Source · Select Committees · International Development Committee

Recommendation 8

8 Accepted

Explore creative diplomacy with likeminded states to solve access issues and evaluate FCDO capacity.

Recommendation
We recommend that the UK explores creative forms of diplomacy with likeminded states that can bring maximum pressure and combined diplomatic capability to solving specific access issues. As part of this initiative the diplomatic capacity and influence of the FCDO needs to be evaluated and invested in where needed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 24)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees that humanitarian aid must be facilitated and commits to strengthening UK diplomatic influence through a new internal humanitarian diplomacy and access strategy, actively pursuing diplomatic efforts, and supporting relevant international mechanisms.
Government Response Accepted
HM Government Accepted
92. We agree that humanitarian aid must be facilitated in an impartial, neutral and independent way without political or physical impediments. The protection of civilians, including humanitarian aid workers, must be central to UK diplomatic action and is crucial to ensure safe delivery of UK funded aid. 93. Partnership with humanitarian aid organisations, particularly including local actors, is integral to ensure diplomatic action is anchored in the realities faced by those operating on the frontlines, upholds their humanitarian principles and promotes their safety. 94. Close partnership between posts and headquarters including FCDO’s political and diplomatic representatives, humanitarian and conflict advisers and legal counsel, is another key aspect of the FCDO approach to using humanitarian diplomacy to enhance humanitarian outcomes. This ensures a coherent approach to wider UK government objectives. 95. Investment in capability is also key. The FCDO’s new internal humanitarian diplomacy training includes a focus on the opportunities posed by effective humanitarian diplomacy for humanitarian access and protection, lessons learnt, as well as risks and mitigation measures. 96. The FCDO’s Humanitarian Allocation Model uses the best available humanitarian data to inform funding allocations across our bilateral portfolio. The model principally prioritises higher severity contexts over lower severity contexts, helping to ensure that delivery of humanitarian ODA is principled and prioritises those most in need. Responsibility and accountability when things go wrong (Conclusion 21, paragraph 75) It is vital that, where aid workers delivering UK Official Development Assistance are casualties, the Government is able to ascertain whether the employer was diligent in its duty of care responsibilities. 97. Though the FCDO does not have legal responsibility for security of aid workers delivering UK-funded programmes, we take this issue seriously and work hard to mitigate risk at multiple levels. 98. We fund partner organisations once we’ve conducted reviews of their ability to responsibly deliver the programme. This includes an assessment of how due diligence is cascaded further down the delivery chain. 99. Should the tragic situation arise where an aid worker delivering UK ODA were to suffer harm, the programme team or institutional lead would urgently discuss the matter with the partner to understand if any health and safety or security weaknesses led to the serious injury or fatality. If such concerns were present, the partner would be required to take steps to mitigate these risks. The original due diligence assessment would also be reviewed to understand if this was an area of risk that was identified through that assessment, and if any recommendations made in the assessment were carried forward into actions in order to mitigate the risk. 100. Dedicated programme managers maintain close communications with delivery partners and regular risk assessment is a mandatory requirement. Regular dialogue provides opportunities for risks to be escalated and considered. For example, the UK backed the UN’s decision to pause humanitarian operations in Saada, Yemen, in March 2025 in response to heightened risk. Recognising the challenges of maintaining robust contextual understanding, particularly in volatile environments, we also procure dedicated expertise where required. 101. A good example is our work to strengthen systems that help partners to manage risks systemically, for example, financial support to organisations such as the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) to provide critical security information and analysis for NGOs and UN agencies. Between 2024 and 2026, FCDO is providing £2 million of central level funding to INSO to provide critical security information and analysis for NGOs and UN agencies. Of its 1,240 NGO partners, 42% are local NGOs. INSO provide support in countries affected by humanitarian crises across the globe. 102. All of this is complemented by diplomatic efforts to enhance humanitarian access and adherence to IHL. 103. The UK also supports the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which was established, with UK support, through General Assembly Resolution 46/182 to serve as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination relating to humanitarian assistance. We welcome the efforts by IASC members, and humanitarian donors, to develop the IASC Risk Sharing framework, and note the FCDO engaged in the process. We are working to incorporate the framework into our programming and approach. (Recommendation 18, paragraph 76) Where incidents relate to employees of UK-registered NGOs, it is essential that the Charity Commission is adequately resourced, and has the necessary powers, to investigate whether relevant organisations were diligent in their statutory obligations regarding their employees. Government Response: Partially Agree 104. The Charity Commission is a non-Ministerial Government de