Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 9
9
Not Addressed
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available...
Recommendation
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available capacity in the cable system during a security crisis. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should request operators to provide regular updates on the scale and type of data each cable carries, short notice rerouting capacity and their ability to prioritise critical services. It should further develop detailed contingency plans for rerouting data through the Channel Tunnel, including in scenarios where high-concentration terrestrial routes are temporarily disabled. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) 63 Repair vulnerabilities
Government response summary AI-generated
The government's response discusses the National Security Act 2023 and reviewing legislation related to subsea cable sabotage, which does not address the recommendation about focusing on cable system capacity, rerouting data, or developing contingency plans for the Channel Tunnel.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government · verbatim extract
Not Addressed
The Government agrees with the Committee that there should be more detailed technical plans on management of the UK’s cable systems in the event of serious disruption to subsea cables. The Government will regularly engage with operators to understand the current capacity of cables and operators’ ability to reroute traffic in the event of significant disruption. to activate, making real-time reporting difficult to achieve. their infrastructure, particularly when capacity is sold to third parties. Therefore, to understand critical data flows DSIT and Lead Government Departments will work with critical sectors to conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments and understand how they rely on the connectivity provided by subsea telecoms cables. Based on the findings of this work the Government will consider what additional contingency plans may be necessary, including for scenarios where high-concentration terrestrial routes are temporarily disabled. We will also use the findings to inform the Government’s National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables (NEP-S).
Read the full response on Parliament ↗