Source · Select Committees · Home Affairs Committee
Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (coronavirus): management of the borders
Home Affairs Committee
HC 563
Published 5 August 2020
Government response
Sixth Special Report: Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (coronavirus): management of the borders: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report · published 13 Nov 2020
Recommendations & Conclusions
1
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 4
In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that...
Conclusion
In conducting this inquiry, we recognise that the COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges and that the Government had to respond swiftly in circumstances of great uncertainty. We also recognise and are grateful for the hard work of all those responding …
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Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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2
Conclusion
Rejected
While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on...
Conclusion
While it is not possible to determine the precise impact that borders policy has on the trajectory of the pandemic, almost every country in the world including the UK has used border measures at some point to try to control …
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Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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3
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 32
The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a...
Conclusion
The Government and its scientific advisers faced a huge challenge in early 2020 from a fast-moving virus in circumstances where information was changing constantly and decisions about borders had to be made at pace. Inevitably those decisions were difficult, and …
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Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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4
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 33
The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early...
Conclusion
The incremental introduction of international travel measures during the period from late January to early March corresponded to the practice in other countries during this time and reflects the great uncertainty with which governments were grappling. It was right to …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, defending its past decisions regarding border measures in March. They state that isolation guidance was superseded, decisions were science-led, and that imported cases made a marginal impact when domestic transmission was high, while maintaining open borders was crucial.
Home Office
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5
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 34
It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other...
Conclusion
It is also clear that, overall, the border measures in the UK and many other European countries in early March were not sufficient to contain the cross-border spread of the virus. Had stronger early measures been taken—such as requiring legally-enforceable …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that border measures were insufficient and that they did not recognise the risk from Europe. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national guidance, decisions were science-led, and enhanced monitoring was in place for high-risk areas during the contain phase.
Home Office
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6
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 35
However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate...
Conclusion
However, the failure to advise people travelling or returning from Spain in particular to self-isolate for 14 days (in line with category 1) or, at the very least, to monitor symptoms and call NHS 111 (in line with category 2) …
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Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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7
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 36
We are also concerned at the lack of clarity over who was responsible for the...
Conclusion
We are also concerned at the lack of clarity over who was responsible for the continued monitoring and assessment of emerging infection threats from different countries, and for drawing up policy options for Ministers to respond. Any future inquiry into …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees that any future inquiry into the UK's handling of COVID-19 should consider all aspects of the response, including the specific points raised by the committee.
Home Office
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8
Conclusion
Deferred
Para 39
We recognise the difficulties faced by the Government in considering temperature checks, screening or testing...
Conclusion
We recognise the difficulties faced by the Government in considering temperature checks, screening or testing at the border, and we also recognise the limited UK testing capacity at that time. However, given the success of targeted COVID-19 testing on arrivals …
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Government Response Summary
The government explains why it has not endorsed testing at the border to avoid self-isolation, citing efficacy concerns, and states that various screening measures have been considered and discounted. However, it will continue to keep all measures under review and is working to consider future border testing options, including reducing self-isolation.
Home Office
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9
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 40
Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of...
Conclusion
Overall, in the epidemic phase of COVID-19, insufficient emphasis was placed on the importance of controlling importation from overseas as a method for containing the virus or delaying its spread. The decision by SAGE only to consider measures that could …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, stating its isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and SAGE advice, including enhanced border monitoring during the contain phase.
Home Office
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10
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 41
Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their...
Conclusion
Dismissing strict border measures as “draconian” on 3 February was erroneous, as it was their strength that could have made a significant contribution and potentially mitigated the scale of domestic restrictions that were later needed. SAGE papers suggest that prioritising …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, maintaining that isolation guidance was replaced by national stay-at-home rules and that its decisions were consistently informed by scientific advice from SAGE during the pandemic.
Home Office
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11
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 59
We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13...
Conclusion
We are concerned that the UK’s approach to border measures in the period from 13 March to 8 June was very different from countries in similar circumstances. This should have raised serious questions within the Government about whether it was …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's concerns about the UK's border approach differing from other countries and their lack of evidence for evaluating those approaches. They reiterate that their decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
Home Office
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12
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 72
It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from...
Conclusion
It is now apparent that many more COVID-19 cases were imported to the UK from Europe in mid-March than was estimated at the time, when, with the exception of Italy, the focus remained largely on potential importations of the virus …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that uncontrolled importations significantly contributed to the rapid spread of the virus in mid-March. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
Home Office
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13
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 73
Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during...
Conclusion
Not having any special border measures applicable to people arriving from Spain and France during March, and only having time-limited self-isolation measures for arrivals from Italy, therefore had a material effect on the number of cases circulating within the UK. …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the Committee's assertions, clarifying that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all pandemic decisions were scientifically informed by SAGE advice, including enhanced border monitoring.
Home Office
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14
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 74
Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not...
Conclusion
Although the full scale of the epidemic in Spain and later in France was not properly known in mid-March, that is not a justification for the lifting of border measures. Evidence of the epidemic escalating, especially in Spain, was already …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that its approach to border measures in mid-March was wrong. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by science and appropriate for the time.
Home Office
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15
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Para 97
The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the...
Conclusion
The failure of the Home Office and other Government Departments to provide us with the scientific advice behind the decision to withdraw special measures for international arrivals on 13 March despite their repeated promises to do so is completely unacceptable. …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions regarding March 13th guidance and defends its decision-making as scientifically informed, but does not address the Committee's specific complaint about the repeated failure to provide the requested scientific advice for that decision.
Home Office
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16
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Para 98
The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence...
Conclusion
The Government has still has not given any indication that it will provide the evidence behind the withdrawal of guidance on 13 March. These appeals have been made to three members of the Cabinet, to one further Minister, and to …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were scientifically informed. However, it fails to address the Committee's specific complaint about the continued non-provision of evidence for the March 13th decision.
Home Office
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17
Recommendation
Rejected
Para 99
The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the...
Recommendation
The Home Office—and other departments of Government if necessary—must either publish or provide to the Committee immediately a full account of the scientific evidence and advice leading to its decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. If …
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Government Response Summary
The government refutes the committee's assertion that isolation guidance was dropped, explaining it was superseded by national guidance and decisions were based on scientific advice. It implicitly rejects the request to publish specific evidence by explaining its reasoning without committing to provide the requested account.
Home Office
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18
Conclusion
Rejected
The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as...
Conclusion
The decision to lift all COVID-19-related guidance for international arrivals on 13 March, just as other countries were expanding their border measures, is inexplicable. The Committee does not accept the argument that the introduction of voluntary ‘stay at home’ guidance …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's claim that lifting guidance for international arrivals on 13 March was inexplicable. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that decisions were science-led and appropriate for the time.
Home Office
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19
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 101
Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures...
Conclusion
Nor do we accept that falling numbers of arrivals justified the lifting of border measures in mid-March. Although passenger numbers started to fall, a further one million people were to arrive between 13 March and lockdown on 23 March, and …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that falling arrival numbers did not justify lifting border measures, stating the committee is incorrect. It explains that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by scientific advice and the progression of the pandemic.
Home Office
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20
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 102
We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after...
Conclusion
We also do not accept the Home Office’s suggestion that no measures were needed after 13 March because imported cases made up only 0.5% of total UK infections. That figure was not calculated until 22 March by which time a …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion that it was incorrect to argue no border measures were needed after 13 March. They maintain that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that decisions were informed by science and appropriate for the given phase of the pandemic.
Home Office
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21
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 103
The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting...
Conclusion
The Government does not seem to have examined the full range of possible measures affecting international travel and considered their additive effect. It is understandable that the Government did not consider it practical or effective to simply restrict flights, not …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by scientific advice and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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22
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 104
Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’...
Conclusion
Firm border measures introduced in June were considerably stronger than both the ‘stay at home’ guidance and lockdown restrictions imposed in mid-March. Indeed, they were exactly the “draconian” measures initially rejected by SAGE, enforceable in law. Justifying the decision to …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertion of inconsistency in its border strategy. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded by national guidance on 13 March and that decisions were informed by scientific advice and were appropriate for the phase of the pandemic.
Home Office
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23
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 107
It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance...
Recommendation
It is not clear who was responsible for making the decision to withdraw self-isolation guidance on 13 March, or on what basis. It is hard to reconcile Professor Aston’s suggestion that advice was provided at the time the decision was …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions about the 13 March decision but fails to address the specific call for urgent clarity on who was responsible for the decision-making process and on what basis. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.
Home Office
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24
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 118
It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that...
Recommendation
It is deeply concerning that the Government is not able to provide any estimates that were produced at any point of the cardinal number of imported cases during March. The Home Office should have requested advice on the estimated number …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's general assertions but fails to address the specific recommendation that the Home Office should have requested and made available estimates of imported cases during March to inform ministerial decisions. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.
Home Office
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25
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 125
In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested...
Recommendation
In a public health crisis transparency is crucial, both to ensure that analysis is tested and to build trust and confidence. We welcome the decision to publish SAGE papers. However, transparency cannot be selective without clear explanation, particularly when the …
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Government Response Summary
The government states that SAGE minutes and papers are now published on www.gov.uk, but it does not address the recommendation to explain clearly why there have been delays in publishing papers within a month of relevant meetings.
Home Office
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26
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
Para 126
The Committee shares the concern of the Science and Technology Committee that bodies advising Government,...
Conclusion
The Committee shares the concern of the Science and Technology Committee that bodies advising Government, including Public Health England, are also insufficiently transparent about the nature and content of the advice they are providing.
Government Response Summary
The government states that minutes and papers from SAGE meetings are now published on www.gov.uk, partially addressing the concern about transparency of advisory bodies.
Home Office
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27
Conclusion
Rejected
The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from...
Conclusion
The Home Office has stated repeatedly that it followed scientific advice from SAGE and from its own Scientific Adviser ahead of the Government’s decision to withdraw guidance for international arrivals on 13 March. By the same measure, the Government’s Chief …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national stay-at-home guidance and that all decisions were informed by scientific advice and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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28
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 149
We welcome the Government’ decision to re-introduce border measures.
Conclusion
We welcome the Government’ decision to re-introduce border measures. We discuss later what the most appropriate border measures should be. But at a time when Home Office preparedness for COOVDD19 (coronavirus): management of the borders 79 COVID-19 infections continue to …
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Government Response Summary
The Government acknowledges the importance of border health measures for protecting public health and controlling imported cases of the virus.
Home Office
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29
Recommendation
Rejected
Para 150
It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism...
Recommendation
It was inevitable that the Government’s reintroduction of border measures was greeted with some scepticism in June. Having removed country-specific guidance in March when other countries were imposing compulsory quarantine arrangements for arrivals, the Government then found itself increasing restrictions …
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Government Response Summary
The government explicitly rejected the committee's assertions, stating that its decisions were consistently informed by scientific advice and SAGE, and detailed past measures without committing to publishing new analysis or explaining its relation to the wider pandemic strategy.
Home Office
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30
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 151
The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the...
Recommendation
The Government faces a difficult task: how to ensure control of the virus at the same time as getting the economy moving, including international travel, in the safest possible way. It will build more support for the difficult balancing judgements …
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Government Response Summary
The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not address the committee's call for transparency regarding the evidence behind its decisions to build public support.
Home Office
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31
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 156
It is very disappointing that Border Force officers did not receive guidance on the implementation...
Recommendation
It is very disappointing that Border Force officers did not receive guidance on the implementation of new regulations until less than one working day before they came into force. Without enough time to raise questions and properly to digest the …
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Government Response Summary
The government states that Border Force already provided a comprehensive readiness programme and training to staff in advance of implementation, and that staff guidance is continually reviewed and updated routinely ahead of changes taking effect.
Home Office
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32
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 174
We welcome the Government’s attempt to develop an approach to travel corridors which recognises the...
Conclusion
We welcome the Government’s attempt to develop an approach to travel corridors which recognises the different prevalence of the virus in different countries and regions. It is clearly sensible to be able to treat travellers from New Zealand, where there …
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Government Response Summary
The government stated it keeps its methodology and border measures under regular review, informed by public health information, and has created a Global Travel Taskforce to enable the safe and sustainable recovery of international travel.
Home Office
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33
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 175
However, we also note the warnings from public health experts in countries like New Zealand...
Recommendation
However, we also note the warnings from public health experts in countries like New Zealand and Singapore that are continuing to take a much more restrictive approach to international travel, and who advised against mass-market travel in Europe this summer. …
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Government Response Summary
The Government agrees swift action is needed and states it already uses the Joint Biosecurity Centre, working with PHE, to assess risks and inform ministerial decisions for travel corridor exemptions, promising to continue this review.
Home Office
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34
Recommendation
Acknowledged
Para 176
We welcome the Government’s commitment regularly to review its border quarantine regulations.
Recommendation
We welcome the Government’s commitment regularly to review its border quarantine regulations. The move to weekly and daily reviews of travel corridors is welcome as three-weekly reviews were not sufficiently frequent. Far more frequent review appropriately reflects the agility required …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the need for increased transparency in the Travel Corridor process and states it is working with other departments and devolved administrations to consider options for this.
Home Office
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35
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 192
Given the surge in confirmed COVID-19 cases in mainland Spain and the clear and rising...
Conclusion
Given the surge in confirmed COVID-19 cases in mainland Spain and the clear and rising risk of increasing numbers of people returning to the UK with COVID-19, a precautionary approach including quarantine for returning travellers is the right one. As …
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Government Response Summary
The government agreed on the need for swift action due to COVID-19 risk, detailing how it acts quickly to adjust travel corridor exemptions based on Joint Biosecurity Centre assessments of public health risks.
Home Office
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36
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 193
However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in...
Recommendation
However, this has undoubtedly been extremely difficult for many travellers who paid for holidays in Spain following the FCO and DfT guidance in the expectation that they would be able to return to work, caring responsibilities, medical appointments and family …
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Government Response Summary
The government stated it agrees swift action is needed for COVID-19 risk and detailed its process for adjusting travel corridor exemptions based on Joint Biosecurity Centre assessments, but did not address the recommendation for greater sensitivity or changes in communication regarding the impact of sudden policy shifts on individuals and businesses.
Home Office
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37
Recommendation
Not Addressed
The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”.
Recommendation
The Government has rightly warned now that “no travel is risk free”. However, stronger warnings should have been given at the time the travel corridors were first introduced in early July. The Government’s mixed messages at that time were regrettable. …
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Government Response Summary
The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, and explains its swift action to remove/reinstate countries. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific prevalence rates or provide a detailed explanation for why Spain was initially included on the travel corridors list.
Home Office
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38
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 195
The disruption to travel plans and surprise caused by removing Spain from the travel corridor...
Recommendation
The disruption to travel plans and surprise caused by removing Spain from the travel corridor list demonstrates how essential it is that surveillance data is shared with the public openly and frequently. Potential travellers must be presented with the risks …
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Government Response Summary
The government details the criteria used for risk assessment, including viral incidence, transmission status, and testing capacity, and states that current travel corridor information is available on gov.uk. It does not commit to publishing a specific 'traffic light system' or its categorisations.
Home Office
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39
Recommendation
Deferred
Para 196
Greater clarity would also be helpful on the Government’s overall objectives for its border measures...
Recommendation
Greater clarity would also be helpful on the Government’s overall objectives for its border measures and travel corridors as part of their wider strategy against COVID-19, including how it is balancing public health and economic considerations. We heard significant warnings …
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Government Response Summary
The government explains the evolving scientific advice behind its past border measure decisions to balance public health and economic considerations. It states that a Global Travel Taskforce was created to consider future steps and will report in early November.
Home Office
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40
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Para 206
The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the...
Conclusion
The creation of a Joint Biosecurity Centre ought to represent a step forward in the management of the pandemic, establishing clear responsibility for regular surveillance of travel risks from different countries and publishing clear and transparent analysis, including of international …
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Government Response Summary
The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's role and methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, but it does not address the committee's concern about the lack of transparency regarding JBC analysis or commit to publishing prevalence rates.
Home Office
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41
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 207
The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of...
Conclusion
The Government’s historic inability to convince the Committee of the credibility of its calculations of the numbers of people who have come into the UK carrying COVID-19 does not inspire us with confidence about its ability to assess the scale …
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Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the committee's assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded by national 'stay at home' guidance and that all decisions were informed by science and appropriate measures were introduced at the right time.
Home Office
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42
Recommendation
Acknowledged
Para 208
We are concerned that Ministers do not seem to have access to information about prevalence...
Recommendation
We are concerned that Ministers do not seem to have access to information about prevalence rates internationally, and there is confusion about what information is held by the Department for Health and Social Care, as well as the interaction between …
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Government Response Summary
The government explains that lead responsibility for border measures has transferred from the Home Office to the Department for Transport, with public health monitoring primarily handled by DHSC. It emphasizes ongoing intensive cross-government collaboration but does not commit to clarifying overall departmental responsibilities or establishing a new process for greater transparency.
Home Office
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43
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 209
As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public...
Recommendation
As we set out in the first chapter, transparency and trust are crucial in public health crises. That is why the Government must now ensure that the analysis behind the introduction of quarantine rules and the introduction of travel corridors …
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Government Response Summary
The government describes the methodology used by the Joint Biosecurity Centre for assessing risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, noting a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific analysis, JBC assessments of prevalence rates, or government estimates of COVID-19 in arrivals as recommended.
Home Office
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44
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 214
It is not clear exactly which Government department or agency is ultimately responsible for coordinating...
Recommendation
It is not clear exactly which Government department or agency is ultimately responsible for coordinating border policy. Evidence from the Home Secretary suggested important roles for the Department of Health and Social Care, Public Health England and the Department for …
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Government Response Summary
The Government states that lead responsibility for the international travel programme has transferred from the Home Office to the Department for Transport, with the Secretary of State for Transport now responsible for signing regulations, while collaborative efforts across departments continue.
Home Office
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45
Recommendation
Acknowledged
Para 215
It is concerning that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Transport have...
Recommendation
It is concerning that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Transport have issued contrasting advice to the public on more than one occasion, at a time when providing clarity about the new travel corridors and nurturing confidence …
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Government Response Summary
The Government agrees on the importance of clear communication and states that gov.uk serves as the single source for policy and operational changes, with content linked from a central page to ensure clarity and consistency for users.
Home Office
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46
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Para 216
We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the...
Recommendation
We are concerned that there is not total agreement between all four nations of the UK over which travel corridors should be implemented. While we respect that matters of public health are devolved, we encourage the UK and devolved governments …
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Government Response Summary
The government agreed on the importance of clear communication and outlined how it ensures gov.uk is the single source for policy changes, but did not address the recommendation for a single four-nations approach to border measures or publishing Joint Biosecurity Centre figures.
Home Office
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47
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 223
The Government’s estimate of compliance with its enforcement regime for border quarantine is unconvincing.
Recommendation
The Government’s estimate of compliance with its enforcement regime for border quarantine is unconvincing. That the estimate is so high should be grounds for healthy cynicism and interrogation. A better method for estimating the true compliance rate is required, based …
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Government Response Summary
The government claims high compliance and describes its existing enforcement mechanisms, including Border Force checks, PHE's Isolation Assurance Service, and police referrals. It notes that "data in relation to Border Health measures" was published once on gov.uk, but does not commit to the routine fortnightly publication of the specific figures requested.
Home Office
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48
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Para 224
Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is...
Conclusion
Effective quarantine arrangements require high levels of voluntary compliance, even more so when enforcement is limited. The suddenness and lack of transparency behind the decisions about Spain may have consequences for enforcement if travellers remain sceptical about the policy or …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the need for swift action and explains its methodology for determining travel corridors and the decision regarding Spain, acknowledging the impact on travellers. However, it does not outline specific plans to build confidence in its decisions or ensure that people can afford to comply with quarantine requirements.
Home Office
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49
Recommendation
Deferred
Border quarantine restrictions are likely to remain in place for some time, particularly if there...
Recommendation
Border quarantine restrictions are likely to remain in place for some time, particularly if there is now emerging agreement that cases of COVID-19 could increase in the winter months. The UK’s approach to its borders will have to become more …
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Government Response Summary
The government has not endorsed widespread border testing due to concerns about false negatives and discounted other screening methods. However, it states that all measures remain under review and the Global Travel Taskforce is considering whether testing could form part of future border health measures, including reducing self-isolation days.
Home Office
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50
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 232
As passenger numbers rise and interactions between Border Force officers and arrivals increase, it is...
Recommendation
As passenger numbers rise and interactions between Border Force officers and arrivals increase, it is crucial that there are no lapses in PPE availability for officers on the frontline who have worked admirably in difficult conditions for several months. The …
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Government Response Summary
The Government states that Border Force and the Home Office already regularly reappraise PPE requirements and maintain good stock levels, and will continue these efforts to protect officers.
Home Office
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51
Recommendation
Accepted
Para 233
Concerns about provision of PPE to key workers have been a recurring theme during the...
Recommendation
Concerns about provision of PPE to key workers have been a recurring theme during the COVID-19 pandemic. We understand that Border Force’s provision of PPE to its staff has been based on PHE and WHO advice. However, Border Force officials …
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Government Response Summary
The government states it has successfully ensured sufficient PPE supply, installed protective screens, and will continue to work with partners and regularly reappraise PPE requirements for Border Force officers, implying existing measures address staff safety concerns.
Home Office
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52
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Para 234
Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising...
Conclusion
Given the widespread concern about the potential for a second wave, and for a rising number of infections toward and during winter, it is likely that some form of border quarantine mechanism will be required for the foreseeable future to …
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Government Response Summary
The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not engage with the committee's conclusion that some form of border quarantine mechanism would likely be required for the foreseeable future.
Home Office
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53
Recommendation
Acknowledged
Para 235
Implementing border quarantine measures over any time frame is indeed disruptive.
Recommendation
Implementing border quarantine measures over any time frame is indeed disruptive. However if applied swiftly, relaxed appropriately, and justified properly using the full range of scientific evidence available, evidence from other countries demonstrates that they are an effective tool to …
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Government Response Summary
The government stated that health measures at the border protect public health and control imported cases, describing how it reviews its approach and is establishing a Global Travel Taskforce to consider the safe and sustainable recovery of international travel.
Home Office
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54
Recommendation
Deferred
Keeping measures in place while closely monitoring travel corridors and other exceptions will be important...
Recommendation
Keeping measures in place while closely monitoring travel corridors and other exceptions will be important to ensure that the UK does not reimport unmanageable levels of COVID-19. This is particularly important when there is doubt about the affordability—both economically, and …
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Government Response Summary
The government states it keeps its border measures under regular review, informed by public health information, and has created a Global Travel Taskforce on 7 October to consider the safe and sustainable recovery of international travel, with a report due in early November.
Home Office
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