Recommendations & Conclusions
9 items
5
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
Many cable landing stations are vulnerable to attack. The Government and operators must take the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously, including against targets in Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Government response. The government's response discusses the need for a UK-based and UK-flagged repair ship, which does not address the committee's recommendation about the vulnerability of cable landing stations or taking the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously.
Cabinet Office
8
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’. This pays insufficient attention to the network’s actual capacity to absorb shocks and does not account for onshore vulnerabilities and long-term trends towards a more brittle system. There is also limited understanding of much damage the system can …
Government response. The government's response addresses emergency services' business continuity plans and their reliance on foreign internet servers, which does not engage with the committee's conclusion about the government's overall resilience concept regarding network capacity, shocks, and onshore vulnerabilities.
Cabinet Office
9
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available capacity in the cable system during a security crisis. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should request operators to provide regular updates on the scale and type of data each cable carries, short notice …
Government response. The government's response discusses the National Security Act 2023 and reviewing legislation related to subsea cable sabotage, which does not address the recommendation about focusing on cable system capacity, rerouting data, or developing contingency plans for the Channel Tunnel.
Cabinet Office
10
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The UK needs more confidence in access to cable repair vessels: the current fleet is ageing, and erstwhile UK businesses have been acquired by foreign entities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government response. The government's response discusses UNCLOS and legal aspects of countering suspicious vessels, explicitly stating it does not accept reliance on piracy provisions or publishing a legal opinion, thereby failing to address the concern about access to cable repair vessels.
Cabinet Office
11
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030. This could be leased to industry on favourable terms during peacetime and made available for Government use in a crisis. The Government should set out a timetable for this in response to this Report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)
Government response. The government's response discusses existing international cooperation on cable breaks and vessel behaviour but does not address the recommendation to acquire a sovereign cable repair ship by 2030 or set a timetable for it.
Cabinet Office
12
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable repair skills on commercial repair vessels. These could be called on in periods of heightened tension. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Moderate and catastrophic impacts
Government response. The government states it agrees with the recommendation, but the subsequent text discusses sensor and monitoring technologies and their integration with the Royal Navy, completely failing to address the call for training personnel in cable repair skills.
Cabinet Office
13
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables. These should be a key focus for contingency planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)
Government response. The government partially agrees but primarily discusses military deterrence, reviewing concepts, and leveraging alliances, without detailing how specific vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector, and military communications cables will be a key focus for contingency planning.
Cabinet Office
14
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly highly damaging. We estimate they would include payment and supply chain failures, some degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses, and unexpected cascading issues—all at a time of crisis. We are not convinced there are currently adequate …
Government response. The government's response discusses escorting ships, investing in underwater drones, and the Royal Navy's exercises, which does not address the committee's conclusion regarding the impacts of catastrophic disruption or the adequacy of sector-by-sector assessments of reliance on subsea cables.
Cabinet Office
16
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on foreign internet servers, and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Legal Responses
Government response. The government's response discusses exploring cable protection zones and engaging with European partners on maritime infrastructure protection, which does not address the recommendation regarding emergency services' business continuity plans for reliance on foreign internet servers or internet disruption.
Cabinet Office