Recommendations & Conclusions
28 items
1
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Acknowledged
The UK’s strategic reliance on subsea cables will likely continue for the foreseeable future. The cable industry provides a commendable and commercially efficient repair service, which ensures good resilience against moderate damage. We do not believe there is an imminent threat to the UK’s national connectivity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 14) Threat …
Read more
The UK’s strategic reliance on subsea cables will likely continue for the foreseeable future. The cable industry provides a commendable and commercially efficient repair service, which ensures good resilience against moderate damage. We do not believe there is an imminent threat to the UK’s national connectivity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 14) Threat picture
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of updated risk scenarios and commits to considering how to best update reasonable worst-case scenarios within national risk assessments to reflect the possibility of coordinated sabotage on subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
2
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms suggested that exploring the risks of a co-ordinated attack …
Read more
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms suggested that exploring the risks of a co-ordinated attack on subsea infrastructure was unhelpfully “apocalyptic”. We disagree. Focusing on fishing accidents and low-level sabotage is no longer good enough. The UK faces a strategic vulnerability in the event of hostilities. Publicly signalling tougher defensive preparations is vital, and may reduce the likelihood of adversaries mounting a sabotage effort in the first place. (Conclusion, Paragraph 37)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees to strengthen security, with DSIT writing to operators to request emergency 'good enough' repair plans within 12 months and defining standards. They are also reviewing legislation and will explore similar exercises with European counterparts.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
3
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks of co-ordinated attacks. We agree that resilience across the sector is generally robust, major disruption is unlikely, and hype is unhelpful. But we caution against adopting ‘business as usual’ industry views to determine national security …
Read more
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks of co-ordinated attacks. We agree that resilience across the sector is generally robust, major disruption is unlikely, and hype is unhelpful. But we caution against adopting ‘business as usual’ industry views to determine national security risk: individual operators have few financial incentives to prepare for a crisis that may never come. The Government, by contrast, has a duty to prepare competently for low-likelihood, high-risk scenarios. The lessons of 9/11, the financial crash, Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine are reminders that such events do happen. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38) 62
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the underlying sentiment, committing to ensuring subsea cable infrastructure is geographically diverse and working with industry and Crown Estates to secure space for future routes to support long-term resilience.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
4
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities
Read more
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees to develop more detailed technical plans for managing cable systems, engage with operators, conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments, and use these findings to inform additional contingency plans and the National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
5
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
Many cable landing stations are vulnerable to attack. The Government and operators must take the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously, including against targets in Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the need for a UK-based and UK-flagged repair ship, which does not address the committee's recommendation about the vulnerability of cable landing stations or taking the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
6
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Deferred
The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) and National Cyber Security Centre should require all UK landing stations to be target-hardened to sufficient levels to deter state-backed sabotage. They should require landing station operators to develop within 12 months an emergency ‘good enough’ repair plan to recover from co-ordinated attacks. The …
Read more
The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) and National Cyber Security Centre should require all UK landing stations to be target-hardened to sufficient levels to deter state-backed sabotage. They should require landing station operators to develop within 12 months an emergency ‘good enough’ repair plan to recover from co-ordinated attacks. The NPSA should also conduct a similar exercise with European counterparts for relevant landing stations on the continent. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government requires more time to consider the recommendation, stating the MoD will work with other departments and industry to evaluate commercial cable repair capacity and determine if intervention is needed.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
7
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage subsea cable providers to connect to landing stations, terrestrial routes and data centres outside high-concentration points. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)
Read more
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage subsea cable providers to connect to landing stations, terrestrial routes and data centres outside high-concentration points. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the recommendation and will accelerate work with Lead Government Departments on technical impact assessments to help critical sectors prepare for subsea cable disruption, with oversight from the Cabinet Office’s ‘Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board’.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
8
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’. This pays insufficient attention to the network’s actual capacity to absorb shocks and does not account for onshore vulnerabilities and long-term trends towards a more brittle system. There is also limited understanding of much damage the system can …
Read more
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’. This pays insufficient attention to the network’s actual capacity to absorb shocks and does not account for onshore vulnerabilities and long-term trends towards a more brittle system. There is also limited understanding of much damage the system can sustain before data stops rerouting properly, triggering temporary systemic connectivity failure. This does not appear to feature as a serious consideration in the Government’s contingency planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 62)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government's response addresses emergency services' business continuity plans and their reliance on foreign internet servers, which does not engage with the committee's conclusion about the government's overall resilience concept regarding network capacity, shocks, and onshore vulnerabilities.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
9
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available capacity in the cable system during a security crisis. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should request operators to provide regular updates on the scale and type of data each cable carries, short notice …
Read more
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available capacity in the cable system during a security crisis. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should request operators to provide regular updates on the scale and type of data each cable carries, short notice rerouting capacity and their ability to prioritise critical services. It should further develop detailed contingency plans for rerouting data through the Channel Tunnel, including in scenarios where high-concentration terrestrial routes are temporarily disabled. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) 63 Repair vulnerabilities
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the National Security Act 2023 and reviewing legislation related to subsea cable sabotage, which does not address the recommendation about focusing on cable system capacity, rerouting data, or developing contingency plans for the Channel Tunnel.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
10
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The UK needs more confidence in access to cable repair vessels: the current fleet is ageing, and erstwhile UK businesses have been acquired by foreign entities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses UNCLOS and legal aspects of countering suspicious vessels, explicitly stating it does not accept reliance on piracy provisions or publishing a legal opinion, thereby failing to address the concern about access to cable repair vessels.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
11
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030. This could be leased to industry on favourable terms during peacetime and made available for Government use in a crisis. The Government should set out a timetable for this in response to this Report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)
Read more
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030. This could be leased to industry on favourable terms during peacetime and made available for Government use in a crisis. The Government should set out a timetable for this in response to this Report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses existing international cooperation on cable breaks and vessel behaviour but does not address the recommendation to acquire a sovereign cable repair ship by 2030 or set a timetable for it.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
12
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable repair skills on commercial repair vessels. These could be called on in periods of heightened tension. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Moderate and catastrophic impacts
Read more
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable repair skills on commercial repair vessels. These could be called on in periods of heightened tension. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Moderate and catastrophic impacts
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government states it agrees with the recommendation, but the subsequent text discusses sensor and monitoring technologies and their integration with the Royal Navy, completely failing to address the call for training personnel in cable repair skills.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
13
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables. These should be a key focus for contingency planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)
Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees but primarily discusses military deterrence, reviewing concepts, and leveraging alliances, without detailing how specific vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector, and military communications cables will be a key focus for contingency planning.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
14
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly highly damaging. We estimate they would include payment and supply chain failures, some degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses, and unexpected cascading issues—all at a time of crisis. We are not convinced there are currently adequate …
Read more
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly highly damaging. We estimate they would include payment and supply chain failures, some degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses, and unexpected cascading issues—all at a time of crisis. We are not convinced there are currently adequate sector-by-sector assessments of reliance on subsea cables, or sufficiently detailed plans for handling cascading consequences if data rerouting stops working properly. We are pleased the Government is starting to address this, with a particular focus on the finance sector. (Conclusion, Paragraph 98)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses escorting ships, investing in underwater drones, and the Royal Navy's exercises, which does not address the committee's conclusion regarding the impacts of catastrophic disruption or the adequacy of sector-by-sector assessments of reliance on subsea cables.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
15
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should ensure all lead departments have detailed sector-by-sector technical impact studies on areas most likely to be affected and response plans—notably finance, maritime and air traffic, communications, defence and supply chains including food and fuel. We suggest such assessments are handled securely given …
Read more
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should ensure all lead departments have detailed sector-by-sector technical impact studies on areas most likely to be affected and response plans—notably finance, maritime and air traffic, communications, defence and supply chains including food and fuel. We suggest such assessments are handled securely given their value to hostile actors. We note that some cascading impacts may not be immediately obvious—it may therefore be helpful to begin with an underpinning assessment of internet failure modes and how this would affect critical systems. The Cabinet Office resilience teams could usefully help to co-ordinate and audit these assessments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 99) 64
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees on the importance of a centralised coordination function, establishing an Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board chaired by the Cabinet Office for strategic direction, but does not adopt the specific suggestion to expand SIRG or set up a new inter-ministerial group.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
16
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Not Addressed
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on foreign internet servers, and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Legal Responses
Read more
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on foreign internet servers, and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Legal Responses
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses exploring cable protection zones and engaging with European partners on maritime infrastructure protection, which does not address the recommendation regarding emergency services' business continuity plans for reliance on foreign internet servers or internet disruption.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
17
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak. It is encouraging that the Government has identified the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill as a potential legislative vehicle to implement changes. We would like to emphasise the urgency of making progress internationally too: legal developments can be slow, and …
Read more
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak. It is encouraging that the Government has identified the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill as a potential legislative vehicle to implement changes. We would like to emphasise the urgency of making progress internationally too: legal developments can be slow, and the matter is pressing. The UK should use its strong credentials in order play a leading international role on this topic. (Conclusion, Paragraph 113)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing that current legislation for non-foreign power sabotage of cables is weak. It is conducting a comprehensive review of legislation related to subsea cable infrastructure to ensure robust routes for prosecuting private actors.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
18
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Deferred
The Government’s review of legislation must pay particular attention to strong deterrents, such as major fines and criminal liability, that can be applied to private actors suspected of working for or on behalf of foreign states. (Recommendation, Paragraph 114)
Read more
The Government’s review of legislation must pay particular attention to strong deterrents, such as major fines and criminal liability, that can be applied to private actors suspected of working for or on behalf of foreign states. (Recommendation, Paragraph 114)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the recommendation and is closely examining the issue of deterrents, such as major fines and criminal liability for private actors, as part of a comprehensive review of legislation relating to subsea cable infrastructure.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
19
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Rejected
The Government should explore new options for taking a more robust approach to interdicting suspicious vessels—for example applying piracy provisions to cables that land in the UK or seeking a limited extension of domestic criminal law jurisdiction. It should commission a legal opinion on options and risks, and publish this …
Read more
The Government should explore new options for taking a more robust approach to interdicting suspicious vessels—for example applying piracy provisions to cables that land in the UK or seeking a limited extension of domestic criminal law jurisdiction. It should commission a legal opinion on options and risks, and publish this within six months for consultation with industry and international partners. The Government should, however, remain cautious about the risks of reciprocal action from adversaries and we do not endorse any particular option at this stage. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees but explicitly rejects applying piracy provisions to cables or commissioning an external legal opinion on this issue, citing the importance of consistency with UNCLOS, international partner views, and the risk of reciprocal action. It states options to counter suspicious vessels are …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
20
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade should apply diplomatic and economic pressure to press for adequate investigations from flag states and states where vessels suspected of cable damage enter port. The Government should also work with partners, particularly the International Maritime Organization, to …
Read more
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade should apply diplomatic and economic pressure to press for adequate investigations from flag states and states where vessels suspected of cable damage enter port. The Government should also work with partners, particularly the International Maritime Organization, to make greater use of port state controls as a deterrent—for example by expanding mechanisms to share data on vessels’ behaviour at sea and ensuring these are then thoroughly integrated into port inspections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 123) 65 Military and monitoring responses
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government states it frequently uses diplomatic levers to ensure investigations into cable breaks. It notes existing IMO work on data sharing and mechanisms for reporting vessel behaviour, but states there is a limit to the utility of port inspections as suspicious vessels often avoid …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
21
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring technology and should explore incentives to encourage such investment. This could include Government commitments to make better use of existing measures and data—for example more proactive identification and investigation of vessels switching off Automatic Identification …
Read more
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring technology and should explore incentives to encourage such investment. This could include Government commitments to make better use of existing measures and data—for example more proactive identification and investigation of vessels switching off Automatic Identification Systems. We also encourage industry to engage closely with the Ministry of Defence to ensure underwater monitoring does not unduly compromise defence activity. (Recommendation, Paragraph 135)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees to support the subsea cable industry in rolling out monitoring technology and is already engaged in cross-government cooperation, including commercial relationships and partnerships with the Royal Navy. It will explore better use of existing data, including AIS, and is collaborating across departments …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
22
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
The UK’s military deterrence concepts are too timid. They need to place greater emphasis on prevention and punitive consequences that go beyond private or public attribution. Otherwise, aggressors that are content with ‘implausible deniability’ can cause damage with minimal risk to themselves. The Government should work with NATO to ensure …
Read more
The UK’s military deterrence concepts are too timid. They need to place greater emphasis on prevention and punitive consequences that go beyond private or public attribution. Otherwise, aggressors that are content with ‘implausible deniability’ can cause damage with minimal risk to themselves. The Government should work with NATO to ensure that monitoring schemes are designed to enable speedy data sharing with law enforcement authorities—which in turn should support timely investigations, and more direct physical interdiction and prosecution where needed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 141)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, stating deterrence concepts are under constant review and leveraging NATO. They acknowledge the importance of effective data sharing, which remains a firm requirement in existing programmes, but do not commit to designing new schemes with NATO for speedy data sharing.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
23
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
In a heightened threat scenario, we are uncertain about the Royal Navy’s ability to protect vulnerable cable regions and escort repair ships without undermining commitments to other NATO tasks. We admire the Minister for Armed Forces’ optimism that the problem can be solved with Atlantic Bastion’s future set of autonomous …
Read more
In a heightened threat scenario, we are uncertain about the Royal Navy’s ability to protect vulnerable cable regions and escort repair ships without undermining commitments to other NATO tasks. We admire the Minister for Armed Forces’ optimism that the problem can be solved with Atlantic Bastion’s future set of autonomous vessels and monitoring systems. We think there are still quite a few questions to address. (Conclusion, Paragraph 146)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed with the Committee's concerns, stating it is investing in new capabilities such as underwater drones, autonomous sensors, and new ships under the 'Atlantic Bastion' concept to augment the Royal Navy's ability to protect vulnerable cable regions. It also noted existing routine …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
24
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
The Ministry of Defence should work with international partners to ensure there are viable plans to escort cable ships without degrading wider NATO taskings. This plan could usefully include heightened surveillance of suspicious vessel activity, rules of engagement enabling a low threshold for physical interdiction of civilian and autonomous vessels, …
Read more
The Ministry of Defence should work with international partners to ensure there are viable plans to escort cable ships without degrading wider NATO taskings. This plan could usefully include heightened surveillance of suspicious vessel activity, rules of engagement enabling a low threshold for physical interdiction of civilian and autonomous vessels, and input from industry. The Royal Navy should also practice live escorting exercises with cable repair ships to build confidence about their deployment in a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 147) 66 Governance and planning
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, stating escorting ships is an important task and rules of engagement are routinely reviewed. They are investing in new capabilities like underwater drones and the ‘Atlantic Bastion’ concept. They also state the Royal Navy already conducts routine live escorting exercises, which …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
25
Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
We commend the Government’s efforts to improve co-ordination, particularly the establishment of the Subsea Infrastructure Response Group and Subsea Communications Cables Industry Group. We accept that changing governance structures for the sake of it is not helpful. Equally, however, there is evidence that improvements to oversight and co- ordination would …
Read more
We commend the Government’s efforts to improve co-ordination, particularly the establishment of the Subsea Infrastructure Response Group and Subsea Communications Cables Industry Group. We accept that changing governance structures for the sake of it is not helpful. Equally, however, there is evidence that improvements to oversight and co- ordination would benefit day-to-day work and crisis response. (Conclusion, Paragraph 162)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed, acknowledging the need for improved coordination but declining to expand the SIRG. Instead, it stated that it has established an Undersea Infrastructure Security (UIS) Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, to provide a senior-level, cross-government function for strategic direction and …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
26
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Accepted in Part
The Government should seek to provide a joined-up subsea cables function providing a centralised point of contact for industry and international partners. This body should co-ordinate, not duplicate, cross-government work—bringing together departments and agencies covering subsea infrastructure operations, policy, security, resilience and contingency planning. In the first instance this could …
Read more
The Government should seek to provide a joined-up subsea cables function providing a centralised point of contact for industry and international partners. This body should co-ordinate, not duplicate, cross-government work—bringing together departments and agencies covering subsea infrastructure operations, policy, security, resilience and contingency planning. In the first instance this could involve upgrading the Subsea Infrastructure Response Group into a formal, standing co-ordination and oversight body, reporting into an inter-ministerial group jointly led by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Ministry of Defence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 163)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, accepting the importance of a centralised function but rejecting the upgrade of SIRG and a new inter-ministerial group. They state an Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board has been established to provide a joined-up function and ministerial oversight is already provided by …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
27
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Deferred
We support the Crown Estate’s ambitions to improve long-term spatial planning via the Marine Delivery Route Map. We urge those involved to ensure that plans prioritise a diversity of cable routes to avoid creating areas of concentrated targets. (Conclusion, Paragraph 168)
Read more
We support the Crown Estate’s ambitions to improve long-term spatial planning via the Marine Delivery Route Map. We urge those involved to ensure that plans prioritise a diversity of cable routes to avoid creating areas of concentrated targets. (Conclusion, Paragraph 168)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with exploring cable protection zones and is considering existing powers as part of a comprehensive legislative review. They will factor identified areas of cable concentration into their assessment and are engaging with international partners on maritime infrastructure protection.
Read full response →
Cabinet Office
28
Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications …
Deferred
The Government should further explore cable protection zones for critical areas of cable concentration, policed by early warning indicators and heightened monitoring and response capabilities. This would require close co-operation with European partners, given the need to manage other maritime activities proportionately. (Recommendation, Paragraph 169) 67
Read more
The Government should further explore cable protection zones for critical areas of cable concentration, policed by early warning indicators and heightened monitoring and response capabilities. This would require close co-operation with European partners, given the need to manage other maritime activities proportionately. (Recommendation, Paragraph 169) 67
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees to further explore cable protection zones, noting potential utility but also jurisdiction limitations and challenges in congested marine environments. They are considering existing powers as part of a legislative review and are engaging with international partners while factoring in existing work on …
Read full response →
Cabinet Office