Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 13
13
Not Addressed
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables.
Recommendation
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables. These should be a key focus for contingency planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)
Government response summary AI-generated
The government partially agrees but primarily discusses military deterrence, reviewing concepts, and leveraging alliances, without detailing how specific vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector, and military communications cables will be a key focus for contingency planning.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government · verbatim extract
Not Addressed
The Government agrees with this recommendation. The UK’s critical sectors must be prepared for reasonable-worst-case subsea cable disruption events. As the Committee notes, DSIT is already working with Lead Government Departments (LGDs) to update the Government’s technical impact studies for sectors most likely to be affected by cable disruption. This includes underpinning assessments of potential impacts on telecoms and the internet, which will inform assessments of cascading impacts on other critical sectors. DSIT, working with individual LGDs, will accelerate work on these assessments, which will be used by the LGDs to develop appropriate response plans for their critical sectors. The Cabinet Office’s ‘Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board’ will provide oversight of this work.
Read the full response on Parliament ↗