Source · Select Committees · International Development Committee
5th Report - Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid
International Development Committee
HC 526
Published 12 June 2025
Recommendations
3
Not Addressed
Lead efforts to reach consensus on autonomous weapons and create an international instrument.
Recommendation
We recommend that the UK Government takes the lead in efforts to reach a consensus on the use of autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence on the battlefield and the creation of an international instrument on their use. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government response discusses diplomatic influence, multilateral engagement, and enhancing IHL adherence for humanitarian access, but it does not address the recommendation regarding autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence on the battlefield.
6
Not Addressed
Prioritise military-to-military training on International Humanitarian Law for foreign militaries.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government prioritises military-to-military training on IHL in line with the increase in defence spending. It should make full use of the range of resources it has at its disposal to support foreign militaries to understand not …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government response outlines the UK's general support for IHL and calls on all parties to comply, but does not address the specific recommendation to prioritise and make full use of military-to-military training on IHL for foreign militaries.
8
Accepted
Explore creative diplomacy with likeminded states to solve access issues and evaluate FCDO capacity.
Recommendation
We recommend that the UK explores creative forms of diplomacy with likeminded states that can bring maximum pressure and combined diplomatic capability to solving specific access issues. As part of this initiative the diplomatic capacity and influence of the FCDO …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees that humanitarian aid must be facilitated and commits to strengthening UK diplomatic influence through a new internal humanitarian diplomacy and access strategy, actively pursuing diplomatic efforts, and supporting relevant international mechanisms.
11
Accepted in Part
Provide clearer guidance and consider standing exemptions for humanitarian organisations regarding sanctions.
Recommendation
We encourage the Government to consider a standing exemption for relevant humanitarian organisations to ensure that they do not risk liability for their legitimate dealings with sanctioned entities. In the meantime, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) must provide …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to introducing a tailored humanitarian exemption or ‘carve-out’ across autonomous UK sanctions when parliamentary time allows. They also state OFSI has comprehensive guidance and will continue working to produce clear guidance for humanitarian actors.
16
Acknowledged
Condemn IHL breaches consistently, irrespective of diplomatic relationships with offending parties.
Recommendation
As part of the UK’s leadership role, the Government must be ready to call out actions not only when a blatant breach of IHL has been ruled on by a court, but when the spirit of IHL is being eroded. …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating it consistently calls on all parties to comply with IHL and observe robust standards without differentiation. It clarifies that it cannot provide a running commentary on possible breaches due to lack of detailed information to determine IHL violations.
18
Rejected
Issue formal response to ICJ opinion on Israel's policies in Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Recommendation
We urge the Government to issue a formal response to the ICJ’s opinion concerning Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, setting out how it is complying with the obligations on the UK as a third party. (Recommendation, …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating that consistent with long-standing policy, it does not consider the ICJ to have jurisdiction in this contentious case between Israel and Palestine. It maintains that a lasting peace requires a negotiated settlement between the parties.
19
Accepted in Part
Call for UNSC Special Session on IHL disregard, humanitarian access, and aid worker safety.
Recommendation
We recommend that the UK works with the other UN Member States represented on the ministerial group for the safety of humanitarian aid workers to call for a Special Session of the UNSC to discuss the problem of disregard of …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating it already actively engages with UN Member States and co-sponsored UNSCR 2730, which addresses humanitarian personnel protection and will lead to a UN Secretary-General's report. It also supports the inclusion of humanitarian access in UN reports and commits to continue doing so, but does not specifically commit to calling for a Special Session of the UNSC focused on hearing from aid workers.
20
Rejected
Establish an independent central repository of evidence for IHL breaches against aid workers.
Recommendation
We recommend that the FCDO works with international partners to establish an independent central repository of evidence of breaches of IHL relating to the delivery of aid and attacks on aid workers. For this to be successful, the Government should …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees with the intent but rejects leading the establishment of a new standalone central repository for evidence of IHL breaches. It prioritizes supporting existing mechanisms, such as UN and IIIM mechanisms, to prevent duplication of efforts.
22
Rejected
Establish a roster of independent experts to investigate IHL breaches.
Recommendation
We recommend that the UK works with other willing members of the Ministerial Group on the Safety of Humanitarian Workers to establish a roster of independent legal experts and expert investigators who can support the criminal investigations of suspected breaches …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government explicitly rejects establishing a new roster of independent legal experts and investigators, stating it will continue to prioritise support to existing accountability mechanisms instead.
24
Rejected
Amend International Criminal Court Act to provide universal jurisdiction for war crimes.
Recommendation
We recommend an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill, to amend the International Criminal Court Act 2001, to provide for universal jurisdiction. This would allow for suspected war criminals to be investigated and prosecuted in the UK irrespective of …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government explicitly rejects amending the Crime and Policing Bill to extend universal jurisdiction, asserting that its existing robust legal framework, including the ICCA 2001, is sufficient for prosecuting international crimes.
25
Accepted
Support and fund UN investigative mechanisms for IHL breaches and evidence preservation.
Recommendation
The UN has also established various investigative mechanisms in response to particular atrocities. Wherever possible, the UK should support, fund and participate in these mechanisms to assist with fact-finding, truth discovery, and the preservation of evidence of breaches of IHL. …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating it already strongly supports and funds various UN investigative mechanisms, providing specific examples of financial support to several missions and ongoing funding for the ICC and other bodies. It also commits to promoting the use of the IHFFC where appropriate.
26
Accepted
Utilise International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission to establish IHL breaches and recommend its services.
Recommendation
Specifically, we recommend that the UK makes better use of the good offices of the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission as part of its process of establishing whether IHL has been broken in specific cases. It should also be actively …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating it recognises the IHFFC as an important mechanism and, while it hasn't used it in specific past contexts, it will consider its use where appropriate and will promote the use of the IHFFC.
27
Accepted
Utilise existing sanctions powers to ensure greater respect for international humanitarian law.
Recommendation
In addition to legal mechanisms, the Government must use its powers to make sanctions a tool for ensuring respect for IHL. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the Government with the power to make sanctions for the purpose …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating it already uses its extensive sanctions powers to encourage compliance with IHL, citing specific examples of sanctions against individuals in Sudan, South Sudan, and Myanmar in 2025 and 2024.
28
Accepted
Apply sanctions to individuals for clear IHL breaches, with sufficient resources and evidence.
Recommendation
The Government must use its power to sanction individuals in response to clear breaches of IHL, such as unlawful killings of aid workers and restrictions on humanitarian aid and assistance. To do this the Government 52 must make sure that …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating it already uses its sanctions powers to encourage compliance with IHL, providing examples of recent sanctions. It also notes that the FCDO continues to assess resourcing requirements for the Sanctions Directorate and that the evidential threshold for designations is set appropriately.
30
Accepted in Part
Introduce interim measures to freeze arms export licences for suspected IHL breaches.
Recommendation
We recommend the Government a. Provide for interim measures to allow for the temporary freezing of licenses where there are credible allegations of IHL breaches, subject to full investigation and final determination; b. report findings of independent audits of arms …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating it already assesses IHL risks and wider security context, including risks to aid workers, for export licences, and will publish an annual report on strategic export controls. However, it rejects providing for interim licence freezing and independent audits of arms exports due to policy and operational reasons.
32
Rejected
Legislate binding due diligence for arms manufacturers and prosecute complicit directors.
Recommendation
The Government should legislate to provide for binding due diligence requirements on arms manufacturers. The Government should also make use of existing powers under the International Criminal Court Act (2001) to prosecute directors of arms manufacturers for complicity in war …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating it already has a robust export control regime and does not intend to legislate for due diligence requirements. It also states that prosecutions are a matter for independent authorities, which the government cannot direct.
33
Accepted in Part
Commemorate sacrifices of aid workers through memorial services and parliamentary updates.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government takes appropriate opportunities to commemorate the sacrifices of the hundreds of aid workers every year who pay the ultimate price in the service of others. This should include representation at the memorial service in Westminster …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees to commemorate aid worker sacrifices, noting it already marks World Humanitarian Day, attends memorial services, delivers speeches for UNSCR 2730, and has introduced the Humanitarian Medal. It welcomes the suggestion to update Parliament on this issue as feasible.
36
Accepted in Part
Collaborate with ODA partners to counter disinformation and fund BBC World Service.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government work closely with those delivering UK Official Development Assistance to identify appropriate responses to disinformation aimed at neutral implementing partners. This should include ensuring organisations such as the BBC World Service are adequately funded to …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees to work on identifying responses to disinformation, citing existing FCDO efforts like a programme in Sudan. However, it clarifies the BBC World Service's editorial independence and does not commit to directly ensuring its funding as a government tool for countering disinformation.
45
Rejected
Establish a dedicated, flexible fund for security risk management, separate from programme costs.
Recommendation
We recommend security risk management costs are decoupled from other programme costs. There should be a designated security risk management fund that organisations delivering UK Official Development Assistance can apply to in order to support their broader security requirements. These …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees on the importance of aid worker safety but explicitly rejects the recommendation for a new designated security risk management fund, arguing it would reduce overall funding due to significant administrative and management costs.
51
Rejected
Prioritise security risk management fund grants to catalyse pooling of activities.
Recommendation
The security risk management fund we recommend should prioritise grants that catalyse the pooling of activities–ensuring the best value for money and maximum reach. For example, this could include funding for pooled Hazardous Environment Awareness Training, in-country NGO forums, shared …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees on the value of collaborative approaches but rejects the recommendation to establish a new security risk management fund. They state they already fund pooled resources like INSO and are exploring support for GISF, and have a history of supporting consortia.
Conclusions (31)
1
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Numbers of aid worker deaths are rising year on year and the situations where access to aid is deliberately impeded are also increasing. This violates the purpose of IHL: to protect civilians in a time of war. We see growing examples of where IHL is ignored or used to justify …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the committee's concerns regarding rising aid worker deaths, restrictions on humanitarian access, and IHL violations, affirming that IHL must be respected and all tools leveraged to address these issues.
2
Conclusion
Accepted
We agree with the view of the ICRC that IHL is clear and comprehensive. It represents both a body of law that is robust and universal in its coverage, and a spirit by which warring parties must place the protection of civilians at the heart of their operational planning. However, …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the importance of IHL's comprehensiveness and accountability, detailing its existing foreign policy of supporting international criminal justice, vigilant alarm-raising, and support for the International Criminal Court.
4
Conclusion
Accepted
There is encouraging collaboration by a select few UN Member States that are promoting adherence to IHL and, in particular, the protection of aid workers. Yet there is a lack of comprehensive leadership across all aspects of IHL by a single Member State and a willingness to expose and publicly …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the vital role of local organisations in humanitarian access negotiations and describes its commitment to leveraging UK influence to include them, and its funding of the Centre for Competence on Humanitarian Negotiations.
5
Conclusion
Not Addressed
The UK armed forces have a strong and proud history of supporting IHL. They have experience of operating within the spirit and letter of IHL in extremely challenging environments, and of complying with accountability mechanisms when there have been allegations against them. At a time of increasing global tensions and …
Government Response Summary
The government response discusses mitigating sanctions impact on humanitarian aid and monitoring IHL adherence generally, but does not address the committee's specific conclusion regarding the UK armed forces' history and role as an example in upholding IHL.
7
Conclusion
Not Addressed
The FCDO appears to be repeating the same approaches to overcoming access challenges whilst expecting different results. Successful records of traditional forms of public diplomacy in promoting unimpeded access to aid are patchy at best. Polarisation within bodies such as the UN Security Council limit the opportunities to overcome barriers …
Government Response Summary
The government response discusses protecting aid workers, IHL, and countering disinformation, but does not address the committee's observation that the FCDO is repeating approaches to access challenges and needs a radically new strategy.
9
Conclusion
Not Addressed
The UK is well placed to ensure the voice of local organisations is heard in negotiations over access for humanitarian aid. This input is vital for effective and sustainable aid delivery as well as maximising the safety of 49 those delivering it. Moreover, the UK is well positioned to make …
Government Response Summary
The government response discusses risk management for aid workers, programme guidelines, and budget lines for security, but does not directly address the committee's conclusion that the UK is well placed to ensure local organisations' voices are heard in access negotiations.
10
Conclusion
Accepted
We applaud the work of the current and previous Governments in ensuring that the safe delivery of aid is not jeopardised by most of the UK’s own legislation. However, lack of clarity around the UK’s anti-terrorism legislation has had a chilling effect on those delivering UK aid and risks limiting …
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges seeking to mitigate negative impacts of sanctions and counter-terrorism legislation on humanitarian aid delivery and describes existing work with aid partners, including the UK Tri-Sector Group, to promote compliance.
12
Conclusion
Accepted
During an evidence session, the Minister was unclear about the extent of the application of approved approaches when it came to creative responses to the situation in Gaza. There are various mechanisms available at the international, regional and domestic levels for holding states and non-state actors to account for alleged …
Government Response Summary
The government asserts it is clear and consistent in its support for IHL in Gaza, consistently urges Israeli authorities to conduct swift investigations into incidents involving aid workers, and believes it is meeting its obligations through existing measures.
13
Conclusion
Acknowledged
At the international level, the International Criminal Court provides a forum for holding states and individuals, respectively, accountable for breaches of IHL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the conclusion, affirming its full commitment to international law and respect for the independence of the ICJ and ICC. It reiterates its strong support for the ICC through multilateral engagement and by encouraging states to become parties to the Rome Statute.
14
Conclusion
Accepted
At a time when the legitimacy and impartiality of international courts is being questioned by some, the UK must stand firm in support of these important mechanisms for accountability to prevent impunity for serious violations of IHL. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees to stand firm in support of international courts, stating its full commitment to international law and respect for the independence of the ICJ and ICC, and reinforcing its support through multilateral fora.
15
Conclusion
Acknowledged
We welcome the times that the Government has made a stand on the likely breaches of IHL that have reduced access of populations to aid and/or have failed to protect those delivering aid. We also welcome the more general calls for the protection of aid workers. However, the lack of …
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating it consistently calls on all parties to comply with IHL without differentiation and engages with partners to address reported violations. It clarifies that it cannot provide a running commentary on possible breaches due to lack of detailed information.
17
Conclusion
Deferred
The FCDO needs to be led by the law without fear or favour. In July 2024, the International Courts of Justice handed down its advisory opinion on the legality of Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This advisory opinion sets out various obligations in respect of third …
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the ICJ's advisory opinion and states it is carefully considering it, committing to publish a full response in due course. It reiterates its commitment to international law and respects the ICJ's independence.
21
Conclusion
Accepted
We agree with the Government that it is preferable to prosecute suspected breaches of IHL within the jurisdiction where they occurred, but only where there are sufficient resources and guarantees of fair trials. There is more the UK could be doing to support these legal systems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees that prosecuting breaches of IHL locally is preferable and highlights its existing support for capacity building in partner countries to strengthen justice and accountability mechanisms for IHL violations.
23
Conclusion
Accepted
The preamble to the Statute of the International Criminal Court recalls “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” At the domestic level, the UK must ensure that it can exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes such as the killings of aid …
Government Response Summary
The government states it is committed to bringing perpetrators of serious international crimes to justice and already possesses a robust legal framework, including extraterritorial jurisdiction, for prosecuting such crimes in the UK regardless of where they were committed.
29
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
There is much more the Government could do to ensure that UK manufactured weapon components do not fall into the hands of those who may use them in attacks on aid workers and aid infrastructure. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating it already has a robust export control regime and will publish an annual report on UK strategic export controls. However, it rejects commitments to an independent review of past allegations, independent audits, or temporary freezing of licences.
31
Conclusion
Rejected
There is no legal requirement for companies in the UK to stop exporting arms when they are aware of a clear risk that their weapons could be used in suspected breaches of IHL–instead the legal obligations rest on the Government. It is time for this to be addressed. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
Government Response Summary
The government rejects the implicit call for action, stating that legal obligations for arms exports rest with the government, not manufacturers, and it does not intend to legislate for binding due diligence requirements. It maintains the UK already has a robust export control regime.
34
Conclusion
Acknowledged
It has never been more dangerous to be a humanitarian aid worker. These workers put their lives on the line every day to protect others. Aid workers suffer direct intimidation and attacks in the field, as well as the impact of vicarious trauma through the processing of media. The disregard …
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the increased risks to humanitarian personnel and reaffirms its commitment to championing aid worker protection through ongoing initiatives, including the proposed Australia-led Declaration.
35
Conclusion
Acknowledged
The safety of aid workers and aid delivery is further hampered by the spread of malicious disinformation online and in other forms of media. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees that malicious disinformation threatens aid worker safety, highlighting the BBC World Service's role and describing FCDO's existing efforts to counter foreign information manipulation, including a recent programme in Sudan.
37
Conclusion
Acknowledged
While it is important that the UK’s aid, trade, defence and diplomacy objectives are coherent, there is a risk that overly-politicised humanitarian responses can make the safe delivery of UK-funded support difficult. (Conclusion, Paragraph 73)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees that humanitarian aid must be impartial, outlining its current approach to ensure principled aid delivery through strong partnerships, coherent diplomatic action, new humanitarian diplomacy training, and a humanitarian allocation model.
38
Conclusion
Accepted
It is vital that, where aid workers delivering UK Official Development Assistance are casualties, the Government is able to ascertain whether the employer was diligent in its duty of care responsibilities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the importance of employers' duty of care, detailing its existing due diligence processes for partner organizations, post-incident assessments, and funding for INSO, while also committing to incorporating the IASC Risk Sharing framework.
39
Conclusion
Rejected
Where incidents relate to employees of UK-registered NGOs, it is essential that the Charity Commission is adequately resourced, and has the necessary powers, to investigate whether relevant organisations were diligent in their statutory obligations regarding their employees. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees but clarifies the Charity Commission's independent and limited role, and does not commit to ensuring it receives adequate resources or new powers as recommended.
40
Conclusion
Accepted
Constrained budgets and competition for funding may incentivise the over- promising of delivery by international NGOs at the risk of underfunding security risk management. This runs the risk of subjecting aid workers to unnecessary pressures, and of their welfare being overlooked. It is important that the mental health of these …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, explaining that FCDO already prioritises mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) funding through existing internal guidance, due diligence frameworks, and funding guidelines, which enable partners to budget for staff psychological support.
41
Conclusion
Accepted
Psychological support and wellbeing strategies need to be appropriate to the context and culture of the aid workers in question. Sufficient flexibility in funding must be built in to ensure that local organisations are supported in designing and implementing their own recovery strategies for their volunteers and employees. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, detailing that FCDO's existing guidance, due diligence framework, and funding guidelines already enable partners to budget for staff psychological support and wellbeing, including for local organisations, and ensures flexible cost recovery.
42
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
Beyond funding, the FCDO should explore how it might make its in- house security and mental health expertise, particularly at diplomatic mission level, accessible to local NGOs as requested as appropriate. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating they cannot commit resources to extend direct security and mental health services to third parties. However, they are open to sharing the rationale for their strategic approach to staff welfare and wellbeing and encourage mutual information exchange with interested partners.
43
Conclusion
Accepted
Whilst it is always the perpetrator who is responsible for the harm caused to victims, there is more that donors and employers could do to mitigate the risks. Indeed, it is the moral responsibility of donors to do all they can to remove or mitigate the risks to aid workers. …
Government Response Summary
The government accepts its responsibility and plans to review existing programme guidelines and consider stand-alone guidance on mitigating risks to aid workers, including promoting direct partner contact. They will also continue efforts to support global Humanitarian Notification Systems.
44
Conclusion
Accepted
We recognise the impact that reducing Official Development Assistance from 0.5%-0.3% of gross national income will have on availability of funding for humanitarian relief. However, any defunding of costs associated with the security of aid workers would be a false economy. Proposals with higher security costs should not be prejudiced …
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating FCDO is committed to aid worker safety and assesses high and low security costs using a Value for Money lens focused on maximising impact. They clarify that their existing Humanitarian Allocation Model already accounts for access and local security considerations.
46
Conclusion
Accepted
Where programme-specific security risk management costs are still built into programme budgets, these should be a distinct budget line rather than being part of administration costs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88)
Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to exploring the possibility of including a dedicated budget line for programme-specific security risk management costs in FCDO's standard templates, and will issue guidance to staff reviewing humanitarian budgets.
47
Conclusion
Accepted
Approaches to negotiating contracts and funding arrangements, where local organisations will be delivering humanitarian aid, are not always fit for purpose. There are inadequate mechanisms to ensure that the security requirements of local organisations are fed through intermediaries to the FCDO. There is evidence of inflexibility in eligible items for …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, committing to issue internal guidance emphasizing the importance of FCDO officials aiming for direct contact with local delivery organisations during proposal and implementation stages to ensure security concerns are adequately covered.
48
Conclusion
Accepted
FCDO officials managing contracts where a significant amount of aid will be delivered by local organisations should aim for direct contact with the relevant local delivery organisation during the proposal agreement stage, regardless of who the contract is with. These conversations should seek to establish whether the organisation’s security concerns …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to issue internal guidance emphasizing the importance of FCDO officials aiming for direct contact with local delivery organisations during proposal, implementation, and evaluation stages to ensure security concerns are adequately covered.
49
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
The FCDO needs to make sure that insurance provided to aid workers by their employers covers legal advice and longer-term medical, including physiological support. The FCDO should work with insurance providers and delivery partners to ensure that appropriate and affordable packages of insurance are provided—including for local staff and volunteers, …
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating that while they support partners' access to insurance, the choice of provider lies with partners. They note flexible funding guidelines and due diligence processes that ensure partners consider staff wellbeing, highlighting the HAVEN programme in Ukraine as an example.
50
Conclusion
Accepted
The relief and development sector continues to strive for value for money– maximising the essential aid to those who need it whilst keeping its staff safe. We have witnessed the strong collegiate working between security risk management professionals across the sector. However, the FCDO’s current approach to contracts does not …
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees that collaborative approaches enhance cost efficiency, but states that a new security risk management fund is not required. They fund INSO as a pooled resource, are exploring funding for GISF, and support consortia for shared resources and impact.