Bichard Inquiry

A national IT system for England and Wales to support police intelligence should be introduced as a matter of urgency. The Home Office should take the lead and report by December 2004 with clear targets for implementation.

The Inquiry recommended the urgent introduction of a national police intelligence system. In May 2007, the Home Office stated that it remained committed to delivering a police intelligence store linking local records with the Police National Computer (PNC) (Home Office, May 2007). The National Audit Office found in September 2021 that the Police National Database (PND) was introduced in 2011 following the Inquiry (Gareth Davies, Sep 2021). It also reported that the department removed the PND from a wider programme in December 2020 to maintain it as a standalone system until 2031 (Gareth Davies, Sep 2021).

The PLX system, which flags that intelligence is held about someone by particular police forces, should be introduced in England and Wales by 2005.

The Home Office stated in May 2006 that the recommendation was implemented (Home Office, May 2006). Previously, in December 2004, the department reported that the Police Local Cross-Check system was on track to index individuals about whom police forces held information, with an interim version scheduled for early 2005 and the full version planned to be accessible to forces by the end of that year (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The procurement of IT systems by the police should be reviewed to ensure that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered to national problems.

The Inquiry asked the Home Office to review police IT procurement for national solutions. In May 2007, the department stated that the implementation of actions from an initial procurement review was vested in the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) on 1 April 2007 (Home Office, May 2007). In September 2021, the National Audit Office (NAO) found that a committee of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) coordinated procurement, while each police force remained responsible for establishing, procuring, and maintaining its own local information and communications technology (ICT) systems (Gareth Davies, Sep 2021; Gareth Davies, Sep 2021).

Investment should be made available by Government to secure the PNC's medium and long-term future, given its importance to intelligence-led policing and to the criminal justice system as a whole. I note that PITO has begun this work.

The Inquiry recommended government investment to secure the future of the Police National Computer (PNC). The Home Office stated in May 2007 that the PNC had been re-platformed, securing its medium-term future, while its long-term future was not mentioned in the sources (Home Office, May 2007). In September 2021, the National Audit Office found that the replacement National Law Enforcement Data Programme was overdue and had yet to deliver expected services, with total costs rising to £1.1 billion (Gareth Davies, Sep 2021). The auditor also found that the PNC remained based on obsolescent technology, making it expensive to operate and difficult to update (Gareth Davies, Sep 2021).

The new Code of Practice, made under the Police Reform Act 2002, dealing with the quality and timeliness of PNC data input, should be implemented as soon as possible.

The Home Office stated in November 2005 that the Code of Practice on Police National Computer data quality and timeliness had been implemented and was "helping to drive improved performance" (Home Office, Nov 2005). The department had previously stated in December 2004 that ministers agreed the statutory code would come into force on 1 January 2005, with force performance to be assessed by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and reviewed after one year (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The quality and timeliness of PNC data input should be routinely inspected as part of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) and the Baseline Assessments, which are being developed by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).

The Home Office reported in November 2005 that the recommendation had been "implemented and mainstreamed" (Home Office, Nov 2005). In December 2004, the department stated that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary had fully incorporated Police National Computer audit and inspection into the regime supporting its baseline assessments (Home Office response, Dec 2004). It noted that core performance measures were being added to the Police Standards Unit's database and would be incorporated into the 2005 Policing Performance Assessment Framework as key diagnostic indicators (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC should be reaffirmed by the Court Service and the Home Office and, if possible, accelerated ahead of the 2006 target. At the least, that deadline must be met.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that delivery remained in progress but had experienced slippage and a revised timetable due to complex technical issues and dependencies in directly inputting court results to the Police National Computer (Home Office, May 2007). Earlier, in December 2004, the department confirmed that it and partner agencies had agreed on an electronic data transfer solution rather than continuing to re-key data (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

A Code of Practice should be produced covering record creation, review, retention, deletion and information sharing. This should be made under the Police Reform Act 2002 and needs to be clear, concise and practical. It should supersede existing guidance.

The Home Office reported in May 2006 that recommendations 8 to 11, including this recommendation, had been implemented (Home Office, May 2006). The department had previously stated in December 2004 that a draft Code of Practice on Information Management had been introduced for consultation, setting out high-level principles for police information management and sharing to be implemented by June 2005 alongside detailed operational guidance (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Code of Practice must clearly set out the key principles of good information management (capture, review, retention, deletion and sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the individual and the law.

The Home Office stated in May 2006 that this recommendation had been implemented (Home Office, May 2006). Previously, in a December 2004 progress report, the department accepted the recommendation and noted that a working group agreed the Code of Practice needed to cover high-level principles relating to the capture, review, retention, deletion and sharing of police information (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Code of Practice must set out the standards to be met in terms of systems (including IT), accountability, training, resources and audit. These standards should be capable of being monitored both within police forces and by HMIC and should fit within the PPAF.

The Home Office stated in its third progress report in May 2006 that this recommendation had been implemented (Home Office, May 2006). In its December 2004 progress report, the department had accepted the recommendation, reporting ongoing discussions with ACPO over guidance and accountability and noting that consideration was being given to reflecting the monitoring requirements in the performance framework through statutory or non-statutory measures (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Code of Practice should have particular regard to the factors to be considered when reviewing the retention or deletion of intelligence in cases of sexual offences.

The Home Office stated in May 2006 that the recommendation was implemented (Home Office, May 2006). In its December 2004 progress report, the department had accepted the recommendation, explaining that specific factors relating to intelligence in sexual offence cases, along with standards on IT systems, training, and audits, would be set out in accompanying guidance rather than solely within the Code of Practice (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Government should reaffirm the guidance in Working Together to Safeguard Children so that the police are notified as soon as possible when a criminal offence has been committed, or is suspected of having been committed, against a child – unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so.

The Home Office stated in December 2004 that the recommendation had been implemented, reporting that a local authority Social Services letter (LASSL) had been issued to all local authorities to re-emphasise guidance in Working Together on the handling of allegations (Home Office response, Dec 2004; Home Office, Dec 2004). The record holds no update since the department's response of December 2004 (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

National guidance should be produced to inform the decision as to whether or not to notify the police. This guidance could usefully draw upon the criteria included in a local protocol being developed by Sheffield Social Services and brought to the attention of the Inquiry. The decision would therefore take account of: age or power imbalances; overt aggression; coercion or bribery; the misuse of substances as a disinhibitor; whether the child's own behaviour, because of the misuse of substances, places him/her at risk so that he/she is unable to make an informed choice about any activity; whether any attempts to secure secrecy have been made by the sexual partner, beyond what would be considered usual in a teenage relationship; whether the sexual partner is known by one of the agencies (which presupposes that checks will be made with the police); whether the child denies, minimises or accepts concerns; and whether the methods used are consistent with grooming.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that the Department for Education and Skills considered Recommendation 13 to have been implemented (Home Office, May 2007). It had previously recorded in May 2006 that the measure was complete (Home Office, May 2006). In December 2004, the department had accepted the recommendation, noting that new guidance would be developed following the implementation of the Children Act 2004 as part of wider guidance on Local Safeguarding Children Boards (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Integrated Children's System should record those cases where a decision is taken not to refer to the police.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that the Department for Education and Skills considered the recommendation "substantially delivered in terms of DfES policy addressing ICS functional requirements", while local implementation was progressing (Home Office, May 2007). It had earlier reported in May 2006 that the recommendation was complete (Home Office, May 2006). In December 2004, it had accepted the recommendation, noting that social services already recorded handling decisions and that database support within the Integrated Children's System was scheduled for rollout by early 2006 (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Commission for Social Care Inspection should, as part of any social services inspection, review whether decisions not to inform the police have been properly taken.

The Home Office reported in November 2005 that Recommendation 15 was complete (Home Office, Nov 2005). Previously, in December 2004, the department stated that the Commission for Social Care Inspection had agreed to modify its inspection process to include a focus on whether allegations of sexual offences committed against a child had been appropriately addressed and reported to the police (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Head teachers and school governors should receive training on how to ensure that interviews to appoint staff reflect the importance of safeguarding children.

The Home Office reported in May 2006 that Recommendation 16 was complete (Home Office, May 2006). The department had previously stated in December 2004 that a steering group involving officials from the Department for Education and Skills, headteacher and governor representatives, faith organisations, and child abuse experts had been established to oversee the development and delivery of safeguarding interview training (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

From a date to be agreed, no interview panel to appoint staff working in schools should be convened without at least one member being properly trained.

The Home Office reported in May 2006 that this recommendation was complete (Home Office, May 2006). In December 2004, the department stated that a steering group had been set up to oversee the development and delivery of training, bringing together officials from the Department for Education and Skills, headteacher, school governor and faith organisations, and experts in child abuse (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The relevant inspection bodies should, as part of their inspection, review the existence and effectiveness of a school's selection and recruitment arrangements.

The Home Office reported in November 2005 in its second progress report that the recommendation was "complete and mainstreamed" (Home Office, Nov 2005). Earlier, the department stated in its December 2004 progress report that Ofsted and its Director of Inspection had agreed that school recruitment and selection procedures would be included in the school’s self-evaluation in future inspection plans starting from September 2005 (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

New arrangements should be introduced requiring those who wish to work with children, or vulnerable adults, to be registered. This register – perhaps supported by a card or licence – would confirm that there is no known reason why an individual should not work with these client groups. The new register would be administered by a central body, which would take the decision, subject to published criteria, to approve or refuse registration on the basis of all the information made available to them by the police and other agencies. The responsibility for judging the relevance of police intelligence in deciding a person's suitability would lie with the central body. The police, as now, would be able to identify intelligence which on no account should be disclosed to the applicant. Employers should still decide, based on good selection procedures, whether or not the job required the postholder to be registered and should retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not to employ. The central body would have the discretion to ignore any conviction information judged not to be relevant to the position in question. Individuals should have a right to appeal against any refusal to place them on the register and that right should be exercised before any information is made available to a third party. The register should be continuously updated and available to prospective employers for checking online or by telephone. The register should be introduced in a phased way, over a period of years, to avoid the problems associated with the introduction of the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB). The DfES, in consultation with other government departments, should decide whether the registration scheme should be evidenced by a licence or card.

In February 2011, HM Government stated in a review published by the Department for Education that "registration, and monitoring, will be scrapped" (HM Government, Feb 2011). The Home Office previously reported in May 2007 that the measure was being addressed through the planned Vetting and Barring Scheme under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Home Office, May 2007). The department had originally accepted the recommendation in December 2004, stating that it had found a practicable and affordable approach building on existing barring schemes (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

HMIC should develop, with ACPO and the CRB, the standards to be observed by police forces in carrying out vetting checks. These should cover the intelligence databases to be searched, the robustness of procedures, guidance, training, supervision and audit.

The Home Office stated in May 2006 that the recommendation was completed (Home Office, May 2006). In December 2004, the department reported that the CRB, working in conjunction with the police service, had taken the lead in developing a QAF to provide detailed guidance and interactive tools to Disclosure Units, adding that the QAF was trialled and immediately implemented at Lancashire Constabulary due to its success, and further refined following a review by a practitioners group (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

All posts, including those in schools, that involve working with children, and vulnerable adults, should be subject to the Enhanced Disclosure regime.

The Home Office reported in May 2007 that regulations brought into force in September 2006 meant all posts within the school environment were entitled to an Enhanced Disclosure (Home Office, May 2007). The department had previously accepted the recommendation in its December 2004 progress report, explaining that revised proposals to broaden disclosure criteria for those working with children and vulnerable adults had been endorsed by stakeholders in July 2004 (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The Registered Bodies' precise responsibilities for checking identities need to be clarified urgently.

The Home Office stated in May 2006 that the recommendation was implemented (Home Office, May 2006). The department had previously reported in December 2004 that five suppliers and 15 Registered Bodies had been selected to conduct online identity checks for disclosure applicants under an authentication pilot, while updated guidance outlining an identity checking process was in the final stages of review ahead of planned publication in February 2005 (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Registered Bodies, or the CRB, should be able to check passports and driving licences presented as proof of identity against the Passport Service and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) databases.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that work on the recommendation was in progress, but stated that further work by the Criminal Records Bureau on formal data-sharing arrangements with the DVLA had been "put on hold" due to links with its wider identity management programme (Home Office, May 2007). The department had previously accepted the recommendation in December 2004, stating that provision for statutory data-sharing gateways to verify applicant identity was included in proposed legislation (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

There should be an expectation that documents produced to confirm identity should, wherever possible, include a photograph.

The Home Office stated in November 2005 that the recommendation was "implemented and mainstreamed" (Home Office, Nov 2005). In its December 2004 progress report, the department noted that guidance issued to Registered Bodies had undergone a complete review to improve content and usability, with revised text advocating that identity documents should include a photograph wherever possible (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Fingerprints should be used as a means of verifying identity.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that this recommendation was subject to no further action pending developments under its identity management programme, adding that the position would be reviewed in due course (Home Office, May 2007). The department had previously noted in December 2004 that a Criminal Records Bureau consultation on using fingerprints for disclosure applications was largely negative, prompting it to pause separate work until the wider identity card project advanced (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Guidance should be issued to Registered Bodies on how to verify that applicants have given a full and accurate account of their current and past addresses.

In its second progress report in November 2005, the Home Office stated that recommendation 26, alongside recommendations 24, 27 and 29, was "implemented and mainstreamed" (Home Office, Nov 2005). The department had previously reported in its December 2004 progress report that the guidance issued to Registered Bodies had undergone a complete review to improve its content and usability (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Registered Bodies should be required to confirm that they have checked the information on the 'Police Check Form' in accordance with CRB guidance.

The Home Office reported in November 2005 that the recommendation was "implemented and mainstreamed" (Home Office, Nov 2005). It had previously stated in December 2004 that a proposed change paper had been submitted to Capita, the Criminal Records Bureau's IT supplier, to introduce an amended declaration emphasising the countersignatory's responsibility to authenticate documentation, validate identity, and confirm the completeness of application details (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

The consents that applicants currently give on the 'Police Check Form' should be sufficiently broad to enable the requisite checks to be undertaken.

The Home Office reported in May 2006 that Recommendation 28 had been implemented (Home Office, May 2006). The department had previously stated in December 2004 that it proposed incorporating the broader consent statement alongside changes for Recommendation 27, noting that legal advisers judged existing wording sufficient until relevant data-sharing agreements and legislation were approved (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Incomplete or withdrawn applications should in future be returned to the Registered Body, and not to the applicant.

The Home Office stated in its November 2005 progress report that the recommendation was "implemented and mainstreamed" (Home Office, Nov 2005). The department had previously reported in December 2004 that the Criminal Records Bureau had signed a contract change note with IT supplier Capita under the normal agreement change procedure, with implementation expected by June 2005 (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

Proposals should be brought forward as soon as possible to improve the checking of people from overseas who want to work with children and vulnerable adults.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that work on the recommendation was in progress, noting that greater impetus was being given to "improve the effective exchange of criminal record information within Europe and more widely" (Home Office, May 2007). The department had previously stated in December 2004 that the Criminal Records Bureau had undertaken an overseas survey and visits to Australia to build links to access Australian data (Home Office response, Dec 2004).

As a priority, legislation should be brought forward to enable the CRB to access the following additional databases for the purpose of vetting: Her Majesty's Customs & Excise; National Criminal Intelligence Service; National Crime Squad; British Transport Police; and the Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents of the Protection of Children Act List and the Protection of Vulnerable Adults List.

In May 2007, the Home Office reported that British Transport Police had been fully integrated into the Disclosure Service, and noted that a pilot testing a search engine with Serious Organised Crime Agency data would run until the end of July 2007 to determine the way forward (Home Office, May 2007). Earlier, in December 2004, the department stated that measures to enable database access were included in the SOCPB following preliminary discussions with the relevant policing and intelligence bodies (Home Office response, Dec 2004).