Recommendations & Conclusions
51 items
1
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
Numbers of aid worker deaths are rising year on year and the situations where access to aid is deliberately impeded are also increasing. This violates the purpose of IHL: to protect civilians in a time of war. We see growing examples of where IHL is ignored or used to justify …
Government response. The government agrees with the committee's concerns regarding rising aid worker deaths, restrictions on humanitarian access, and IHL violations, affirming that IHL must be respected and all tools leveraged to address these issues.
2
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We agree with the view of the ICRC that IHL is clear and comprehensive. It represents both a body of law that is robust and universal in its coverage, and a spirit by which warring parties must place the protection of civilians at the heart of their operational planning. However, …
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of IHL's comprehensiveness and accountability, detailing its existing foreign policy of supporting international criminal justice, vigilant alarm-raising, and support for the International Criminal Court.
3
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Not Addressed
We recommend that the UK Government takes the lead in efforts to reach a consensus on the use of autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence on the battlefield and the creation of an international instrument on their use. (Recommendation, Paragraph 10) 48
Government response. The government response discusses diplomatic influence, multilateral engagement, and enhancing IHL adherence for humanitarian access, but it does not address the recommendation regarding autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence on the battlefield.
4
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
There is encouraging collaboration by a select few UN Member States that are promoting adherence to IHL and, in particular, the protection of aid workers. Yet there is a lack of comprehensive leadership across all aspects of IHL by a single Member State and a willingness to expose and publicly …
Government response. The government agrees on the vital role of local organisations in humanitarian access negotiations and describes its commitment to leveraging UK influence to include them, and its funding of the Centre for Competence on Humanitarian Negotiations.
5
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Not Addressed
The UK armed forces have a strong and proud history of supporting IHL. They have experience of operating within the spirit and letter of IHL in extremely challenging environments, and of complying with accountability mechanisms when there have been allegations against them. At a time of increasing global tensions and …
Government response. The government response discusses mitigating sanctions impact on humanitarian aid and monitoring IHL adherence generally, but does not address the committee's specific conclusion regarding the UK armed forces' history and role as an example in upholding IHL.
6
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Not Addressed
We recommend that the Government prioritises military-to-military training on IHL in line with the increase in defence spending. It should make full use of the range of resources it has at its disposal to support foreign militaries to understand not only their obligations under IHL, but the benefit of adherence …
Government response. The government response outlines the UK's general support for IHL and calls on all parties to comply, but does not address the specific recommendation to prioritise and make full use of military-to-military training on IHL for foreign militaries.
7
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Not Addressed
The FCDO appears to be repeating the same approaches to overcoming access challenges whilst expecting different results. Successful records of traditional forms of public diplomacy in promoting unimpeded access to aid are patchy at best. Polarisation within bodies such as the UN Security Council limit the opportunities to overcome barriers …
Government response. The government response discusses protecting aid workers, IHL, and countering disinformation, but does not address the committee's observation that the FCDO is repeating approaches to access challenges and needs a radically new strategy.
8
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We recommend that the UK explores creative forms of diplomacy with likeminded states that can bring maximum pressure and combined diplomatic capability to solving specific access issues. As part of this initiative the diplomatic capacity and influence of the FCDO needs to be evaluated and invested in where needed. (Recommendation, …
Government response. The government agrees that humanitarian aid must be facilitated and commits to strengthening UK diplomatic influence through a new internal humanitarian diplomacy and access strategy, actively pursuing diplomatic efforts, and supporting relevant international mechanisms.
9
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Not Addressed
The UK is well placed to ensure the voice of local organisations is heard in negotiations over access for humanitarian aid. This input is vital for effective and sustainable aid delivery as well as maximising the safety of 49 those delivering it. Moreover, the UK is well positioned to make …
Government response. The government response discusses risk management for aid workers, programme guidelines, and budget lines for security, but does not directly address the committee's conclusion that the UK is well placed to ensure local organisations' voices are heard in access negotiations.
10
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We applaud the work of the current and previous Governments in ensuring that the safe delivery of aid is not jeopardised by most of the UK’s own legislation. However, lack of clarity around the UK’s anti-terrorism legislation has had a chilling effect on those delivering UK aid and risks limiting …
Government response. The government acknowledges seeking to mitigate negative impacts of sanctions and counter-terrorism legislation on humanitarian aid delivery and describes existing work with aid partners, including the UK Tri-Sector Group, to promote compliance.
11
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
We encourage the Government to consider a standing exemption for relevant humanitarian organisations to ensure that they do not risk liability for their legitimate dealings with sanctioned entities. In the meantime, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) must provide clearer guidance for the humanitarian sector on the interpretation of …
Government response. The government agrees and commits to introducing a tailored humanitarian exemption or ‘carve-out’ across autonomous UK sanctions when parliamentary time allows. They also state OFSI has comprehensive guidance and will continue working to produce clear guidance for humanitarian actors.
12
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
During an evidence session, the Minister was unclear about the extent of the application of approved approaches when it came to creative responses to the situation in Gaza. There are various mechanisms available at the international, regional and domestic levels for holding states and non-state actors to account for alleged …
Government response. The government asserts it is clear and consistent in its support for IHL in Gaza, consistently urges Israeli authorities to conduct swift investigations into incidents involving aid workers, and believes it is meeting its obligations through existing measures.
13
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
At the international level, the International Criminal Court provides a forum for holding states and individuals, respectively, accountable for breaches of IHL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
Government response. The government agrees with the conclusion, affirming its full commitment to international law and respect for the independence of the ICJ and ICC. It reiterates its strong support for the ICC through multilateral engagement and by encouraging states to become …
14
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
At a time when the legitimacy and impartiality of international courts is being questioned by some, the UK must stand firm in support of these important mechanisms for accountability to prevent impunity for serious violations of IHL. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)
Government response. The government agrees to stand firm in support of international courts, stating its full commitment to international law and respect for the independence of the ICJ and ICC, and reinforcing its support through multilateral fora.
15
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
We welcome the times that the Government has made a stand on the likely breaches of IHL that have reduced access of populations to aid and/or have failed to protect those delivering aid. We also welcome the more general calls for the protection of aid workers. However, the lack of …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it consistently calls on all parties to comply with IHL without differentiation and engages with partners to address reported violations. It clarifies that it cannot provide a running commentary on possible breaches due to lack …
16
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
As part of the UK’s leadership role, the Government must be ready to call out actions not only when a blatant breach of IHL has been ruled on by a court, but when the spirit of IHL is being eroded. This condemnation needs to extend to where an overly permissive …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it consistently calls on all parties to comply with IHL and observe robust standards without differentiation. It clarifies that it cannot provide a running commentary on possible breaches due to lack of detailed information to …
17
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Deferred
The FCDO needs to be led by the law without fear or favour. In July 2024, the International Courts of Justice handed down its advisory opinion on the legality of Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This advisory opinion sets out various obligations in respect of third …
Government response. The government acknowledges the ICJ's advisory opinion and states it is carefully considering it, committing to publish a full response in due course. It reiterates its commitment to international law and respects the ICJ's independence.
18
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We urge the Government to issue a formal response to the ICJ’s opinion concerning Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, setting out how it is complying with the obligations on the UK as a third party. (Recommendation, Paragraph 41)
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation, stating that consistent with long-standing policy, it does not consider the ICJ to have jurisdiction in this contentious case between Israel and Palestine. It maintains that a lasting peace requires a negotiated settlement between the …
19
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
We recommend that the UK works with the other UN Member States represented on the ministerial group for the safety of humanitarian aid workers to call for a Special Session of the UNSC to discuss the problem of disregard of IHL in the delivery of aid. This session should focus …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it already actively engages with UN Member States and co-sponsored UNSCR 2730, which addresses humanitarian personnel protection and will lead to a UN Secretary-General's report. It also supports the inclusion of humanitarian access in UN …
20
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend that the FCDO works with international partners to establish an independent central repository of evidence of breaches of IHL relating to the delivery of aid and attacks on aid workers. For this to be successful, the Government should undertake a consultation exercise with international and local delivery organisations, …
Government response. The government partially agrees with the intent but rejects leading the establishment of a new standalone central repository for evidence of IHL breaches. It prioritizes supporting existing mechanisms, such as UN and IIIM mechanisms, to prevent duplication of efforts.
21
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We agree with the Government that it is preferable to prosecute suspected breaches of IHL within the jurisdiction where they occurred, but only where there are sufficient resources and guarantees of fair trials. There is more the UK could be doing to support these legal systems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Government response. The government agrees that prosecuting breaches of IHL locally is preferable and highlights its existing support for capacity building in partner countries to strengthen justice and accountability mechanisms for IHL violations.
22
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend that the UK works with other willing members of the Ministerial Group on the Safety of Humanitarian Workers to establish a roster of independent legal experts and expert investigators who can support the criminal investigations of suspected breaches of IHL. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)
Government response. The government explicitly rejects establishing a new roster of independent legal experts and investigators, stating it will continue to prioritise support to existing accountability mechanisms instead.
23
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The preamble to the Statute of the International Criminal Court recalls “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” At the domestic level, the UK must ensure that it can exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes such as the killings of aid …
Government response. The government states it is committed to bringing perpetrators of serious international crimes to justice and already possesses a robust legal framework, including extraterritorial jurisdiction, for prosecuting such crimes in the UK regardless of where they were committed.
24
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill, to amend the International Criminal Court Act 2001, to provide for universal jurisdiction. This would allow for suspected war criminals to be investigated and prosecuted in the UK irrespective of their nationality, residency status, or location. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)
Government response. The government explicitly rejects amending the Crime and Policing Bill to extend universal jurisdiction, asserting that its existing robust legal framework, including the ICCA 2001, is sufficient for prosecuting international crimes.
25
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The UN has also established various investigative mechanisms in response to particular atrocities. Wherever possible, the UK should support, fund and participate in these mechanisms to assist with fact-finding, truth discovery, and the preservation of evidence of breaches of IHL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)
Government response. The government agrees, stating it already strongly supports and funds various UN investigative mechanisms, providing specific examples of financial support to several missions and ongoing funding for the ICC and other bodies. It also commits to promoting the use of …
26
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Specifically, we recommend that the UK makes better use of the good offices of the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission as part of its process of establishing whether IHL has been broken in specific cases. It should also be actively recommending these services to others. (Recommendation, Paragraph 56)
Government response. The government agrees, stating it recognises the IHFFC as an important mechanism and, while it hasn't used it in specific past contexts, it will consider its use where appropriate and will promote the use of the IHFFC.
27
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
In addition to legal mechanisms, the Government must use its powers to make sanctions a tool for ensuring respect for IHL. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the Government with the power to make sanctions for the purpose of promoting compliance with IHL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
Government response. The government agrees, stating it already uses its extensive sanctions powers to encourage compliance with IHL, citing specific examples of sanctions against individuals in Sudan, South Sudan, and Myanmar in 2025 and 2024.
28
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The Government must use its power to sanction individuals in response to clear breaches of IHL, such as unlawful killings of aid workers and restrictions on humanitarian aid and assistance. To do this the Government 52 must make sure that the Sanctions Team is sufficiently resourced and that the evidence …
Government response. The government agrees, stating it already uses its sanctions powers to encourage compliance with IHL, providing examples of recent sanctions. It also notes that the FCDO continues to assess resourcing requirements for the Sanctions Directorate and that the evidential threshold …
29
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
There is much more the Government could do to ensure that UK manufactured weapon components do not fall into the hands of those who may use them in attacks on aid workers and aid infrastructure. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it already has a robust export control regime and will publish an annual report on UK strategic export controls. However, it rejects commitments to an independent review of past allegations, independent audits, or temporary freezing …
30
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
We recommend the Government a. Provide for interim measures to allow for the temporary freezing of licenses where there are credible allegations of IHL breaches, subject to full investigation and final determination; b. report findings of independent audits of arms exports to Parliament, including details of any incidents where British …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it already assesses IHL risks and wider security context, including risks to aid workers, for export licences, and will publish an annual report on strategic export controls. However, it rejects providing for interim licence freezing …
31
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
There is no legal requirement for companies in the UK to stop exporting arms when they are aware of a clear risk that their weapons could be used in suspected breaches of IHL–instead the legal obligations rest on the Government. It is time for this to be addressed. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
Government response. The government rejects the implicit call for action, stating that legal obligations for arms exports rest with the government, not manufacturers, and it does not intend to legislate for binding due diligence requirements. It maintains the UK already has a …
32
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
The Government should legislate to provide for binding due diligence requirements on arms manufacturers. The Government should also make use of existing powers under the International Criminal Court Act (2001) to prosecute directors of arms manufacturers for complicity in war crimes such as those relating to the targeting of aid …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation, stating it already has a robust export control regime and does not intend to legislate for due diligence requirements. It also states that prosecutions are a matter for independent authorities, which the government cannot direct.
33
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
We recommend that the Government takes appropriate opportunities to commemorate the sacrifices of the hundreds of aid workers every year who pay the ultimate price in the service of others. This should include representation at the memorial service in Westminster Abbey, speeches coinciding with the UN Secretary General’s update on …
Government response. The government agrees to commemorate aid worker sacrifices, noting it already marks World Humanitarian Day, attends memorial services, delivers speeches for UNSCR 2730, and has introduced the Humanitarian Medal. It welcomes the suggestion to update Parliament on this issue as …
34
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
It has never been more dangerous to be a humanitarian aid worker. These workers put their lives on the line every day to protect others. Aid workers suffer direct intimidation and attacks in the field, as well as the impact of vicarious trauma through the processing of media. The disregard …
Government response. The government acknowledges the increased risks to humanitarian personnel and reaffirms its commitment to championing aid worker protection through ongoing initiatives, including the proposed Australia-led Declaration.
35
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
The safety of aid workers and aid delivery is further hampered by the spread of malicious disinformation online and in other forms of media. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government response. The government agrees that malicious disinformation threatens aid worker safety, highlighting the BBC World Service's role and describing FCDO's existing efforts to counter foreign information manipulation, including a recent programme in Sudan.
36
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
We recommend that the Government work closely with those delivering UK Official Development Assistance to identify appropriate responses to disinformation aimed at neutral implementing partners. This should include ensuring organisations such as the BBC World Service are adequately funded to fulfil their roles. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)
Government response. The government agrees to work on identifying responses to disinformation, citing existing FCDO efforts like a programme in Sudan. However, it clarifies the BBC World Service's editorial independence and does not commit to directly ensuring its funding as a government …
37
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Acknowledged
While it is important that the UK’s aid, trade, defence and diplomacy objectives are coherent, there is a risk that overly-politicised humanitarian responses can make the safe delivery of UK-funded support difficult. (Conclusion, Paragraph 73)
Government response. The government agrees that humanitarian aid must be impartial, outlining its current approach to ensure principled aid delivery through strong partnerships, coherent diplomatic action, new humanitarian diplomacy training, and a humanitarian allocation model.
38
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
It is vital that, where aid workers delivering UK Official Development Assistance are casualties, the Government is able to ascertain whether the employer was diligent in its duty of care responsibilities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)
Government response. The government acknowledges the importance of employers' duty of care, detailing its existing due diligence processes for partner organizations, post-incident assessments, and funding for INSO, while also committing to incorporating the IASC Risk Sharing framework.
39
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
Where incidents relate to employees of UK-registered NGOs, it is essential that the Charity Commission is adequately resourced, and has the necessary powers, to investigate whether relevant organisations were diligent in their statutory obligations regarding their employees. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)
Government response. The government partially agrees but clarifies the Charity Commission's independent and limited role, and does not commit to ensuring it receives adequate resources or new powers as recommended.
40
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Constrained budgets and competition for funding may incentivise the over- promising of delivery by international NGOs at the risk of underfunding security risk management. This runs the risk of subjecting aid workers to unnecessary pressures, and of their welfare being overlooked. It is important that the mental health of these …
Government response. The government agrees, explaining that FCDO already prioritises mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) funding through existing internal guidance, due diligence frameworks, and funding guidelines, which enable partners to budget for staff psychological support.
41
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Psychological support and wellbeing strategies need to be appropriate to the context and culture of the aid workers in question. Sufficient flexibility in funding must be built in to ensure that local organisations are supported in designing and implementing their own recovery strategies for their volunteers and employees. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Government response. The government agrees, detailing that FCDO's existing guidance, due diligence framework, and funding guidelines already enable partners to budget for staff psychological support and wellbeing, including for local organisations, and ensures flexible cost recovery.
42
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
Beyond funding, the FCDO should explore how it might make its in- house security and mental health expertise, particularly at diplomatic mission level, accessible to local NGOs as requested as appropriate. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating they cannot commit resources to extend direct security and mental health services to third parties. However, they are open to sharing the rationale for their strategic approach to staff welfare and wellbeing and encourage mutual …
43
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Whilst it is always the perpetrator who is responsible for the harm caused to victims, there is more that donors and employers could do to mitigate the risks. Indeed, it is the moral responsibility of donors to do all they can to remove or mitigate the risks to aid workers. …
Government response. The government accepts its responsibility and plans to review existing programme guidelines and consider stand-alone guidance on mitigating risks to aid workers, including promoting direct partner contact. They will also continue efforts to support global Humanitarian Notification Systems.
44
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We recognise the impact that reducing Official Development Assistance from 0.5%-0.3% of gross national income will have on availability of funding for humanitarian relief. However, any defunding of costs associated with the security of aid workers would be a false economy. Proposals with higher security costs should not be prejudiced …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating FCDO is committed to aid worker safety and assesses high and low security costs using a Value for Money lens focused on maximising impact. They clarify that their existing Humanitarian Allocation Model already accounts for …
45
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend security risk management costs are decoupled from other programme costs. There should be a designated security risk management fund that organisations delivering UK Official Development Assistance can apply to in order to support their broader security requirements. These grants should be flexible to allow for the appropriate measures …
Government response. The government partially agrees on the importance of aid worker safety but explicitly rejects the recommendation for a new designated security risk management fund, arguing it would reduce overall funding due to significant administrative and management costs.
46
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Where programme-specific security risk management costs are still built into programme budgets, these should be a distinct budget line rather than being part of administration costs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88)
Government response. The government agrees and commits to exploring the possibility of including a dedicated budget line for programme-specific security risk management costs in FCDO's standard templates, and will issue guidance to staff reviewing humanitarian budgets.
47
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Approaches to negotiating contracts and funding arrangements, where local organisations will be delivering humanitarian aid, are not always fit for purpose. There are inadequate mechanisms to ensure that the security requirements of local organisations are fed through intermediaries to the FCDO. There is evidence of inflexibility in eligible items for …
Government response. The government agrees, committing to issue internal guidance emphasizing the importance of FCDO officials aiming for direct contact with local delivery organisations during proposal and implementation stages to ensure security concerns are adequately covered.
48
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
FCDO officials managing contracts where a significant amount of aid will be delivered by local organisations should aim for direct contact with the relevant local delivery organisation during the proposal agreement stage, regardless of who the contract is with. These conversations should seek to establish whether the organisation’s security concerns …
Government response. The government agrees and commits to issue internal guidance emphasizing the importance of FCDO officials aiming for direct contact with local delivery organisations during proposal, implementation, and evaluation stages to ensure security concerns are adequately covered.
49
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted in Part
The FCDO needs to make sure that insurance provided to aid workers by their employers covers legal advice and longer-term medical, including physiological support. The FCDO should work with insurance providers and delivery partners to ensure that appropriate and affordable packages of insurance are provided—including for local staff and volunteers, …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating that while they support partners' access to insurance, the choice of provider lies with partners. They note flexible funding guidelines and due diligence processes that ensure partners consider staff wellbeing, highlighting the HAVEN programme in …
50
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The relief and development sector continues to strive for value for money– maximising the essential aid to those who need it whilst keeping its staff safe. We have witnessed the strong collegiate working between security risk management professionals across the sector. However, the FCDO’s current approach to contracts does not …
Government response. The government partially agrees that collaborative approaches enhance cost efficiency, but states that a new security risk management fund is not required. They fund INSO as a pooled resource, are exploring funding for GISF, and support consortia for shared resources …
51
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
The security risk management fund we recommend should prioritise grants that catalyse the pooling of activities–ensuring the best value for money and maximum reach. For example, this could include funding for pooled Hazardous Environment Awareness Training, in-country NGO forums, shared access to security advisors, mental health first aid training, and …
Government response. The government partially agrees on the value of collaborative approaches but rejects the recommendation to establish a new security risk management fund. They state they already fund pooled resources like INSO and are exploring support for GISF, and have a …