UK COVID-19 Inquiry

The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure, within 12 months of the publication of this Report, that the pandemic stockpiles: retain stock that is better aligned with the range and severity of pandemic risks identified in the National Security Risk Assessment; maintain a minimum three-month supply of PPE for the entire health and social care system in the UK; retain close-to-zero tolerance for expired stock; better reflect the composition of the UK’s health and social care workforce, aligned with fit-testing and other sizing requirements; maintain a simple and streamlined system of management and oversight; and are stored in a wide range of accessible locations. To demonstrate continued compliance with the above, inspection reports should be submitted to health and social care ministers at least annually. Any issues identified should be resolved within three months. The inspection reports should be published with the preparedness and resilience reports (Module 1, Recommendation 8).

The Inquiry asked ministers to reform pandemic stockpile composition and introduce annual inspections. The Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the July 2026 Module 5 report when the Executive Office publications list was checked in September 2026 (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government had also not published a response to the report when its inquiry publications were reviewed in the same month (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). Similarly, the Welsh Government had not published a response to the module when its inquiry page was checked in September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should evaluate the readiness of the structures, systems and processes for the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment as part of UK-wide pandemic response exercises.

The Inquiry asked governments to evaluate emergency healthcare procurement systems during pandemic exercises across the UK. In September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive had not published a formal reply to the July 2026 procurement report on the Executive Office publications list (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government also had not published a document addressing the report in its online collection of inquiry responses when checked in September 2026 (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). The Welsh Government had likewise not published a paper on its inquiry module reports page when reviewed in September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, within 12 months of the publication of this Report, should each have ready systems for the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. These new systems must: integrate procurement and distribution; have the ability rapidly to scale up efficient operations, including through integrated emergency procurement teams and automating the triaging and processing of offers of supply; and be able to use market research, modelling and price benchmarking to ensure value for money.

The Inquiry recommended that UK administrations establish emergency healthcare equipment procurement and distribution systems. In September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the July 2026 report on its publications list (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government had likewise not published a response in its collection of inquiry responses as of September 2026 (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). Publications on the Welsh Government website in September 2026 also showed that it had not published a response to the report (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should publish simplified regulations for emergency healthcare equipment that are aligned with and cover the range and severity of pandemic risks identified in the National Security Risk Assessment. The simplified regulations should: establish the minimum technical specifications of healthcare equipment specifically for use in a pandemic, including international standards that are recognised in the UK; clearly identify the regulator responsible for coordinating regulation, inspection and enforcement for each type of equipment; and be accompanied by a buyer’s guide that is easily understood by procurement officials, suppliers and end-users in the health and social care sectors. The emergency healthcare equipment regulations and the buyer’s guide should be kept under review and updated in line with relevant changes to the National Security Risk Assessment.

The Inquiry asked governments to publish simplified emergency healthcare equipment regulations covering pandemic risks. The Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 5 report of 14 July 2026 when the Executive Office's publications list was checked in September 2026 (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government had also not published a response to the report when its online collection was checked in September 2026 (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). In September 2026, the Welsh Government had likewise not published a response on its inquiry responses page (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

UK regulators, including the Health and Safety Executive, the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland, the Office for Product Safety and Standards and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, should establish an emergency healthcare equipment cross-regulator plan for future pandemics. The plan must include arrangements for: coordination of written guidance from regulators to ensure that it is clear, concise and updated when required; and increasing testing house capacity and the deployment of suitable inspection regimes both to reduce the quantity of non-compliant equipment entering the system and to improve enforcement.

The Inquiry asked UK regulators to create an emergency healthcare equipment plan for future pandemics. When the Executive Office's publications list was checked in September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 5 report of 14 July 2026 (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government had also not published a response to the report when its collection of inquiry responses was checked in September 2026 (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). Similarly, the Welsh Government had not published a response when its module reports page was checked in September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should jointly commission a group of experts to develop blueprints for rapidly scalable critical care medical technology, aligned with the range and severity of pandemic risks identified in the National Security Risk Assessment, within 12 months of the publication of this Report. The blueprints should be issued in accordance with the emergency healthcare equipment regulations and buyer’s guide (see Recommendation 4 of this Report) and regularly reviewed to ensure that they reflect technological advances.

The Inquiry recommended commissioning expert blueprints for scalable intensive care medical technology. In September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 5 report when the Executive Office's publications list was checked (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). A check of gov.scot in September 2026 recorded that the Scottish Government had not published a response to the July 2026 report (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). The Welsh Government also had not published a response when its collection of inquiry module responses on GOV.WALES was checked in September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy, which the Inquiry has recommended should be developed by the UK government and devolved administrations (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4), should include specific objectives for international trade and domestic industry during a pandemic. These must include: the establishment of trading alliances in advance of the next pandemic, to diversify overseas sources of raw materials and healthcare equipment; contractual arrangements with domestic and international suppliers of raw materials and healthcare equipment manufacturers which activate when a pandemic is declared; a robust plan to enable domestic manufacturers rapidly to retool and repurpose facilities for the production of healthcare equipment; and supporting investment for research and development into advanced manufacturing of healthcare equipment in the UK.

The Inquiry asked the Cabinet Office to incorporate trade and industry objectives into civil emergency planning. When the Executive Office's publications list was checked in September 2026, a response to the July 2026 Module 5 report from the Northern Ireland Executive remained unpublished (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). When the Scottish Government's online collection of inquiry responses was checked in September 2026, its response to the report also remained unpublished (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). When the Welsh Government's page of inquiry module responses was checked in September 2026, its response likewise remained unpublished (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should each establish a pool of officials who are trained in the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. Completion of the training should be mandatory for at least 20% of the workforce of each nation’s central healthcare equipment procurement bodies and kept up to date through annual refresher courses.

The Inquiry recommended establishing trained pools of officials for emergency healthcare equipment procurement and distribution. In September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive's publications list indicated that a formal response to the July 2026 Module 5 report remained unpublished (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government's published records of inquiry responses similarly indicated in September 2026 that its formal response had not been published (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). The Welsh Government also had not published a formal response to the report on its website as of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government and devolved administrations should collaborate to establish a UK-wide commercial framework agreement of pre-approved external specialists in the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. The framework should be refreshed every three years.

The Inquiry recommended establishing a UK-wide commercial framework for emergency healthcare procurement specialists. The Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 5 report of July 2026 when the Executive Office's publications list was checked in September 2026 (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government had not published a response to the report when its collection of inquiry responses was checked in September 2026 (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). The Welsh Government had likewise not published a response to the report when its module responses page was checked in September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should improve transparency, governance and accountability for procurement in an emergency. As a minimum, these improvements should include the following: Enhancing transparency Any central digital platform used for procurement must allow for the automated collation of contract information and must reduce the administrative burden involved in publishing contract information. Contracting authorities across the UK should be required to publish contract award notices (in Scotland) and contract details notices in addition to contract award notices (in England, Wales and Northern Ireland) irrespective of the country in which the supplier is based. Governance: Fairness in emergency procurement There should be no high priority lane. All offers to supply healthcare equipment during a pandemic should be assessed according to the application of objective criteria. Accountability: Approval process for emergency spending on healthcare equipment In advance of a pandemic, each health and social care department in each government should agree, with their respective treasuries or finance departments, a process to scrutinise and approve emergency spending on healthcare equipment to ensure that there is a balance between accountability and timely spending decisions.

The Inquiry asked UK governments to improve emergency procurement transparency, governance, and accountability. In September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive had yet to publish a reply to the July 2026 Module 5 report on the Executive Office publications list (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). A check of the Scottish Government website in September 2026 similarly showed that it had not published a reply to the report (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). The Welsh Government had likewise not published a reply when its website was reviewed in September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).

Within three years of the publication of this Report, the systems for the procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment should be digitalised and interoperable across the UK government and devolved administrations. As a minimum, these systems should be able to use technology to collect, share and analyse data across the UK in real time on: pandemic stockpiles, health and social care sector inventories and usage rates; offers of supply, enabling automated comparison, triaging and processing; non-compliant healthcare equipment entering the market; supply chains, including international delivery times and domestic logistics and distribution data; procurement and distribution workforce capacity; and spending – automatically identifying, collecting and collating key contract data for publication.

The Inquiry recommended digitalising healthcare equipment procurement systems across the United Kingdom (UK). In September 2026, the Northern Ireland Executive had not published a formal reply to the July 2026 report on its publications list (Northern Ireland Executive response, Sep 2026). The Scottish Government in September 2026 had likewise not published a formal reply within its online collection of inquiry responses (Scottish Government response, Sep 2026). The Welsh Government in September 2026 had also not published a formal reply on its inquiry module reports page (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of September 2026 (Welsh Government response, Sep 2026).