Select Committee · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

Undersea cables

Status: Open Opened: 23 Jan 2025 21 recommendations 7 conclusions 1 report

Undersea cables form the backbone of the world’s internet. The UK has around 60 cables which connect us to the outside world, carrying 99% of our data. Concern has been growing about the risk of these cables being sabotaged by foreign states. The consequences would be extensive. This inquiry will examine the UK’s ability to … Show more

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Reports

1 report
Title HC No. Published Items Response
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications cables: resilience a… HC 723 19 Sep 2025 28 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

6 items
2 Recommendation 1st Report - Subsea telecommunications … Accepted

The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the...

The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms suggested that exploring the risks of a co-ordinated attack … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government agrees to strengthen security, with DSIT writing to operators to request emergency 'good enough' repair plans within 12 months and defining standards. They are also reviewing legislation and will explore similar exercises with European counterparts.
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Cabinet Office
3 Conclusion 1st Report - Subsea telecommunications … Accepted

We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks...

We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks of co-ordinated attacks. We agree that resilience across the sector is generally robust, major disruption is unlikely, and hype is unhelpful. But we caution against adopting ‘business as usual’ industry views to determine national security … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the underlying sentiment, committing to ensuring subsea cable infrastructure is geographically diverse and working with industry and Crown Estates to secure space for future routes to support long-term resilience.
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Cabinet Office
4 Recommendation 1st Report - Subsea telecommunications … Accepted

The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage...

The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities Read more

Government response AI summary
The government agrees to develop more detailed technical plans for managing cable systems, engage with operators, conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments, and use these findings to inform additional contingency plans and the National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables.
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Cabinet Office
7 Recommendation 1st Report - Subsea telecommunications … Accepted

To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage...

To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage subsea cable providers to connect to landing stations, terrestrial routes and data centres outside high-concentration points. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49) Read more

Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the recommendation and will accelerate work with Lead Government Departments on technical impact assessments to help critical sectors prepare for subsea cable disruption, with oversight from the Cabinet Office’s ‘Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board’.
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Cabinet Office
17 Recommendation 1st Report - Subsea telecommunications … Accepted

The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak.

The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak. It is encouraging that the Government has identified the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill as a potential legislative vehicle to implement changes. We would like to emphasise the urgency of making progress internationally too: legal developments can be slow, and … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing that current legislation for non-foreign power sabotage of cables is weak. It is conducting a comprehensive review of legislation related to subsea cable infrastructure to ensure robust routes for prosecuting private actors.
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Cabinet Office
21 Recommendation 1st Report - Subsea telecommunications … Accepted

The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring...

The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring technology and should explore incentives to encourage such investment. This could include Government commitments to make better use of existing measures and data—for example more proactive identification and investigation of vessels switching off Automatic Identification … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government agrees to support the subsea cable industry in rolling out monitoring technology and is already engaged in cross-government cooperation, including commercial relationships and partnerships with the Royal Navy. It will explore better use of existing data, including AIS, and is collaborating across departments …
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Cabinet Office

Oral evidence sessions

4 sessions
Date Witnesses
30 Jun 2025 Kevin Adams · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, Luke Pollard MP · Ministry of Defence, Paul Wyatt · Ministry of Defence, Sir Chris Bryant MP · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology View ↗
9 Jun 2025 Alasdair Wilkie · Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA), Alex Towers · BT Group, Chief Constable Gavin Stephens · National Police Chiefs' Council, Dr Fenella Wrigley MBE · London Ambulance Service, John Wrottesley · European Subsea Cables Association, Laura Catterick · UK Finance, Mick McGovern · Alcatel Submarine Networks View ↗
19 May 2025 Captain Niels Markussen · NATO, Commodore (Rtd) John Aitken OBE · Thales, Dr Marie Jacobsson · Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Professor Aurel Sari · University of Exeter View ↗
12 May 2025 Dr Sidharth Kaushal · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Elisabeth Braw · Atlantic Council, Matthew Bowden · Red Penguin Marine, Professor Kevin Rowlands · Kings College London View ↗

Who gave evidence

19 witnesses
WitnessOrganisationSessions
Alasdair Wilkie · Chairman Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA) 1
Alex Towers · Director of Policy and Public Affairs BT Group 1
Captain Niels Markussen · Director, NATO Maritime Centre for Security of Cr… NATO 1
Chief Constable Gavin Stephens · Chair National Police Chiefs' Council 1
Commodore (Rtd) John Aitken OBE · Underwater System Services General Manager Thales 1
Dr Fenella Wrigley MBE · Chief Medical Officer and Deputy CEO London Ambulance Service 1
Dr Marie Jacobsson · Former Principal Legal Adviser on International L… Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1
Dr Sidharth Kaushal · Senior Research Fellow Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 1
Elisabeth Braw · Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center Atlantic Council 1
John Wrottesley · Executive Director European Subsea Cables Association 1
Kevin Adams · Interim Director Digital Infrastructure Department for Science, Innovation and Technology 1
Laura Catterick · Director, Resilience & Cyber UK Finance 1
Luke Pollard MP · Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry Ministry of Defence 1
Matthew Bowden · Director & General Manager Red Penguin Marine 1
Mick McGovern · General Manager Marine Operations Alcatel Submarine Networks 1
Paul Wyatt · Director General, Policy Ministry of Defence 1
Professor Aurel Sari · Professor of Public International Law University of Exeter 1
Professor Kevin Rowlands · Visiting Professor Kings College London 1
Sir Chris Bryant MP · Minister of State for Data Protection and Telecoms Department for Science, Innovation and Technology 1

Correspondence

2 letters
DateDirectionTitle
8 Sep 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Scie…
14 Jul 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Scie…