UK-wide Civil Emergency Strategy

3.9 Most emergencies in Wales are managed at the local level by the emergency services, local authorities, and other responder organisations, such as Natural Resources Wales, Public Health Wales, water and energy companies and transport operators, with multi-agency coordination and decisions being undertaken through Strategic Coordination Groups where necessary. However, because of scale or complexity, some emergencies may need a degree of government coordination or support, with the Welsh and UK Governments taking the lead where appropriate, in line with the devolution settlement. The Pan Wales Response Plan sets out the arrangements for management of major emergencies affecting several or all parts of Wales. The Plan was updated in 2023 and endorsed by the Wales Resilience Forum in December 2023.

3.10 In the event of a major or catastrophic emergency, for example widespread and substantial flooding across Wales, major industrial accident or disruption, or terrorist attack, the Welsh Government’s activates strategic response structures to keep ministers appraised of the situation, coordinate the Welsh Government’s response, share information (including with the UK Government, via COBR Unit), record and disseminate decisions, and advise ministers on any high-level decisions they may need to take to support response and recovery efforts.

3.11 In addition, recognising the impacts on the organisation and partners that arise from activation of the Emergency Coordination Centre Wales and the efficiencies to be gained from coordinating a response virtually by making best use of current IT tools, the Welsh Government developed and implemented in 2022 a more agile, proportionate approach to help meet strategic response demands. Known as “First Response”, this refreshed approach does not discount the need to stand-up the Emergency Coordination Centre Wales, and bring together in one location government officials and responders when required. However, it recognises that full Emergency Coordination Centre Wales activation is not always proportionate to the level of response required or the most efficient way of meeting response demands.

3.12 First Response is supported by the Risk and Preparedness Committee and effectively presents a rapid response mechanism for the organisation to develop sustained response structures, if these are needed. This enables cross government oversight, shared situational awareness and understanding of risk, effective governance with clear decision points, whilst supporting incident preparedness and response. Following a successfully trial of the approach in 2022, First Response arrangements have been activated on multiple occasions in the last two years, including, most recently, in relation to Storm Darragh in early December 2024.

3.13 The First Response approach fits with UK Government response processes, including Calling Notices for both Official and Ministerial COBR meetings, and management of reporting requirements, such as Commonly Recognised Information Picture for Wales and Situation Reports, ensuring that Wales’ interests are informed, accurate and well-represented.

3.14 First Response manages co-ordinated action across Welsh Government, and when required, across local partners, emergency planners and Category 1 responders. Maintaining these links enables informed early action and wider awareness across key stakeholders, supporting early calls for mutual aid and/or government support.

3.15 A strong resilience system, however, requires all partners and interested parties working collaboratively - including UK Government, local authorities, emergency services and the private and voluntary and community sectors. As part of the Wales resilience framework programme, the Welsh Government will be undertaking further work to identify how best to enhance community and societal resilience, and to better understand and integrate this into resilience and emergency management activities.

3.16 Alignment and interoperability across the UK and devolved governments is absolutely critical to our ability to effectively respond to whole-system risks. However, all governments agree that a single UK-wide strategy which covers all of the sub-recommendations would be unwieldy and would not be appropriate given devolution arrangements, responsibilities and accountabilities. We agree that risk planning should be done jointly or in concert, and we will cooperate closely going forward.

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle. We recognise the importance of having preparations in place to prevent whole system civil emergencies and to reduce, control and mitigate their effects should they occur. We agree that there is a benefit in working together with the UK Government and devolved governments, and therefore, we are working with four nations counterparts on a four nations Concept of Operations (ConOps) and an exercise plan for UK-wide whole system civil emergencies, that will deliver the substantial points raised in this recommendation.

Whole system civil emergencies can have significant impacts on our country. We agree that it is important to clearly establish and set out the roles and responsibilities of those involved in emergency management during whole system civil emergencies. Emergencies can often occur with little or no warning, and so we welcome this opportunity to define and communicate our position on aspects of our emergency preparations.

Dealing with whole system civil emergencies, whether foreseen or unforeseen, requires a flexible and adaptive approach. Preparing Scotland, our suite of national guidance documents, is available for use by organisations involved in resilience and emergency preparedness. It seeks to provide a common philosophy which underpins our approach to resilience, while still providing flexibility to enable Scotland to respond to new hazards and threats, known as Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). IEM supports the development of flexible and adaptable arrangements to support the response to emergencies, irrespective of the scenario.

One example of a flexible arrangements is a Concept of Operations, or ConOps, a document which sets out arrangements in relation to emergencies and provides an opportunity to agree roles and responsibilities in advance of emergencies regardless of the scenario.

To achieve this recommendation in principle, we have committed to working on a four nations basis to introduce a shared ConOps, rather than a Strategy, as this is compatible with the well-established, well-utilised concept of IEM. The introduction of a four nations ConOps will establish and communicate the handling of civil emergencies whilst still allowing room for adjusting these plans for each emergency, as the impacts of these events can vary greatly between each occurrence.

Producing the ConOps on a four nations basis will allow knowledge exchange between all nations, resulting in a well informed and considered document. The four nations aspect will ensure a consistent approach across the UK, providing clarity to categorised (under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) and non-categorised responders on their role in emergency preparedness.

To ensure the ConOps remains an accurate, reliable document, we are also committing to participating fully in the National Exercise Plan for Tier 1 exercises to help identify the possible gaps in planning and preparations for whole system civil emergencies (as discussed later in reference to Recommendation Six). This will allow us to address these gaps and incorporate updated preparations into the ConOps. The exercises will cover a multitude of risks and will identify lessons which are applicable across a range of scenarios. The combination of a four nations ConOps and exercise plan will ensure that our preparations for whole system civil emergencies are continuously improved.

The Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) is also developing a new ConOps to ensure that it delivers its functions according to clear and agreed policies and procedures and plays its part in facilitating an effective the Scottish Government response to a wide range of civil contingencies emergencies.

The SGoRR ConOps clearly sets out SGoRR’s role in the Scottish Government’s response to civil contingencies emergencies. Further, it sets out how SGoRR works with internal and external partners, including the UK Government and categorised responders.

As work on the SGoRR ConOps progresses, additional plans for emergencies that require deviations from or additions to the standard operating procedures will be developed. In line with our continuous improvement approach to risk assessment, the development of associated plans will be conducted on an iterative basis. As part of this work, the SGoRR Secretariat will engage on an ongoing basis with relevant stakeholders such as the UK Government and categorised responders to ensure roles and responsibilities are clear and agreed.

The Scottish Government is committed to putting measures in place to enable support to reach vulnerable people during emergencies. The Scottish Government actively supports partners in the development of the Persons at Risk Distribution (PARD) resource which enables the swift identification of, and support to, those most at risk during an incident.

We recognise the benefits of a UK-wide approach to civil contingencies and have worked with the UK government and other devolved governments to ensure an aligned approach. A single UK-wide strategy, however, would be complex and unwieldy and may not deliver the required benefits.

Officials are working with UK government and devolved governments’ officials to develop Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) for each identified whole system scenario on the basis of assessment against the Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario (RWCS). There are 11 risks considered to require a whole-system approach, of which three fall within the devolved sphere. CONOPS for each scenario are being developed sequentially, the first being that required for a pandemic. The DoH in NI is engaged in this workstream.

Each devolved nation has a Memorandum of Understanding with Cabinet Office regarding the Civil Contingencies Act. It is recognised that the Memorandum of Understanding for NI is out of date and therefore needs reviewed and updated to ensure it is fit for purpose.

The “Building Resilience Together” Framework describes how the system would move from Prepare to Response and provides guidance on how this can be triggered by operational partners.

A revised governance arrangement was introduced in June 2021 to support the new Framework, building on long standing civil contingencies arrangements which were deployed during the Covid-19 pandemic. CCG(NI) remains the principal body for Prepare mode and meets three times per year in March, June and November (with a focus on Winter preparedness). It provides regular reports to the NICS Board.

The Pandemic Resilience planning work underway across the NICS will identify the core system requirements for responding to future health pandemics.

The government agrees with the Inquiry’s insights, and they align with our own reflections. The government is therefore implementing a common strategic approach to preparing for and responding to whole-system civil emergencies, which will form part of a refreshed resilience strategy. The resilience strategy will be developed and published in spring 2025 following the resilience review and will set out the government’s vision for a stronger and more resilient UK.

Alignment and interoperability across the UK and devolved governments is absolutely critical to our ability to effectively respond to catastrophic risks. However, all governments agree that a single UK-wide strategy which covers all of the sub-recommendations would be unwieldy and would not be appropriate given devolution arrangements, responsibilities and accountabilities. We agree that risk planning should be done jointly or in concert, and we will cooperate closely as we develop the approach to a new resilience strategy.

Risk profiles vary greatly for different whole-system risks; to create long-term improvements the government has strengthened risk-specific strategies to drive forward meaningful change. Risk-specific planning documents can be refreshed more frequently, enabling greater agility in the face of a changing risk landscape. The UK Biological Security Strategy was published in June 2023 with a renewed vision, mission, outcomes and plans to protect the UK and our interests from significant biological risks, no matter how these occur and no matter who or what they affect. It provides the overarching strategic framework for mitigating biological risks to the UK and sets the framing for several threat and disease specific UK strategies (such as the recently published Antimicrobial Resistance National Action Plan, and the new strategic approach to Pandemic Preparedness). This government has adopted the Strategy in full and committed to ensure we have the capabilities we need to protect the public from a spectrum of biological threats.

To fulfil a commitment in the Strategy, the Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) is publishing a government health and care pandemic preparedness strategy that will set out how the health and care system is implementing the principles of the new strategic approach to pandemic preparedness.

DHSC is also leading work to complete a UK-wide respiratory response plan for health and care, followed by response plans for all other routes of transmission: oral, blood and sexual, contact and vector. In the autumn 2024 budget, the government announced it is strengthening the UK’s pandemic preparedness and health protection with £460 million of investment.

The government also agrees that having clearly defined and well-understood roles and responsibilities is a pre-requisite for an effective UK-wide response. Following the experience of the Covid-19 pandemic, the government implemented a programme of substantial change to how it plans for and responds to whole-system risks. This includes:

a substantial refresh of the government’s risk-agnostic framework for how we collectively respond to crises - the Central Government Concept of Operations for Emergency Response and Recovery (HMG ConOps). This will be published by spring 2025;

risk-specific operational plans which reflect the leadership role for the Cabinet Office in whole-system emergencies. These will be delivered by spring 2025 and will be scalable and adaptable, clarify roles and responsibilities (departments, agencies and devolved governments), and set out triggers and thresholds for moving to a centralised response;

improvements to the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) where assessments will be based on published modelling, where available, and will include the potential health, social, environmental and economic impacts of the emergencies as well as potential impacts on critical infrastructure and services. The assessments will also aim to evaluate the impacts of potential response options on the population and, in particular, on vulnerable people;

building on the National Response Capabilities Programme, which provides oversight of the government’s ability to respond to civil emergencies through a set of emergency response capabilities (including plans, personnel, legislation, training, equipment, data, infrastructure, technology and skills);

completing mapping of key cascading impacts of catastrophic risks to support departments in their planning and response and ensure a more developed and whole-system approach to risk planning. Crucially this includes identifying gaps where further work is required, which will then be escalated through refreshed governance structures; and

establishing and building the skills needed to respond effectively across the UK through the UK Resilience Academy and the Crisis Management Excellence Programme.

We welcome the Inquiry’s emphasis on a whole of society and whole system approach to resilience. The multi-agency partnership role of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) is key to local areas better preparing for, responding to and recovering from incidents. This government will continue to strengthen local resilience working closely with LRFs and wider local partners, and will work with local leaders to consider the role of Strategic Authorities in building resilience across their areas.

As set out in our progress update of January 2026, the Scottish Government completed the first version of the core CONOPS for SGORR by the end of July 2025. The CONOPS remains subject to regular review and adaptation to ensure it is fit for purpose, alongside the addition of scenario-specific plans developed with consideration of the risk landscape.

The Scottish Government also contributed to the UK Government's Amber Book (a national framework for crisis response that establishes roles and responsibilities) ahead of its publication on 28 April 2025, including input to the annex focusing on four nation working and the links between devolved governments and the UK Government during response.

Work is currently underway to consider a Scottish Resilience Strategy.

This recommendation, alongside work already undertaken, was considered as part of the Scottish Government’s response to the Inquiry’s Module 2 Report (Recommendations 12 and 19), published 17 March 2026.

The Scottish Government wrote to the inquiry chair on 18 May 2026 to confirm that this recommendation has been delivered and closed.

Status: OPEN Introduction We acknowledge the advantages of a UK-wide approach to civil contingencies and continue to engage with the UK Government and other Devolved Governments to ensure an aligned approach. Progress update With the establishment of the Catastrophic Impact Programme Task and Finish Group (see Recommendation 3), Executive departments are actively engaged on catastrophic / whole of society risks as agreed in our July 2025 update. With the conclusion of the first three phases of Exercise Pegasus, we are further progressing the development of a NICS Pandemic CONOPs that draws on the learnings from Pegasus and the testing of the Taskforce Model. We will look to wrap the remainder of this workstream into our response to Module 2C Recommendations 10 and 19. As noted in the update for Recommendation 1, the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework will shortly undergo a comprehensive review in the wake of Exercise Pegasus to ensure that the plans and procedures are articulate, realistic and fit for purpose as we work through our lessons management process.

As emergencies do not respect borders, we are committed to close collaboration with the UK government and the devolved governments to ensure a joined-up approach to UK-wide, whole-system emergencies. This co-operation is essential to align policies and facilitate effective coordination for the benefit of all citizens.

The Four Nations Inter-ministerial Group on Strategic Resilience is a dedicated forum for Ministers across the UK to address shared resilience priorities and strengthen collective preparedness for future challenges, this is due to meet in the new year.

Following the introduction of the Wales Resilience Framework and its supporting delivery plan and the action we are taking with the UK government and devolved governments, I consider implementation of recommendation 4 has now been completed.

To fulfil its commitment in the government response to the M1 report, the Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) is publishing a Pandemic Preparedness Strategy in early 2026 after reflecting early learnings from Exercise PEGASUS.

DHSC has developed a UK-wide respiratory response plan for health and care, which was shared in draft with government participants of Exercise PEGASUS. The Plan will be updated to incorporate lessons learned from that exercise. Work will continue to adapt this plan to all other routes of transmission: oral, blood and sexual, contact and vector over 2026.

DHSC is working with health and care partners and other departments, with support from the Cabinet Office, to develop a UK Pandemic Preparedness Strategy. Progress has been made on a draft strategy, which is now being reviewed in light of initial learnings from the Exercise PEGASUS Tier 1 exercise, for publication in early 2026.

A working draft of the Respiratory Response Plan was completed in summer 2025 and a draft shared for feedback during Exercise PEGASUS. DHSC will look to update the Plan with initial learnings from the Exercise PEGASUS and feedback received, before adapting to other routes of transmission.

Since the publication of the government's response to the Module 1 report, the Cabinet Office and respective LGDs have begun mapping the cascading impacts of catastrophic risks and using this information to inform departmental contingency planning. This focus on both primary and cascading impacts will continue to be utilised in current and future risk preparedness with any concerns or issues being escalated through risk governance structures.

Implementation update for recommendation 4 - A UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy (updated June 2025)

15. As set out in the full government response, the UK and devolved governments agree that a single UK-wide strategy which covers all of the sub-recommendations would be unwieldy and would not be appropriate given devolution arrangements, responsibilities and accountabilities. However, the UK government believes the publication of the Resilience Action Plan coupled with the central operational plans for each catastrophic risk and the NSRA, covers all the aspects of the strategy the Inquiry recommended.

16. The UK Government’s Resilience Action Plan was published on 8 July 2025. While significant aspects of resilience are wholly the responsibility of the devolved governments, the UK Government is committed to working in partnership to align policies and facilitate closer cooperation for the benefit of all our citizens. It sets out this government’s refreshed approach to resilience through deepening our understanding of how resilient the UK is to target interventions and resources; enabling individuals, businesses and civil society to increase their resilience and maximising the impact of the public sector resilience system. As set out under recommendation 2, for each catastrophic risk there are now central operational plans which detail structures, roles and responsibilities, thresholds, and expected data requirements. Updates on specific commitments made in the government Module 1 response are included below, however others are covered in response to recommendation 2 due to the thematic overlap:

a. DHSC is working with health and care partners and other departments with support from the Cabinet Office to develop the pandemic preparedness strategy. The aim is to publish this in autumn 2025, after incorporating interim findings of the PEGASUS Tier 1 Exercise taking place.

b. The Department for Health and Social Care’s (DHSC) respiratory response plan is due to be completed in summer 2025. Following its completion, DHSC will look to adapt the plan to other routes of transmission, learning from the experience of developing the respiratory response plan and informed by Exercise PEGASUS.