Source · Select Committees · International Development Committee
Recommendation 29
29
Accepted in Part
Insufficient government action to prevent UK weapon components harming aid workers.
Conclusion
There is much more the Government could do to ensure that UK manufactured weapon components do not fall into the hands of those who may use them in attacks on aid workers and aid infrastructure. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating it already has a robust export control regime and will publish an annual report on UK strategic export controls. However, it rejects commitments to an independent review of past allegations, independent audits, or temporary freezing of licences.
Government Response
Accepted in Part
HM Government
Accepted in Part
Partially Agree 66. The UK operates one of the most robust export control regimes in the world. All export licence applications are considered on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. A licence will not be issued if to do so would be inconsistent with any of the Criteria. 67. The Government also keeps all existing licences under review. This means that where there is a clear risk that the export might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of IHL, the licence would be suspended or revoked. 68. The Consolidated Criteria make explicit provision for an assessment of the risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of IHL. Criterion 2, on the respect for human rights and IHL in the country of final destination, states that the Government “will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law”. The UK also assesses the wider security context when making decisions on export licences, including risks to aid workers. 69. The Government will publish an annual report on UK strategic export controls covering export licensing decisions, including licence refusals. 70. However, the Government cannot commit to an independent review of past allegations or independent audits of arms exports to Parliament, nor can it provide interim measures to allow for the temporary freezing of licences. This is because decisions around export licences are for the Government to take. Interim suspensions would be difficult to operate consistently in a legally robust manner given the complexity of the criteria and the volume of applications/licences. The Government’s policy is to keep the legal advice it receives confidential in line with the long-standing practice of successive governments.