Cabinet Office Leadership for Emergencies

The government agrees with the need for a greater Cabinet Office role for whole-system civil emergencies. This is in addition to the Lead Government Department model which retains an essential role in preparedness and resilience.

In building the resilience of the UK to respond to whole-system emergencies, we are looking across a complex system which involves all of UK society, as well as international actors. The system needs to operate across the whole lifecycle of an extensive array of risks, have clarity of roles and responsibilities, and act in an agile and efficient way at each stage of the cycle. Therefore, in improving the leadership of this system for whole-system civil emergencies, we have sought to maximise and best direct the available resources to provide the most effective impact.

For these reasons, the government has focused on the most serious whole-system risks with significant cascading impacts which affect the whole of society. These risks are those with a catastrophic impact level in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA, further detail about this is included under recommendation 3).

To provide a clear line of accountability the UK has a ‘Lead Government Department’ (LGD) model to cover all phases of the emergency management cycle for all risks in the NSRA. In the LGD model, designated government departments with the day-to-day responsibility for an issue or sector are responsible for leading work to identify serious risks and ensuring that the right planning, response and recovery arrangements are in place. This ensures that the responsibility and oversight sits with the body with the best understanding, relationships and mechanisms for delivery to identify and address risks. The system is most effective when responsibilities for resilience are managed by those most able to discharge them, with central support for cross-system collaboration and information sharing, as no single organisation or government can manage these risks alone.

To support that balance, we will retain the Lead Government Department model for catastrophic risks, but with a greater role for the Cabinet Office in driving work to improve preparedness and resilience. Furthermore, the Cabinet Office is expected to provide leadership in responding to catastrophic risks should they arise, working closely with the LGD, to coordinate a whole-system response. This supplements the role of all government departments to prepare for and respond to the cascading impacts of these risks in the areas for which they are responsible. The Cabinet Office will collaborate closely with the LGDs and all departments to place the best available expertise on each catastrophic risk at the heart of our national preparations, supporting departments to identify and plan against a fuller range of cascading impacts.

To ensure these capabilities are integrated into the government’s approach, we will publish updated guidance for all government departments on catastrophic risk management to ensure all parts of the system understand their roles and responsibilities in delivering whole-system preparedness. This is in relation to the primary risk impacts, but also to ensure preparedness and resilience to the cascading impacts of the risk.

The Cabinet Office has already taken steps to strengthen its role on catastrophic risks. Since the pandemic, the department has published a revised Lead Government Department list, which makes clear risk ownership across the UK and devolved governments to ensure that all civil contingencies risks are appropriately and effectively managed through all parts of the risk cycle.

These actions strengthen the Cabinet Office’s long-standing role in monitoring, supporting and improving the preparedness and resilience of other departments. This includes leadership of two cross-cutting resilience programmes, the Response Capabilities Programme and the National Exercising Programme (NEP). This programme monitors and identifies possible improvements to the government’s core emergency response capabilities and the NEP delivers an annual national (or ‘Tier 1’) exercise to test cross-government co-ordination. National exercises involve regional/devolved government administrations and local responders, as well as relevant businesses and voluntary and community organisations and culminate in a post-exercise report which makes recommendations to improve the government’s capacity and capabilities to prepare for and respond to risks. Further detail can be found in Recommendation 6.

For all risks, the decision to move to a centrally-led response remains at the discretion of the Prime Minister when considering the scale, complexity or severity of a crisis. To reinforce this, the Cabinet Office has:

Developed a substantial update of the Central Government Concept of Operations for Emergency Response and Recovery (HMG CONOPs) which is due for publication in Spring 2025. This provides further detail on the role of the Cabinet Office in the immediate response to whole-of-system crises, and includes information on arrangements for when the Cabinet Office may take on a leadership role.

Undertaken additional work on planning against defined catastrophic risks. This supplements the HMG CONOPs by creating plans for individual catastrophic risks should a response be required. These plans include trigger points for when a risk might escalate to a catastrophic level, clear decision-making authorities and processes, the activation procedures for acute crisis management structures, and data requirements. To support this the Cabinet Office also works with departments, devolved governments and local partners, where appropriate, to plan and prepare for the cascading impacts of catastrophic risks.

Updated the governance structures for catastrophic risks to reflect the Cabinet Office’s larger role. In this governance structure, the Cabinet Office supports departments to correct problems, and escalate issues to the UK Cabinet-level National Security Council (Resilience) and supporting senior official groups. The governance for catastrophic risks forms a key part of the wider governance structure set out in recommendation 1.

The government’s response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 1 Report committed to publishing updated guidance for all government departments on catastrophic risk management. This is to ensure all parts of the system understand their roles and responsibilities in delivering whole-system preparedness. This work has been incorporated into the Amber Book and the Lead Government Department (LGD) Expectations guidance which will set out the role of Cabinet Office and other UK government departments in planning, preparing, responding to, and recovering from emergencies.

In April 2025, the government published the updated Central Government Concept of Operations for Emergency Response and Recovery (the Amber Book). The Amber Book provides detail on roles and responsibilities, as well as appropriate governance structures for whole-of-system crises.

The development of the Lead Government Expectations guidance is nearing completion, and is expected to be published in spring 2026. Before publication, we are conducting cross-government engagement to ensure the guidance has been fully tested by its end-user and is applicable across all risk-owning departments.

Implementation update for recommendation 2 - Cabinet Office leadership for whole-system civil emergencies in the UK (updated June 2025)

3. As the government stated in the Module 1 response, we agree with the Inquiry that whole-system risks (such as pandemics and national power outages) clearly require a stronger and more directive role from the centre. We have now explicitly embedded the leadership role of the Cabinet Office within our central crisis management doctrine, the Amber Book, as well as our risk-specific planning. This means that the Cabinet Office now co-leads each whole-system risk.

4. However, stronger leadership from the centre should bolster the LGD model rather than replace it. LGDs continue to have a critical role in planning for whole-system risks. It is vital that the bodies with the day-to-day responsibility for an issue or sector lead work on risk planning, response and recovery arrangements. LGDs are best placed to leverage relationships with their sectors, alongside having vital policy expertise, tools, and resources. Duplication of these responsibilities at the centre would risk a lack of clarity around engagement, communications channels and planning. The government will therefore retain the LGD model, reinforced by the stronger role for the Cabinet Office.

5. For example, in the case of a National Power Outage, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) as the lead government department for this risk would be focused on working with the National Energy System Operator (NESO) to ensure that power restoration is achieved as quickly as possible. All government departments would be focused on responding to the impacts to their individual sectors, e.g. the health service or the education sector. The Cabinet Office would facilitate the rapid co-ordination of the Government’s overall response and effective decision-making.

6. The Cabinet Office also co-chairs a number of catastrophic risk boards with LGDs, which have been strengthened through increased meeting regularity and undertaking more in-depth reviews of individual sector plans. These risk boards can then escalate issues, including up to the National Security Council (Resilience) which has responsibility for readiness and resilience.

7. Working closely with respective LGDs, the Cabinet Office has written internal central operational plans for each catastrophic risk. These set out indicative thresholds for a move to a Cabinet Office-led response as well as what this would look like in practice for that specific risk (e.g. structures, roles and responsibilities and expected data requirements). The Cabinet Office has also undertaken a substantial piece of work to map existing response plans and capabilities for cascading impacts to identify and fill capability gaps.

8. To ensure consistency, good practice, and accountability in planning and responses, the government will publish Lead Government Department Expectations by the end of 2025, setting out the role of Cabinet Office and other UK government departments. It will set clear responsibilities for LGDs throughout the risk cycle (from risk identification through to recovery), including articulating minimum expectations and good practice. A greater emphasis will also be placed on ensuring the needs of vulnerable people are at the forefront of planning.

9. In summary, the Cabinet Office role has been strengthened through the publication of the Amber Book, which provides an overview of the Cabinet Office role in whole-system emergencies; the creation of internal operational plans (drafted by the Cabinet Office with the support of the LGD) for each catastrophic risk, which uses the concepts of the Amber Book to set out the trigger point for Cabinet Office involvement, and the role of the LGDs and other government departments if that risk manifested; and finally the development (for future publication) of the LGD Expectations, which will set out LGD responsibilities throughout the risk cycle, from risk identification to recovery.

10. Updates on specific commitments made in the government response include:

a. Work to publish updated guidance for all government departments on catastrophic risk management has now been incorporated into a wider piece of work on Lead Government Department Expectations, due to be published by the end of 2025.

b. The government published the updated Central Government Concept of Operations for Emergency Response and Recovery (the Amber Book) in April 2025. The publication of the Amber Book has codified the leadership role the Cabinet Office plays for responding to whole-of-system emergencies. For this category of risks, the Cabinet Office co-sponsors the planning phase with the LGD which owns the risk, with a particular focus on ensuring the right concept of operations is in place should a response be required. The Amber Book provides detail on roles and responsibilities, as well as appropriate governance structures for whole-of-system crises. While the framework is risk agnostic, it provides the basis for risk-specific planning, including for whole-of-system risks. This provides the basis for the internal central operational plans for each catastrophic risk, which set out the role of the Cabinet Office versus the LGD for specific catastrophic risks.

Status: OPEN Introduction The Executive acknowledges that each department is its own legal entity and continues to work closely in a collaborative and collegiate manner to deliver for society here. This recommendation highlights opportunities to prepare for and build resilience for whole-system civil emergencies across society. Progress update In addition to the new pandemic resilience governance arrangements established within TEO, the Department of Health in Northern Ireland has established new governance arrangements around NI’s approach to pandemic preparedness in conjunction with TEO and other government departments, via the Northern Ireland Cross-Departmental Pandemic Resilience Oversight Group. The enhanced cross-departmental co-ordination provided by that group proved to be a beneficial resource during preparations for Exercise Pegasus and ensured early engagement by all departments as the exercise scenario unfolded. Officials in DoH also engage regularly with counterparts in the Irish Department of Health and that will continue as we consider the lessons learned from Exercise Pegasus and our unique position with a land border and two jurisdictions. Whole System or Catastrophic Risks are front and centre of the NI risk management strategy. Exercise Pegasus provided an opportunity to coordinate a response to the impacts of a whole system risk whilst contributing to Cabinet Office delivery of national strategy on reserved matters. The four nations have worked closely to prepare for the independent panel for expert review of risks as outlined in Module 1, Recommendation 10. This has been a valuable opportunity to review the 11 Whole System Risks on the UK National Risk Register whilst recognising that Cabinet Office leads and Devolved Governments have a duty to deliver on devolved impacts.

As set out in our response to the inquiry, the Welsh Government adopts the lead department model for risk assessment, emergency preparedness and response and recovery, underpinned by the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level while co-ordination occurs at the highest necessary level.

However, we recognise that in the event of a prolonged, whole-system emergency, this model has limitations and may need to be strengthened. To address this, through our resilience governance structures, we have established a cross-government group to develop an alternative model for an enduring, whole-of-system emergency response. Its work will inform the Welsh Government’s Crisis Management Concept of Operations (CONOPs), which sets out our approach to crisis management. The final version of the Concept of Operations will be published in autumn 2026 following a final phase of work, consultation with partners and independent review.

The Welsh Government trialled the draft version of our Concept of Operations, during Exercise PEGASUS (which is addressed further in Recommendation 6).