Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 16
16
Not Addressed
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on...
Recommendation
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on foreign internet servers, and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Legal Responses
Government response summary AI-generated
The government's response discusses exploring cable protection zones and engaging with European partners on maritime infrastructure protection, which does not address the recommendation regarding emergency services' business continuity plans for reliance on foreign internet servers or internet disruption.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government · verbatim extract
Not Addressed
The Government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation that emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans explicitly identify any critical reliance on foreign internet servers and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. Departments and agencies have reviewed, or are in the process of reviewing and strengthening, their planning frameworks to reflect this, ensuring that operational resilience is maintained across all emergency services. The majority of NHS digital infrastructure—clinical systems, patient records, and operational platforms—is hosted within the United Kingdom, significantly reducing exposure to foreign internet server risks. Where services rely on international vendors or cloud platforms, these providers typically operate with geographically distributed data centres and robust failover mechanisms. NHS organisations are expected to identify and manage these dependencies within their business continuity plans. While a major subsea cable disruption could have some impact, the impact is likely to be manageable. UK police forces maintain business continuity plans that include assessments of digital infrastructure dependencies, and any reliance on foreign-hosted services. These plans are structured to ensure operational resilience across a wide range of scenarios, including internet disruption. In the event of a major incident, Strategic Co-ordination Groups (SCGs) are stood up under well-tested local resilience frameworks, typically chaired by senior police commanders. These structures are equipped to respond to internet outages and maintain critical policing functions. Critical data and communications infrastructure for the UK’s Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) is hosted within the UK. There is no dependency on foreign internet servers or subsea cables for essential communications or operational response, and the FRS have well-tested business continuity plans that include fallback procedures in the event of internet disruption. HM Coastguard regularly tests its critical systems to ensure they are resilient and ready to operate in the event of a security crisis or internet disruption. It has procedures in place to assess the security of suppliers during procurement and is introducing new tools to strengthen this process across the organisation. HM Coastguard is currently reviewing its key systems and infrastructure to better understand any reliance on foreign internet servers. This work is helping to improve business continuity planning and reduce vulnerability to internet outages.
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