UK COVID-19 Inquiry

The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each simplify and reduce the number of structures with responsibility for preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. The core structures should be: a single Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee (including the senior minister responsible for health and social care) responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience for each government, which meets regularly and is chaired by the leader or deputy leader of the relevant government; and a single cross-departmental group of senior officials in each government (which reports regularly to the Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee) to oversee and implement policy on civil emergency preparedness and resilience. This should be put in place within 12 months of the publication of this Report. Within 6 months of the creation of the group of senior officials, it should complete a review to simplify and reduce the number of structures responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. Subsequently, within 24 months of the publication of this Report, the ministerial committee should rationalise and streamline subordinate or supporting groups and committees responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. Any groups and committees retained or created to support this core structure should have a clear purpose and should report regularly about progress with, and completion of, tasks assigned to them.

The Inquiry asked UK administrations to simplify and streamline civil emergency preparedness structures. The UK Government (Cabinet Office) stated in July 2025 that the recommendation was closed, having established the National Security Council (Resilience) and refreshed catastrophic risk governance (Cabinet Office, Jul 2025). In July 2026, the Scottish Government reported that its Crisis Preparation Oversight Programme continued to support preparedness work alongside regular Cabinet updates (Scottish Government, Jul 2026). The Northern Ireland Executive stated in January 2026 that options to review its civil contingencies landscape remained under consideration (Northern Ireland Executive, Jan 2026), while the First Minister of Wales, Eluned Morgan MS, reported in July 2025 that implementation in Wales was completed (Eluned Morgan MS, Jul 2025).

The UK government should: abolish the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience; and require the Cabinet Office to lead on preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across UK government departments, including monitoring the preparedness and resilience of other departments, supporting departments to correct problems, and escalating issues to the UK Cabinet-level ministerial committee and group of senior officials in Recommendation 1.

The Inquiry recommended replacing the lead department model with central government leadership for whole-system emergencies. In January 2026, the Cabinet Office described embedding its leadership role in updated emergency doctrine, but did not describe abolishing the lead department model, noting that guidance on departmental expectations was expected in spring 2026 (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). The Northern Ireland Executive reported in January 2026 that whole-system risks remained central to its risk management strategy (Northern Ireland Executive, Jan 2026). In a written statement that month, Eluned Morgan MS, First Minister of Wales, stated that an alternative crisis management model was being developed for publication in autumn 2026 (Eluned Morgan MS, Jan 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should work together on developing a new approach to risk assessment that moves away from a reliance on single reasonable worst-case scenarios towards an approach that: assesses a wider range of scenarios representative of the different risks and the range of each kind of risk; considers the prevention and mitigation of an emergency in addition to dealing with its consequences; provides a full analysis of the ways in which the combined impacts of different risks may complicate or worsen an emergency; assesses long-term risks in addition to short-term risks and considers how they may interact with each other; undertakes an assessment of the impact of each risk on vulnerable people; and takes into account the capacity and capabilities of the UK. In doing so, the UK government and devolved administrations should perform risk assessments that reflect the circumstances and characteristics particular to England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the UK as a whole.

The Inquiry recommended creating a new multi-scenario approach to national risk assessment. In January 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that it had begun reviewing the National Security Risk Assessment methodology to reference varied scenarios, issued guidance on vulnerable groups, and continued developing a digital platform to analyse linked risks (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). The department also noted progress on an alternative capability-based assessment pilot with the Royal Academy of Engineering, though joint work with devolved administrations was not mentioned (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). It stated that the methodology review is scheduled to conclude in summer 2026 with changes implemented in 2027, alongside rollout of the digital platform and delivery of the pilot during 2026 (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should together introduce a UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy (which includes pandemics) to prevent each emergency and also to reduce, control and mitigate its effects. As a minimum, the strategy should: be adaptable; include sections dedicated to each potential whole-system civil emergency – for example, one on pandemics with a clear explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the UK government, devolved administrations and their departments/directorates as well as local responders; consider a wide range of potential scenarios for each type of emergency; identify the key issues and set out a range of potential responses; identify how the strategy is to be applied to ensure that any potential responses are proportionate to the particular circumstances of the emergency; include an assessment in the short, medium and long term, based on published modelling, of the potential health, social and economic impacts of the emergency and of potential responses to the emergency on the population and, in particular, on vulnerable people; and include an assessment of the infrastructure, technology and skills the UK needs to respond effectively to the emergency and how those needs might change for different scenarios. The strategy should be subject to a substantive reassessment at least every three years to ensure that it is up to date and effective, incorporating lessons learned between reassessments.

The Inquiry recommended a UK-wide civil emergency strategy covering pandemics and other major risks. In January 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Department for Health and Social Care was preparing a pandemic preparedness strategy for publication in early 2026 and updating a respiratory response plan (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). It stated that adapting the plan to other transmission routes would continue throughout 2026, alongside work mapping cascading impacts of catastrophic risks (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). It had earlier stated in July 2025 that its Resilience Action Plan and risk-specific operational plans addressed the recommendation, maintaining that a single UK-wide strategy would be "unwieldy" under devolution arrangements (Cabinet Office, Jul 2025).

The UK government, working with the devolved administrations, should establish mechanisms for the timely collection, analysis, secure sharing and use of reliable data for informing emergency responses, in advance of future pandemics. Data systems should be tested in pandemic exercises. The UK government should also commission a wider range of research projects ready to commence in the event of a future pandemic. These could be ‘hibernated’ studies or existing studies that are designed to be rapidly adapted to a new outbreak. Better working with international partners should be encouraged. This should include projects to: understand the prevalence of a new virus; measure the effectiveness of a range of different public health measures; and identify which groups of vulnerable people are hardest hit by the pandemic and why.

The Inquiry asked the UK government to establish pandemic data systems and adaptable research. The Cabinet Office reported in January 2026 that the Biothreats Radar platform was launched across government, the Risk Vulnerability Tool was made available during Exercise PEGASUS, and a chair was appointed for the Health Data Research Service (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). The Northern Ireland Executive stated in January 2026 that legislative amendments to permit sharing health datasets remained scheduled for 2025 to 2026 (Northern Ireland Executive, Jan 2026). Eluned Morgan MS stated in January 2026 that full adoption of the Welsh Emergency Care Data Set remained targeted for autumn 2026 (Eluned Morgan MS, Jan 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should together hold a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years. The exercise should: test the UK-wide, cross-government, national and local response to a pandemic at all stages, from the initial outbreak to multiple waves over a number of years; include a broad range of those involved in pandemic preparedness and response; and consider how a broad range of vulnerable people will be helped in the event of a pandemic.

The Cabinet Office reported in January 2026 that live participation in Exercise Pegasus, a UK-wide pandemic exercise involving all government departments and devolved administrations, concluded in November 2025 (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). It stated that a fourth tabletop phase focusing on recovery was planned for summer 2026 to examine the impact of response decisions (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). The department aims to deliver an outstanding post-exercise report communicating the findings and lessons in winter 2026 (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026).

For all civil emergency exercises, the governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each (unless there are reasons of national security for not doing so): publish an exercise report summarising the findings, lessons and recommendations, within three months of the conclusion of the exercise; publish an action plan setting out the specific steps that will be taken in response to the report's findings, and by which entity, within six months of the conclusion of the exercise; and keep exercise reports, action plans, and emergency plans and guidance from across the UK in a single, UK-wide online archive, accessible to all involved in emergency preparedness, resilience and response.

The Cabinet Office reported in January 2026 that development was underway on a UK-wide online repository for civil emergency exercise information and a cross-government lessons management framework (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). In the same January 2026 update, the department noted that repository scoping work was expected to conclude in 2026, while the publication schedule for the Exercise PEGASUS report remained to be confirmed with publication likely in winter 2026 (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026).

The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each produce and publish reports to their respective legislatures at least every three years on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The reports should include as a minimum: the risks that each government has identified are likely to result in whole-system civil emergencies; the recommendations that have been made to each government to mitigate those risks, and whether these recommendations have been accepted or rejected; a cost–benefit analysis setting out the economic and social costs of accepting the risks as against taking action to mitigate the risks; who may be vulnerable to the risks and what steps are being taken to mitigate those risks; a plan setting out the timescales for implementing the recommendations that have been accepted; and an update on the progress that has been made on implementing previously accepted recommendations.

The Cabinet Office reported in July 2025 that it considered the recommendation closed after delivering an annual statement to Parliament on risk and resilience (Cabinet Office, Jul 2025). The Scottish Government stated in July 2026 that the recommendation had been delivered and closed following the publication of its first preparedness report, while First Minister of Wales Eluned Morgan MS considered it completed in January 2026 (Eluned Morgan MS, Jan 2026; Scottish Government, Jul 2026). The Northern Ireland Executive stated in January 2026 that the recommendation remained open, with work ongoing to develop a position paper by July 2026 to inform its first report to the assembly (Northern Ireland Executive, Jan 2026).

The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each introduce the use of red teams in the Civil Service to scrutinise and challenge the principles, evidence, policies and advice relating to preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. The red teams should be brought in from outside of government and the Civil Service.

The Cabinet Office reported in January 2026 that an October 2025 pilot was being applied to incorporate red teaming into the ongoing 2026 Capabilities Assessment, the Government Office for Science had established a resilience red teaming function, and remaining expert advisory groups were being stood up to review risks throughout the year (Cabinet Office, Jan 2026). The department previously stated in July 2025 that a broader red teaming capability to test departmental risk planning is due in autumn 2026 (Cabinet Office, Jul 2025).

The UK government should, in consultation with the devolved administrations, create a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The new body should be given responsibility for: providing independent, strategic advice to the UK government and devolved administrations on their planning for, preparedness for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies; consulting with the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector at a national and local level and directors of public health on the protection of vulnerable people in whole-system civil emergencies; assessing the state of planning for, preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across the UK; and making recommendations on the capacity and capabilities that will be required to prepare for and build resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. As an interim measure, the new body should be established on a non-statutory basis within 12 months of this Report, so that it may begin its work in advance of legislation being passed.

The Inquiry recommended creating an independent statutory resilience body for civil emergencies. In April 2026, Dan Jarvis, for the Cabinet Office, stated that convening independent panels to scrutinise whole-system risks forms the government's response, though the Minister did not mention creating a statutory body (Dan Jarvis, Apr 2026). In March 2026, the National Preparedness Commission stated that the recommendation had been rejected and questioned whether ad hoc panels would adequately substitute for an independent scrutinising body (House of Lords National Resilience Committee, Mar 2026; House of Lords National Resilience Committee, Mar 2026). The department had previously stated in July 2025 that a statutory body was not necessary because it could not outsource responsibility for response plans (Cabinet Office, Jul 2025; Cabinet Office, Jul 2025).