Recommendations & Conclusions
9 items
18
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We urge the Government to issue a formal response to the ICJ’s opinion concerning Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, setting out how it is complying with the obligations on the UK as a third party. (Recommendation, Paragraph 41)
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation, stating that consistent with long-standing policy, it does not consider the ICJ to have jurisdiction in this contentious case between Israel and Palestine. It maintains that a lasting peace requires a negotiated settlement between the …
20
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend that the FCDO works with international partners to establish an independent central repository of evidence of breaches of IHL relating to the delivery of aid and attacks on aid workers. For this to be successful, the Government should undertake a consultation exercise with international and local delivery organisations, …
Government response. The government partially agrees with the intent but rejects leading the establishment of a new standalone central repository for evidence of IHL breaches. It prioritizes supporting existing mechanisms, such as UN and IIIM mechanisms, to prevent duplication of efforts.
22
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend that the UK works with other willing members of the Ministerial Group on the Safety of Humanitarian Workers to establish a roster of independent legal experts and expert investigators who can support the criminal investigations of suspected breaches of IHL. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)
Government response. The government explicitly rejects establishing a new roster of independent legal experts and investigators, stating it will continue to prioritise support to existing accountability mechanisms instead.
24
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill, to amend the International Criminal Court Act 2001, to provide for universal jurisdiction. This would allow for suspected war criminals to be investigated and prosecuted in the UK irrespective of their nationality, residency status, or location. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)
Government response. The government explicitly rejects amending the Crime and Policing Bill to extend universal jurisdiction, asserting that its existing robust legal framework, including the ICCA 2001, is sufficient for prosecuting international crimes.
31
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
There is no legal requirement for companies in the UK to stop exporting arms when they are aware of a clear risk that their weapons could be used in suspected breaches of IHL–instead the legal obligations rest on the Government. It is time for this to be addressed. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
Government response. The government rejects the implicit call for action, stating that legal obligations for arms exports rest with the government, not manufacturers, and it does not intend to legislate for binding due diligence requirements. It maintains the UK already has a …
32
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
The Government should legislate to provide for binding due diligence requirements on arms manufacturers. The Government should also make use of existing powers under the International Criminal Court Act (2001) to prosecute directors of arms manufacturers for complicity in war crimes such as those relating to the targeting of aid …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation, stating it already has a robust export control regime and does not intend to legislate for due diligence requirements. It also states that prosecutions are a matter for independent authorities, which the government cannot direct.
39
Conclusion
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
Where incidents relate to employees of UK-registered NGOs, it is essential that the Charity Commission is adequately resourced, and has the necessary powers, to investigate whether relevant organisations were diligent in their statutory obligations regarding their employees. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)
Government response. The government partially agrees but clarifies the Charity Commission's independent and limited role, and does not commit to ensuring it receives adequate resources or new powers as recommended.
45
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
We recommend security risk management costs are decoupled from other programme costs. There should be a designated security risk management fund that organisations delivering UK Official Development Assistance can apply to in order to support their broader security requirements. These grants should be flexible to allow for the appropriate measures …
Government response. The government partially agrees on the importance of aid worker safety but explicitly rejects the recommendation for a new designated security risk management fund, arguing it would reduce overall funding due to significant administrative and management costs.
51
Recommendation
5th Report - Protection not permission:…
Rejected
The security risk management fund we recommend should prioritise grants that catalyse the pooling of activities–ensuring the best value for money and maximum reach. For example, this could include funding for pooled Hazardous Environment Awareness Training, in-country NGO forums, shared access to security advisors, mental health first aid training, and …
Government response. The government partially agrees on the value of collaborative approaches but rejects the recommendation to establish a new security risk management fund. They state they already fund pooled resources like INSO and are exploring support for GISF, and have a …