Source · Select Committees · International Development Committee
Second Report - Global Britain in demand: UK climate action and international development around COP26
International Development Committee
HC 99
Published 26 October 2021
Recommendations
2
Para 25
We are concerned about the extent to which the priorities and knowledge of marginalised groups...
Recommendation
We are concerned about the extent to which the priorities and knowledge of marginalised groups are factored into measures tackling climate change. Ensuring that the voices of the most marginalised, local communities are fully taken on board will improve the …
Read more
3
Building the capacity of local authorities and grassroots organisations in LDCs and SIDS to tackle...
Recommendation
Building the capacity of local authorities and grassroots organisations in LDCs and SIDS to tackle climate change requires more attention. We urge the FCDO to grow long-term capacity in LDCs and SIDS by lengthening programme cycles to 5–10 years for …
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4
Para 51
Access to climate finance remains a significant challenge for LDCs, SIDS and grassroots organisations.
Recommendation
Access to climate finance remains a significant challenge for LDCs, SIDS and grassroots organisations. For Global Britain to be a credible “force for good”, we urge the Government to use its COP presidency and position as a key donor to …
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5
We believe that the current level of international climate finance is fundamentally over-reported, reducing the...
Recommendation
We believe that the current level of international climate finance is fundamentally over-reported, reducing the credibility of declarations and scope for achieving climate adaptation and resilience. We are calling for full transparency in the reporting of climate finance to enhance …
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6
Para 74
We are concerned about the broad list of exemptions in the Government’s new fossil fuel...
Recommendation
We are concerned about the broad list of exemptions in the Government’s new fossil fuel policy as it raises questions about the UK’s credibility as a “force for good” and its commitment to net zero. We therefore urge the Government …
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7
Para 81
We understand the call of many contributors to create a separate funding stream for loss...
Recommendation
We understand the call of many contributors to create a separate funding stream for loss and damage from climate events, such as from sea-level rise, and acknowledge the challenges in accomplishing this at this time. Nonetheless, we urge the Government …
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8
Para 91
We welcome the Government holding a Climate and Development Ministerial meeting in March 2021 to...
Recommendation
We welcome the Government holding a Climate and Development Ministerial meeting in March 2021 to capture the concerns of climate-vulnerable countries in the run-up to COP26. We recommend that the FCDO hosts a Climate and Development Ministerial with climate-vulnerable countries …
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11
We believe that climate and development are closely intertwined.
Recommendation
We believe that climate and development are closely intertwined. The Integrated Review prioritises climate change “in 2021 and beyond” and suggests using UK ODA to increase the Government’s impact as a “force for good”. We therefore recommend the introduction of …
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25
We are concerned about the extent to which the priorities and knowledge of marginalised groups...
Recommendation
We are concerned about the extent to which the priorities and knowledge of marginalised groups are factored into measures tackling climate change. Ensuring that the voices of the most marginalised, local communities are fully taken on board will improve the …
Read more
33
Building the capacity of local authorities and grassroots organisations in LDCs and SIDS to tackle...
Recommendation
Building the capacity of local authorities and grassroots organisations in LDCs and SIDS to tackle climate change requires more attention. We urge the FCDO to grow long-term capacity in LDCs and SIDS by lengthening programme cycles to 5–10 years for …
Read more
51
Access to climate finance remains a significant challenge for LDCs, SIDS and grassroots organisations.
Recommendation
Access to climate finance remains a significant challenge for LDCs, SIDS and grassroots organisations. For Global Britain to be a credible “force for good”, we urge the Government to use its COP presidency and position as a key donor to …
Read more
62
We believe that the current level of ICF is fundamentally over-reported, reducing the credibility of...
Recommendation
We believe that the current level of ICF is fundamentally over-reported, reducing the credibility of declarations and scope for achieving climate adaptation and resilience. We are calling for full transparency in the reporting of climate finance to enhance the ability …
Read more
74
We are concerned about the broad list of exemptions in the Government’s new fossil fuel...
Recommendation
We are concerned about the broad list of exemptions in the Government’s new fossil fuel policy as it raises questions about the UK’s credibility as a “force for good” and its commitment to net zero. We therefore urge the Government …
Read more
81
We understand the call of many contributors to create a separate funding stream for loss...
Recommendation
We understand the call of many contributors to create a separate funding stream for loss and damage from climate events, such as from sea-level rise, and acknowledge the challenges in accomplishing this at this time. Nonetheless, we urge the Government …
Read more
91
We welcome the Government holding a Climate and Development Ministerial meeting in March 2021 to...
Recommendation
We welcome the Government holding a Climate and Development Ministerial meeting in March 2021 to capture the concerns of climate-vulnerable countries in the run-up to COP26. We recommend that the FCDO hosts a Climate and Development Ministerial with climate-vulnerable countries …
Read more
Conclusions (82)
1
Conclusion
Para 24
We are concerned that the FCDO might focus more on fast results than on tackling the root causes of social vulnerability in its interventions. Furthermore, we are concerned that social vulnerability might be considered less a core focus of the UK’s delivery of climate action and more just another tick …
9
Conclusion
Para 95
Tackling climate change and biodiversity loss as the Government’s “number one international priority” will inevitably involve international development. We are concerned that the Integrated Review does not include explicit initiatives building the capacity of FCDO’s network to maximise the synergies between departments dealing with development, climate, energy and the environment.
10
Conclusion
Para 96
A failure to anchor climate change in development and to ensure greater policy coherence in Whitehall will increase the scope for maladaptation, the negative consequences of poorly designed Nature-based Solutions and wasteful spending of the reduced ODA. By introducing a Climate and Development Minister, the UK would demonstrate that it …
12
Conclusion
Dr Lisa Schipper also told us that staff at the FCDO faced pressure to deliver results swiftly.26 She added that the FCDO officers to whom she presented her paper on maladaptation were “fully aware” of the risks of maladaptation but were “operating within a structure that does not allow them …
13
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that effective sustainable development takes into consideration “all factors and risks, including climate change and social vulnerability”.28 The Government has engaged in numerous measures to ensure global progress on adaptation and resilience in the run-up to COP26. On 25 January 2021, the Government committed itself to …
14
Conclusion
On the same day, COP26 President the Rt Hon Alok Sharma MP launched the Adaptation Action Coalition,31 in order to accelerate progress on adaptation in partnership with five countries and the UN32 as well as the “Race to Resilience” campaign to build the resilience of four billion climate-vulnerable people by …
15
Conclusion
In its Adaptation Communication to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN Climate Change) in December 2020, the Government stated that it was: committed to ensuring women and girls, indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, and marginalised groups, particularly those from parts of the world that …
16
Conclusion
However, Eileen Mairena Cunningham, Active Observer at the Green Climate Fund representing the Civil Society, Indigenous Peoples and Local Community Network, told us that in terms of UK interventions in the Green Climate Fund, which is the world’s biggest multilateral climate fund: the UK Government are not so vocal about …
17
Conclusion
Asked about unintended consequences of green energy projects, Lord Goldsmith, the Minister for the Pacific and the Environment at the FCDO and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), told us that the FCDO’s approach was “generally a pretty robust and holistic one”.36 He said: 28 Foreign, Commonwealth …
18
Conclusion
Vel Gnanendran, Head of the Climate and Environment Directorate (CED) at the FCDO, added that the Department followed a “do no harm” principle and that “every business case has to have a gender equality assessment, and social development advisers are involved in some of the social implications of all programmes”.38 …
19
Conclusion
Nature-based Solutions are: actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems, that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits.39
20
Conclusion
Contributors told us that Nature-based Solutions (NbS) must be implemented with the full engagement and consent of local communities to effectively build their resilience.40 According to Christian Aid, NbS can either result in “considerable potential co-benefits” for biodiversity, people and the climate if done well, or in “disastrous outcomes” if …
21
Conclusion
The Institute of Development Studies stated that NbS are neither a “silver bullet” nor a substitute for phasing out fossil fuels and warned against the expansion of tree planting to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere instead of the protection of existing, intact ecosystems, of biodiversity, of land rights of …
22
Conclusion
In its Adaptation Communication to UN Climate Change in December 2020, the Government stated that: [t]hrough the UK COP 26 nature campaign, we are seeking to ensure that finance, capacity building and co-operation are available to unlock the potential of nature-based solutions.44 37 Q113 [Lord Zac Goldsmith] 38 Q113 [Vel …
23
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that it would “kick-start a just rural transition towards sustainable land use to benefit people, climate and nature” by earmarking £3 billion of the £11.6 billion in UK ICF for 2021–2026 to fund programmes that “protect, restore and sustainably manage nature”.45 Lord Goldsmith said that: You …
24
Conclusion
We are concerned that the FCDO might focus more on fast results than on tackling the root causes of social vulnerability in its interventions. Furthermore, we are concerned that social vulnerability might be considered less a core focus of the UK’s delivery of climate action and more just another tick …
26
Conclusion
In 2019, our predecessor Committee concluded that DFID-funded programmes: • ran for two to three years on average instead of the seven to ten years which NGOs preferred; • were terminated instead of being scaled up on a regular basis even if they were successful; and • were often accompanied …
27
Conclusion
Vulnerable countries and grassroots organisations are still calling for high-income donor countries and multilateral financial institutions to engage with them meaningfully in ways which build their capacity, knowledge and experience in adaptation in the long term.48
28
Conclusion
Cecília da Silva Bernardo, Representative of the Least Developed Countries Group and Co-Chair of the Adaptation Committee of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), told us that one of the biggest challenges for LDCs was insufficient capacity and expertise to plan and implement adaptation programmes by themselves in …
29
Conclusion
We heard that capacity-building at a local level was hampered by weak digital infrastructure,51 the complex design of programmes52 and a lack of sufficient adjustment of projects to the needs of local communities.53 Furthermore, we were told that projects implemented in the Global South might appear to be running for …
30
Conclusion
We received several examples of well-run, successful projects focussing on climate change which had not been scaled up.56 The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) concluded that, overall, the UK continued to provide climate finance for four years or less, with many programmes terminated even earlier due to change …
31
Conclusion
Catherine Pettengell, Interim Director at Climate Action Network UK (CAN- UK), told us that it did not make sense to close down efficient programming which was delivering the intended outcomes only to reopen it a few years later.59 She added that “there is significant wasted impact, wasted resources and wasted …
32
Conclusion
In its response to our predecessor Committee’s report, the Government partially agreed with the Committee’s conclusions but stressed that average programme duration was six to seven years and that projects were extended or scaled up if they were effective.61
34
Conclusion
Globally, adaptation plays “second fiddle” to mitigation in terms of international climate finance.63 Following a threat by low- and middle-income countries to walk out on the negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, higher income countries pledged to provide “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding” to meet “a goal …
35
Conclusion
The US$100 billion goal has yet to be met.66 The balance between mitigation and adaptation is also unmet as only 25% of climate finance has been invested in adaptation globally in recent years.67 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) suggests that adaptation already costs low- and middle-income countries an estimated …
36
Conclusion
We heard that the UK has “a really good story to tell on adaptation”.69 On average, 47% of UK ICF was spent on adaptation in the past four years.70 Furthermore the UK provided 89% of its ICF in grants rather than loans between 2016 and 2019,71 bucking the global trend …
37
Conclusion
In September 2019, the Government announced that it would double the amount of UK ICF to £11.6 billion for the period of 2021/22–2025/26.73 The Government referred to UK ODA as a means to increase its impact as a “force for good” in the Integrated Review.74 On 13 July 2021, however, …
38
Conclusion
We heard that the process of applying for climate funds remains cumbersome for most LDCs, SIDS and grassroots organisations.82 Only 14% of ICF reached the 46 LDCs and just 2% reached the 39 SIDS between 2016 and 2018.83 73 Gov.uk, UK Biennial Finance Communication to the UN Framework Convention on …
39
Conclusion
Our inquiry received many contributions about the largest multilateral climate fund,84 the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Our predecessor Committee previously highlighted the challenges in accessing funding from the GCF,85 and recommended that the Government improve efficiency in GCF decision-making and enable better access to climate finance.86
40
Conclusion
Since then, little has changed. The evidence that we heard includes accounts of the obstacles that must be overcome to access funding, which disadvantage fragile and conflict-affected states, other LDCs and SIDS as well as grassroots organisations.87
41
Conclusion
LDCs and SIDS face difficulties in accessing funding from multilateral organisations such as the GCF. H.E. Diann Black-Layne told us that: There is a struggle to keep on reminding the green climate fund and others—not the adaptation fund—that this is not development finance.88
42
Conclusion
Gebru Jember, Technical Lead of the Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) and former Chair of the LDC Group, spoke of lengthy review processes as well as micromanaging by the GCF Board which delayed the disbursement of funds even further..89 In his words: They [the Board …
43
Conclusion
He added that: when you submit a proposal, it takes two to three years minimum to access the finance. Then you need to revise, because things change. The impact of climate change invariably becomes a bit more severe, and that means the cost for adaptation and mitigation becomes more and …
44
Conclusion
Contributors also raised the importance of direct access to multilateral funds for grassroots organisations, LDCs and SIDS.92 To access funding from the GCF, for example, applicants have to become accredited first – a process which the GCF describes as a means to “assess whether they [applicants] are capable of strong …
45
Conclusion
Grassroots organisations equally face significant hurdles in accessing climate funding. Less than 10% of climate finance committed to low- and middle-income countries to combat climate change reaches the local level as funders of climate adaptation tend to prefer “bulk spending through central governments over tailoring and targeting locally, and directly …
46
Conclusion
As a result of bureaucratic procedures and accessing funding through intermediaries, the total amount of money at the disposal of grassroots organisations can be as little as 10–15% of the project value.96 Julius Ng’oma told us that his organisation - the Civil Society Network on Climate Change (CISONECC) – had …
47
Conclusion
Eileen Mairena Cunningham called for the full, effective and meaningful incorporation of marginalised groups in the global response to climate change and for direct access by them to funds from the GCF.99 She told us that currently: The requirements to access a fund are really difficult and it is always …
48
Conclusion
The UK is a top contributor to the four multilateral climate funds including the GCF.102 As such, it has influence on their policies and procedures. The UK was also instrumental in the establishment of the Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR), whose goal is to channel …
49
Conclusion
According to the FCDO, the UK helped facilitate the introduction of the GCF’s Updated Strategic Plan for 2020–2024, which aims to improve access to funding for LDCs, SIDS and other African countries as well as of a new voting procedure in the GCF.105 It has also facilitated work on a …
50
Conclusion
Vel Gnanendran told us that the Government intended to make propositions such as cutting the application process by 100 days as part of a simplified process, at the GCF Board meeting in October 2021.107 He added that: Hopefully, that will be approved, but it will take some time to be …
52
Conclusion
Despite its omnipresence in climate negotiations, there is no officially agreed definition of climate finance.110 In November 2020, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that the level of climate finance was US$78.9 billion in 2018.111 Yet, the OECD itself acknowledged that official reporting by higher income countries …
53
Conclusion
In their paper on climate finance, Roberts et al stated that the “US$100 billion per year climate finance promise had deep flaws, making it impossible to now assess whether it has been met.”113 Although the pledge of US$100 billion per year stated that funding would be derived from bilateral, multilateral …
54
Conclusion
We heard that another challenge was the different interpretation of the term ‘new and additional’. At COP15 in Copenhagen (2009), high-income countries agreed to provide new and additional funding “approaching US$30 billion” for 2010–2012 for climate adaptation and mitigation.116 Although reiterated at subsequent COPs in 2010 and 2015, it remains …
55
Conclusion
In its biennial progress report (December 2020), the Government stated that: Our funding will be new and in addition to our previous £5.8 billion ICF commitment.118 Many contributors criticised this statement for its interpretation of ‘new and additional’.119 The NGOs that wrote to us would prefer climate finance to be …
56
Conclusion
Contributors raised significant concerns around the accuracy of the amount of global international climate finance that is being reported as pledged and disbursed for adaptation by the UK and other donor countries.123 In its report published in January 2021, CARE International wrote that “current official figures for adaptation finance are …
57
Conclusion
In their paper on climate finance, Roberts et al state that funding is “insecure”, unpredictable and based on a “fragmented institutional architecture” which low- and middle-income countries cannot influence sufficiently.126 In their words: climate funds are funnelled through over 100 channels, very few of which are controlled in meaningful ways …
58
Conclusion
Marek Soanes, Researcher in Climate Finance at the IIED, told us in relation to marginalised groups that “It is just impossible to understand where the money is actually hitting their pockets”.128
59
Conclusion
At the Climate and Development Ministerial in March 2021, LDCs and SIDS offered practical solutions to improve access to climate finance.129 According to the IIED, these solutions included establishing a Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance headed by the UK and Fiji, harmonising and simplifying procedures to access directly ICF …
60
Conclusion
Although the UK was rated among the better performers in this report, CARE stated that, like other countries, the data provided by the UK lacked clarity and completeness in terms of the recipients and programmes to be funded.132
61
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that the UK reported its ICF at programme level—that is, a more granular level—to the UNFCCC, and provided details such as programme codes.133 It also told us that all its programme documentation is held in the Development Tracker, which listed “details of contracts and funding arrangements, …
63
Conclusion
The volume of greenhouse gas emissions has a significant impact on the capacity of LDCs and SIDS to adapt to climate change. On 9 August 2021, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its Sixth Assessment report, which the UN Secretary General referred to as a “a code red …
64
Conclusion
In March 2021, the Government introduced its new fossil fuel policy, which mirrors that of its development finance institution, the CDC Group (CDC). Both ban new, direct financial or promotional support for the fossil fuel energy sector137 abroad except for special, albeit controversial circumstances.138 The Government’s exemptions include:139 • Support …
65
Conclusion
Contributors expressed concerns about the Government’s fossil fuel policy and its impact on the investments made by the Government affiliates CDC, UK Export Finance (UKEF) and the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG).140 Dario Kenner, Lead Analyst on Sustainable Economic Development at the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), told us …
66
Conclusion
We also heard concerns about CDC’s level of transparency in its reporting. Dario Kenner told us that although the level of information provided on CDC’s website had improved “a great deal”, third parties sought more disclosure of data especially in the area of CDC’s work with financial institutions and intermediaries.143 …
67
Conclusion
Contributors told us that despite the official “arms-length” relationship between the Government and CDC, the Government had ample scope to influence the latter’s operations and decisions as its sole shareholder.145 NGOs are seeking greater Government influence on CDC’s operations to reduce the scope for funding fossil fuel energy sector abroad. …
68
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that the Government’s new fossil fuel policy “determines the UK’s voting position at the boards of Multilateral Development Banks and can be used to influence the investment policies of other development financial institutions (such CDC Group PLC and the Private Infrastructure Development Group) that receive UK …
69
Conclusion
The FCDO also stated that it would accelerate the transition to clean energy through the COP26 Energy Transition Council, which would “bring together energy ministers, leaders of multilateral development banks, and heads of expert agencies […] to ensure that for every country considering new power generation, clean power is the …
70
Conclusion
In July 2020, CDC presented its new Climate Change Strategy, with the aim of further aligning CDC’s measures with the Paris Agreement.150 CDC told us that it had committed over US$1 billion in climate finance since 2017, including for measures to provide renewable energy sources to people in hard-to-reach areas.151 …
71
Conclusion
On the exemptions to CDC’s new fossil fuel policy, Colin Buckley, General Counsel and Head of External Affairs at CDC, told us that it would “respect the individual country road maps to net zero” as “developing countries will all have slightly different paths to get to net zero by 2030”.154
72
Conclusion
On the pace of transition, CDC state on their webpage that: we avoid short-term policy changes. We are a long-term investor who thinks in decades rather than years.155 Colin Buckley told us that the perceived slow pace at aligning with the Paris Agreement of 2015 was due to “investment decisions …
73
Conclusion
On transparency and availability of data on CDC investments, Dr Amal-Lee Amin, Director of Climate Change, Value Creation Strategies team at the CDC, stated that it was “very much an evolving process.”158
75
Conclusion
We heard that loss and damage159 remained underserved in international climate action—even more so than climate adaptation.160 Contributors called for new and additional funding for loss and damage and for a more ambitious approach to addressing loss and damage.161 Bond and CAN-UK told us that: The UK has not yet …
76
Conclusion
H.E. Diann Black-Layne, Lead Negotiator on Climate Change, Alliance of Small Island States, told us that: The frequency and intensity [of hurricanes] is increasing, and this increase is caused by pollution that is not our fault. […] Ideally, climate justice should kick in and those who are polluting should compensate …
77
Conclusion
At the Climate and Development Ministerial on 31 March 2021, the Government launched the ‘Climate and Development Pathway’, including the commitment to operationalise the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage before COP26.166 While participants of a subsequent Ministerial meeting on 25-26 July 2021 agreed on the need for urgent action, …
78
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that the Government would use its COP26 presidency “to increase efforts to avert, minimise and address the challenges arising from loss and damage, including through effective disaster preparedness, risk reduction and response.”168
79
Conclusion
Lord Goldsmith agreed with the premise that those who had done the least were suffering the most from climate change but considered the introduction of a separate finance stream for loss and damage “highly unlikely”.169 He said: it is a political issue. If countries wanted to step up, they could, …
80
Conclusion
He added that: Our approach of pushing very hard for a clear, even split between adaptation and mitigation is, in a sense, probably the most elegant way through what would otherwise be an impasse, by getting countries that may not accept the language of loss and damage, or compensation, to …
82
Conclusion
As a “stress multiplier”,172 climate change could increase the number of people living in poverty by an additional 100 million by 2030,173 while covid-19 and its secondary impacts have significantly slowed down the economic and social development of particularly marginalised groups in the Global South.174
83
Conclusion
COP26 is the starting point of a one-year opportunity for the UK to shape the direction of climate action and development in this decade significantly. As COP President, the UK 168 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (CDC0016) 169 Q125 [Lord Goldsmith] 170 Q125 [Lord Goldsmith] 171 Q126 [Lord Goldsmith] 172 …
84
Conclusion
Contributors told us, however, that the cuts to ODA reduce the scope for the UK to support vulnerable countries to address climate change alongside the impact of the covid-19 pandemic and high levels of public debt.175 We were also told that the aid cuts might damage the trust of climate-vulnerable …
85
Conclusion
H.E. Ms Diann Black-Layne, Lead Negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), spoke of a “broken trust” of LDCs and SIDS in the credibility of the UK and other donors because of the failure to contribute US$100 billion per year for low- and middle- income countries178—a stark contrast …
86
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that COP26 “is a key demonstration of the government’s vision of a Global Britain, the UK’s diplomatic and international convening power, and the newly formed FCDO.”180 During its COP presidency, the UK could put in place several measures to help deliver its ambition thanks to its …
87
Conclusion
On 31 March 2021, the Government hosted a Climate and Development Ministerial to discuss the challenges and priorities for delivering the Paris Climate Agreement and meeting the SDGs.181 The meeting brought together ministers of 35 countries and representatives of international finance institutions to produce practical actions regarding adaptation, access to …
88
Conclusion
Bond and CAN UK told us that the Ministerial had failed to address loss and damage directly.183 Further, the International Committee of the Red Cross highlighted a distinct lack of mentioning conflict and fragility in the Chair’s summary and the small number of participants from conflict-affected countries.184 UK’s response—Climate and …
89
Conclusion
The FCDO told us that the Climate and Development Ministerial had been a “key step in demonstrating that the UK Presidency and wider donor community is listening to and actively working to address the concerns of climate vulnerable countries”.185
90
Conclusion
Overall, we consider the Ministerial a notable step in making the UK a “force for good” and increasing the Government’s credibility as climate leader. We therefore agree with contributors that delivering on the issues raised at the Ministerial would help the Government build trust and momentum on decisive issues during …
92
Conclusion
In 2019, our predecessor Committee heard that DFID had been “hollowed out in terms of expertise”.187 Two years later, the FCDO’s largest thematic network consists of climate, energy and environment attachés and advisors.188 Alongside the FCDO, the Government also created the “Climate and Environment Directorate (CED)” with around 100 members …
93
Conclusion
The FCDO has taken a number of encouraging steps to address the impact of climate change in vulnerable countries such as the “Race to Resilience” campaign, the Adaptation Action Coalition, backing the Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) and signing up to the “Principles for Locally-Led …
94
Conclusion
Having heard of the challenges vulnerable countries and communities face and the measures taken by the Government, we would see value in the introduction of a Climate and Development Minister in the FCDO with a focus on adaptation and resilience. 183 Bond and Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (CDC0045) 184 …
95
Conclusion
Tackling climate change and biodiversity loss as the Government’s “number one international priority” will inevitably involve international development. We are concerned that the Integrated Review does not include explicit initiatives building the capacity of FCDO’s network to maximise the synergies between departments dealing with development, climate, energy and the environment.
96
Conclusion
A failure to anchor climate change in development and to ensure greater policy coherence in Whitehall will increase the scope for maladaptation, the negative consequences of poorly designed Nature-based Solutions and wasteful spending of the reduced ODA. By introducing a Climate and Development Minister, the UK would demonstrate that it …
97
Conclusion
We believe that climate and development are closely intertwined. The Integrated Review prioritises climate change “in 2021 and beyond” and suggests using UK ODA to increase the Government’s impact as a “force for good”. We therefore recommend the introduction of a Climate and Development Minister at the FCDO with a …