Home Office preparedness for Covid-19 (Coronavirus)

The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented situation that poses an urgent threat to public health and safety, and has put the police in the position of dealing with challenges they have never faced before, which they are having to navigate with sensitivity and diligence. We thank the police for the vital work they are doing to counter the spread of the pandemic while continuing to protect our communities from crime and safeguard the most vulnerable in society. They will continue to have our strong support in their work to protect the NHS and save lives. (Paragraph 3) Enforcement of the new Coronavirus restrictions

The vast majority of the public are following Government advice and complying with the new Regulations, and the police are adapting quickly and effectively to challenges in upholding the new law. Adherence to the regulations is principally the responsibility of the public across the country, and we agree that police measures to restrict movement and gatherings will only succeed if the principle of policing by consent is upheld. We welcome the strategy to engage, explain and encourage before considering enforcement, and the determination on the part of the police to uphold the tradition of policing by consent.

Given the pace at which the new regulations had to be implemented, it is not surprising that there have been some early problems and errors and we welcome the additional guidance that the police have published because it is important that these do not endure.

We welcome the swift clarifications and apologies from forces on social media about cases where the police have got things wrong. Forces need to ensure that there are proper checks in place to ensure errors that are not captured on social media are also corrected. The early evidence and figures shared with us from some forces suggest that the overall police response has been proportionate. Some of the challenges for the police have arisen due to the divergence between the regulations and the different statements from Government. The Department for Health and Social Care and the Home Office need to ensure that where there is divergence between regulations and messages coming from central Government (for example over shopping for non- essential goods) they continue to provide swift clarity for the public as well as the police; otherwise the police will be left in a difficult position.

It is vital that all forces and all officers understand the distinction between Government advice and legal requirement, and that the tone and tactics they use are appropriate to each. Failing to do so depletes public trust. We will continue to monitor the actions of forces to ensure that a bond of trust is maintained between the police and the public.

We recommend that the NPCC and the College of Policing collate and publish figures for use of new enforcement measures by all UK forces on a weekly basis and monitor where there is significant divergence between forces in the use of enforcement Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (Coronavirus)) Policing 15 measures. The NPCC and the College of Policing should review their guidance at least monthly, and inform the Committee in writing of any changes they plan to make.

Parks and green spaces provide benefits to the health and wellbeing of all members of the public and especially those who do not have access to outdoor space where they live. For families with children and many others, being prevented from using local parks can make it much harder to cope with lockdown. Where people are deliberately flouting the social distancing regulations when using parks, they are making it much harder for others who are adhering to the rules. In those circumstances, intervention by the police is very important. In some cases, local authorities and the police had taken the decision to close parks without having first tried enforcement measures or alternative access arrangements. Especially in urban areas where there are few alternative green spaces, we urge police forces and local authorities to work in partnership, and first consider whether proper enforcement action against those who are breaching the rules would allow parks and green spaces to be kept open for everyone else instead. (Paragraph 24) The nature of crime and police demand during lockdown

Scrutinising how police and Government safeguard against any increased domestic abuse risk is a priority for the Committee. It is worrying that charities and police forces are reporting an increase in calls as victims face periods of confinement with their abusers. We have therefore issued a further call for evidence on these concerns, with a view to producing a further short, specific report. We encourage anybody with concerns about the wellbeing of themselves or others to contact the services listed in that call for evidence. Individuals at risk of immediate violence or abuse should always call 999 and take steps to protect themselves or their families from violence, including if necessary leaving the home and seeking refuge and support.

We encourage the public to remain vigilant, and to stop and think twice before giving any money or personal details away over the phone or in person.

Previous Home Affairs Committee reports have set out strong concerns about the weaknesses and inadequacies of Action Fraud and policing arrangements to tackle online crime and fraud. Rising online fraud as a result of COVID-19 is likely to expose those weaknesses further. We urge the Home Office, National Crime Agency and NPCC to set out what action they are taking to address COVID-19 related online fraud in the short term. We believe it is imperative that the Home Office takes seriously the Committee’s previous recommendations and overhauls and modernises action against online fraud as we emerge from this crisis.

We welcome the commitment from forces to support mental health. It is important that police officers get the support they need both to respond to mental health cases and look after their own mental health during this crisis. Police forces must have the resources to be able adequately to support officers who have had to deal with traumatic incidents, including the aftermath of suicide, and attending deaths suspected as resulting from COVID-19. (Paragraph 34) 16 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (Coronavirus)) Policing

The Committee believes that, in times of national emergency only, chief constables should not have to rely on the goodwill of employers alone to make increased use of their trained special constables, should they need to do so. The Committee therefore recommends that the Home Office immediately addresses the discrepancy in Schedule 7 of the Coronavirus Act 2020, which does not list special constables amongst the types of volunteers employers are compelled to release on full paid leave should they be needed to report for duty by their chief constable. (Paragraph 35) Relationship with the criminal justice system

Effective law enforcement is a multipartite process. The courts have a crucial role to play in ensuring that crimes committed during the pandemic are dealt with in an appropriate time frame and a professional manner. It is therefore concerning that workers supporting the criminal justice system have not been afforded key worker status. We recommend that Government review which workers in the criminal justice system have not been afforded key worker status, and consider extending the status to them. They should write to us to inform us of the outcome, and explain the rationale for any decision not to extend the status to workers in the system. (Paragraph 37) Provision of COOVDD19 tests to police officers

We support the Government’s decision to prioritise NHS and social care staff for COVID-19 antigen testing. Once testing capacity has been suitably scaled up, however, police officers must be an early priority. This will increase the availability of officers, and therefore the amount of support they are able to provide to the public. The Home Office should write to us to clarify the plans and timetable for the testing regime to be put in place for police officers. The letter should tell us: when tests will start becoming available to officers; whether the Government’s 100,000 target by the end of April includes any tests for police officers; how it will ensure that police are being given accurate information about tests; and if certain police roles or forces will be prioritised for testing, and the reasons why. The Home Office should also explain if police forces will be required to purchase their own tests or if tests will be provided to them from central government once they become available. (Paragraph 39) Personal Protective Equipment

Officers must be given certainty that the guidance issued to them about the appropriate use of PPE is clear, consistent and comprehensive. Clarity and consistency are harder to achieve when authorities issue multiple versions of guidance in a short space of time, and when organisations then issue their own. These actions could increase the possibility that officers are following incorrect guidance. The NPCC must immediately work with Public Health England, the Health and Safety Executive and any other appropriate bodies including the Police Federation to address any confusion resulting from inconsistencies in guidance issued to officers. Thereafter, they should provide a copy of the guidance to us, indicating any changes that were required. In addition, the NPCC should write to us explaining why the advice was issued three times in five days. The Home Office should also explain to the Committee in writing: what conversations have taken place between the department and the Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (Coronavirus)) Policing 17 NPCC in relation to PPE advice; what role it has played in ensuring that the advice is accurate; how it will assure the Committee that any confusion will be resolved as a matter of urgency; and its plans to ensure that supply of PPE will meet the required levels.

Individuals who use COVID-19 to threaten police officers—including through coughing or spitting at officers—must be prosecuted swiftly for the crime. Spit guards are an important tool with which to protect officers and must be made readily available to forces where chief constables require them. We ask all forces to write to us explaining their policy for providing spit guards to frontline officers during the COVID-19 outbreak. All use of spit guards must of course be in line with existing safeguards and guidance.

Providing appropriate PPE to all officers who need it is of paramount importance to ensure an effective policing response to COVID-19 that does not put officers at risk. While we are pleased that the forces who spoke to us have enough PPE for now, we are concerned about gaps and inconsistencies in supplies. The Home Office and NPCC need to ensure there is a secure and robust supply chain for PPE—including building in extra supplies both locally and nationally to ensure forces can cope with surges in demand, and working with the NHS, social care and other sectors to ensure those sectors’ supplies aren’t put at risk. We welcome the action of those businesses which are reported to have shared spare PPE resource with their local forces, and would encourage others to follow this example as part of the national effort. We recommend that, following clarification to NPCC guidance on when PPE should be used, the National Police Coordination Centre send us their prediction of PPE demand among forces over the next month and then beyond, and current anticipated supply to meet that demand. (Paragraph 48) 18 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (Coronavirus)) Policing

We strongly welcome the Government’s public information campaign encouraging people to seek help and making clear that help is available. The Home Secretary’s personal leadership of the information campaign is very welcome and has enhanced its visibility and encouraged police forces and others to run similar campaigns. We encourage the Government to ensure these messages are also integrated into the main Covid-19 information campaigns so that it is made clear to the public that, as the Home Secretary has said, domestic abuse or the risk of abuse constitutes a reasonable excuse to leave home while lockdown measures are in place.

The messages should be communicated widely and inclusively, in multiple languages and formats including easy read and British Sign Language. The campaign should also include a child facing element and we would welcome further awareness-raising elements on child abuse.

The Home Office should consider development of links between helplines and services, to ensure that every victim gets a timely and safe response.

We welcome the Government’s announcement of additional funding for charities which could potentially benefit organisations that provide support services to tackle domestic abuse and child abuse. We strongly support the clear commitment from Martin Hewitt and police forces that responding to domestic abuse is a high priority during the current crisis. The Government, the police and other organisations have all stressed how vital it is to tackle domestic abuse during the Covid-19 crisis and we welcome their recognition of the seriousness and importance of this issue.

Whilst the public information programme is welcome, the Government now needs to go much further and set out a full Covid-19 cross-Government strategy on domestic abuse to cover both the period of lockdown and the period immediately after lockdown, when need for support is also likely to be acute. National leadership and coordination from central Government are important. We agree with the Commissioners that a formal cross-Government working group must be established, tasked with the production and implementation of a co-ordinated cross-Government action plan which is integrated into the wider Government planning through the emergency COBR committee. This group should be led by the Home Secretary and include relevant Ministers across Government as well as the Domestic Abuse, Victims and Children’s Commissioners and should operate in consultation with frontline providers.

The strategy should include steps on ensuring access to information and support; outreach and prevention; funding for support services, including specialist and BAME services; provision of housing and refuge accommodation; and a criminal justice response. This national strategy should be backed up by action plans produced by all local authorities, as part of their emergency Covid-19 planning, to prevent and address domestic abuse during and after the lockdown. (Paragraph 30) 28 Preparedness for Covid-19 (Coronavirus): domestic abuse and risks of harm within the home

While lockdown and strict social distancing measures are in place, new strategies are needed to ensure victims can access forms of urgent help and support that take account of the fact that it might be harder to phone from home, or to talk privately to a GP, friend or neighbour. We welcome the progress which has already been made towards a Safe Spaces model to offer help through pharmacies. The Government should sponsor a scheme enabling victims of abuse to contact support services through supermarkets and other retailers too. We agree with witnesses that it is essential to act creatively, both nationally and locally, to find new ways to offer access to support during lockdown and to share, encourage and spread effective initiatives.

Local authorities, as part of their action plans on domestic abuse, should ensure that local services are pursuing proactive outreach during lockdown, visiting families and households where there have been domestic abuse incidents in the past or where there are vulnerable children.

In circumstances where many victims of abuse may have their access to phones and devices controlled by their abuser, neighbours, employers and friends can also play a vital role by recognising the signs of domestic or child abuse, and raising concerns.

Domestic abuse needs to be a priority for the entire criminal justice system. The police, Crown Prosecution Service and Courts need to work together to ensure that Domestic Violence Protection Order cases are heard swiftly. Local authorities need to ensure that their domestic abuse action plans include provision for alternative temporary accommodation for perpetrators if that is needed to apply DVPOs and keep victims safe.

The Government should ensure that legal aid is granted automatically to domestic abuse victims in respect of any application for protection during the lockdown.

We support the Domestic Abuse Commissioner’s call for the time limit for proceedings on domestic abuse-related summary offences to be extended following the lockdown. The Government should legislate to extend the time limit set by s127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.

Support services for domestic abuse and vulnerable children need urgent and direct funding support: without it, desperate victims will be put at far greater risk of harm. Immediate and targeted assistance is needed to maintain services and to address the wider needs of victims of abuse including refuge, food security, culturally-specific support and services addressing additional needs such as debt, insecure immigration status, mental health needs and drug and alcohol dependency.

The Government should provide an emergency funding package that recognises the needs of, and is accessible to, both generic providers and those small, specialist, targeted services which are best equipped to help individuals from protected, vulnerable or minority groups, and people with additional needs. We would encourage the Government to consider whether the Tampon Tax might contribute to this support in the short term. (Paragraph 53) Preparedness for Covid-19 (Coronavirus): domestic abuse and risks of harm within the home 29

The Government should provide a ring-fenced allocation within the promised £750m fund for charities to cover organisations supporting people at risk of abuse, including children. It should also confirm the arrangements for timely, fair and equitable distribution of this fund. We call on the Government to guarantee that all services will be able to apply for funding, regardless of size and whether or not they have an existing relationship with the Government, a local authority or PCC; that the application process will be simple; and that decisions will be made quickly.

We recommend that priority need for settled accommodation is extended to survivors of domestic abuse.

We welcome the Government’s commitment on 11 April to look at alternative accommodation to support refuges. There is huge pressure on refuges in the meantime and, while referrals are still being accepted, requests for accommodation for women and children at risk of harm are rising. This cannot wait.

The Government must prioritise working with local authorities, providers and other stakeholders to increase the availability of refuge and move-on accommodation. Clear Government leadership should be brought to the task of securing hotel and hostel accommodation for victims in all parts of the country, as national coordination is needed to meet the scale and urgency of the challenge, and so that anyone needing to leave their home during lockdown because of abuse can be guaranteed a safe place to stay. The Government must also ensure that the existing network of refuges remains sustainable for the long term by providing ring-fenced support for the additional costs, and loss of income, incurred by these services as a result of coronavirus.

Government funding for support services and refuge accommodation must include specialist provision and must ensure that BME services can continue and expand to meet any increased need.

It is vital that BME and specialist services get the funding they need at this time, and any individual with No Recourse to Public Funds status should, following referral from a domestic abuse service, be entitled to access state support during the coronavirus crisis, regardless of their immigration status. We will look further at issues relating to NRPF status in our future work.

We agree with the Children’s Commissioner and our other witnesses that children’s direct experience of domestic abuse should be recognised in the definition of domestic abuse in the Domestic Abuse Bill.

Children’s support services need to be maintained during the Covid-19 crisis. We welcome the fact that helplines like Childline and other services such as CAMHS services, are still open for children who need help. They too need to be sustained by direct Government funding where there are shortfalls because of falling charitable donations.

Domestic violence and child abuse remain closely linked. In order to safeguard the most vulnerable children, face to face contact remains the most effective approach. The coronavirus crisis has created new challenges in doing that and therefore we would urge local authorities, schools, police and other professionals involved in child welfare to work collaboratively, to find smarter ways to enable face to face contact to happen 30 Preparedness for Covid-19 (Coronavirus): domestic abuse and risks of harm within the home and to make sure these children remain firmly on their radar. We are concerned about the numbers of vulnerable children who would be eligible for school places who have not taken up places. Contact should be made to assess whether additional support is needed at home and whether vulnerable children not in school are safe at home. Funding, additional staff and PPE should be supplied to these services to facilitate swift progress with home visits. Leadership is also required from Government to continue the development and clarification of guidance for local authorities and social services on contact with families in crisis outside school.

Without strong action to tackle domestic abuse and support victims during the Covid-19 pandemic, society will be dealing with the devastating consequences for a generation. (Paragraph 83) Preparedness for Covid-19 (Coronavirus): domestic abuse and risks of harm within the home 31

We recognise that in the current unprecedented circumstances it is hard to operate a normal immigration system. Travel restrictions have made entering or leaving the country a complex or impossible process; there are difficulties in implementing normal work or income requirements without undermining public health messages; and the impact of the pandemic on workload and staffing levels is also being felt by the Home Office. We place on record our appreciation to Home Office officials and caseworkers who have provided support and guidance to people at this challenging time. In this context, we welcome recent developments that show that the Home Office recognises the need for pragmatic temporary changes to ensure that the UK’s immigration and visa systems can continue to function appropriately. (Paragraph 3) Visa extensions for everyone with temporary status

We welcome the Home Office’s recognition of the problems faced by individuals with soon-to-expire visas and the offer of visa extensions. Granting temporary extensions—initially until 31 May and then to 31 July—has removed one burden at a time of great stress and difficulty for many people. We welcome the commitment by the Home Secretary and senior Home Office officials that nobody will be punished for circumstances beyond their control.

Waiting until the middle of May to extend visas beyond 31 May to 31 July will have caused some people difficulties, however. If it is likely that travel continues to be difficult beyond 31 July because of Covid-19, the Home Office should continue with appropriate targeted or general extensions and must notify people affected in good time.

The Home Office must clarify the legal basis for the offers of visa extensions. Relying on the Home Secretary’s discretion is not sufficient legal assurance for people whose lives in the UK depend on evidential clarity. We recommend that the department introduce a statutory instrument clarifying the legal basis for both the extension of leave for all individuals who are unable to leave the country before the expiry of their current visa, and for the automatic extensions of leave offered to NHS staff.

The Home Office must also clarify the circumstances in which an individual who applies for a visa extension would not be successful in their application.

The department must improve communication about the availability of visa extensions. This arrangement has not been well publicised, and we are concerned that there may be people who risk overstaying (or who have already overstayed) their visa because they are unaware that they may be entitled to an extension. We request that the Home Office is transparent about the scale of the issue by providing us with its estimate of the number of people whose visas have expired or will expire during the time period which would make them eligible for an extension, the numbers who have so far applied for an extension, and the numbers who are thought still to be in the country as unwitting 32 Home Office preparedness for Covidd19 (coronavirus): immigration and visas overstayers. We call on the Home Office to contact all individuals whose visas are due to expire before 31 July 2020 directly, to inform them about what they have to do to extend their visa.

We also request that the Home Office clarify whether an individual who does not apply for a visa extension, and therefore overstays their existing visa because of Covid-19, may retrospectively gain the extension to which they would have been entitled had they known about the department’s offer at an earlier point. We also ask the Home Office to explain what the implications are for individuals who have inadvertently overstayed but who do not apply for the extension, including in particular the impact this might have on future applications to return to the UK.

As indicated in our letter to the Home Secretary of 22 May, we recommend that the Home Office explores the possibility of blanket visa extensions or an alternative automatic process, appropriately underpinned by statute and without any need for an application. This would prevent any unintentional overstaying due to travel restrictions and ease the burden on the Home Office. If the Home Office does not believe this is possible, it should explain why not. (Paragraph 25) Visa arrangements for frontline NHS and care workers

We strongly welcome the Home Secretary’s offer of immediate and automatic indefinite leave to remain to the families of NHS doctors and nurses, and the more recent extension to the families of social care workers and non-medical NHS staff following correspondence with the Committee. It would be wrong to make a family that has just lost a parent, spouse or child to Covid-19 while working to care for others suddenly have to leave their home, their school and this country.

The Government is right to recognise the huge debt we owe to all NHS and social care workers for the work they are doing during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given that they have already contributed so much to the NHS through their valiant and life-saving work, the Government’s announcement that NHS staff and social care employees will be removed from the Immigration Health Surcharge is very welcome. We encourage the Home Secretary and Health and Social Care Secretary to make fulfilment of this commitment an urgent priority. We also believe there is a need to review the appropriateness of the NHS charge, and the rate it is set at more generally.

We also welcome the Government’s offer of free visa extensions to some NHS staff and their families, who might otherwise have to pay thousands of pounds to stay in the UK. As of January 2020, 13.8% of NHS staff report a non-British nationality. They should not have to face the pressures and costs of the UK visa system in the middle of a pandemic, so the Home Secretary was right to introduce a free visa extension. We are pleased that the offer has now been expanded to a wider pool of workers than was initially communicated.

However, we are extremely disappointed that the Government has so far decided not to extend the offer to non-medical NHS employees and social care workers. These lower paid workers have now rightly been included in the life assurance scheme, the provisions for bereaved families, and the exemption from the Immigration Health Home Office preparedness for Covidd19 (coronavirus): immigration and visas 33 Surcharge. Excluding care workers and lower-paid NHS staff from the fee-free visa extension, however, is unfair and fails to recognise the scale of their contribution to the UK fight against Covid-19. We recommend that all NHS staff—regardless of job role, pay grade or visa route—and social care workers are offered the same fee-free one-year visa extension. It cannot be right that, at a time when they are providing a vital and life-saving service for the country, non-UK health and care staff have to worry about their status and residency in the country.

Many of the excluded NHS employees—who include hospital porters, cleaners and administrative staff—are providing essential services to the NHS and its patients at this most trying time. They are also more likely to be in lower-paid job roles, meaning that the necessity of paying visa renewal fees is a much greater financial burden. The goodwill generated by the Government through this offer to NHS staff will only be sustained by addressing discrimination against workers in lower-paid and lower-profile roles.

It is also unfair to exclude the overwhelming majority of social care workers, including those providing direct care, at a time when care homes are under immense pressure as a result of Covid-19. Care workers are as much on the frontline of fighting the virus and trying to save lives as the NHS, and they have also been more likely to see their own health suffer. A care worker who needs to renew family visas this summer could be facing costs of thousands of pounds, with more required for the Immigration Health Surcharge that has not yet been lifted. For care workers who often do not get more than statutory sick pay if they get ill or need to self-isolate this is an additional and grave financial worry, which could put them under pressure to keep working even when it is not appropriate to do so.

We do not accept the Home Office claim that including social care workers in the free visa extensions policy is too difficult because many work for independent providers. The Government has rightly found ways to include care workers in the life assurance scheme, the provisions for those who die in service, and the exemption from the Immigration Health Surcharge. It must now address the remaining anomaly and include them in the free visa extension. A statutory instrument confirming fee- free one-year visa extensions to all NHS staff and social care workers would have an immediate effect, by confirming that these people are entitled to an extension while the Government seeks information from employers to apply the extensions in practice. The Health and Social Care Secretary rightly stated that “we are committed to doing whatever is needed; that promise applies just as much to social care as it does for the NHS”. The Government now needs to fulfil that promise.

The Government should also ensure that foreign national family members of British health and care staff are included in its offers of fee-free visa extensions. There appears to be no good reason for excluding this group of frontline health workers. They should be able to receive free one-year visa extensions on the same basis as the family members of non-British health and care workers.

We also call on the Government to take further measures in respect of those working in health and social care during the pandemic. Many frontline and support staff do not have British citizenship or long-term security in the UK as they will be on short-term visas. Some will ultimately hope to attain indefinite leave to remain and settlement in 34 Home Office preparedness for Covidd19 (coronavirus): immigration and visas the UK. For those who have worked tirelessly to combat Covid-19, and who wish for it, the Government should set out new arrangements to offer them British citizenship or permanent residency in recognition of the huge contribution they have made to the UK health and social care system during the Covid-19 crisis. We believe that people who have given so much, and in many cases risked their own health, for the nations and people of the UK should be assisted to become permanent members of the society to which they have dedicated themselves. (Paragraph 62) Other visas and requirements

We welcome the Home Secretary’s promise that “nobody will be punished for circumstances outside of their control”. To ensure this the Home Office must recognise that the exceptional circumstances of the Covid-19 crisis will have had unexpected impacts on the ability of individuals and families to meet visa conditions. We call on the department to issue guidance to caseworkers stating that they should exercise flexibility when considering applications which, on the balance of probabilities, would have met all relevant criteria had it not been for the Covid-19 crisis.

We consider that there are several steps the Government could take to mitigate the negative impacts of the pandemic on the ability of visa holders and applicants to meet requirements. These could include: (Paragraph 73) • Enabling individuals whose employment or income has been negatively impacted by the pandemic to prove financial sustainability by demonstrating ‘adequate maintenance’ rather than having to meet the Minimum Income Requirement, as is currently done for some people in receipt of welfare benefits and which was the requirement on all applicants prior to 2012; • Allowing a wider range of income sources to contribute towards meeting financial requirements; • Giving similar flexibility over sources for satisfying the Minimum Income Requirement to people on the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme or the Self- Employment Income Support Scheme as is already offered to individuals facing exceptional circumstances; • Taking furlough, illness, or other Covid-19 related job absences or income losses into account by allowing people to provide six months’ worth of evidence over the previous year instead of just the last six months, or allowing for a letter from an employer to count as proof of continuing employment instead of income proof; • Suspending the Minimum Income Requirement for those individuals applying for indefinite leave to remain after five years of residence in the UK, as they will have satisfied the requirement for the previous five years. We call on the Home Office to consider and implement a combination of these measures to provide the appropriate flexibility required as a result of the pandemic and write to us with its conclusions. It should also ensure that where people are benefiting from this additional flexibility they are still able to remain on their current route to residency, and should not be moved onto a longer route. (Paragraph 73) Home Office preparedness for Covidd19 (coronavirus): immigration and visas 35

The Home Office must be conscious of the fact that the difficulties in meeting the Minimum Income Requirement and other visa requirements are not short-term problems which will go away in a few months: the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic will affect visa holders and applicants for the foreseeable future. The Home Office therefore needs to conduct a thorough review of its policy on the Minimum Income Requirement and how the acceptable evidence requirements for each of the permitted income sources will be affected by Covid-19 related disruption. (Paragraph 74) Home Office communication

We understand that this is an unprecedented time and that it is difficult to introduce new policies with the rapidity with which they have been required. However, at such a time adequate communication between the Government, legal professionals and the public is vital. The Government needs to know the concerns of the legal community and the issues which are being encountered; legal professionals need certainty so that they can advise clients appropriately; and visa holders and applicants need to know that their situations are being addressed.

The Home Office must ensure that clear, unambiguous and up-to-date guidance is made publicly accessible on the Government’s website, and that previous versions of guidance are also available for reference. Informal lines of communication between the Home Office and immigration law practitioners are welcome, but they cannot be a substitute for making policy statements available and accessible to the public at large. (Paragraph 81) EU Settlement Scheme

It is to the Home Office’s credit that more than three million grants of status under the EU Settlement Scheme have been made with more than a year to go to the deadline. However, our concern has always been for vulnerable people and others who will find it difficult to apply, and in many cases it will be people in these groups who will be particularly affected by impacts of Covid-19. Once the crisis abates, we call on the Home Office to step up its efforts to support those who have not yet applied to the EU Settlement Scheme to do so. We call on the Home Office to provide us with details—updated as a result of the pandemic—of the measures it is taking to identify and provide support to individuals who are yet to apply for status. We also call on the Home Office to explain clearly the approach it will take to late applications from those who may not have known they were required to apply to the scheme, and what work it will undertake, if any, to assess the numbers of eligible citizens who have not yet applied.

We are particularly concerned about the reports of low rates of applications on behalf of children and young people in care. We recommend that local authorities increase efforts to identify young people in their care who are required to apply under the EU Settlement Scheme. We hope that the new guidance recently published by the Home Office, which we welcome, assists with this process. (Paragraph 90) 36 Home Office preparedness for Covidd19 (coronavirus): immigration and visas

We recommend that, once they are identified by local authorities and health and social care trusts, the Government make automatic grants of settled status for all children in care and care leavers.

We call on the Home Office to set out its position on the legal position of those with pre-settled status. (Paragraph 92) No recourse to public funds

We are pleased that the Home Office has recognised the need to respond sympathetically to those with NRPF conditions who find themselves in difficulties owing to the pandemic and we are encouraged by the Prime Minister’s personal commitment to look into these concerns. No one should have to put their own or their loved ones’ lives at risk for fear of destitution. Throughout this report we have sought to address exceptional circumstances which call for a more compassionate response.

We welcome the revised guidance issued by the Home Office, clarifying the situation for caseworkers and confirming that under the family and private life rules the NRPF condition must be lifted or not imposed if an applicant is destitute or is at risk of imminent destitution. There is scope, however, for further measures to provide reassurance and support to NRPF condition holders affected by the pandemic. There needs to be clarity that all who are prohibited from having recourse to public funds must have access to the support they need during this crisis, and funding provided to ensure that happens. The Government should immediately make arrangements for the temporary lifting of NRPF conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government should also direct local authorities to provide support where required by others who are destitute (or at risk of destitution) and who would otherwise be prohibited from accessing public funds, and it should provide funding to allow this to happen.

We also recommend that the Government reduce the evidential burden on individuals seeking changes in visa conditions or fee waivers as a consequence of the pandemic. It should ensure that clear guidance on the options and support available to individuals and families with NRPF conditions is consolidated and easily accessible on the Government website. (Paragraph 117) Home Office preparedness for Covidd19 (coronavirus): immigration and visas 37

We are deeply concerned that there was so little early access to testing for Covid-19 for asylum seekers housed in shared facilities, whether IA or dispersal, given the higher risk of spreading infection in accommodation where it is often difficult to self-isolate, and where there are other residents who are shielding. We heard from accommodation providers on 7 May that they had significant numbers of asylum seekers who were currently self-isolating but were not being tested. Testing and tracing should have been readily available and organised through accommodation providers from early on in the pandemic for anyone housed in institutional accommodation.

At this point in the response, testing is widely available: any symptomatic person can apply for a test, including a home test kit, and live translation services are now available in more than 200 languages including British Sign Language to support those wishing to access test and trace services. These provisions are available to asylum seekers as they are to other members of the population, and this is very welcome. We are however concerned that there is no readily accessible guidance online to support local health managers in maintaining a clear and consistent approach to testing wider resident communities in asylum accommodation where a resident is symptomatic of Covid-19.

The Government must urgently publish a clear policy on residential testing if there are outbreaks. This must be put in place immediately to ensure that accommodation providers are prepared for all potential scenarios in the next phase of the pandemic.

Any service user who wants and needs a test must have easy access to that test. This also means that asylum seekers should be informed of the opportunity to request a test and of the associated translation support available to them through that process; they should be provided with any financial or transport assistance required to reach an appropriate testing facility. With a clear testing policy in place, it is essential that all accommodation providers proactively monitor and ensure that their service users are accessing the assistance they need.

Vulnerable people such as pregnant women, victims of abuse and people with PTSD should never be placed in accommodation in which they have to share a room with an unrelated adult, nor should they be required to use shared bathroom/toilet facilities which may have a detrimental impact on their mental and physical health. (Paragraph 37) 54 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation

We recognise that once the lockdown started in March it was more difficult to move people into alternative accommodation, both because of public health requirements and because of the increased demand overall for accommodation. However, that only makes resolution of this issue more pressing as scientists warn of the possibility of a second national outbreak peaking in January–February 2021.

Our predecessor Committee recommended that shared accommodation should be phased out across the estate as a whole. While we welcome the progress towards ending this practice, we are extremely disappointed that the Home Office did not take the opportunity of contract replacement in 2019 to make this change in full. It is deeply concerning that the contract for dispersed accommodation in London and the South East until 2029 was tendered on the basis of non-related adults sharing rooms. Further, the argument that room sharing is more acceptable in short term initial accommodation is unsustainable, given the increasing duration of service users’ stays in these facilities.

The risks posed to vulnerable individuals by Covid-19 make more urgent the necessity of a complete end to room sharing by unrelated adults. While the first peak of infection has passed in some parts of the UK, there continues to be a real and substantial threat of further outbreaks. Providers must move people out of shared rooms now in advance of a possible second major national outbreak

The Home Office must take appropriate action, including contract variation if necessary, to ensure room sharing across the whole estate is phased out. The Department must also ensure that additional accommodation obtained to meet this requirement is of a high quality and fit for purpose. Fulfilment of this recommendation will provide an opportunity for the Home Office to pursue its commitment to a more equitable and sustainable system by expanding the areas participating in dispersal.

Accommodation providers must urgently put in place measures to enable greater social distancing and effective hygiene practices. We are appalled at reports that service users have not been universally provided either with laundry facilities, a generous supply of cleaning products, soap and sanitiser, or with financial support to enable them to access these essentials. It is difficult to conceive of any provision which is more fundamental to public health during the pandemic. The Home Office must immediately take steps to ensure these essentials are provided to all service users, whether in initial, contingency or dispersed accommodation. It must write to us confirming the steps taken, and how it will monitor the ongoing provision of these supplies, within 4 weeks of receiving this report.

All Home Office contracted housing providers must ensure that any vulnerable adults are accommodated appropriately. Where the Home Office has explicitly authorised an individual to have a single room, this must be implemented without question or delay. To ensure that this is enforced in practice, the Home Office must write to us within 4 weeks of receiving this report outlining how it will require providers to account for their response to such individual cases both during the pandemic and for the long- term.

We welcome the additional support that providers have told us that they are giving to their service users, specifically those who need to self-isolate, during this time. Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 55 Nonetheless we have heard evidence that not all service users are receiving the support they require from providers, with some particularly vulnerable individuals reporting that they are unable to self-isolate as a result. We urge all accommodation providers to ensure that no individual in their accommodation is placed in the precarious position of being unable to self-isolate or shield due to difficulties accessing basic necessities such as nappies for their children, food, toiletries and cleaning equipment.

We are appalled that the Home Office response to the communication support requirements of service users who are not accommodated in hotels or large IA facilities was simply to gather information about where free Wi-Fi might be provided locally—thus encouraging vulnerable people to go to public places—especially at a time when many such places might be closed or restricting public access. If there is a second major national outbreak and lockdown, the Home Office must not repeat this advice.

Users of asylum accommodation are often very vulnerable people, including torture survivors, individuals suffering PTSD, pregnant women and mothers with small children. Smart phones, access to the internet and television can be a lifeline to a range of external information and support services. Prior to the lockdown many asylum seekers will have relied on local libraries and voluntary support groups, which are now impossible to access physically, to obtain such support. Without access to phones, internet and television, asylum seekers may be unable to access essential Covid-19 updates and crucial support networks in the UK and abroad. Asylum seekers’ ability to attend video consultations with their GP and other healthcare professionals, including secondary mental health care, may also be impeded by this lack of communication provision.

The Home Office’s recent provision of SIM cards to asylum seekers in larger IA facilities is welcome. However, we are concerned that the denial of provision to individuals who do not have personal phones, or who are currently being asked to leave their accommodation in order to access free Wi-Fi in their local area, increases their vulnerability.

While asylum support payments were provisionally increased in June 2020 from £37.75 to £39.60 per week, people with ongoing asylum claims may still struggle to meet their essential needs on this weekly amount, particularly during the pandemic. It is imperative that all asylum seekers have access to essential support services and Covid-19 information through television, phones and the internet at this time. The Government must urgently assess, and work with its contract holders to secure, asylum seekers’ access to these facilities; we also urge the Home Office and its providers to ensure all asylum seekers receive £10 a week to top up their phone credit.

Following the National Audit Office’s report that asylum seekers are now expected to remain in initial accommodation for up to five weeks, with many staying for nearly three months, the Home Office must urgently reconsider the provision of medical services, subsistence payments and children’s educational support in initial accommodation. We appreciate the reasons for the current lengthy stays in IA as a result of lockdown and delays in being able to move people on. However, we are very concerned that so little progress had been made before lockdown in addressing the 56 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation shortfall of dispersal accommodation, making it harder to respond to Covid-19. It is vital that swift progress is made now in advance of any second wave this winter.

Urgent Government action is needed to ensure that access to primary and secondary health services is in place for all service users, and that healthy, fresh food that is appropriate to individuals’ dietary needs is available.

We know that asylum seekers with an active application or appeal are entitled to access NHS primary and secondary healthcare free of charge but there is no obligation on accommodation providers to register asylum seekers in IA with a GP. The Home Office Minister of State recently gave assurances that healthcare would be available. However, evidence we have received makes plain that, while healthcare may technically be available, it is not accessible to many of those in initial accommodation. This is a deeply concerning situation.

While service users remain in IA for more than three weeks, accommodation providers should ensure that all of their residents are linked up to primary and secondary health provision. We call on the Home Office to ensure that this change is made, if necessary by a variation to the Asylum Accommodation and Support Statement of Requirements. The Home Office should also ensure that the necessary funding is secured for affected statutory health services in any such provision.

We are concerned to learn that key stakeholders have reported a lack of information from the Home Office and its providers about revisions in contractual expectations of accommodation providers during the pandemic. The pandemic has impacted hugely on asylum seekers housed in asylum accommodation who have experienced lengthy stays in IA, social distancing concerns and inconsistent access to healthcare in IA, as well as difficulties accessing phones, Wi-Fi, internet and television.

We urge the Home Office and its providers to send a memorandum to key stakeholders outlining any revisions to providers’ contractual obligations since 1 March. This memorandum should be issued to the Home Office’s single point of contact, all strategic migration partnerships and dispersal authorities by 15 September.

While we welcome the communication of Covid-19 guidance by providers to their service users, we urge all providers to check regularly with their service users, and with wider stakeholders, to ensure that they are receiving up to date and timely Covid-19 guidance. This is essential given the Government’s gradual easing of the lockdown restrictions and its fast-changing key messages.

We recommend that the Government continues to work with trusted partners such as Doctors of the World UK to translate all updated Covid-19 guidance for the general public into the languages most commonly spoken by those individuals in the asylum system. This guidance should be sent out in digital and print format by providers to all of their service users.

Asylum seekers should not have been moved to new accommodation during the pandemic without justified and urgent reasons for doing so or without a vulnerability assessment demonstrating that the move could be made safely. This must happen Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 57 in future. If, following such an assessment, a move is found to be necessary and appropriate, sufficient notice must be given to the individual, to medical and other caseworkers working with that individual and, if they are to be moved to another area, to the local councils, to ensure they are effectively supported. In light of other evidence expressing concern about a lack of primary medical care in hotels, the Home Office should also review the adequacy of health service provision within hotel accommodation to ensure that asylum service users are easily and safely able to discuss concerns about their physical and mental health.

We welcome the fact that the Home Office is investigating these issues seriously. This investigation should engage with those raising these concerns, assessing whether the moves during lockdown were consistent with public health guidance and seeking detail on precisely how any vulnerability assessments were undertaken and by who. The Home Office should set out the findings of its investigations and what lessons the department and contractors have learned as a result in its response to this report.

The Department should ensure that lessons learned from the handling of asylum moves during the lockdown are referred to the safeguarding board and incorporated into the safeguarding and assurance frameworks. The Department should consider how local authorities and third sector partners in asylum support can be engaged in the work of the safeguarding board. The Department should also report its progress in developing the assurance framework to us every two months, from an initial report to us four weeks after receiving this report. Given the importance of safeguarding as part of the asylum accommodation system, we would encourage the department to explore whether a KPI could be used to ensure that contractors are properly held to account for their work to safeguard vulnerable individuals. For the same reasons and in the interests of transparency, we believe that the safeguarding framework should be published.

We welcome the Minister’s willingness to consider the case for reinstating the weekly allowance for individuals who have previously had this allowance withdrawn, following forced changes of accommodation during the pandemic. Individuals who were moved into hotels at the start of the lockdown will now have been there for three months and many will have experienced additional costs in that time for essential items such as toiletries, over the counter medicines, additional food, children’s clothing and educational materials which will not be covered by the full board arrangement. This modest allowance also helps traumatised individuals to maintain autonomy, independence and a sense of dignity. We urge the Minister to reinstate the payment for these individuals.

The subsistence allowance should be provided to any individual whose entitlement to section 95 support has been accepted from the time that entitlement is determined, whether or not they are then immediately able to move into dispersal accommodation. This allowance should be provided via the cashless ASPEN card system. We believe that there is no legal barrier to such payments, provided they relate to essential living needs, just because an individual remains in initial accommodation. If the Government takes the view, however, that this change would require amendment of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000, it should amend them as soon as possible. (Paragraph 124) 58 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation

We support the NAO’s recommendation that the Government should consider whether its performance framework effectively incentivises providers to move service users into dispersal accommodation within agreed timescales; the Government should also reassess the value for money provided by contingency accommodation in hotels and the contractual requirement for initial accommodation provision within the asylum establishment, in light of demand. The Government should consult service users, local authorities, health service and third sector partners as part of this review, to ensure that lived experience of the service is taken into account in this review.

Our predecessors highlighted the shortcomings of the Home Office’s dispersal policy and its failure to make dispersal arrangements equitable across the UK. Three years on from the Committee’s 2017 report, we have noted with concern the pressures on the system since the introduction of the AASC contracts in September

In order to achieve an equitable and sustainable UK-wide dispersal system, the Home Office and its providers must give due regard to the acute financial and capacity constraints currently placed on dispersal authorities, many of which are grappling with even greater community pressures arising from the pandemic, including housing the broader homeless population.

In 2018 our predecessors recommended that the Government “must provide dispersal authorities with dedicated funding to better manage dispersal and the related impact on services” and to give currently non-participating authorities confidence that they would be fully supported were they to take an equitable share of this population. We are both concerned and disappointed that the Home Office has failed to make better progress on this fundamental issue, which could compromise the Government’s ability to meet its statutory responsibilities under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. We repeat that, to achieve increased voluntary participation in the dispersal scheme, the Government must directly fund all dispersal local authorities to take account of the competing financial and capacity challenges that they face.

During the pandemic the Government has asked providers to source additional accommodation in areas which had not previously participated in dispersal, which we understand and welcome. However, at the same time the Government has temporarily sanctioned providers to secure such accommodation without the prior approval of the relevant local authority. Our predecessors’ 2018 report on asylum accommodation reiterated the Committee’s concerns that the Government’s dispersal policy risked undermining the support and consent of local communities, many of which have a long history of welcoming those in need of sanctuary. We repeat this concern again in light of evidence we have received which suggests that communication issues still remain between providers and local dispersal authorities. Nonetheless we were encouraged to hear examples of providers engaging with local areas when sourcing accommodation.

We call once again on the Home Office and its providers to work closely with housing providers, local authorities and Strategic Migration Partnerships to increase the availability of asylum accommodation both during the period of lockdown, and afterwards. (Paragraph 143) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 59

The Government said that it would review its policy of temporarily pausing all evictions from asylum accommodation and continuing the provision of asylum support before the end of June. In a Parliamentary debate on 17 June, a number of MPs expressed concern about the Home Office’s intention to end the temporary additional support for asylum seekers and to recommence moving on those who have been granted refugee status and those who have been refused asylum. At the time of writing in July, we understand that the temporary support remains in place. This is welcome.

Before taking any final decision to remove temporary support for asylum seekers, the Home Office and its accommodation providers must engage and consult closely with Public Health England, devolved governments, Strategic Migration Partnerships, asylum dispersal councils and local public health units to ensure that any changes do not place individuals at any risk or overwhelm other statutory support services.

We welcome the substantial reduction in the number of individuals detained in IRCs since the beginning of the lockdown. This was a sensible response to Covid-19 and will have helped prevent infections.

Government guidance which came into force on 5 May 2020, although it was not published until 5 June, confirmed that individuals at high risk of contracting Covid-19 should be treated as AAR Level 3 cases. This clarification, which confirms the commitment made by the Home Office to the High Court on 26 March, is welcome although earlier publication would have provided greater clarity and reassurance. Evidence we received from the IRC providers shortly after this guidance came into effect indicated inconsistencies in their implementation of the AAR policy, specifically as it relates to those highly vulnerable detainees at greater risk of becoming ill from Covid-19. This is deeply concerning, and reflects concerns raised in evidence to us about officials’ attempts to interpret broadly drafted immigration detention policies, and the consequent litigation and uncertainty that can ensue.

It is troubling that nearly 40% of those remaining in immigration detention should have been categorised as meeting Levels 2 or 3 of the Adults at Risk policy indicating significant vulnerability and, potentially, that they are at high risk from Covid-19. Government guidance on the operation of the adults at risk policy indicates that evidence meeting the standard for Level 2 in the AAR policy “should normally be accepted and consideration given as to how this may be impacted by detention”, while evidence at Level 3 “stating that the individual is at risk and that a period of detention would be likely to cause harm … should be afforded significant weight… and any detention reviewed in light of the accepted evidence”. On this basis, serious consideration must be given to moving these individuals back into the community. However, we recognise that, as the Home Office has stated, 97% of those remaining in immigration detention are foreign national offenders and that therefore where it is not possible to remove them from detention all possible precautions must be given to enable detainees to self-isolate safely within IRCs. (Paragraph 171) 60 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation

Guidance should be provided for custodial and detention staff on the approach to be taken where an individual is considered to be at high risk of having contracted Covid-19, but is not symptomatic at the point of reception.

The Home Office and its providers must communicate timely and accurate information to NGOs as well as to service providers working to support people in immigration detention.

Some of the temporary measures introduced by the Government in response to Covid-19 hold open the prospect of future improvements in the operation of both the asylum and immigration removal processes. Among these, the decision to extend asylum support for refugees until their first welfare benefit payment is received was a simple and sensible as well as a compassionate measure and should be made permanent. Within the immigration removal process, the decision to remove from immigration detention people who did not need to be there, who were not a danger to the public, and who had no prospect of imminent removal was equally sensible. We are encouraged to note that this action was in line with the Home Office’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, which stipulate that detention should only be maintained when removal is imminent (i.e. within 28 days (four weeks)), and which our predecessors in 2019 urged should be formalised through creation of a statutory time limit.

As government lockdown restrictions are eased, it is imperative that the Home Office and its providers communicate in a clear and timely manner to key national and local actors. The Government needs now to work closely with stakeholders across both the asylum accommodation and immigration detention sectors to ensure a smooth transition out of lockdown. The Government and providers of both types of institutional accommodation must also be alert to new concerns about protecting people in the event of a second wave of Covid-19.

We are extremely concerned at this failure of communication by Mears Group with the receiving local authorities, and at the lack of arrangements for testing individuals who were being moved across the country out of an accommodation centre where other residents had Covid-19, and which had previously been treated as a single household during lockdown. We are also very concerned at reports of a wider failure in the duty of care towards these individuals and households.

While Mears affirms that the dispersal of individuals from Urban House on 10 July without testing, even after cases of Covid-19 were confirmed in the facility, was in line with the national system, we are deeply concerned that the company acted in this manner apparently without thought for the consequences of dispersing these individuals into other communities, and without consulting the receiving authorities. Mears’ commitment to participate in a lessons learned exercise is helpful. However this is not the first time during the pandemic that it has been reported that Mears has moved large numbers of asylum seekers from one location to another in a rush, without consulting local authorities or ensuring proper support is in place, and we are consequently very concerned about the quality of planning and decision making within the group. (Paragraph 202) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 61

We urge the Home Office urgently to review the way Mears has been operating during the pandemic, to consider its poor management of service users’ welfare, and the wider public health consequences of its approach.

It is essential that lessons are learned from the dispersal from Urban House, and that clear policies are put in place to ensure effective communication between providers and local authorities in the event of further outbreaks in asylum accommodation, and in respect of the dispersal of service users from one area to another.

The experience of the pandemic has demonstrated the importance of implementing this Committee’s previous recommendations both in respect of asylum accommodation and immigration detention. We welcome the Home Office’s commitment to proceed carefully “back to a more normal state of affairs”. We also welcome its commitment to talk to local government and to take public health advice seriously in respect of asylum accommodation. We will hold the Home Office to account on these commitments. However, we are deeply concerned about the lack of clarity on the Home Office’s plans to end temporary support to those in the asylum support system, following the formal expiry of the provisions on 30 June.

On 5 June, the Housing Secretary announced a two month extension, until the end of August, of the suspension of evictions from social or private rented housing to protect tenants and landlords during the pandemic.

We urge the Home Office to follow MHCLG’s lead and to agree jointly with local authorities, devolved nations and third sector partners a sensible and fair extension to the current measures in place for asylum seekers that reduces the public health risk for them and for the local community. Any extension to these measures should take account of the potential heightened risk of vulnerable asylum seekers becoming ill from Covid-19 if temporary support and accommodation is withdrawn; sufficient time should be provided for asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status and those who have been refused asylum to access appropriate financial and accommodation support. The Home Office should also ensure that its approach to ending cessations is phased to ensure that changes do not overwhelm other services. It should give due consideration to any impact that its decisions may have on the already stretched capacity of local authorities.

We urge the Home Office to set out a full, public, Covid-19 strategy which addresses the key concerns outlined in this chapter in relation to asylum accommodation and immigration detention. The strategy should cover further periods of local or national lockdowns and the period afterwards and should be published on the Government website. The strategy must recognise the need to ensure individuals’ access to clear and timely information about any changes to the Government’s current temporary measures. It should also ensure that support organisations, local authorities and statutory bodies which formally contribute to individuals’ support are appropriately resourced for these responsibilities.

As part of this Covid-19 strategy, the Home Office should publish the Public Health England guidance that it has taken to inform its decisions about ending the current 62 Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation measures to support asylum seekers. The Home Office should also confirm how it has adhered to the relevant Public Sector Equality Duty requirements in taking these decisions.

The Home Office should conduct a full review of its management of Covid-19 impacts on asylum accommodation and immigration detention in conjunction with its providers and other government departments. It should evaluate the impact of the temporary measures put in place and incorporate this learning into the development of future process and policy interventions before the end of 2020. This will be an important safeguard in the event of further outbreaks. (Paragraph 208) Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (Coronavirus): institutional accommodation 63

In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that the Government had to respond swiftly in circumstances of great uncertainty. We also recognise and are grateful for the hard work of all those responding to the crisis to ensure safety at the border at a time of considerable pressure, from Border Force staff to Government officials and scientific advisers. We recognise too that border measures in isolation are not effective in controlling the virus and must be considered alongside a suite of other measures such as social distancing and lockdowns. However, as one witness told us, all measures are “additive” and the relative absence of firm border measures in the UK earlier during the pandemic is notable.

While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on the trajectory of the pandemic, almost every country in the world including the UK has used border measures at some point to try to control or manage the spread of the virus. As well as important public health consequences of those decisions, there are also significant economic consequences. For that reason, we have looked not only at the decisions that were taken and their consequences but also the reasons behind them and the lessons that should be learned. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, and as patterns of infection in different countries keep changing, governments across the world are likely to keep drawing upon border measures to help control the spread of the virus. We want to be assured that everything possible is being done here in the UK to ensure that the most effective measures are put in place at the right stage. (Paragraph 5) Government decisions on the border up to and during lockdown

The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a fast-moving virus in circumstances where information was changing constantly and decisions about borders had to be made at pace. Inevitably those decisions were difficult, and some will look different in hindsight. However, scrutiny is important to ensure lessons are learned. As COVID-19 has not gone away, many of these challenges could recur.

The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early March corresponded to the practice in other countries during this time and reflects the great uncertainty with which governments were grappling. It was right to adjust and extend self-isolation provisions as the virus became established, starting with Wuhan and China, but also extending provisions to cover places like Italy as the virus spread. Many other European countries were beginning to be affected by coronavirus in the same way, and many took a similar incremental approach as the UK. Evidence shows that the number of cases of direct transmission from China into the UK was extremely small, and that the number of cases from Italy started to fall after 25 February when border measures were 74 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders introduced. However, it is impossible to distinguish between the impact of border measures and other factors such as lockdowns in Wuhan and Italy or falling overall passenger numbers which may have had a much bigger effect.

It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other European countries in early March were not sufficient to contain the cross-border spread of the virus. Had stronger early measures been taken—such as requiring legally-enforceable quarantine for arrivals—it is likely that the spread of the virus could have been slowed. The UK Government did not recognise soon enough the increased risk of importations from European countries owing to the greater amount of travel between these countries and the UK, and the speed at which case numbers were increasing. Many of those returning to the UK during that period were British residents, and we agree with the SAGE assessment that border closures would not have been appropriate.

However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate for 14 days (in line with category 1) or, at the very least, to monitor symptoms and call NHS 111 (in line with category 2) was a mistake. With border measures in mind, there should have been particular surveillance focus on the countries that have high levels of travellers into the UK, particularly Spain and France. We are concerned that we have not seen evidence of that happening during the early stages of the crisis, and that, as a result, Spain was not added to the list of countries for self-isolation measures when it should have been. As a result, large numbers of passengers from Spain continued to arrive, including to attend the Atletico Madrid-Liverpool football match, without any requirements being placed upon them.

We are also concerned at the lack of clarity over who was responsible for the continued monitoring and assessment of emerging infection threats from different countries, and for drawing up policy options for Ministers to respond. Any future inquiry into the UK’s handling of COVID-19 should consider not only whether the UK Government should have acted more quickly at this time to prevent cases of the virus arriving in the UK and spreading in the community, but also whether the arrangements for monitoring and assessing emerging threats and considering policy options were fit for purpose.

We recognise the difficulties faced by the Government in considering temperature checks, screening or testing at the border, and we also recognise the limited UK testing capacity at that time. However, given the success of targeted COVID-19 testing on arrivals demonstrated by South Korea during early March, more should have been done to assess the feasibility of such approaches in the UK even if they could not immediately be introduced. The lack of existing testing capacity should not have prevented proper analysis of the options and a strategy to develop and expand testing as part of border measures.

Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of controlling importation from overseas as a method for containing the virus or delaying its spread. The decision by SAGE only to consider measures that could deliver a full month’s delay to the spread of the virus was a mistake and it is very hard to understand why that approach was taken. Additive measures that Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 75 could have contributed to more effective containment should have been considered, and delays even of a few days alongside the introduction of other domestic measures such as social distancing and lockdown could have had a significant impact on the scale of the outbreak in the UK.

Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their strength that could have made a significant contribution and potentially mitigated the scale of domestic restrictions that were later needed. SAGE papers suggest that prioritising delay of spread rather than suppression of cases was influenced by the conclusion that the virus ought to be treated similarly to pandemic influenza, but this has been retrospectively proved wrong.

We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13 March to 8 June was very different from countries in similar circumstances. This should have raised serious questions within the Government about whether it was taking the correct decisions. We have not seen any evidence that, at the time it was making its own decisions, the UK Government was examining and evaluating the approaches taken by other countries to controlling importations of the virus from abroad.

It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from Europe in mid-March than was estimated at the time, when, with the exception of Italy, the focus remained largely on potential importations of the virus from Asia. As evidenced by genomic studies and referenced by Sir Patrick Vallance in oral evidence, a large number of instances of the virus—up to 1,356 importation strains and up to 10,000 cases—were imported during the period leading to, and following, the abandonment of special measures for international arrivals on 13 March, even though the overall number of people arriving in the UK was decreasing. Evidence shows it is highly likely that uncontrolled importations of the virus from European countries contributed to the rapid increase in the spread of the virus in mid-March, and the overall scale of the outbreak in the UK.

Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during March, and only having time-limited self-isolation measures for arrivals from Italy, therefore had a material effect on the number of cases circulating within the UK. Border measures in the UK were lifted rather than extended on 13 March at a time when the number of infections being imported from abroad was still rising. Evidence suggests that thousands of new infections in the UK resulted from cases arriving from Europe in the ten days between this decision and the introduction of lockdown on 23 March. The failure to have any special border measures during this period was a serious mistake that significantly increased both the pace and the scale of the epidemic in the UK, and meant that many more people caught COVID-19.

Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not properly known in mid-March, that is not a justification for the lifting of border measures. Evidence of the epidemic escalating, especially in Spain, was already available. Other countries with the same information as the UK introduced stronger measures—for example, quarantine or limiting international arrivals so that only residents could 76 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders enter the country—and proved justified in doing so. The UK was extremely unusual in choosing not to introduce measures of this kind; it is evident that this was the wrong approach.

The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the scientific advice behind the decision to withdraw special measures for international arrivals on 13 March despite their repeated promises to do so is completely unacceptable. Despite many appeals for this information, the Government has only drawn our attention to SAGE advice and analysis on 22 and 23 March, ten days after the decision, and to SAGE papers from 3 and 4 February, nearly six weeks before the decision. Given the rapidly changing circumstances of the epidemic, we do not accept that these SAGE discussions adequately explain or justify decisions made on 13 March.

The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence behind the withdrawal of guidance on 13 March. These appeals have been made to three members of the Cabinet, to one further Minister, and to three of the Home Office’s most senior officials. It is unacceptable that the information we requested concerning the decision to withdraw measures for international arrivals on 13 March has not yet been made available to us. The Committee has been reassured time and again that it would receive copies of the advice it had requested. After more than three months of being repeatedly promised this information, it will be difficult for this Committee to accept that there are any grounds why the Government cannot provide it to us; if there were such grounds, it has had ample time and opportunity to explain what these might be. It could at any previous juncture over this period have offered reasons for non-compliance or agreed terms for information to be given privately or with redaction. In such circumstances as these, the Committee could quite reasonably conclude that the advice we have requested simply does not exist.

The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the Committee immediately a full account of the scientific evidence and advice leading to its decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. If this does not exist in written form, the Committee should receive a full account of what considerations were made and a summary of orally tendered advice, including the dates on which it was provided.

The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as other countries were expanding their border measures, is inexplicable. The Committee does not accept the argument that the introduction of voluntary ‘stay at home’ guidance for households with possible coronavirus infection on 13 March was enough reason to withdraw all guidance for returning travellers or visitors. Advice to stay at home applied only to those households with a suspected case of COVID-19 and was not legally enforceable for another 13 days. The Government stated that its priority in mid-March was buying time for the NHS. Imposing firmer measures on all international arrivals—including travellers from parts of Europe that had never been subject to specific guidance—would have contributed to this to some degree, as part of a cumulative or “additive” approach. Removing measures for international arrivals rather than extending them was the wrong thing to do. (Paragraph 100) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 77

Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures in mid-March. Although passenger numbers started to fall, a further one million people were to arrive between 13 March and lockdown on 23 March, and possibly hundreds of thousands more by mid-April. That is likely to have included thousands of people with COVID-19.

We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after 13 March because imported cases made up only 0.5% of total UK infections. That figure was not calculated until 22 March by which time a million more people had arrived and the epidemic had rapidly escalated in the UK. It is likely to have been substantially higher at the time when guidance was lifted. We set out further concerns about the Home Office reliance on this measurement from paragraph 108.

The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting international travel and considered their additive effect. It is understandable that the Government did not consider it practical or effective to simply restrict flights, not least because of large numbers of British residents seeking to return home. However, the failure to properly consider the possibility of imposing stricter requirements on those arriving—such as mandatory self-isolation, increased screening, targeted testing or enforceable quarantine—was a serious error. In mid- March, the Government had a limited sense of how many infectious people were arriving in the UK, or where they were arriving from, and had limited means of controlling the onward spread of the virus from such cases. In the circumstances, a precautionary approach aimed at continuing suppression of imported cases of the virus should have included more comprehensive measures for passengers arriving from places which had significant numbers of infections.

Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’ guidance and lockdown restrictions imposed in mid-March. Indeed, they were exactly the “draconian” measures initially rejected by SAGE, enforceable in law. Justifying the decision to lift measures on 13 March on the basis that, at that time, measures applying to international arrivals were at parity with ‘stay at home’ guidance issued the same day is not consistent with the Government’s eventual chosen strategy. That later strategy, discussed in the next chapter, places more onerous legal restrictions on arrivals from overseas than have been placed on any other group in the UK, at any point over the course of the pandemic.

It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance on 13 March, or on what basis. It is hard to reconcile Professor Aston’s suggestion that advice was provided at the time the decision was made with either his own indication that he was not involved in the decision, or his later emphasis on advice given six weeks prior to the decision, on 3 and 4 February. Urgent clarity is needed on what scientific evidence was considered and advice provided in relation to self-isolation measures in the days preceding the decision of 13 March, given its likely significant impact in the number of cases imported into the UK in mid- March. Despite this, no Cabinet Minister or official whom we have asked has been able to provide any explanation for the process by which, and the basis on which, the decision was made. It is not clear who was responsible for gathering the evidence, formulating policy options or scrutinising and testing the advice. It is not clear 78 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders whether there was a lead department or a lead institution, or which Minister took lead responsibility for the decision. The lack of clarity about the responsibility for decision making in this crucial area is very serious and may well have contributed to mistakes being made.

It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that were produced at any point of the cardinal number of imported cases during March. The Home Office should have requested advice on the estimated number of importations, and the rough proportion of overall arrivals which that estimated figure represented. While the figure of 0.5% of circulating cases resulting from importation is a useful one and indeed may still be reliable as of 15 July, evidence to us demonstrates that these other figures are also crucially important to deciding border policy and should have been made available to Ministers. Nothing the Home Office had told us demonstrates beyond doubt that these other figures were asked for or made available. Having actual estimates of the number of people likely to be affected by any decision is important and can lead to qualitatively different decision- making processes than just relying on figures expressed as small proportions. Estimates should have been available to Ministers throughout March to allow them to make fully informed decisions.

In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested and to build trust and confidence. We welcome the decision to publish SAGE papers. However, transparency cannot be selective without clear explanation, particularly when the advice relates to policy decisions as important as those concerning the introduction of border measures, which affects wide swathes of the economy and disrupts millions of peoples’ plans. Where it has not been able to meet the commitment to publish papers within a month of the relevant meeting, the Government should explain clearly why.

The Committee shares the concern of the Science and Technology Committee that bodies advising Government, including Public Health England, are also insufficiently transparent about the nature and content of the advice they are providing.

The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from its own Scientific Adviser ahead of the Government’s decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. By the same measure, the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser has been clear that advice from SAGE includes an inherent degree of uncertainty. This is reasonable, particularly in a rapidly evolving situation such as COVID-19. However, we have heard no evidence to suggest that the Home Office requested additional information that could have fed into its border policy, nor that it interrogated the inherent uncertainties around SAGE’s advice or around the limited figures it was given. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that the Department took at face value the advice provided; it should not have done so. (Paragraph 129) The introduction of border quarantine requirements

We welcome the Government’ decision to re-introduce border measures. We discuss later what the most appropriate border measures should be. But at a time when Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 79 COVID-19 infections continue to increase across the world and when hotspots of infection continue to change, all countries are going to need different kinds of border measures to control the spread of the virus for some time to come.

It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism in June. Having removed country-specific guidance in March when other countries were imposing compulsory quarantine arrangements for arrivals, the Government then found itself increasing restrictions just as other countries were loosening them in June—something which was hard to explain, and which appeared inconsistent. This has been exacerbated by the Government’s continued defence of the previous lack of quarantine at the border from March until June rather than acknowledging that, in hindsight, firmer measures should have been in place. Building up credibility requires transparency. The Government should publish the analysis that informed its decision to introduce quarantine measures and explain how it relates to the Government’s wider strategy for overcoming the pandemic.

The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the same time as getting the economy moving, including international travel, in the safest possible way. It will build more support for the difficult balancing judgements it has to take if it is open about the evidence behind them.

It is very disappointing that Border Force officers did not receive guidance on the implementation of new regulations until less than one working day before they came into force. Without enough time to raise questions and properly to digest the guidance, it is likely that avoidable mistakes were made during the first days that the regulations were in force. As the UK begins to exempt countries from the regulations, the task of ascertaining who should and should not quarantine and what information they should provide is further complicated. We ask the Government to ensure that any changes to guidance are provided to Border Force officials as early as possible before they come into operation.

We welcome the Government’s attempt to develop an approach to travel corridors which recognises the different prevalence of the virus in different countries and regions. It is clearly sensible to be able to treat travellers from New Zealand, where there have been 52 new cases since 8 June, differently from travellers from the USA or Brazil where infections continue to soar. Given that we will need to be able to manage the changing risk of COVID-19 from different countries for some time to come, setting up a sustainable and agile framework that can be adapted quickly is extremely important.

However, we also note the warnings from public health experts in countries like New Zealand and Singapore that are continuing to take a much more restrictive approach to international travel, and who advised against mass-market travel in Europe this summer. We consider in the next section the reintroduction of quarantine for Spain and the criteria for exempting countries. However the travel corridor list is constituted, it is clear that Government must have a system in place for robust surveillance and assessment of any increasing risk in countries where 80 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders travel corridors have been agreed so that they can be swiftly suspended if necessary to prevent the virus spreading again, and to prevent deeply damaging consequences for both public health and the economy.

We welcome the Government’s commitment regularly to review its border quarantine regulations. The move to weekly and daily reviews of travel corridors is welcome as three-weekly reviews were not sufficiently frequent. Far more frequent review appropriately reflects the agility required to prevent a rise in importations. We recommend that the Government publish the methodology and findings of its reviews by means of a statement to the House, and on gov.uk when the House is not sitting. Given the likely increase in travel during the summer holidays, public health surveillance is particularly important for those countries where passenger numbers are highest. The Government should therefore make clear in its statements what criteria it is applying to assess possible risks, the relative weighting of those criteria, and on what basis changes to travel corridors are made.

Given the surge in confirmed COVID-19 cases in mainland Spain and the clear and rising risk of increasing numbers of people returning to the UK with COVID-19, a precautionary approach including quarantine for returning travellers is the right one. As we have set out in Chapter 1, the consequences of not introducing quarantine for Spain and then France in February and March were very serious for public health and, as a result, the economy. It is important and welcome that the Government has learned from what happened earlier in the crisis and is responding now to prevent imported cases rising.

However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in Spain following the FCO and DfT guidance in the expectation that they would be able to return to work, caring responsibilities, medical appointments and family events on their return, which will now be impossible. Many will face significant financial difficulties as a result of losing pay. Such sudden changes in policy make it even more difficult for businesses in the travel industry which are already under huge pressure. Given the continued risk from COVID-19 and the pace at which it can spread, travel corridors can only work as part of a plan to control the virus if they can also be lifted swiftly based on data when cases rise. However, the Government needs to be much more sensitive to the serious consequences for families and businesses of changing policy with no warning in this way. There should be significant changes to the way such decisions are handled and communicated.

The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”. However, stronger warnings should have been given at the time the travel corridors were first introduced in early July. The Government’s mixed messages at that time were regrettable. In the case of Spain, it appears from the First Minister of Scotland’s statements that the Joint Biosecurity Centre had already concluded that prevalence rates there were significant higher than in the UK at the time when the travel corridor was established—but that information has not been published. It should have been, both so that individual travellers could be aware of the risks and so that the decision to include Spain at all could be scrutinised. The Government should publish these prevalence rates now and explain why Spain was included on the travel corridors list. (Paragraph 194) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 81

The disruption to travel plans and surprise caused by removing Spain from the travel corridor list demonstrates how essential it is that surveillance data is shared with the public openly and frequently. Potential travellers must be presented with the risks of travelling, even to countries on the travel corridor list, while the pandemic is ongoing and the guidance is liable to change at short notice. We urge the Government to publish the details of its traffic light system to distinguish between high-risk (red), medium-risk (amber) and low-risk (green) countries, and how different countries are currently categorised on that system, so potential travellers can assess the level of risk attached to their chosen travel destinations, and to whether quarantine rules might change.

Greater clarity would also be helpful on the Government’s overall objectives for its border measures and travel corridors as part of their wider strategy against COVID-19, including how it is balancing public health and economic considerations. We heard significant warnings from public health experts in Singapore and Hong Kong that Europe’s attempt to restart mass market travel and cross border tourism this summer was a mistake and would make it harder to suppress the virus or as a result return to near normal in other sections of the economy. The Government should therefore explain its strategy, including its different objectives on suppressing the virus and opening up the economy, and how it believes its border measures and the current expected level of cross border travel contribute to those objectives.

The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the management of the pandemic, establishing clear responsibility for regular surveillance of travel risks from different countries and publishing clear and transparent analysis, including of international prevalence rates. It should also be responsible for assessing the combined public health impact of all the border measures including assessments of the number of people likely to be arriving with COVID-19. However there has so far been a concerning lack of transparency about the analysis produced by the Joint Biosecurity Centre as even basic assessments of prevalence rates have not been published.

The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of the numbers of people who have come into the UK carrying COVID-19 does not inspire us with confidence about its ability to assess the scale of the risk from likely infectious people coming into the country in the future.

We are concerned that Ministers do not seem to have access to information about prevalence rates internationally, and there is confusion about what information is held by the Department for Health and Social Care, as well as the interaction between different agencies including Public Health England, NHS Test and Trace and the Joint Biosecurity Centre and SAGE. We urge the Department to clarify responsibilities and establish a process for greater transparency from this point on. We urge the Department to clarify responsibilities and establish a process for greater transparency from this point on.

As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public health crises. That is why the Government must now ensure that the analysis behind the introduction of quarantine rules and the introduction of travel corridors is all 82 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders published—including JBC assessments of the prevalence of COVID-19 in different countries, and the Government’s overall estimates of the number and proportion of people arriving in the UK who are likely to have COVID-19.

It is not clear exactly which Government department or agency is ultimately responsible for coordinating border policy. Evidence from the Home Secretary suggested important roles for the Department of Health and Social Care, Public Health England and the Department for Transport as well as the Home Office and Border Force. Given that the Home Secretary announced the border quarantine policy it was surprising to discover that she did not expect to be involved in the decisions on travel corridors and that the Home Office wasn’t briefed on prevalence rates for different countries. While it is appropriate that all Departments carry out work within their remit, good coordination and some overall leadership is required for border policies to work coherently. Otherwise, there is the potential for confused policy-making and contradiction between Government departments, like that shown by the inconsistency between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for Transport on travel advice. This would likely reduce public confidence in the measures as they are introduced, and as they vary. We note that the COVID-19 Operations committee appears to be taking the decisions on border policy and we welcome a cross-Government process to coordinate different departments and ensure that decisions are consistent, and evidence based. However, it still resulted in different advice emerging from the FCO and DfT, and it remains unclear which Department retains lead responsibility for border policy. One accountable Department should be clearly charged with lead responsibility. We believe that should either be the Cabinet Office or, as the Department with overall responsibility for border operations, the Home Office.

It is concerning that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Transport have issued contrasting advice to the public on more than one occasion, at a time when providing clarity about the new travel corridors and nurturing confidence in them is of great importance. The Government must ensure that its communications are consistent and accurate across all departments. We recommend that one department leads on communications in this matter, and works constructively with other departments and associated bodies, such as public health authorities, to make sure all appropriate guidance and advice is clearly reflected. The Government must review differences between Foreign and Commonwealth Office travel advice and Department for Transport air corridor countries as an urgent priority, with a view to reconciling discrepancies. Where those departments are not able to agree, the Gov.uk website should clearly explain why this is the case in order to allow would-be travellers to make informed decisions before using travel corridors.

We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the UK over which travel corridors should be implemented. While we respect that matters of public health are devolved, we encourage the UK and devolved governments to work more closely together to ensure there is a single, four-nations approach to measures at our border. Disjointedness risks deepening damage to the aviation industry and inhibiting public confidence. It is, however, notable that the Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 83 First Minister of Scotland has quoted figures from the Joint Biosecurity Centre, to explain the decisions her Government had made to extend, or refuse, travel corridors. The UK Government should do the same.

The Government’s estimate of compliance with its enforcement regime for border quarantine is unconvincing. That the estimate is so high should be grounds for healthy cynicism and interrogation. A better method for estimating the true compliance rate is required, based on routine publication of the following figures: • the number of people required to quarantine under the regulations; • the number of spot checks carried out on arrivals at the border; • the number of spot checks carried out by Public Health England on those quarantining; • the number of referrals from Public Health England to the Police; • the number of visits undertaken by police to quarantining individuals; and • the number of enforcement actions ultimately taken. This will allow oversight of the entire process. These data should be published fortnightly, to mirror the work undertaken by the National Police Chiefs’ Council to publish fortnightly totals of the number of Fixed-Penalty Notices issued under lockdown Regulations.

Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is limited. The suddenness and lack of transparency behind the decisions about Spain may have consequences for enforcement if travellers remain sceptical about the policy or face financial pressures as a result of not being able to return to work as planned. It is important for Government to build confidence in the decisions it has taken and the justification for them, and also to make sure that people can afford to comply.

Border quarantine restrictions are likely to remain in place for some time, particularly if there is now emerging agreement that cases of COVID-19 could increase in the winter months. The UK’s approach to its borders will have to become more flexible in order to respond rapidly to the contours of the pandemic. We recommend that the Home Office, in coordination with the Department for Transport and Department for Health and Social Care, investigates urgently the viability of introducing widespread and targeted tests at the border, as in Iceland, Hong Kong or South Korea. Now that testing capacity in the UK has increased, the Government should be ready to learn from other countries and should examine what role testing or screening could play, including the ability to target particular flight routes. We agree with the Government that a testing and tracing system alone is not currently enough to address the importation risk from overseas travel, especially from high-prevalence countries like Brazil and the USA. However, the Government should look at international examples and develop testing further. It should assess what role testing could play alongside quarantine and travel corridor measures. This could require close coordination with airports and others to access flight and route-specific information over and above what is readily available. (Paragraph 227) 84 Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders

As passenger numbers rise and interactions between Border Force officers and arrivals increase, it is crucial that there are no lapses in PPE availability for officers on the frontline who have worked admirably in difficult conditions for several months. The Government owes it to hard-working officers to ensure that they are protected and feel safe so they can continue in their duties. As part of each review of border quarantine measures, Border Force and the Home Office should conduct a reappraisal of the appropriate level of PPE that should be provided for Border Force officials, and a nationwide assessment of stock levels to ensure that staff have everything they need.

Concerns about provision of PPE to key workers have been a recurring theme during the COVID-19 pandemic. We understand that Border Force’s provision of PPE to its staff has been based on PHE and WHO advice. However, Border Force officials must be able to feel safe while carrying out their vital work in particularly difficult conditions. This should include wearing masks where staff feel safer doing so.

Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising number of infections toward and during winter, it is likely that some form of border quarantine mechanism will be required for the foreseeable future to avoid the possibility that imported cases and strains could compound these challenges. Professor Teo Yik-Ying predicted that Singapore would maintain border restrictions at least until 2021.

Implementing border quarantine measures over any time frame is indeed disruptive. However if applied swiftly, relaxed appropriately, and justified properly using the full range of scientific evidence available, evidence from other countries demonstrates that they are an effective tool to assist in keeping COVID-19 from spreading into countries with a relatively low level of infection. We have concluded that the UK’s experience of COVID-19 has been far worse as a result of the Government’s decision not to require quarantine and thus reduce the number of imported strains during March.

Keeping measures in place while closely monitoring travel corridors and other exceptions will be important to ensure that the UK does not reimport unmanageable levels of COVID-19. This is particularly important when there is doubt about the affordability—both economically, and in terms of goodwill—of a second national lockdown, and when seasonal pressures on the NHS begin to build over the autumn and into the winter months. In a situation as fast-moving as the COVID-19 pandemic, any delay in controlling new infections can have profound consequences; it is therefore of paramount importance that the Government reviews its border measures weekly and is able to respond quickly to changing patterns of infection, including by introducing further restrictions if needed. We do not take lightly the potential burden on individuals and the economy from closing borders and requiring quarantine, as well as the potential damage to the economy and to public health if the virus takes hold again; we also recognise that it can only be one strand in a wider, larger strategy of disease control. However, border health measures must form crucial part of any Government strategy to obtain and maintain control of the virus over the months to come. (Paragraph 236) Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 85