accommodation where it is often difficult to self-isolate, and where there are other residents who are shielding. We heard from accommodation providers on 7 May that they had significant numbers of asylum seekers who were currently self-isolating but were not being tested. Testing and tracing should have been readily available and organised through accommodation providers from early on in the pandemic for anyone housed in institutional accommodation.
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Government response AI summary
The government's response is a truncated title and provides no substantive information regarding early access to Covid-19 testing for asylum seekers in shared facilities.
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Home Office
3
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
At this point in the response, testing is widely available: any symptomatic person can apply for a test, including a home test kit, and live translation services are now available in more than 200 languages including British Sign Language to support those wishing to access test and trace services. These …
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At this point in the response, testing is widely available: any symptomatic person can apply for a test, including a home test kit, and live translation services are now available in more than 200 languages including British Sign Language to support those wishing to access test and trace services. These provisions are available to asylum seekers as they are to other members of the population, and this is very welcome. We are however concerned that there is no readily accessible guidance online to support local health managers in maintaining a clear and consistent approach to testing wider resident communities in asylum accommodation where a resident is symptomatic of Covid-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided no substantive response to the committee's concern regarding the lack of readily accessible online guidance for local health managers on COVID-19 testing in asylum accommodation.
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Home Office
4
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
The Government must urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing if there are outbreaks. This must be put in place immediately to ensure that accommodation providers are prepared for all potential scenarios in the next phase of the pandemic.
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The Government must urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing if there are outbreaks. This must be put in place immediately to ensure that accommodation providers are prepared for all potential scenarios in the next phase of the pandemic.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided no substantive response to the recommendation to urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing for outbreaks.
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Home Office
5
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Any service user who wants and needs a test must have easy access to that test. This also means that asylum seekers should be informed of the opportunity to request a test and of the associated translation support available to them through that process; they should be provided with any …
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Any service user who wants and needs a test must have easy access to that test. This also means that asylum seekers should be informed of the opportunity to request a test and of the associated translation support available to them through that process; they should be provided with any financial or transport assistance required to reach an appropriate testing facility. With a clear testing policy in place, it is essential that all accommodation providers proactively monitor and ensure that their service users are accessing the assistance they need.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that it does not believe the Home Office or accommodation providers should develop independent testing strategies for asylum seekers, instead advocating for a consistent approach with the wider population based on scientific advice. It affirms that accommodation providers are ensuring testing takes …
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Home Office
6
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Vulnerable people such as pregnant women, victims of abuse and people with PTSD should never be placed in accommodation in which they have to share a room with an unrelated adult, nor should they be required to use shared bathroom/toilet facilities which may have a detrimental impact on their mental …
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Vulnerable people such as pregnant women, victims of abuse and people with PTSD should never be placed in accommodation in which they have to share a room with an unrelated adult, nor should they be required to use shared bathroom/toilet facilities which may have a detrimental impact on their mental and physical health. (Paragraph 37) 54 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation
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Government response AI summary
The government response is a page reference and does not address the recommendation that vulnerable people should not be placed in shared accommodation or facilities.
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Home Office
7
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
We recognise that once the lockdown started in March it was more difficult to move people into alternative accommodation, both because of public health requirements and because of the increased demand overall for accommodation. However, that only makes resolution of this issue more pressing as scientists warn of the possibility …
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We recognise that once the lockdown started in March it was more difficult to move people into alternative accommodation, both because of public health requirements and because of the increased demand overall for accommodation. However, that only makes resolution of this issue more pressing as scientists warn of the possibility of a second national outbreak peaking in January–February 2021.
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Government response AI summary
The government response was a reference to another document and did not address the committee's conclusion regarding the pressing need for resolution of accommodation issues due to the potential for a second COVID-19 outbreak.
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Home Office
8
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Our predecessor Committee recommended that shared accommodation should be phased out across the estate as a whole. While we welcome the progress towards ending this practice, we are extremely disappointed that the Home Office did not take the opportunity of contract replacement in 2019 to make this change in full. …
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Our predecessor Committee recommended that shared accommodation should be phased out across the estate as a whole. While we welcome the progress towards ending this practice, we are extremely disappointed that the Home Office did not take the opportunity of contract replacement in 2019 to make this change in full. It is deeply concerning that the contract for dispersed accommodation in London and the South East until 2029 was tendered on the basis of non-related adults sharing rooms. Further, the argument that room sharing is more acceptable in short term initial accommodation is unsustainable, given the increasing duration of service users’ stays in these facilities.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided no substantive response to the committee's concerns regarding the continued use of shared accommodation for unrelated adults in asylum dispersal contracts.
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Home Office
9
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
The risks posed to vulnerable individuals by Covid-19 make more urgent the necessity of a complete end to room sharing by unrelated adults. While the first peak of infection has passed in some parts of the UK, there continues to be a real and substantial threat of further outbreaks. Providers …
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The risks posed to vulnerable individuals by Covid-19 make more urgent the necessity of a complete end to room sharing by unrelated adults. While the first peak of infection has passed in some parts of the UK, there continues to be a real and substantial threat of further outbreaks. Providers must move people out of shared rooms now in advance of a possible second major national outbreak
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to end room sharing for unrelated adults, stating that existing contractual criteria prohibit it for vulnerable persons and that further restrictions would not assist providers.
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Home Office
10
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
The Home Office must take appropriate action, including contract variation if necessary, to ensure room sharing across the whole estate is phased out. The Department must also ensure that additional accommodation obtained to meet this requirement is of a high quality and fit for purpose. Fulfilment of this recommendation will …
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The Home Office must take appropriate action, including contract variation if necessary, to ensure room sharing across the whole estate is phased out. The Department must also ensure that additional accommodation obtained to meet this requirement is of a high quality and fit for purpose. Fulfilment of this recommendation will provide an opportunity for the Home Office to pursue its commitment to a more equitable and sustainable system by expanding the areas participating in dispersal.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to phase out room sharing for unrelated adults, stating there are no plans for contractual changes and they do not agree further restrictions would assist providers in securing accommodation.
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Home Office
11
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Accommodation providers must urgently put in place measures to enable greater social distancing and effective hygiene practices. We are appalled at reports that service users have not been universally provided either with laundry facilities, a generous supply of cleaning products, soap and sanitiser, or with financial support to enable them …
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Accommodation providers must urgently put in place measures to enable greater social distancing and effective hygiene practices. We are appalled at reports that service users have not been universally provided either with laundry facilities, a generous supply of cleaning products, soap and sanitiser, or with financial support to enable them to access these essentials. It is difficult to conceive of any provision which is more fundamental to public health during the pandemic. The Home Office must immediately take steps to ensure these essentials are provided to all service users, whether in initial, contingency or dispersed accommodation. It must write to us confirming the steps taken, and how it will monitor the ongoing provision of these supplies, within 4 weeks of receiving this report.
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Government response AI summary
The government states it expects high standards and has been in daily contact with providers to ensure contractual requirements are met. It outlines existing measures such as issuing guidance, providing cleaning items and laundry services in full board, and increasing cash allowances for dispersed accommodation. …
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Home Office
12
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
All Home Office contracted housing providers must ensure that any vulnerable adults are accommodated appropriately. Where the Home Office has explicitly authorised an individual to have a single room, this must be implemented without question or delay. To ensure that this is enforced in practice, the Home Office must write …
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All Home Office contracted housing providers must ensure that any vulnerable adults are accommodated appropriately. Where the Home Office has explicitly authorised an individual to have a single room, this must be implemented without question or delay. To ensure that this is enforced in practice, the Home Office must write to us within 4 weeks of receiving this report outlining how it will require providers to account for their response to such individual cases both during the pandemic and for the long- term.
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Government response AI summary
The government outlined its expectations for contractors and existing measures for supporting vulnerable individuals during the pandemic, including the Migrant Help service, but did not commit to writing to the Committee within 4 weeks to detail provider accountability mechanisms for individual cases.
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Home Office
13
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We welcome the additional support that providers have told us that they are giving to their service users, specifically those who need to self-isolate, during this time. Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 55 Nonetheless we have heard evidence that not all service users are receiving the support …
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We welcome the additional support that providers have told us that they are giving to their service users, specifically those who need to self-isolate, during this time. Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 55 Nonetheless we have heard evidence that not all service users are receiving the support they require from providers, with some particularly vulnerable individuals reporting that they are unable to self-isolate as a result. We urge all accommodation providers to ensure that no individual in their accommodation is placed in the precarious position of being unable to self-isolate or shield due to difficulties accessing basic necessities such as nappies for their children, food, toiletries and cleaning equipment.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that providers are monitored to ensure high standards and meet contractual requirements, which include providing essential items and support for self-isolation. Existing measures like food parcels, telephony, free cleaning items, increased cash allowance, and a 24/7 helpline are already in place.
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Home Office
14
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
We are appalled that the Home Office response to the communication support requirements of service users who are not accommodated in hotels or large IA facilities was simply to gather information about where free Wi-Fi might be provided locally—thus encouraging vulnerable people to go to public places—especially at a time …
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We are appalled that the Home Office response to the communication support requirements of service users who are not accommodated in hotels or large IA facilities was simply to gather information about where free Wi-Fi might be provided locally—thus encouraging vulnerable people to go to public places—especially at a time when many such places might be closed or restricting public access. If there is a second major national outbreak and lockdown, the Home Office must not repeat this advice.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that it encouraged vulnerable people to access public Wi-Fi, stating such information was part of general induction and that Wi-Fi or SIM cards are provided in initial accommodation and hotels.
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Home Office
15
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Users of asylum accommodation are often very vulnerable people, including torture survivors, individuals suffering PTSD, pregnant women and mothers with small children. Smart phones, access to the internet and television can be a lifeline to a range of external information and support services. Prior to the lockdown many asylum seekers …
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Users of asylum accommodation are often very vulnerable people, including torture survivors, individuals suffering PTSD, pregnant women and mothers with small children. Smart phones, access to the internet and television can be a lifeline to a range of external information and support services. Prior to the lockdown many asylum seekers will have relied on local libraries and voluntary support groups, which are now impossible to access physically, to obtain such support. Without access to phones, internet and television, asylum seekers may be unable to access essential Covid-19 updates and crucial support networks in the UK and abroad. Asylum seekers’ ability to attend video consultations with their GP and other healthcare professionals, including secondary mental health care, may also be impeded by this lack of communication provision.
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Government response AI summary
The government recognises the importance of access to information and states they have already ensured Wi-Fi or data-only SIM cards are available in initial accommodation and hotels, and that communication costs are covered in asylum seeker allowances.
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Home Office
16
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
The Home Office’s recent provision of SIM cards to asylum seekers in larger IA facilities is welcome. However, we are concerned that the denial of provision to individuals who do not have personal phones, or who are currently being asked to leave their accommodation in order to access free Wi-Fi …
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The Home Office’s recent provision of SIM cards to asylum seekers in larger IA facilities is welcome. However, we are concerned that the denial of provision to individuals who do not have personal phones, or who are currently being asked to leave their accommodation in order to access free Wi-Fi in their local area, increases their vulnerability.
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Government response AI summary
The government denies encouraging asylum seekers to leave accommodation for Wi-Fi and states it already ensures access to Wi-Fi or SIM cards in initial accommodation and hotels, with communication costs covered in allowances.
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Home Office
17
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted in Part
While asylum support payments were provisionally increased in June 2020 from £37.75 to £39.60 per week, people with ongoing asylum claims may still struggle to meet their essential needs on this weekly amount, particularly during the pandemic. It is imperative that all asylum seekers have access to essential support services …
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While asylum support payments were provisionally increased in June 2020 from £37.75 to £39.60 per week, people with ongoing asylum claims may still struggle to meet their essential needs on this weekly amount, particularly during the pandemic. It is imperative that all asylum seekers have access to essential support services and Covid-19 information through television, phones and the internet at this time. The Government must urgently assess, and work with its contract holders to secure, asylum seekers’ access to these facilities; we also urge the Home Office and its providers to ensure all asylum seekers receive £10 a week to top up their phone credit.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of communication access, stating it provides Wi-Fi or SIM cards in initial accommodation and hotels. It rejects the recommendation for an additional £10 weekly phone credit, confirming a full review of cash allowances is ongoing and will be published.
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Home Office
18
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Following the National Audit Office’s report that asylum seekers are now expected to remain in initial accommodation for up to five weeks, with many staying for nearly three months, the Home Office must urgently reconsider the provision of medical services, subsistence payments and children’s educational support in initial accommodation. We …
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Following the National Audit Office’s report that asylum seekers are now expected to remain in initial accommodation for up to five weeks, with many staying for nearly three months, the Home Office must urgently reconsider the provision of medical services, subsistence payments and children’s educational support in initial accommodation. We appreciate the reasons for the current lengthy stays in IA as a result of lockdown and delays in being able to move people on. However, we are very concerned that so little progress had been made before lockdown in addressing the 56 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation shortfall of dispersal accommodation, making it harder to respond to Covid-19. It is vital that swift progress is made now in advance of any second wave this winter.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that extended stays in initial accommodation are not a long-term solution and they prioritize moving vulnerable service users. They are monitoring stays and inviting local authorities to collaborate on increasing dispersal accommodation, but do not commit to reconsidering medical services, subsistence payments, …
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Home Office
19
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Urgent Government action is needed to ensure that access to primary and secondary health services is in place for all service users, and that healthy, fresh food that is appropriate to individuals’ dietary needs is available.
Government response AI summary
The government states that existing Asylum Accommodation and Support contracts already mandate accommodation providers to ensure access to health services, including signposting, liaising with health authorities, and securing GP registrations for vulnerable users. They also confirm providers are required to ensure healthy, fresh food appropriate …
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Home Office
20
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We know that asylum seekers with an active application or appeal are entitled to access NHS primary and secondary healthcare free of charge but there is no obligation on accommodation providers to register asylum seekers in IA with a GP. The Home Office Minister of State recently gave assurances that …
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We know that asylum seekers with an active application or appeal are entitled to access NHS primary and secondary healthcare free of charge but there is no obligation on accommodation providers to register asylum seekers in IA with a GP. The Home Office Minister of State recently gave assurances that healthcare would be available. However, evidence we have received makes plain that, while healthcare may technically be available, it is not accessible to many of those in initial accommodation. This is a deeply concerning situation.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that existing contracts mandate accommodation providers to facilitate access to health services and secure GP registrations for vulnerable service users. It clarifies that lack of proof of address is not grounds for refusal and existing guidance should be followed.
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Home Office
21
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Deferred
While service users remain in IA for more than three weeks, accommodation providers should ensure that all of their residents are linked up to primary and secondary health provision. We call on the Home Office to ensure that this change is made, if necessary by a variation to the Asylum …
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While service users remain in IA for more than three weeks, accommodation providers should ensure that all of their residents are linked up to primary and secondary health provision. We call on the Home Office to ensure that this change is made, if necessary by a variation to the Asylum Accommodation and Support Statement of Requirements. The Home Office should also ensure that the necessary funding is secured for affected statutory health services in any such provision.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that existing contracts require accommodation providers to facilitate access to health services. They clarify that the Department for Health is responsible for ensuring guidance is followed, and Public Health England has provided guidance and funding reassurance to Clinical Commissioning Groups.
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Home Office
22
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
We are concerned to learn that key stakeholders have reported a lack of information from the Home Office and its providers about revisions in contractual expectations of accommodation providers during the pandemic. The pandemic has impacted hugely on asylum seekers housed in asylum accommodation who have experienced lengthy stays in …
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We are concerned to learn that key stakeholders have reported a lack of information from the Home Office and its providers about revisions in contractual expectations of accommodation providers during the pandemic. The pandemic has impacted hugely on asylum seekers housed in asylum accommodation who have experienced lengthy stays in IA, social distancing concerns and inconsistent access to healthcare in IA, as well as difficulties accessing phones, Wi-Fi, internet and television.
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Government response AI summary
The government states they have been informing stakeholders and will continue to do so, while providers have made temporary amendments to ensure safety. They will also continue to work with partners to keep translated COVID-19 guidance updated and available to service users.
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Home Office
23
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
We urge the Home Office and its providers to send a memorandum to key stakeholders outlining any revisions to providers’ contractual obligations since 1 March. This memorandum should be issued to the Home Office’s single point of contact, all strategic migration partnerships and dispersal authorities by 15 September.
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We urge the Home Office and its providers to send a memorandum to key stakeholders outlining any revisions to providers’ contractual obligations since 1 March. This memorandum should be issued to the Home Office’s single point of contact, all strategic migration partnerships and dispersal authorities by 15 September.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that strategic stakeholders are informed of changes in the asylum accommodation system and will continue to be, but does not commit to sending a specific memorandum outlining contractual revisions by the requested deadline.
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Home Office
24
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
While we welcome the communication of Covid-19 guidance by providers to their service users, we urge all providers to check regularly with their service users, and with wider stakeholders, to ensure that they are receiving up to date and timely Covid-19 guidance. This is essential given the Government’s gradual easing …
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While we welcome the communication of Covid-19 guidance by providers to their service users, we urge all providers to check regularly with their service users, and with wider stakeholders, to ensure that they are receiving up to date and timely Covid-19 guidance. This is essential given the Government’s gradual easing of the lockdown restrictions and its fast-changing key messages.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of communication and commits to continuing to work with partners to ensure translated public health COVID-19 guidance is kept up to date and made available to service users.
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Home Office
25
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We recommend that the Government continues to work with trusted partners such as Doctors of the World UK to translate all updated Covid-19 guidance for the general public into the languages most commonly spoken by those individuals in the asylum system. This guidance should be sent out in digital and …
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We recommend that the Government continues to work with trusted partners such as Doctors of the World UK to translate all updated Covid-19 guidance for the general public into the languages most commonly spoken by those individuals in the asylum system. This guidance should be sent out in digital and print format by providers to all of their service users.
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Government response AI summary
The government commits to continuing to work with relevant partners to ensure translated PHE COVID-19 guidance is kept up to date and made available to service users as health guidance evolves.
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Home Office
26
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted in Part
Asylum seekers should not have been moved to new accommodation during the pandemic without justified and urgent reasons for doing so or without a vulnerability assessment demonstrating that the move could be made safely. This must happen Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 57 in future. If, following …
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Asylum seekers should not have been moved to new accommodation during the pandemic without justified and urgent reasons for doing so or without a vulnerability assessment demonstrating that the move could be made safely. This must happen Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 57 in future. If, following such an assessment, a move is found to be necessary and appropriate, sufficient notice must be given to the individual, to medical and other caseworkers working with that individual and, if they are to be moved to another area, to the local councils, to ensure they are effectively supported. In light of other evidence expressing concern about a lack of primary medical care in hotels, the Home Office should also review the adequacy of health service provision within hotel accommodation to ensure that asylum service users are easily and safely able to discuss concerns about their physical and mental health.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts that communication during some moves was not thorough and will share operational lessons, but does not explicitly commit to vulnerability assessments for all future moves or a review of health provision in hotel accommodation, and has no plans for a safeguarding KPI.
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Home Office
27
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We welcome the fact that the Home Office is investigating these issues seriously. This investigation should engage with those raising these concerns, assessing whether the moves during lockdown were consistent with public health guidance and seeking detail on precisely how any vulnerability assessments were undertaken and by who. The Home …
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We welcome the fact that the Home Office is investigating these issues seriously. This investigation should engage with those raising these concerns, assessing whether the moves during lockdown were consistent with public health guidance and seeking detail on precisely how any vulnerability assessments were undertaken and by who. The Home Office should set out the findings of its investigations and what lessons the department and contractors have learned as a result in its response to this report.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts that Mears's local engagement and communication in Glasgow was inadequate, and commits to continued engagement with stakeholders, investigation of concerns, sharing operational lessons, and has established a National Safeguarding Forum.
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Home Office
28
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted in Part
The Department should ensure that lessons learned from the handling of asylum moves during the lockdown are referred to the safeguarding board and incorporated into the safeguarding and assurance frameworks. The Department should consider how local authorities and third sector partners in asylum support can be engaged in the work …
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The Department should ensure that lessons learned from the handling of asylum moves during the lockdown are referred to the safeguarding board and incorporated into the safeguarding and assurance frameworks. The Department should consider how local authorities and third sector partners in asylum support can be engaged in the work of the safeguarding board. The Department should also report its progress in developing the assurance framework to us every two months, from an initial report to us four weeks after receiving this report. Given the importance of safeguarding as part of the asylum accommodation system, we would encourage the department to explore whether a KPI could be used to ensure that contractors are properly held to account for their work to safeguard vulnerable individuals. For the same reasons and in the interests of transparency, we believe that the safeguarding framework should be published.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects introducing a contractual KPI for safeguarding but states that a dedicated Safeguarding Board oversees existing frameworks. They have established a National Safeguarding Forum with local authorities and partners to enhance understanding and allow input, committing to provide progress updates to the Committee.
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Home Office
29
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted in Part
We welcome the Minister’s willingness to consider the case for reinstating the weekly allowance for individuals who have previously had this allowance withdrawn, following forced changes of accommodation during the pandemic. Individuals who were moved into hotels at the start of the lockdown will now have been there for three …
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We welcome the Minister’s willingness to consider the case for reinstating the weekly allowance for individuals who have previously had this allowance withdrawn, following forced changes of accommodation during the pandemic. Individuals who were moved into hotels at the start of the lockdown will now have been there for three months and many will have experienced additional costs in that time for essential items such as toiletries, over the counter medicines, additional food, children’s clothing and educational materials which will not be covered by the full board arrangement. This modest allowance also helps traumatised individuals to maintain autonomy, independence and a sense of dignity. We urge the Minister to reinstate the payment for these individuals.
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Government response AI summary
The government has no plans to reinstate the full weekly allowance of £39.60 but has decided to provide a weekly sum of £8 to cover essential needs for travel and clothing for those in temporary accommodation.
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Home Office
30
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted in Part
The subsistence allowance should be provided to any individual whose entitlement to section 95 support has been accepted from the time that entitlement is determined, whether or not they are then immediately able to move into dispersal accommodation. This allowance should be provided via the cashless ASPEN card system. We …
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The subsistence allowance should be provided to any individual whose entitlement to section 95 support has been accepted from the time that entitlement is determined, whether or not they are then immediately able to move into dispersal accommodation. This allowance should be provided via the cashless ASPEN card system. We believe that there is no legal barrier to such payments, provided they relate to essential living needs, just because an individual remains in initial accommodation. If the Government takes the view, however, that this change would require amendment of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000, it should amend them as soon as possible. (Paragraph 124) 58 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects providing the full £39.60 weekly allowance to asylum seekers in initial accommodation, stating there are no plans to do so. However, they have decided to provide a weekly sum of £8 to cover essential travel and clothing needs.
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Home Office
31
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
We support the NAO’s recommendation that the Government should consider whether its performance framework effectively incentivises providers to move service users into dispersal accommodation within agreed timescales; the Government should also reassess the value for money provided by contingency accommodation in hotels and the contractual requirement for initial accommodation provision …
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We support the NAO’s recommendation that the Government should consider whether its performance framework effectively incentivises providers to move service users into dispersal accommodation within agreed timescales; the Government should also reassess the value for money provided by contingency accommodation in hotels and the contractual requirement for initial accommodation provision within the asylum establishment, in light of demand. The Government should consult service users, local authorities, health service and third sector partners as part of this review, to ensure that lived experience of the service is taken into account in this review.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to review its performance framework, reassess value for money, and consult stakeholders, stating existing KPIs and time limits are in place and there are no plans to review or redesign asylum contracts at this point.
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Home Office
32
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Our predecessors highlighted the shortcomings of the Home Office’s dispersal policy and its failure to make dispersal arrangements equitable across the UK. Three years on from the Committee’s 2017 report, we have noted with concern the pressures on the system since the introduction of the AASC contracts in September
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Our predecessors highlighted the shortcomings of the Home Office’s dispersal policy and its failure to make dispersal arrangements equitable across the UK. Three years on from the Committee’s 2017 report, we have noted with concern the pressures on the system since the introduction of the AASC contracts in September
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the challenges with the dispersal policy and outlines ongoing efforts, including the establishment of the HOLGCEX group and an agreed approach from 2019 to achieve more equitable asylum dispersal across the UK. It also details continued engagement with local authorities and strategic …
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Home Office
33
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
In order to achieve an equitable and sustainable UK-wide dispersal system, the Home Office and its providers must give due regard to the acute financial and capacity constraints currently placed on dispersal authorities, many of which are grappling with even greater community pressures arising from the pandemic, including housing the …
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In order to achieve an equitable and sustainable UK-wide dispersal system, the Home Office and its providers must give due regard to the acute financial and capacity constraints currently placed on dispersal authorities, many of which are grappling with even greater community pressures arising from the pandemic, including housing the broader homeless population.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the financial constraints faced by local authorities and states it is committed to collaborative work through the HOLGCEX group and with Strategic Migration Partnerships to improve dispersal and increase dispersed accommodation.
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Home Office
34
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
In 2018 our predecessors recommended that the Government “must provide dispersal authorities with dedicated funding to better manage dispersal and the related impact on services” and to give currently non-participating authorities confidence that they would be fully supported were they to take an equitable share of this population. We are …
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In 2018 our predecessors recommended that the Government “must provide dispersal authorities with dedicated funding to better manage dispersal and the related impact on services” and to give currently non-participating authorities confidence that they would be fully supported were they to take an equitable share of this population. We are both concerned and disappointed that the Home Office has failed to make better progress on this fundamental issue, which could compromise the Government’s ability to meet its statutory responsibilities under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. We repeat that, to achieve increased voluntary participation in the dispersal scheme, the Government must directly fund all dispersal local authorities to take account of the competing financial and capacity challenges that they face.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that lack of direct funding is an issue but rejects the recommendation to directly fund local authorities, instead focusing on collaborative work to increase dispersed accommodation procurement.
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Home Office
35
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
During the pandemic the Government has asked providers to source additional accommodation in areas which had not previously participated in dispersal, which we understand and welcome. However, at the same time the Government has temporarily sanctioned providers to secure such accommodation without the prior approval of the relevant local authority. …
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During the pandemic the Government has asked providers to source additional accommodation in areas which had not previously participated in dispersal, which we understand and welcome. However, at the same time the Government has temporarily sanctioned providers to secure such accommodation without the prior approval of the relevant local authority. Our predecessors’ 2018 report on asylum accommodation reiterated the Committee’s concerns that the Government’s dispersal policy risked undermining the support and consent of local communities, many of which have a long history of welcoming those in need of sanctuary. We repeat this concern again in light of evidence we have received which suggests that communication issues still remain between providers and local dispersal authorities. Nonetheless we were encouraged to hear examples of providers engaging with local areas when sourcing accommodation.
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Government response AI summary
The government highlights its commitment to working collaboratively with communities and stakeholders, detailing established groups like HOLGCEX and ongoing engagement with local authorities and Strategic Migration Partnerships to improve asylum dispersal and address capacity issues.
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Home Office
36
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted in Part
We call once again on the Home Office and its providers to work closely with housing providers, local authorities and Strategic Migration Partnerships to increase the availability of asylum accommodation both during the period of lockdown, and afterwards. (Paragraph 143) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 59
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We call once again on the Home Office and its providers to work closely with housing providers, local authorities and Strategic Migration Partnerships to increase the availability of asylum accommodation both during the period of lockdown, and afterwards. (Paragraph 143) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 59
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Government response AI summary
The government states it is committed to collaborative work and has tasked Strategic Migration Partnerships to work with Local Authorities to increase dispersal participation and procurement of accommodation, reporting to the HOLGCEX group.
Read full response →
Home Office
37
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
The Government said that it would review its policy of temporarily pausing all evictions from asylum accommodation and continuing the provision of asylum support before the end of June. In a Parliamentary debate on 17 June, a number of MPs expressed concern about the Home Office’s intention to end the …
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The Government said that it would review its policy of temporarily pausing all evictions from asylum accommodation and continuing the provision of asylum support before the end of June. In a Parliamentary debate on 17 June, a number of MPs expressed concern about the Home Office’s intention to end the temporary additional support for asylum seekers and to recommence moving on those who have been granted refugee status and those who have been refused asylum. At the time of writing in July, we understand that the temporary support remains in place. This is welcome.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that following careful discussion and planning, cessations of support resumed in a phased approach starting in August, with those granted refugee status moving first, and cessations for refused claims to follow later.
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Home Office
38
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Before taking any final decision to remove temporary support for asylum seekers, the Home Office and its accommodation providers must engage and consult closely with Public Health England, devolved governments, Strategic Migration Partnerships, asylum dispersal councils and local public health units to ensure that any changes do not place individuals …
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Before taking any final decision to remove temporary support for asylum seekers, the Home Office and its accommodation providers must engage and consult closely with Public Health England, devolved governments, Strategic Migration Partnerships, asylum dispersal councils and local public health units to ensure that any changes do not place individuals at any risk or overwhelm other statutory support services.
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Government response AI summary
The government confirmed that they engaged in careful discussion and planning with Public Health Agencies, Local Authorities, other government departments, and stakeholders, including the voluntary sector, before resuming cessations in a phased approach from August.
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Home Office
39
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
We welcome the substantial reduction in the number of individuals detained in IRCs since the beginning of the lockdown. This was a sensible response to Covid-19 and will have helped prevent infections.
Government response AI summary
The government response provides only a reference number and does not address the committee's observation or welcome regarding the reduction in individuals detained in IRCs.
Read full response →
Home Office
40
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
Government guidance which came into force on 5 May 2020, although it was not published until 5 June, confirmed that individuals at high risk of contracting Covid-19 should be treated as AAR Level 3 cases. This clarification, which confirms the commitment made by the Home Office to the High Court …
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Government guidance which came into force on 5 May 2020, although it was not published until 5 June, confirmed that individuals at high risk of contracting Covid-19 should be treated as AAR Level 3 cases. This clarification, which confirms the commitment made by the Home Office to the High Court on 26 March, is welcome although earlier publication would have provided greater clarity and reassurance. Evidence we received from the IRC providers shortly after this guidance came into effect indicated inconsistencies in their implementation of the AAR policy, specifically as it relates to those highly vulnerable detainees at greater risk of becoming ill from Covid-19. This is deeply concerning, and reflects concerns raised in evidence to us about officials’ attempts to interpret broadly drafted immigration detention policies, and the consequent litigation and uncertainty that can ensue.
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Government response AI summary
The government defends its approach to immigration detention during COVID-19 by referencing a High Court ruling and public health guidance, stating it has not changed Adults at Risk policy and has implemented various measures to protect detainees.
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Home Office
41
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
It is troubling that nearly 40% of those remaining in immigration detention should have been categorised as meeting Levels 2 or 3 of the Adults at Risk policy indicating significant vulnerability and, potentially, that they are at high risk from Covid-19. Government guidance on the operation of the adults at …
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It is troubling that nearly 40% of those remaining in immigration detention should have been categorised as meeting Levels 2 or 3 of the Adults at Risk policy indicating significant vulnerability and, potentially, that they are at high risk from Covid-19. Government guidance on the operation of the adults at risk policy indicates that evidence meeting the standard for Level 2 in the AAR policy “should normally be accepted and consideration given as to how this may be impacted by detention”, while evidence at Level 3 “stating that the individual is at risk and that a period of detention would be likely to cause harm … should be afforded significant weight… and any detention reviewed in light of the accepted evidence”. On this basis, serious consideration must be given to moving these individuals back into the community. However, we recognise that, as the Home Office has stated, 97% of those remaining in immigration detention are foreign national offenders and that therefore where it is not possible to remove them from detention all possible precautions must be given to enable detainees to self-isolate safely within IRCs. (Paragraph 171) 60 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation
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Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the committee's recognition and cites a High Court ruling endorsing its existing COVID-19 precautionary measures within immigration detention centres. It details various measures already in place to protect detainees, but explicitly states "no change" has been made to the Adults at Risk …
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Home Office
42
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
Guidance should be provided for custodial and detention staff on the approach to be taken where an individual is considered to be at high risk of having contracted Covid-19, but is not symptomatic at the point of reception.
Government response AI summary
The government stated that existing precautionary measures for managing COVID-19 risks in immigration detention, including isolation protocols and alignment with public health guidance, already address the recommendation for staff guidance.
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Home Office
43
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
The Home Office and its providers must communicate timely and accurate information to NGOs as well as to service providers working to support people in immigration detention.
Government response AI summary
The government's response details measures taken in immigration detention regarding COVID-19, including detainee numbers and health precautions, but does not address the recommendation to communicate timely and accurate information to NGOs and service providers.
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Home Office
44
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
Some of the temporary measures introduced by the Government in response to Covid-19 hold open the prospect of future improvements in the operation of both the asylum and immigration removal processes. Among these, the decision to extend asylum support for refugees until their first welfare benefit payment is received was …
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Some of the temporary measures introduced by the Government in response to Covid-19 hold open the prospect of future improvements in the operation of both the asylum and immigration removal processes. Among these, the decision to extend asylum support for refugees until their first welfare benefit payment is received was a simple and sensible as well as a compassionate measure and should be made permanent. Within the immigration removal process, the decision to remove from immigration detention people who did not need to be there, who were not a danger to the public, and who had no prospect of imminent removal was equally sensible. We are encouraged to note that this action was in line with the Home Office’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, which stipulate that detention should only be maintained when removal is imminent (i.e. within 28 days (four weeks)), and which our predecessors in 2019 urged should be formalised through creation of a statutory time limit.
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Government response AI summary
The government provides a generic response about its ongoing work during the pandemic to support people in asylum accommodation and immigration removal centres, but does not address the specific recommendation to make the extension of asylum support permanent.
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Home Office
45
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
As government lockdown restrictions are eased, it is imperative that the Home Office and its providers communicate in a clear and timely manner to key national and local actors. The Government needs now to work closely with stakeholders across both the asylum accommodation and immigration detention sectors to ensure a …
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As government lockdown restrictions are eased, it is imperative that the Home Office and its providers communicate in a clear and timely manner to key national and local actors. The Government needs now to work closely with stakeholders across both the asylum accommodation and immigration detention sectors to ensure a smooth transition out of lockdown. The Government and providers of both types of institutional accommodation must also be alert to new concerns about protecting people in the event of a second wave of Covid-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government states they have been working closely with Public Health leads and providers throughout the pandemic, monitoring and adjusting procedures. They commit to continuing to listen and work closely with stakeholders during the recovery period to safeguard public health.
Read full response →
Home Office
46
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We are extremely concerned at this failure of communication by Mears Group with the receiving local authorities, and at the lack of arrangements for testing individuals who were being moved across the country out of an accommodation centre where other residents had Covid-19, and which had previously been treated as …
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We are extremely concerned at this failure of communication by Mears Group with the receiving local authorities, and at the lack of arrangements for testing individuals who were being moved across the country out of an accommodation centre where other residents had Covid-19, and which had previously been treated as a single household during lockdown. We are also very concerned at reports of a wider failure in the duty of care towards these individuals and households.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the failures in communication and duty of care identified by the Committee, noting that Mears has apologised. It states that the Home Office and Mears have met with public health officials to learn lessons and are taking appropriate action to support providers …
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Home Office
47
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
While Mears affirms that the dispersal of individuals from Urban House on 10 July without testing, even after cases of Covid-19 were confirmed in the facility, was in line with the national system, we are deeply concerned that the company acted in this manner apparently without thought for the consequences …
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While Mears affirms that the dispersal of individuals from Urban House on 10 July without testing, even after cases of Covid-19 were confirmed in the facility, was in line with the national system, we are deeply concerned that the company acted in this manner apparently without thought for the consequences of dispersing these individuals into other communities, and without consulting the receiving authorities. Mears’ commitment to participate in a lessons learned exercise is helpful. However this is not the first time during the pandemic that it has been reported that Mears has moved large numbers of asylum seekers from one location to another in a rush, without consulting local authorities or ensuring proper support is in place, and we are consequently very concerned about the quality of planning and decision making within the group. (Paragraph 202) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 61
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the concerns, states that Mears has apologised for communication shortcomings during moves from Urban House, and commits to taking appropriate action to support providers in managing future dispersals and outbreaks.
Read full response →
Home Office
48
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We urge the Home Office urgently to review the way Mears has been operating during the pandemic, to consider its poor management of service users’ welfare, and the wider public health consequences of its approach.
Government response AI summary
The government states that the Home Office and Mears have met with the Director of Public Health for Wakefield to discuss lessons learned from the Urban House incident. Mears has apologised for communication shortcomings, and the government is taking appropriate action to support providers in …
Read full response →
Home Office
49
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
It is essential that lessons are learned from the dispersal from Urban House, and that clear policies are put in place to ensure effective communication between providers and local authorities in the event of further outbreaks in asylum accommodation, and in respect of the dispersal of service users from one …
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It is essential that lessons are learned from the dispersal from Urban House, and that clear policies are put in place to ensure effective communication between providers and local authorities in the event of further outbreaks in asylum accommodation, and in respect of the dispersal of service users from one area to another.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that the Home Office and Mears have met with the Director of Public Health for Wakefield to learn lessons from the Urban House dispersal, and Mears has apologised for communication shortcomings. They are taking appropriate action to support providers in managing future …
Read full response →
Home Office
50
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
The experience of the pandemic has demonstrated the importance of implementing this Committee’s previous recommendations both in respect of asylum accommodation and immigration detention. We welcome the Home Office’s commitment to proceed carefully “back to a more normal state of affairs”. We also welcome its commitment to talk to local …
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The experience of the pandemic has demonstrated the importance of implementing this Committee’s previous recommendations both in respect of asylum accommodation and immigration detention. We welcome the Home Office’s commitment to proceed carefully “back to a more normal state of affairs”. We also welcome its commitment to talk to local government and to take public health advice seriously in respect of asylum accommodation. We will hold the Home Office to account on these commitments. However, we are deeply concerned about the lack of clarity on the Home Office’s plans to end temporary support to those in the asylum support system, following the formal expiry of the provisions on 30 June.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the concern about clarity and explains that cessations of temporary support have resumed in a phased approach since August, prioritising those still awaiting decisions and deferring cessations for refused claimants.
Read full response →
Home Office
51
Conclusion
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Acknowledged
On 5 June, the Housing Secretary announced a two month extension, until the end of August, of the suspension of evictions from social or private rented housing to protect tenants and landlords during the pandemic.
Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the committee's recognition of support for asylum seekers and provides an update on the resumption of cessations of support in a phased approach since August, following consultation with public health agencies and local authorities.
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Home Office
52
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Accepted
We urge the Home Office to follow MHCLG’s lead and to agree jointly with local authorities, devolved nations and third sector partners a sensible and fair extension to the current measures in place for asylum seekers that reduces the public health risk for them and for the local community. Any …
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We urge the Home Office to follow MHCLG’s lead and to agree jointly with local authorities, devolved nations and third sector partners a sensible and fair extension to the current measures in place for asylum seekers that reduces the public health risk for them and for the local community. Any extension to these measures should take account of the potential heightened risk of vulnerable asylum seekers becoming ill from Covid-19 if temporary support and accommodation is withdrawn; sufficient time should be provided for asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status and those who have been refused asylum to access appropriate financial and accommodation support. The Home Office should also ensure that its approach to ending cessations is phased to ensure that changes do not overwhelm other services. It should give due consideration to any impact that its decisions may have on the already stretched capacity of local authorities.
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Government response AI summary
The government has resumed cessations in a phased approach since August, starting with those granted refugee status and later for those refused asylum, following careful discussion and planning with public health agencies and local authorities. They committed to continued engagement with stakeholders.
Read full response →
Home Office
53
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
We urge the Home Office to set out a full, public, Covid-19 strategy which addresses the key concerns outlined in this chapter in relation to asylum accommodation and immigration detention. The strategy should cover further periods of local or national lockdowns and the period afterwards and should be published on …
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We urge the Home Office to set out a full, public, Covid-19 strategy which addresses the key concerns outlined in this chapter in relation to asylum accommodation and immigration detention. The strategy should cover further periods of local or national lockdowns and the period afterwards and should be published on the Government website. The strategy must recognise the need to ensure individuals’ access to clear and timely information about any changes to the Government’s current temporary measures. It should also ensure that support organisations, local authorities and statutory bodies which formally contribute to individuals’ support are appropriately resourced for these responsibilities.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation for a single, consolidated COVID-19 strategy for asylum accommodation and immigration detention, stating it does not believe a combined approach is appropriate or helpful.
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Home Office
54
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Not Addressed
As part of this Covid-19 strategy, the Home Office should publish the Public Health England guidance that it has taken to inform its decisions about ending the current 62 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation measures to support asylum seekers. The Home Office should also confirm how it …
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As part of this Covid-19 strategy, the Home Office should publish the Public Health England guidance that it has taken to inform its decisions about ending the current 62 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation measures to support asylum seekers. The Home Office should also confirm how it has adhered to the relevant Public Sector Equality Duty requirements in taking these decisions.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the premise of a single COVID-19 strategy across different institutional settings and refers to general availability of PHE guidance. It does not commit to publishing the *specific* guidance that informed its decisions for asylum seekers or provide detailed confirmation of PSED adherence …
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Home Office
55
Recommendation
Fourth Report: Home Office preparednes…
Rejected
The Home Office should conduct a full review of its management of Covid-19 impacts on asylum accommodation and immigration detention in conjunction with its providers and other government departments. It should evaluate the impact of the temporary measures put in place and incorporate this learning into the development of future …
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The Home Office should conduct a full review of its management of Covid-19 impacts on asylum accommodation and immigration detention in conjunction with its providers and other government departments. It should evaluate the impact of the temporary measures put in place and incorporate this learning into the development of future process and policy interventions before the end of 2020. This will be an important safeguard in the event of further outbreaks. (Paragraph 208) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 63
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects conducting a consolidated review of its COVID-19 management across both asylum accommodation and immigration detention, stating it is not helpful to compare them. They instead refer to ongoing daily management and review of temporary measures and published guidance by UKVI and IE.
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Home Office
1
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that the Government had to respond swiftly in circumstances of great uncertainty. We also recognise and are grateful for the hard work of all those responding to the crisis to ensure safety at the border at …
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In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that the Government had to respond swiftly in circumstances of great uncertainty. We also recognise and are grateful for the hard work of all those responding to the crisis to ensure safety at the border at a time of considerable pressure, from Border Force staff to Government officials and scientific advisers. We recognise too that border measures in isolation are not effective in controlling the virus and must be considered alongside a suite of other measures such as social distancing and lockdowns. However, as one witness told us, all measures are “additive” and the relative absence of firm border measures in the UK earlier during the pandemic is notable.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
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Home Office
2
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on the trajectory of the pandemic, almost every country in the world including the UK has used border measures at some point to try to control or manage the spread of the virus. As well as …
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While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on the trajectory of the pandemic, almost every country in the world including the UK has used border measures at some point to try to control or manage the spread of the virus. As well as important public health consequences of those decisions, there are also significant economic consequences. For that reason, we have looked not only at the decisions that were taken and their consequences but also the reasons behind them and the lessons that should be learned. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, and as patterns of infection in different countries keep changing, governments across the world are likely to keep drawing upon border measures to help control the spread of the virus. We want to be assured that everything possible is being done here in the UK to ensure that the most effective measures are put in place at the right stage. (Paragraph 5) Government decisions on the border up to and during lockdown
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
3
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a fast-moving virus in circumstances where information was changing constantly and decisions about borders had to be made at pace. Inevitably those decisions were difficult, and some will look different in hindsight. However, scrutiny is important …
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The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a fast-moving virus in circumstances where information was changing constantly and decisions about borders had to be made at pace. Inevitably those decisions were difficult, and some will look different in hindsight. However, scrutiny is important to ensure lessons are learned. As COVID-19 has not gone away, many of these challenges could recur.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
4
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early March corresponded to the practice in other countries during this time and reflects the great uncertainty with which governments were grappling. It was right to adjust and extend self-isolation provisions as the virus became established, …
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The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early March corresponded to the practice in other countries during this time and reflects the great uncertainty with which governments were grappling. It was right to adjust and extend self-isolation provisions as the virus became established, starting with Wuhan and China, but also extending provisions to cover places like Italy as the virus spread. Many other European countries were beginning to be affected by coronavirus in the same way, and many took a similar incremental approach as the UK. Evidence shows that the number of cases of direct transmission from China into the UK was extremely small, and that the number of cases from Italy started to fall after 25 February when border measures were 74 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders introduced. However, it is impossible to distinguish between the impact of border measures and other factors such as lockdowns in Wuhan and Italy or falling overall passenger numbers which may have had a much bigger effect.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, defending its past decisions regarding border measures in March. They state that isolation guidance was superseded, decisions were science-led, and that imported cases made a marginal impact when domestic transmission was high, while maintaining open borders was crucial.
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Home Office
5
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other European countries in early March were not sufficient to contain the cross-border spread of the virus. Had stronger early measures been taken—such as requiring legally-enforceable quarantine for arrivals—it is likely that the spread of the …
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It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other European countries in early March were not sufficient to contain the cross-border spread of the virus. Had stronger early measures been taken—such as requiring legally-enforceable quarantine for arrivals—it is likely that the spread of the virus could have been slowed. The UK Government did not recognise soon enough the increased risk of importations from European countries owing to the greater amount of travel between these countries and the UK, and the speed at which case numbers were increasing. Many of those returning to the UK during that period were British residents, and we agree with the SAGE assessment that border closures would not have been appropriate.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that border measures were insufficient and that they did not recognise the risk from Europe. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national guidance, decisions were science-led, and enhanced monitoring was in place for high-risk areas during the …
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Home Office
6
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate for 14 days (in line with category 1) or, at the very least, to monitor symptoms and call NHS 111 (in line with category 2) was a mistake. With border measures in mind, there should …
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However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate for 14 days (in line with category 1) or, at the very least, to monitor symptoms and call NHS 111 (in line with category 2) was a mistake. With border measures in mind, there should have been particular surveillance focus on the countries that have high levels of travellers into the UK, particularly Spain and France. We are concerned that we have not seen evidence of that happening during the early stages of the crisis, and that, as a result, Spain was not added to the list of countries for self-isolation measures when it should have been. As a result, large numbers of passengers from Spain continued to arrive, including to attend the Atletico Madrid-Liverpool football match, without any requirements being placed upon them.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Read full response →
Home Office
7
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
We are also concerned at the lack of clarity over who was responsible for the continued monitoring and assessment of emerging infection threats from different countries, and for drawing up policy options for Ministers to respond. Any future inquiry into the UK’s handling of COVID-19 should consider not only whether …
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We are also concerned at the lack of clarity over who was responsible for the continued monitoring and assessment of emerging infection threats from different countries, and for drawing up policy options for Ministers to respond. Any future inquiry into the UK’s handling of COVID-19 should consider not only whether the UK Government should have acted more quickly at this time to prevent cases of the virus arriving in the UK and spreading in the community, but also whether the arrangements for monitoring and assessing emerging threats and considering policy options were fit for purpose.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that any future inquiry into the UK's handling of COVID-19 should consider all aspects of the response, including the specific points raised by the committee.
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Home Office
8
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Deferred
We recognise the difficulties faced by the Government in considering temperature checks, screening or testing at the border, and we also recognise the limited UK testing capacity at that time. However, given the success of targeted COVID-19 testing on arrivals demonstrated by South Korea during early March, more should have …
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We recognise the difficulties faced by the Government in considering temperature checks, screening or testing at the border, and we also recognise the limited UK testing capacity at that time. However, given the success of targeted COVID-19 testing on arrivals demonstrated by South Korea during early March, more should have been done to assess the feasibility of such approaches in the UK even if they could not immediately be introduced. The lack of existing testing capacity should not have prevented proper analysis of the options and a strategy to develop and expand testing as part of border measures.
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Government response AI summary
The government explains why it has not endorsed testing at the border to avoid self-isolation, citing efficacy concerns, and states that various screening measures have been considered and discounted. However, it will continue to keep all measures under review and is working to consider future …
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Home Office
9
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of controlling importation from overseas as a method for containing the virus or delaying its spread. The decision by SAGE only to consider measures that could deliver a full month’s delay to the spread of the …
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Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of controlling importation from overseas as a method for containing the virus or delaying its spread. The decision by SAGE only to consider measures that could deliver a full month’s delay to the spread of the virus was a mistake and it is very hard to understand why that approach was taken. Additive measures that Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 75 could have contributed to more effective containment should have been considered, and delays even of a few days alongside the introduction of other domestic measures such as social distancing and lockdown could have had a significant impact on the scale of the outbreak in the UK.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, stating its isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and SAGE advice, including enhanced border monitoring during the contain phase.
Read full response →
Home Office
10
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their strength that could have made a significant contribution and potentially mitigated the scale of domestic restrictions that were later needed. SAGE papers suggest that prioritising delay of spread rather than suppression of cases was influenced …
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Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their strength that could have made a significant contribution and potentially mitigated the scale of domestic restrictions that were later needed. SAGE papers suggest that prioritising delay of spread rather than suppression of cases was influenced by the conclusion that the virus ought to be treated similarly to pandemic influenza, but this has been retrospectively proved wrong.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, maintaining that isolation guidance was replaced by national stay-at-home rules and that its decisions were consistently informed by scientific advice from SAGE during the pandemic.
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Home Office
11
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13 March to 8 June was very different from countries in similar circumstances. This should have raised serious questions within the Government about whether it was taking the correct decisions. We have not seen any evidence …
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We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13 March to 8 June was very different from countries in similar circumstances. This should have raised serious questions within the Government about whether it was taking the correct decisions. We have not seen any evidence that, at the time it was making its own decisions, the UK Government was examining and evaluating the approaches taken by other countries to controlling importations of the virus from abroad.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's concerns about the UK's border approach differing from other countries and their lack of evidence for evaluating those approaches. They reiterate that their decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
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Home Office
12
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from Europe in mid-March than was estimated at the time, when, with the exception of Italy, the focus remained largely on potential importations of the virus from Asia. As evidenced by genomic studies and referenced by …
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It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from Europe in mid-March than was estimated at the time, when, with the exception of Italy, the focus remained largely on potential importations of the virus from Asia. As evidenced by genomic studies and referenced by Sir Patrick Vallance in oral evidence, a large number of instances of the virus—up to 1,356 importation strains and up to 10,000 cases—were imported during the period leading to, and following, the abandonment of special measures for international arrivals on 13 March, even though the overall number of people arriving in the UK was decreasing. Evidence shows it is highly likely that uncontrolled importations of the virus from European countries contributed to the rapid increase in the spread of the virus in mid-March, and the overall scale of the outbreak in the UK.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that uncontrolled importations significantly contributed to the rapid spread of the virus in mid-March. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
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Home Office
13
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during March, and only having time-limited self-isolation measures for arrivals from Italy, therefore had a material effect on the number of cases circulating within the UK. Border measures in the UK were lifted rather than extended …
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Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during March, and only having time-limited self-isolation measures for arrivals from Italy, therefore had a material effect on the number of cases circulating within the UK. Border measures in the UK were lifted rather than extended on 13 March at a time when the number of infections being imported from abroad was still rising. Evidence suggests that thousands of new infections in the UK resulted from cases arriving from Europe in the ten days between this decision and the introduction of lockdown on 23 March. The failure to have any special border measures during this period was a serious mistake that significantly increased both the pace and the scale of the epidemic in the UK, and meant that many more people caught COVID-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, clarifying that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all pandemic decisions were scientifically informed by SAGE advice, including enhanced border monitoring.
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Home Office
14
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not properly known in mid-March, that is not a justification for the lifting of border measures. Evidence of the epidemic escalating, especially in Spain, was already available. Other countries with the same information as the UK …
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Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not properly known in mid-March, that is not a justification for the lifting of border measures. Evidence of the epidemic escalating, especially in Spain, was already available. Other countries with the same information as the UK introduced stronger measures—for example, quarantine or limiting international arrivals so that only residents could 76 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders enter the country—and proved justified in doing so. The UK was extremely unusual in choosing not to introduce measures of this kind; it is evident that this was the wrong approach.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that its approach to border measures in mid-March was wrong. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by science and appropriate for the time.
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Home Office
15
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the scientific advice behind the decision to withdraw special measures for international arrivals on 13 March despite their repeated promises to do so is completely unacceptable. Despite many appeals for this information, the Government has only …
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The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the scientific advice behind the decision to withdraw special measures for international arrivals on 13 March despite their repeated promises to do so is completely unacceptable. Despite many appeals for this information, the Government has only drawn our attention to SAGE advice and analysis on 22 and 23 March, ten days after the decision, and to SAGE papers from 3 and 4 February, nearly six weeks before the decision. Given the rapidly changing circumstances of the epidemic, we do not accept that these SAGE discussions adequately explain or justify decisions made on 13 March.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions regarding March 13th guidance and defends its decision-making as scientifically informed, but does not address the Committee's specific complaint about the repeated failure to provide the requested scientific advice for that decision.
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Home Office
16
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence behind the withdrawal of guidance on 13 March. These appeals have been made to three members of the Cabinet, to one further Minister, and to three of the Home Office’s most senior officials. It is …
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The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence behind the withdrawal of guidance on 13 March. These appeals have been made to three members of the Cabinet, to one further Minister, and to three of the Home Office’s most senior officials. It is unacceptable that the information we requested concerning the decision to withdraw measures for international arrivals on 13 March has not yet been made available to us. The Committee has been reassured time and again that it would receive copies of the advice it had requested. After more than three months of being repeatedly promised this information, it will be difficult for this Committee to accept that there are any grounds why the Government cannot provide it to us; if there were such grounds, it has had ample time and opportunity to explain what these might be. It could at any previous juncture over this period have offered reasons for non-compliance or agreed terms for information to be given privately or with redaction. In such circumstances as these, the Committee could quite reasonably conclude that the advice we have requested simply does not exist.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were scientifically informed. However, it fails to address the Committee's specific complaint about the continued non-provision of evidence for the March 13th decision.
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Home Office
17
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the Committee immediately a full account of the scientific evidence and advice leading to its decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. If this does not exist in written form, the Committee should …
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The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the Committee immediately a full account of the scientific evidence and advice leading to its decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. If this does not exist in written form, the Committee should receive a full account of what considerations were made and a summary of orally tendered advice, including the dates on which it was provided.
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Government response AI summary
The government refutes the committee's assertion that isolation guidance was dropped, explaining it was superseded by national guidance and decisions were based on scientific advice. It implicitly rejects the request to publish specific evidence by explaining its reasoning without committing to provide the requested account.
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Home Office
18
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as other countries were expanding their border measures, is inexplicable. The Committee does not accept the argument that the introduction of voluntary ‘stay at home’ guidance for households with possible coronavirus infection on 13 March was …
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The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as other countries were expanding their border measures, is inexplicable. The Committee does not accept the argument that the introduction of voluntary ‘stay at home’ guidance for households with possible coronavirus infection on 13 March was enough reason to withdraw all guidance for returning travellers or visitors. Advice to stay at home applied only to those households with a suspected case of COVID-19 and was not legally enforceable for another 13 days. The Government stated that its priority in mid-March was buying time for the NHS. Imposing firmer measures on all international arrivals—including travellers from parts of Europe that had never been subject to specific guidance—would have contributed to this to some degree, as part of a cumulative or “additive” approach. Removing measures for international arrivals rather than extending them was the wrong thing to do. (Paragraph 100) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 77
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's claim that lifting guidance for international arrivals on 13 March was inexplicable. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
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Home Office
19
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures in mid-March. Although passenger numbers started to fall, a further one million people were to arrive between 13 March and lockdown on 23 March, and possibly hundreds of thousands more by mid-April. That is likely …
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Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures in mid-March. Although passenger numbers started to fall, a further one million people were to arrive between 13 March and lockdown on 23 March, and possibly hundreds of thousands more by mid-April. That is likely to have included thousands of people with COVID-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that falling arrival numbers did not justify lifting border measures, stating the committee is incorrect. It explains that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by scientific advice and the progression of the …
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Home Office
20
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after 13 March because imported cases made up only 0.5% of total UK infections. That figure was not calculated until 22 March by which time a million more people had arrived and the epidemic had rapidly …
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We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after 13 March because imported cases made up only 0.5% of total UK infections. That figure was not calculated until 22 March by which time a million more people had arrived and the epidemic had rapidly escalated in the UK. It is likely to have been substantially higher at the time when guidance was lifted. We set out further concerns about the Home Office reliance on this measurement from paragraph 108.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that it was incorrect to argue no border measures were needed after 13 March. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by science and appropriate for the given phase of …
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Home Office
21
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting international travel and considered their additive effect. It is understandable that the Government did not consider it practical or effective to simply restrict flights, not least because of large numbers of British residents seeking to …
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The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting international travel and considered their additive effect. It is understandable that the Government did not consider it practical or effective to simply restrict flights, not least because of large numbers of British residents seeking to return home. However, the failure to properly consider the possibility of imposing stricter requirements on those arriving—such as mandatory self-isolation, increased screening, targeted testing or enforceable quarantine—was a serious error. In mid- March, the Government had a limited sense of how many infectious people were arriving in the UK, or where they were arriving from, and had limited means of controlling the onward spread of the virus from such cases. In the circumstances, a precautionary approach aimed at continuing suppression of imported cases of the virus should have included more comprehensive measures for passengers arriving from places which had significant numbers of infections.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by scientific advice and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
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Home Office
22
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’ guidance and lockdown restrictions imposed in mid-March. Indeed, they were exactly the “draconian” measures initially rejected by SAGE, enforceable in law. Justifying the decision to lift measures on 13 March on the basis that, at …
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Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’ guidance and lockdown restrictions imposed in mid-March. Indeed, they were exactly the “draconian” measures initially rejected by SAGE, enforceable in law. Justifying the decision to lift measures on 13 March on the basis that, at that time, measures applying to international arrivals were at parity with ‘stay at home’ guidance issued the same day is not consistent with the Government’s eventual chosen strategy. That later strategy, discussed in the next chapter, places more onerous legal restrictions on arrivals from overseas than have been placed on any other group in the UK, at any point over the course of the pandemic.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion of inconsistency in its border strategy. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded by national guidance on 13 March and that decisions were informed by scientific advice and were appropriate for the phase of the pandemic.
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Home Office
23
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance on 13 March, or on what basis. It is hard to reconcile Professor Aston’s suggestion that advice was provided at the time the decision was made with either his own indication that he was not …
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It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance on 13 March, or on what basis. It is hard to reconcile Professor Aston’s suggestion that advice was provided at the time the decision was made with either his own indication that he was not involved in the decision, or his later emphasis on advice given six weeks prior to the decision, on 3 and 4 February. Urgent clarity is needed on what scientific evidence was considered and advice provided in relation to self-isolation measures in the days preceding the decision of 13 March, given its likely significant impact in the number of cases imported into the UK in mid- March. Despite this, no Cabinet Minister or official whom we have asked has been able to provide any explanation for the process by which, and the basis on which, the decision was made. It is not clear who was responsible for gathering the evidence, formulating policy options or scrutinising and testing the advice. It is not clear 78 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders whether there was a lead department or a lead institution, or which Minister took lead responsibility for the decision. The lack of clarity about the responsibility for decision making in this crucial area is very serious and may well have contributed to mistakes being made.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions about the 13 March decision but fails to address the specific call for urgent clarity on who was responsible for the decision-making process and on what basis. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.
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Home Office
24
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that were produced at any point of the cardinal number of imported cases during March. The Home Office should have requested advice on the estimated number of importations, and the rough proportion of overall arrivals which …
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It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that were produced at any point of the cardinal number of imported cases during March. The Home Office should have requested advice on the estimated number of importations, and the rough proportion of overall arrivals which that estimated figure represented. While the figure of 0.5% of circulating cases resulting from importation is a useful one and indeed may still be reliable as of 15 July, evidence to us demonstrates that these other figures are also crucially important to deciding border policy and should have been made available to Ministers. Nothing the Home Office had told us demonstrates beyond doubt that these other figures were asked for or made available. Having actual estimates of the number of people likely to be affected by any decision is important and can lead to qualitatively different decision- making processes than just relying on figures expressed as small proportions. Estimates should have been available to Ministers throughout March to allow them to make fully informed decisions.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's general assertions but fails to address the specific recommendation that the Home Office should have requested and made available estimates of imported cases during March to inform ministerial decisions. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.
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Home Office
25
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested and to build trust and confidence. We welcome the decision to publish SAGE papers. However, transparency cannot be selective without clear explanation, particularly when the advice relates to policy decisions as important as those concerning …
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In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested and to build trust and confidence. We welcome the decision to publish SAGE papers. However, transparency cannot be selective without clear explanation, particularly when the advice relates to policy decisions as important as those concerning the introduction of border measures, which affects wide swathes of the economy and disrupts millions of peoples’ plans. Where it has not been able to meet the commitment to publish papers within a month of the relevant meeting, the Government should explain clearly why.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that SAGE minutes and papers are now published on www.gov.uk, but it does not address the recommendation to explain clearly why there have been delays in publishing papers within a month of relevant meetings.
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Home Office
26
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted in Part
The Committee shares the concern of the Science and Technology Committee that bodies advising Government, including Public Health England, are also insufficiently transparent about the nature and content of the advice they are providing.
Government response AI summary
The government states that minutes and papers from SAGE meetings are now published on www.gov.uk, partially addressing the concern about transparency of advisory bodies.
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Home Office
27
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from its own Scientific Adviser ahead of the Government’s decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. By the same measure, the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser has been clear that advice from SAGE includes …
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The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from its own Scientific Adviser ahead of the Government’s decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. By the same measure, the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser has been clear that advice from SAGE includes an inherent degree of uncertainty. This is reasonable, particularly in a rapidly evolving situation such as COVID-19. However, we have heard no evidence to suggest that the Home Office requested additional information that could have fed into its border policy, nor that it interrogated the inherent uncertainties around SAGE’s advice or around the limited figures it was given. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that the Department took at face value the advice provided; it should not have done so. (Paragraph 129) The introduction of border quarantine requirements
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by scientific advice and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
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Home Office
28
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
We welcome the Government’ decision to re-introduce border measures. We discuss later what the most appropriate border measures should be. But at a time when Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 79 COVID-19 infections continue to increase across the world and when hotspots of infection continue …
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We welcome the Government’ decision to re-introduce border measures. We discuss later what the most appropriate border measures should be. But at a time when Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 79 COVID-19 infections continue to increase across the world and when hotspots of infection continue to change, all countries are going to need different kinds of border measures to control the spread of the virus for some time to come.
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Government response AI summary
The Government acknowledges the importance of border health measures for protecting public health and controlling imported cases of the virus.
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Home Office
29
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism in June. Having removed country-specific guidance in March when other countries were imposing compulsory quarantine arrangements for arrivals, the Government then found itself increasing restrictions just as other countries were loosening them in June—something which …
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It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism in June. Having removed country-specific guidance in March when other countries were imposing compulsory quarantine arrangements for arrivals, the Government then found itself increasing restrictions just as other countries were loosening them in June—something which was hard to explain, and which appeared inconsistent. This has been exacerbated by the Government’s continued defence of the previous lack of quarantine at the border from March until June rather than acknowledging that, in hindsight, firmer measures should have been in place. Building up credibility requires transparency. The Government should publish the analysis that informed its decision to introduce quarantine measures and explain how it relates to the Government’s wider strategy for overcoming the pandemic.
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Government response AI summary
The government explicitly rejected the committee's assertions, stating that its decisions were consistently informed by scientific advice and SAGE, and detailed past measures without committing to publishing new analysis or explaining its relation to the wider pandemic strategy.
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Home Office
30
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the same time as getting the economy moving, including international travel, in the safest possible way. It will build more support for the difficult balancing judgements it has to take if it is open about the …
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The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the same time as getting the economy moving, including international travel, in the safest possible way. It will build more support for the difficult balancing judgements it has to take if it is open about the evidence behind them.
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not address the committee's call for transparency regarding the evidence behind its decisions to build public support.
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Home Office
31
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
It is very disappointing that Border Force officers did not receive guidance on the implementation of new regulations until less than one working day before they came into force. Without enough time to raise questions and properly to digest the guidance, it is likely that avoidable mistakes were made during …
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It is very disappointing that Border Force officers did not receive guidance on the implementation of new regulations until less than one working day before they came into force. Without enough time to raise questions and properly to digest the guidance, it is likely that avoidable mistakes were made during the first days that the regulations were in force. As the UK begins to exempt countries from the regulations, the task of ascertaining who should and should not quarantine and what information they should provide is further complicated. We ask the Government to ensure that any changes to guidance are provided to Border Force officials as early as possible before they come into operation.
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Government response AI summary
The government states that Border Force already provided a comprehensive readiness programme and training to staff in advance of implementation, and that staff guidance is continually reviewed and updated routinely ahead of changes taking effect.
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Home Office
32
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
We welcome the Government’s attempt to develop an approach to travel corridors which recognises the different prevalence of the virus in different countries and regions. It is clearly sensible to be able to treat travellers from New Zealand, where there have been 52 new cases since 8 June, differently from …
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We welcome the Government’s attempt to develop an approach to travel corridors which recognises the different prevalence of the virus in different countries and regions. It is clearly sensible to be able to treat travellers from New Zealand, where there have been 52 new cases since 8 June, differently from travellers from the USA or Brazil where infections continue to soar. Given that we will need to be able to manage the changing risk of COVID-19 from different countries for some time to come, setting up a sustainable and agile framework that can be adapted quickly is extremely important.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated it keeps its methodology and border measures under regular review, informed by public health information, and has created a Global Travel Taskforce to enable the safe and sustainable recovery of international travel.
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Home Office
33
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
However, we also note the warnings from public health experts in countries like New Zealand and Singapore that are continuing to take a much more restrictive approach to international travel, and who advised against mass-market travel in Europe this summer. We consider in the next section the reintroduction of quarantine …
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However, we also note the warnings from public health experts in countries like New Zealand and Singapore that are continuing to take a much more restrictive approach to international travel, and who advised against mass-market travel in Europe this summer. We consider in the next section the reintroduction of quarantine for Spain and the criteria for exempting countries. However the travel corridor list is constituted, it is clear that Government must have a system in place for robust surveillance and assessment of any increasing risk in countries where 80 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders travel corridors have been agreed so that they can be swiftly suspended if necessary to prevent the virus spreading again, and to prevent deeply damaging consequences for both public health and the economy.
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Government response AI summary
The Government agrees swift action is needed and states it already uses the Joint Biosecurity Centre, working with PHE, to assess risks and inform ministerial decisions for travel corridor exemptions, promising to continue this review.
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Home Office
34
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
We welcome the Government’s commitment regularly to review its border quarantine regulations. The move to weekly and daily reviews of travel corridors is welcome as three-weekly reviews were not sufficiently frequent. Far more frequent review appropriately reflects the agility required to prevent a rise in importations. We recommend that the …
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We welcome the Government’s commitment regularly to review its border quarantine regulations. The move to weekly and daily reviews of travel corridors is welcome as three-weekly reviews were not sufficiently frequent. Far more frequent review appropriately reflects the agility required to prevent a rise in importations. We recommend that the Government publish the methodology and findings of its reviews by means of a statement to the House, and on gov.uk when the House is not sitting. Given the likely increase in travel during the summer holidays, public health surveillance is particularly important for those countries where passenger numbers are highest. The Government should therefore make clear in its statements what criteria it is applying to assess possible risks, the relative weighting of those criteria, and on what basis changes to travel corridors are made.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for increased transparency in the Travel Corridor process and states it is working with other departments and devolved administrations to consider options for this.
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Home Office
35
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
Given the surge in confirmed COVID-19 cases in mainland Spain and the clear and rising risk of increasing numbers of people returning to the UK with COVID-19, a precautionary approach including quarantine for returning travellers is the right one. As we have set out in Chapter 1, the consequences of …
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Given the surge in confirmed COVID-19 cases in mainland Spain and the clear and rising risk of increasing numbers of people returning to the UK with COVID-19, a precautionary approach including quarantine for returning travellers is the right one. As we have set out in Chapter 1, the consequences of not introducing quarantine for Spain and then France in February and March were very serious for public health and, as a result, the economy. It is important and welcome that the Government has learned from what happened earlier in the crisis and is responding now to prevent imported cases rising.
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed on the need for swift action due to COVID-19 risk, detailing how it acts quickly to adjust travel corridor exemptions based on Joint Biosecurity Centre assessments of public health risks.
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Home Office
36
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in Spain following the FCO and DfT guidance in the expectation that they would be able to return to work, caring responsibilities, medical appointments and family events on their return, which will now be impossible. Many …
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However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in Spain following the FCO and DfT guidance in the expectation that they would be able to return to work, caring responsibilities, medical appointments and family events on their return, which will now be impossible. Many will face significant financial difficulties as a result of losing pay. Such sudden changes in policy make it even more difficult for businesses in the travel industry which are already under huge pressure. Given the continued risk from COVID-19 and the pace at which it can spread, travel corridors can only work as part of a plan to control the virus if they can also be lifted swiftly based on data when cases rise. However, the Government needs to be much more sensitive to the serious consequences for families and businesses of changing policy with no warning in this way. There should be significant changes to the way such decisions are handled and communicated.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated it agrees swift action is needed for COVID-19 risk and detailed its process for adjusting travel corridor exemptions based on Joint Biosecurity Centre assessments, but did not address the recommendation for greater sensitivity or changes in communication regarding the impact of sudden …
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Home Office
37
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”. However, stronger warnings should have been given at the time the travel corridors were first introduced in early July. The Government’s mixed messages at that time were regrettable. In the case of Spain, it appears from the First …
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The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”. However, stronger warnings should have been given at the time the travel corridors were first introduced in early July. The Government’s mixed messages at that time were regrettable. In the case of Spain, it appears from the First Minister of Scotland’s statements that the Joint Biosecurity Centre had already concluded that prevalence rates there were significant higher than in the UK at the time when the travel corridor was established—but that information has not been published. It should have been, both so that individual travellers could be aware of the risks and so that the decision to include Spain at all could be scrutinised. The Government should publish these prevalence rates now and explain why Spain was included on the travel corridors list. (Paragraph 194) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 81
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Government response AI summary
The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, and explains its swift action to remove/reinstate countries. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific prevalence rates or provide a detailed explanation for why Spain …
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Home Office
38
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
The disruption to travel plans and surprise caused by removing Spain from the travel corridor list demonstrates how essential it is that surveillance data is shared with the public openly and frequently. Potential travellers must be presented with the risks of travelling, even to countries on the travel corridor list, …
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The disruption to travel plans and surprise caused by removing Spain from the travel corridor list demonstrates how essential it is that surveillance data is shared with the public openly and frequently. Potential travellers must be presented with the risks of travelling, even to countries on the travel corridor list, while the pandemic is ongoing and the guidance is liable to change at short notice. We urge the Government to publish the details of its traffic light system to distinguish between high-risk (red), medium-risk (amber) and low-risk (green) countries, and how different countries are currently categorised on that system, so potential travellers can assess the level of risk attached to their chosen travel destinations, and to whether quarantine rules might change.
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Government response AI summary
The government details the criteria used for risk assessment, including viral incidence, transmission status, and testing capacity, and states that current travel corridor information is available on gov.uk. It does not commit to publishing a specific 'traffic light system' or its categorisations.
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Home Office
39
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Deferred
Greater clarity would also be helpful on the Government’s overall objectives for its border measures and travel corridors as part of their wider strategy against COVID-19, including how it is balancing public health and economic considerations. We heard significant warnings from public health experts in Singapore and Hong Kong that …
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Greater clarity would also be helpful on the Government’s overall objectives for its border measures and travel corridors as part of their wider strategy against COVID-19, including how it is balancing public health and economic considerations. We heard significant warnings from public health experts in Singapore and Hong Kong that Europe’s attempt to restart mass market travel and cross border tourism this summer was a mistake and would make it harder to suppress the virus or as a result return to near normal in other sections of the economy. The Government should therefore explain its strategy, including its different objectives on suppressing the virus and opening up the economy, and how it believes its border measures and the current expected level of cross border travel contribute to those objectives.
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Government response AI summary
The government explains the evolving scientific advice behind its past border measure decisions to balance public health and economic considerations. It states that a Global Travel Taskforce was created to consider future steps and will report in early November.
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Home Office
40
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the management of the pandemic, establishing clear responsibility for regular surveillance of travel risks from different countries and publishing clear and transparent analysis, including of international prevalence rates. It should also be responsible for assessing the …
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The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the management of the pandemic, establishing clear responsibility for regular surveillance of travel risks from different countries and publishing clear and transparent analysis, including of international prevalence rates. It should also be responsible for assessing the combined public health impact of all the border measures including assessments of the number of people likely to be arriving with COVID-19. However there has so far been a concerning lack of transparency about the analysis produced by the Joint Biosecurity Centre as even basic assessments of prevalence rates have not been published.
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Government response AI summary
The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's role and methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, but it does not address the committee's concern about the lack of transparency regarding JBC analysis or commit to publishing prevalence rates.
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Home Office
41
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Rejected
The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of the numbers of people who have come into the UK carrying COVID-19 does not inspire us with confidence about its ability to assess the scale of the risk from likely infectious people coming into the …
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The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of the numbers of people who have come into the UK carrying COVID-19 does not inspire us with confidence about its ability to assess the scale of the risk from likely infectious people coming into the country in the future.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
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Home Office
42
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
We are concerned that Ministers do not seem to have access to information about prevalence rates internationally, and there is confusion about what information is held by the Department for Health and Social Care, as well as the interaction between different agencies including Public Health England, NHS Test and Trace …
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We are concerned that Ministers do not seem to have access to information about prevalence rates internationally, and there is confusion about what information is held by the Department for Health and Social Care, as well as the interaction between different agencies including Public Health England, NHS Test and Trace and the Joint Biosecurity Centre and SAGE. We urge the Department to clarify responsibilities and establish a process for greater transparency from this point on. We urge the Department to clarify responsibilities and establish a process for greater transparency from this point on.
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Government response AI summary
The government explains that lead responsibility for border measures has transferred from the Home Office to the Department for Transport, with public health monitoring primarily handled by DHSC. It emphasizes ongoing intensive cross-government collaboration but does not commit to clarifying overall departmental responsibilities or establishing …
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Home Office
43
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public health crises. That is why the Government must now ensure that the analysis behind the introduction of quarantine rules and the introduction of travel corridors is all 82 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management …
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As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public health crises. That is why the Government must now ensure that the analysis behind the introduction of quarantine rules and the introduction of travel corridors is all 82 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders published—including JBC assessments of the prevalence of COVID-19 in different countries, and the Government’s overall estimates of the number and proportion of people arriving in the UK who are likely to have COVID-19.
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Government response AI summary
The government describes the methodology used by the Joint Biosecurity Centre for assessing risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, noting a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific analysis, JBC assessments of prevalence rates, or government …
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Home Office
44
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
It is not clear exactly which Government department or agency is ultimately responsible for coordinating border policy. Evidence from the Home Secretary suggested important roles for the Department of Health and Social Care, Public Health England and the Department for Transport as well as the Home Office and Border Force. …
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It is not clear exactly which Government department or agency is ultimately responsible for coordinating border policy. Evidence from the Home Secretary suggested important roles for the Department of Health and Social Care, Public Health England and the Department for Transport as well as the Home Office and Border Force. Given that the Home Secretary announced the border quarantine policy it was surprising to discover that she did not expect to be involved in the decisions on travel corridors and that the Home Office wasn’t briefed on prevalence rates for different countries. While it is appropriate that all Departments carry out work within their remit, good coordination and some overall leadership is required for border policies to work coherently. Otherwise, there is the potential for confused policy-making and contradiction between Government departments, like that shown by the inconsistency between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for Transport on travel advice. This would likely reduce public confidence in the measures as they are introduced, and as they vary. We note that the COVID-19 Operations committee appears to be taking the decisions on border policy and we welcome a cross-Government process to coordinate different departments and ensure that decisions are consistent, and evidence based. However, it still resulted in different advice emerging from the FCO and DfT, and it remains unclear which Department retains lead responsibility for border policy. One accountable Department should be clearly charged with lead responsibility. We believe that should either be the Cabinet Office or, as the Department with overall responsibility for border operations, the Home Office.
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Government response AI summary
The Government states that lead responsibility for the international travel programme has transferred from the Home Office to the Department for Transport, with the Secretary of State for Transport now responsible for signing regulations, while collaborative efforts across departments continue.
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Home Office
45
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
It is concerning that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Transport have issued contrasting advice to the public on more than one occasion, at a time when providing clarity about the new travel corridors and nurturing confidence in them is of great importance. The Government must ensure …
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It is concerning that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Transport have issued contrasting advice to the public on more than one occasion, at a time when providing clarity about the new travel corridors and nurturing confidence in them is of great importance. The Government must ensure that its communications are consistent and accurate across all departments. We recommend that one department leads on communications in this matter, and works constructively with other departments and associated bodies, such as public health authorities, to make sure all appropriate guidance and advice is clearly reflected. The Government must review differences between Foreign and Commonwealth Office travel advice and Department for Transport air corridor countries as an urgent priority, with a view to reconciling discrepancies. Where those departments are not able to agree, the Gov.uk website should clearly explain why this is the case in order to allow would-be travellers to make informed decisions before using travel corridors.
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Government response AI summary
The Government agrees on the importance of clear communication and states that gov.uk serves as the single source for policy and operational changes, with content linked from a central page to ensure clarity and consistency for users.
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Home Office
46
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the UK over which travel corridors should be implemented. While we respect that matters of public health are devolved, we encourage the UK and devolved governments to work more closely together to ensure there is a …
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We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the UK over which travel corridors should be implemented. While we respect that matters of public health are devolved, we encourage the UK and devolved governments to work more closely together to ensure there is a single, four-nations approach to measures at our border. Disjointedness risks deepening damage to the aviation industry and inhibiting public confidence. It is, however, notable that the Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 83 First Minister of Scotland has quoted figures from the Joint Biosecurity Centre, to explain the decisions her Government had made to extend, or refuse, travel corridors. The UK Government should do the same.
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed on the importance of clear communication and outlined how it ensures gov.uk is the single source for policy changes, but did not address the recommendation for a single four-nations approach to border measures or publishing Joint Biosecurity Centre figures.
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Home Office
47
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
The Government’s estimate of compliance with its enforcement regime for border quarantine is unconvincing. That the estimate is so high should be grounds for healthy cynicism and interrogation. A better method for estimating the true compliance rate is required, based on routine publication of the following figures: • the number …
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The Government’s estimate of compliance with its enforcement regime for border quarantine is unconvincing. That the estimate is so high should be grounds for healthy cynicism and interrogation. A better method for estimating the true compliance rate is required, based on routine publication of the following figures: • the number of people required to quarantine under the regulations; • the number of spot checks carried out on arrivals at the border; • the number of spot checks carried out by Public Health England on those quarantining; • the number of referrals from Public Health England to the Police; • the number of visits undertaken by police to quarantining individuals; and • the number of enforcement actions ultimately taken. This will allow oversight of the entire process. These data should be published fortnightly, to mirror the work undertaken by the National Police Chiefs’ Council to publish fortnightly totals of the number of Fixed-Penalty Notices issued under lockdown Regulations.
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Government response AI summary
The government claims high compliance and describes its existing enforcement mechanisms, including Border Force checks, PHE's Isolation Assurance Service, and police referrals. It notes that "data in relation to Border Health measures" was published once on gov.uk, but does not commit to the routine fortnightly …
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Home Office
48
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is limited. The suddenness and lack of transparency behind the decisions about Spain may have consequences for enforcement if travellers remain sceptical about the policy or face financial pressures as a result of not being able …
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Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is limited. The suddenness and lack of transparency behind the decisions about Spain may have consequences for enforcement if travellers remain sceptical about the policy or face financial pressures as a result of not being able to return to work as planned. It is important for Government to build confidence in the decisions it has taken and the justification for them, and also to make sure that people can afford to comply.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the need for swift action and explains its methodology for determining travel corridors and the decision regarding Spain, acknowledging the impact on travellers. However, it does not outline specific plans to build confidence in its decisions or ensure that people can …
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Home Office
49
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Deferred
Border quarantine restrictions are likely to remain in place for some time, particularly if there is now emerging agreement that cases of COVID-19 could increase in the winter months. The UK’s approach to its borders will have to become more flexible in order to respond rapidly to the contours of …
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Border quarantine restrictions are likely to remain in place for some time, particularly if there is now emerging agreement that cases of COVID-19 could increase in the winter months. The UK’s approach to its borders will have to become more flexible in order to respond rapidly to the contours of the pandemic. We recommend that the Home Office, in coordination with the Department for Transport and Department for Health and Social Care, investigates urgently the viability of introducing widespread and targeted tests at the border, as in Iceland, Hong Kong or South Korea. Now that testing capacity in the UK has increased, the Government should be ready to learn from other countries and should examine what role testing or screening could play, including the ability to target particular flight routes. We agree with the Government that a testing and tracing system alone is not currently enough to address the importation risk from overseas travel, especially from high-prevalence countries like Brazil and the USA. However, the Government should look at international examples and develop testing further. It should assess what role testing could play alongside quarantine and travel corridor measures. This could require close coordination with airports and others to access flight and route-specific information over and above what is readily available. (Paragraph 227) 84 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders
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Government response AI summary
The government has not endorsed widespread border testing due to concerns about false negatives and discounted other screening methods. However, it states that all measures remain under review and the Global Travel Taskforce is considering whether testing could form part of future border health measures, …
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Home Office
50
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
As passenger numbers rise and interactions between Border Force officers and arrivals increase, it is crucial that there are no lapses in PPE availability for officers on the frontline who have worked admirably in difficult conditions for several months. The Government owes it to hard-working officers to ensure that they …
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As passenger numbers rise and interactions between Border Force officers and arrivals increase, it is crucial that there are no lapses in PPE availability for officers on the frontline who have worked admirably in difficult conditions for several months. The Government owes it to hard-working officers to ensure that they are protected and feel safe so they can continue in their duties. As part of each review of border quarantine measures, Border Force and the Home Office should conduct a reappraisal of the appropriate level of PPE that should be provided for Border Force officials, and a nationwide assessment of stock levels to ensure that staff have everything they need.
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Government response AI summary
The Government states that Border Force and the Home Office already regularly reappraise PPE requirements and maintain good stock levels, and will continue these efforts to protect officers.
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Home Office
51
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Accepted
Concerns about provision of PPE to key workers have been a recurring theme during the COVID-19 pandemic. We understand that Border Force’s provision of PPE to its staff has been based on PHE and WHO advice. However, Border Force officials must be able to feel safe while carrying out their …
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Concerns about provision of PPE to key workers have been a recurring theme during the COVID-19 pandemic. We understand that Border Force’s provision of PPE to its staff has been based on PHE and WHO advice. However, Border Force officials must be able to feel safe while carrying out their vital work in particularly difficult conditions. This should include wearing masks where staff feel safer doing so.
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has successfully ensured sufficient PPE supply, installed protective screens, and will continue to work with partners and regularly reappraise PPE requirements for Border Force officers, implying existing measures address staff safety concerns.
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Home Office
52
Conclusion
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Not Addressed
Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising number of infections toward and during winter, it is likely that some form of border quarantine mechanism will be required for the foreseeable future to avoid the possibility that imported cases and strains could compound …
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Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising number of infections toward and during winter, it is likely that some form of border quarantine mechanism will be required for the foreseeable future to avoid the possibility that imported cases and strains could compound these challenges. Professor Teo Yik-Ying predicted that Singapore would maintain border restrictions at least until 2021.
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not engage with the committee's conclusion that some form of border quarantine mechanism would likely be required for the foreseeable future.
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Home Office
53
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Acknowledged
Implementing border quarantine measures over any time frame is indeed disruptive. However if applied swiftly, relaxed appropriately, and justified properly using the full range of scientific evidence available, evidence from other countries demonstrates that they are an effective tool to assist in keeping COVID-19 from spreading into countries with a …
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Implementing border quarantine measures over any time frame is indeed disruptive. However if applied swiftly, relaxed appropriately, and justified properly using the full range of scientific evidence available, evidence from other countries demonstrates that they are an effective tool to assist in keeping COVID-19 from spreading into countries with a relatively low level of infection. We have concluded that the UK’s experience of COVID-19 has been far worse as a result of the Government’s decision not to require quarantine and thus reduce the number of imported strains during March.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that health measures at the border protect public health and control imported cases, describing how it reviews its approach and is establishing a Global Travel Taskforce to consider the safe and sustainable recovery of international travel.
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Home Office
54
Recommendation
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness …
Deferred
Keeping measures in place while closely monitoring travel corridors and other exceptions will be important to ensure that the UK does not reimport unmanageable levels of COVID-19. This is particularly important when there is doubt about the affordability—both economically, and in terms of goodwill—of a second national lockdown, and when …
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Keeping measures in place while closely monitoring travel corridors and other exceptions will be important to ensure that the UK does not reimport unmanageable levels of COVID-19. This is particularly important when there is doubt about the affordability—both economically, and in terms of goodwill—of a second national lockdown, and when seasonal pressures on the NHS begin to build over the autumn and into the winter months. In a situation as fast-moving as the COVID-19 pandemic, any delay in controlling new infections can have profound consequences; it is therefore of paramount importance that the Government reviews its border measures weekly and is able to respond quickly to changing patterns of infection, including by introducing further restrictions if needed. We do not take lightly the potential burden on individuals and the economy from closing borders and requiring quarantine, as well as the potential damage to the economy and to public health if the virus takes hold again; we also recognise that it can only be one strand in a wider, larger strategy of disease control. However, border health measures must form crucial part of any Government strategy to obtain and maintain control of the virus over the months to come. (Paragraph 236) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 85
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Government response AI summary
The government states it keeps its border measures under regular review, informed by public health information, and has created a Global Travel Taskforce on 7 October to consider the safe and sustainable recovery of international travel, with a report due in early November.
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Home Office