Recommendations & Conclusions
21 items
2
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We agree with the view of the ICRC that IHL is clear and comprehensive. It represents both a body of law that is robust and universal in its coverage, and a spirit by which warring parties must place the protection of civilians at the heart of their operational planning. However, …
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of IHL's comprehensiveness and accountability, detailing its existing foreign policy of supporting international criminal justice, vigilant alarm-raising, and support for the International Criminal Court.
4
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
There is encouraging collaboration by a select few UN Member States that are promoting adherence to IHL and, in particular, the protection of aid workers. Yet there is a lack of comprehensive leadership across all aspects of IHL by a single Member State and a willingness to expose and publicly …
Government response. The government agrees on the vital role of local organisations in humanitarian access negotiations and describes its commitment to leveraging UK influence to include them, and its funding of the Centre for Competence on Humanitarian Negotiations.
8
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We recommend that the UK explores creative forms of diplomacy with likeminded states that can bring maximum pressure and combined diplomatic capability to solving specific access issues. As part of this initiative the diplomatic capacity and influence of the FCDO needs to be evaluated and invested in where needed. (Recommendation, …
Government response. The government agrees that humanitarian aid must be facilitated and commits to strengthening UK diplomatic influence through a new internal humanitarian diplomacy and access strategy, actively pursuing diplomatic efforts, and supporting relevant international mechanisms.
10
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We applaud the work of the current and previous Governments in ensuring that the safe delivery of aid is not jeopardised by most of the UK’s own legislation. However, lack of clarity around the UK’s anti-terrorism legislation has had a chilling effect on those delivering UK aid and risks limiting …
Government response. The government acknowledges seeking to mitigate negative impacts of sanctions and counter-terrorism legislation on humanitarian aid delivery and describes existing work with aid partners, including the UK Tri-Sector Group, to promote compliance.
12
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
During an evidence session, the Minister was unclear about the extent of the application of approved approaches when it came to creative responses to the situation in Gaza. There are various mechanisms available at the international, regional and domestic levels for holding states and non-state actors to account for alleged …
Government response. The government asserts it is clear and consistent in its support for IHL in Gaza, consistently urges Israeli authorities to conduct swift investigations into incidents involving aid workers, and believes it is meeting its obligations through existing measures.
14
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
At a time when the legitimacy and impartiality of international courts is being questioned by some, the UK must stand firm in support of these important mechanisms for accountability to prevent impunity for serious violations of IHL. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)
Government response. The government agrees to stand firm in support of international courts, stating its full commitment to international law and respect for the independence of the ICJ and ICC, and reinforcing its support through multilateral fora.
21
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We agree with the Government that it is preferable to prosecute suspected breaches of IHL within the jurisdiction where they occurred, but only where there are sufficient resources and guarantees of fair trials. There is more the UK could be doing to support these legal systems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Government response. The government agrees that prosecuting breaches of IHL locally is preferable and highlights its existing support for capacity building in partner countries to strengthen justice and accountability mechanisms for IHL violations.
23
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The preamble to the Statute of the International Criminal Court recalls “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” At the domestic level, the UK must ensure that it can exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes such as the killings of aid …
Government response. The government states it is committed to bringing perpetrators of serious international crimes to justice and already possesses a robust legal framework, including extraterritorial jurisdiction, for prosecuting such crimes in the UK regardless of where they were committed.
25
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The UN has also established various investigative mechanisms in response to particular atrocities. Wherever possible, the UK should support, fund and participate in these mechanisms to assist with fact-finding, truth discovery, and the preservation of evidence of breaches of IHL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)
Government response. The government agrees, stating it already strongly supports and funds various UN investigative mechanisms, providing specific examples of financial support to several missions and ongoing funding for the ICC and other bodies. It also commits to promoting the use of …
26
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Specifically, we recommend that the UK makes better use of the good offices of the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission as part of its process of establishing whether IHL has been broken in specific cases. It should also be actively recommending these services to others. (Recommendation, Paragraph 56)
Government response. The government agrees, stating it recognises the IHFFC as an important mechanism and, while it hasn't used it in specific past contexts, it will consider its use where appropriate and will promote the use of the IHFFC.
27
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
In addition to legal mechanisms, the Government must use its powers to make sanctions a tool for ensuring respect for IHL. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the Government with the power to make sanctions for the purpose of promoting compliance with IHL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
Government response. The government agrees, stating it already uses its extensive sanctions powers to encourage compliance with IHL, citing specific examples of sanctions against individuals in Sudan, South Sudan, and Myanmar in 2025 and 2024.
28
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The Government must use its power to sanction individuals in response to clear breaches of IHL, such as unlawful killings of aid workers and restrictions on humanitarian aid and assistance. To do this the Government 52 must make sure that the Sanctions Team is sufficiently resourced and that the evidence …
Government response. The government agrees, stating it already uses its sanctions powers to encourage compliance with IHL, providing examples of recent sanctions. It also notes that the FCDO continues to assess resourcing requirements for the Sanctions Directorate and that the evidential threshold …
38
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
It is vital that, where aid workers delivering UK Official Development Assistance are casualties, the Government is able to ascertain whether the employer was diligent in its duty of care responsibilities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)
Government response. The government acknowledges the importance of employers' duty of care, detailing its existing due diligence processes for partner organizations, post-incident assessments, and funding for INSO, while also committing to incorporating the IASC Risk Sharing framework.
40
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Constrained budgets and competition for funding may incentivise the over- promising of delivery by international NGOs at the risk of underfunding security risk management. This runs the risk of subjecting aid workers to unnecessary pressures, and of their welfare being overlooked. It is important that the mental health of these …
Government response. The government agrees, explaining that FCDO already prioritises mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) funding through existing internal guidance, due diligence frameworks, and funding guidelines, which enable partners to budget for staff psychological support.
41
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Psychological support and wellbeing strategies need to be appropriate to the context and culture of the aid workers in question. Sufficient flexibility in funding must be built in to ensure that local organisations are supported in designing and implementing their own recovery strategies for their volunteers and employees. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Government response. The government agrees, detailing that FCDO's existing guidance, due diligence framework, and funding guidelines already enable partners to budget for staff psychological support and wellbeing, including for local organisations, and ensures flexible cost recovery.
43
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Whilst it is always the perpetrator who is responsible for the harm caused to victims, there is more that donors and employers could do to mitigate the risks. Indeed, it is the moral responsibility of donors to do all they can to remove or mitigate the risks to aid workers. …
Government response. The government accepts its responsibility and plans to review existing programme guidelines and consider stand-alone guidance on mitigating risks to aid workers, including promoting direct partner contact. They will also continue efforts to support global Humanitarian Notification Systems.
44
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
We recognise the impact that reducing Official Development Assistance from 0.5%-0.3% of gross national income will have on availability of funding for humanitarian relief. However, any defunding of costs associated with the security of aid workers would be a false economy. Proposals with higher security costs should not be prejudiced …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating FCDO is committed to aid worker safety and assesses high and low security costs using a Value for Money lens focused on maximising impact. They clarify that their existing Humanitarian Allocation Model already accounts for …
46
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Where programme-specific security risk management costs are still built into programme budgets, these should be a distinct budget line rather than being part of administration costs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88)
Government response. The government agrees and commits to exploring the possibility of including a dedicated budget line for programme-specific security risk management costs in FCDO's standard templates, and will issue guidance to staff reviewing humanitarian budgets.
47
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
Approaches to negotiating contracts and funding arrangements, where local organisations will be delivering humanitarian aid, are not always fit for purpose. There are inadequate mechanisms to ensure that the security requirements of local organisations are fed through intermediaries to the FCDO. There is evidence of inflexibility in eligible items for …
Government response. The government agrees, committing to issue internal guidance emphasizing the importance of FCDO officials aiming for direct contact with local delivery organisations during proposal and implementation stages to ensure security concerns are adequately covered.
48
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
FCDO officials managing contracts where a significant amount of aid will be delivered by local organisations should aim for direct contact with the relevant local delivery organisation during the proposal agreement stage, regardless of who the contract is with. These conversations should seek to establish whether the organisation’s security concerns …
Government response. The government agrees and commits to issue internal guidance emphasizing the importance of FCDO officials aiming for direct contact with local delivery organisations during proposal, implementation, and evaluation stages to ensure security concerns are adequately covered.
50
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Accepted
The relief and development sector continues to strive for value for money– maximising the essential aid to those who need it whilst keeping its staff safe. We have witnessed the strong collegiate working between security risk management professionals across the sector. However, the FCDO’s current approach to contracts does not …
Government response. The government partially agrees that collaborative approaches enhance cost efficiency, but states that a new security risk management fund is not required. They fund INSO as a pooled resource, are exploring funding for GISF, and support consortia for shared resources …