Twenty-First Report: Transforming electronic monitoring services

HMPPS remains reliant on outdated technology which puts the tagging service at risk of failing. Due to the prolonged delays in the programme, HMPPS is relying on legacy technology and will have to use its current case management system until at least 2024, which will cost £9.8 million for remediation work and licensing costs. As HMPPS has been using its current system since 2012, many of its applications are no longer supported by manufacturers and have severe risks, with outdated hardware and software. The telephone system Capita uses in the live service has failed six times since May 2021. HMPPS asserts that there have not been any undetected breaches by offenders, as it recovers data after an outage. But this clearly remains a significant risk until it replaces the system. HMPPS is updating and replacing systems to ensure they are stable and scalable as the number of people fitted with tags rises. It opted not to simulate additional tagging volumes on its existing systems to see how well they can cope with caseload increases, but asserts that it will improve resilience by moving the system to the cloud. Recommendation: To provide assurance that the risk of system failure will not materialise, HMPPS should explain the following in its Treasury Minute response: • what progress it has made in delivering planned remediation work on its case management system; • how well its systems are coping with caseload increases; and • how it will ensure that future digital contracts will factor in routine IT upgrades and maintenance. 6 Transforming electronic monitoring services

HMPPS has failed to provide police forces and the Probation Service with timely access to the tagging information they need to effectively supervise offenders and protect the public. HMPPS expected Gemini and the user portal to enhance probation officers’ supervision of offenders and improve public protection by providing: a single version of case management records; improved management information and reporting capabilities; and crucially, access to historical and real- time maps of offenders’ movements by using GPS tags. Without this system, police and probation officers cannot access real-time data and have to submit manual requests for location data, which limits the value of using GPS tracking. However, HMPPS’s acquisitive crime pilot—which involves comparing data from GPS tags against the locations of alleged crimes submitted by the police—has enabled probation officers to have real-time access to location data for the 650 offenders in the pilot. HMPPS has received requests from the police for direct access to its system, but it has so far not provided this due to data protection considerations. Recommendation: Before starting future contracts in January 2024, HMPPS should explore how it can provide police forces and other law enforcement agencies with real-time access to location monitoring data across all GPS tagging cohorts —taking account of data protection considerations—and update us on its plans.

It is unacceptable that HMPPS still does not know if or how tagging reduces reoffending, and it has been too slow to improve data. Despite our previous recommendations, HMPPS still does not know the impact of tagging. The Ministry recognises that evaluation of the transformation programme was not as strong as it should have been. HMPPS has now strengthened its analytical capacity, and has committed to evaluating its expansion programme, although it will need to rely on higher numbers of tagged offenders to better understand differences in outcomes between tagged offenders and control groups if it is to build a rich evidence base. It recognises the importance of establishing links to reoffending, but accepts it has previously missed opportunities to develop this understanding. There is variable use of tagging between courts. Going forward, better evidence on what works in tagging will help improve magistrates’ and judges’ understanding of the sentencing options available. Linked to this, HMPPS has not improved persistent issues with data availability and quality, such as the lack of data on offenders’ protected characteristics. It does not know whether ethnic minority offenders are over- or under-represented in tagging services but has committed to collect better data in future contracts. Recommendation: Within one year, HMPPS should publish a comprehensive plan outlining what it has achieved so far and remaining work required in: • improving data collection and analysis in tagging services; • monitoring the delivery of benefits in its expansion programme; and • building the evidence base for the impact of tagging on reoffending and offenders’ diversion from prison.

HMPPS’s innovative use of technology in its expansion projects has yielded some encouraging early results. HMPPS has achieved some initial positive results from using new technology in its alcohol monitoring scheme and acquisitive crime Transforming electronic monitoring services 7 project. For example, offenders have had high short-term sobriety rates while being tagged, although HMPPS did not explain how it will be able to monitor longer- term abstinence or whether the scheme reduces alcohol-fuelled offending. HMPPS’s acquisitive crime project has helped to secure 30 charges for theft, burglary or robbery and it claims that participating police forces value the scheme. However, HMPPS’s early experience in delivering non-fitted monitoring devices for Foreign National Offenders was much less positive, as the system was discovered not to be compliant with cyber security standards. It has created an £18.5 million innovation fund which will help it explore further tagging options, including a possible drugs tag. In order to ensure that HMPPS protects taxpayers’ interests, we expect it to rigorously apply learning from its experience of developing and using new technology as it continues to expand tagging services. Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, HMPPS should explain how it will apply lessons from its tagging expansion projects to future schemes, including the forthcoming project for tagging domestic abusers.

HMPPS’s poor track record in its transformation programme does not inspire confidence that it will be well-equipped to handle risks in its £1.2 billion expansion programme. HMPPS is re-procuring contracts to run the electronic monitoring service. It is attempting to apply lessons and reduce delivery risks, for example by using off-the-shelf systems and limiting the number of suppliers in the new model. However, there are inherent delivery risks to reprocuring a changing service where the number of tagged people is increasing. In addition, it will still face challenges in integrating the work of its suppliers, particularly given its tight timeframes to put new contracts in place by early 2024. It expects suppliers to integrate their systems in six months, but HMPPS has not yet started its testing work so does not know how difficult this would be. HMPPS intends to outsource the role of systems integrator again, something which it tried and failed to do before. There are significant risks with this approach, including the risk of conflicts of interest and unclear accountability due to dependencies between future suppliers’ work. Recommendation: HMPPS should write to the Committee in 2023, once the procurement of new contracts to run electronic monitoring is complete, on how it is handling risks in the programme. As part of this, it should explain how it will oversee suppliers’ work effectively and ensure clear lines of responsibility and accountability between the integrator and its other suppliers in the programme. 8 Transforming electronic monitoring services 1 HM Prison & Probation Service’s tagging transformation programme

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) and HM Prison & Probation Service (HMPPS) on HMPPS’s electronic monitoring (‘tagging’) transformation programme.1

The Ministry and HMPPS told us that they have learnt lessons from pursuing technology which have to be developed from scratch. HMPPS took a detailed and prescriptive approach to setting requirements for Gemini. This introduced complexity and inflexibility, and limited innovation in the programme.11 The Ministry told us that at the outset of the programme, government tended to prefer “bespoke and better” technology. Following a review of the programme in 2016, it opted to buy hardware off-the-shelf and is now also pursuing off-the-shelf hardware and software in its expansion programme. It explained that given how technology had now moved on and the range of products which were now available on the market, it would not be sensible to pursue bespoke solutions.12 Governance and scrutiny

Witnesses admitted there should have been stronger governance and more scrutiny of the programme from the Ministry of Justice. In late 2019, HMPPS prepared an 6 Q 90 7 Q 17 8 Qq 21, 26; C&AG’s report, para 3 9 Q 20; C&AG’s report, para 3.4 10 Q 22; C&AG’s report, para 2.4 11 C&AG’s report, para 3.4 12 Q 78 10 Transforming electronic monitoring services ‘addendum’ to its business case for the programme, as Capita’s delays in developing Gemini would require a further extension to its interim contract. Although this approach to extending the programme complied with rules in place at the time, the NAO found that this approach required more limited support and less challenge than if the programme had been formally reconsidered through a revised business case.13 HMPPS told us that as the changes fell within the scope of the business case and the then Senior Responsible Owner’s delegated authority, the programme team asked the Ministry’s investment committee “only to note the decision”.14 It also told us that had the programme pursued a termination of Capita’s contract at that point, this would have involved more detailed governance and scrutiny. HMPPS told us that it believed that its decision to extend the programme was right, as changes it made to its systems and moving them to the cloud enabled its plans to expand tagging services over the previous 18 months.15

Both the Ministry and HMPPS told us that they had learnt lessons from weaknesses in governance and scrutiny in the programme. The Ministry explained that a lack of scrutiny can be the nature of big departments with a small corporate centre and multiple agencies. Often project teams did not know at what point issues should be escalated as tolerances had not been explicitly agreed. The Ministry told us that recent work in both the Ministry and HMPPS had improved governance, risk controls and thresholds for escalation. The Ministry explained that it had introduced additional governance for its portfolio of major projects and programmes with a whole-life cost of at least £30 million. This additional governance included a delivery board and thresholds on affordability, delivery timetables, benefits slippage and risks and issues.16 The consequences of relying on legacy systems

HMPPS intended Gemini to replace the current case management system (‘Integrity’) which had been in use since 2012 and must now be relied on until 2024. The NAO found that many of its applications were no longer supported by manufacturers and had severe risks, including outdated and vulnerable hardware and software.17 We asked HMPPS how it knew whether the system could cope with an additional 10,000 tagged offenders without failing. It explained that although it opted not to test the system through simulated increases, it had commissioned external reviews which provided it with confidence that the system can cope. HMPPS’ ongoing reliance on Integrity will cost a further £9.8 million, comprising £5 million for urgent remedial work and £4.8 million in licensing costs. HMPPS was not aware of the level of obsolescence in Integrity, because Capita held the contract for the system, but HMPPS has now taken on the Integrity contract directly with G4S. HMPPS told us that its new approach provided better visibility of the system and gave it the ability to make changes. It explained that by running the contract directly it expected to reduce Integrity’s contract costs by around £6 million before it retires the system.18

The telephone system Capita uses in the live service for its operations—including contacting offenders—has been in place since 2005. Since May 2021, there have been six 13 Q 24; C&AG’s report, paras 3.6–3.7 14 Q 36 15 Qq 33, 36 16 Qq 24, 37–38 17 C&AG’s report, paras 2.22–2.23 18 Qq 53–55; C&AG’s report, para 2.23 Transforming electronic monitoring services 11 major system failures and HMPPS told us that on one occasion the system was down for six hours overnight. HMPPS explained that it had contingency plans in place to deal with system failures and that it was not aware of an occasion when an offender had committed a serious offence while systems have been down, as all data are recovered when the system is available again.19 Insights for police forces and the Probation Service

HMPPS’s failure to deliver Gemini also means that police forces and the Probation Service lack timely access to tagging data to investigate crime, supervise offenders and protect the public.20 HMPPS expected Gemini and the user portal to provide a range of benefits for stakeholders, including: a single version of case management records; improved management information and reporting; and access to historical and real-time maps of offenders’ movements for offenders wearing GPS tags. Without Gemini, police and probation officers cannot access data in real-time across all offenders on GPS tags and have to submit manual requests for location data.21

We asked why government was not exploring mobile phone GPS technology or identity scanning software, such as fingerprint scanning used by banks. HMPPS explained that the challenge of using mobile phones in tagging is that they would not be solely used for this purpose, and that phones could be linked to servers offshore with potential data security implications. However, HMPPS has harnessed data from GPS location data in its acquisitive crime pilot which covers a cohort of around 650 offenders convicted for theft, burglary or robbery offences. The pilot uses data on alleged crimes from police and overlays location data to produce matches where offenders have been in a defined proximity. HMPPS told us that while the offenders’ probation officers can access data in real-time, the challenge was to match this capability for the rest of the GPS caseload. It told us that it had received a large number of requests from police for direct access to its system. HMPPS believed it could see operational benefits for the police if it provided direct access but it had so far not done so due to data protection considerations which it told us it wanted to step through carefully.22 19 Qq 48, 52; C&AG’s report, para 2.22 20 C&AG’s report, para 7 21 C&AG’s report, para 2.20. Figure 8 22 Qq 47, 80; C&AG’s report, Figure 15 12 Transforming electronic monitoring services 2 The evidence base for tagging Understanding the impact of tagging

In 2006, our Committee found that there was insufficient evidence available to determine whether tagging helped to reduce re-offending or promote rehabilitation. We recommended that the Home Office—which previously managed tagging services— should carry out research to establish the role that electronic monitoring could play in minimising reoffending and make the results available to courts and prisons.23 In its response to our report, the Home Office committed to conduct analysis of the reconviction rates of offenders on tagging curfew orders and make its analysis available in 2007.24 In its 2022 report, the NAO found that the evidence base for tagging still remained weak 16 years later. HMPPS did not assess the impact of tagging on demand for prison places or reoffending in its GPS location monitoring pilots due to limited resources. More broadly, HMPPS did not monitor its planned benefits in its transformation programme, which included involving diverting offenders from custody and modifying offenders’ behaviour.25

The Ministry admitted that its evaluation in the transformation programme was not as strong as it should have been and recognised that it needed to put more effort into evaluation going forward. It told us that it was extending its team of analysts in its expansion programme, from three to 17.26 The Ministry told us that while there was evidence which suggested that tagging changes offenders’ behaviour while offenders were wearing tags, insights into longer-term impacts after tags are removed were limited. It committed to rigorously evaluate its current and future programmes and the extent to which tagging impacts on longer-term outcomes, including reducing reoffending, which it described as the “holy grail” of insight.27 The Ministry told us it looked forward to collecting robust and world-leading evidence, but that it did not underestimate the challenge ahead. It explained that it would need to rely on higher numbers of tagged offenders to produce robust analyses, while it still needs to better understand differences in outcomes between tagged offenders and control groups.28

We asked HMPPS what information it shared with the judiciary to inform their sentencing choices. It explained that it had an extensive programme of engagement in place to ensure judges and magistrates were aware of available services. However, it told us that there were significant variations in the use of electronic monitoring between different courts, with differences in the use of types of tags imposed. Some courts made extensive use of radio frequency tags but do not use GPS and in others, it was the other way round. HMPPS made clear that it saw it as part of its job to ensure that sentencers, judges and magistrates have the information about what is available in their jurisdiction to make informed choices.29 23 Committee of Public Accounts, The electronic monitoring of adult offenders, Sixty-second Report of Session 2005–06, HC 997, 12 October 2006 24 HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes on the Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, Sixty-first and the Sixty-second Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts 2005–2006, December 2006 25 C&AG’s report, paras 9 and 2.9, Figure 10 26 Q 71 27 Qq 58–59 28 Qq 59–60, 89 29 Q 62 Transforming electronic monitoring services 13

The NAO found persistent issues in the quality and availability of HMPPS’s data on tagging, including inefficient processes, poor-quality data, limited data capture and access, and siloed data and systems. In particular, HMPPS only captured data on offenders’ age and gender.30 We asked witnesses whether they intended to capture more data on protected characteristics and whether they were concerned that ethnic minority offenders may have a greater likelihood of being placed on tags or not being placed on tags. The Ministry and HMPPS committed to capturing this data in future contracts to make sure they were providing a fair and proportionate service. More generally, HMPPS acknowledged that it could make better use of the pool of data available.31 30 C&AG’s report, para 2.18 31 Qq 72, 76–77 14 Transforming electronic monitoring services 3 Expanding tagging services

In 2020, HMPPS launched a tagging expansion programme to widen the use of tagging to different groups of offenders. As part of the programme, it aims to: develop a flexible and scalable service; build the evidence base to demonstrate the effectiveness of electronic monitoring; be “data driven”; be led by user needs and integrated within probation services; and ensure cost-effectiveness.32 HMPPS expects to monitor an additional 10,000 offenders over the next few years, bringing the number of people who are tagged to around 25,000 offenders. It is delivering projects to expand the service to new types of offenders while undertaking a major re-procurement of contracts to deliver the service, with the new contracts expected to be in place by January 2024. It expects to spend £1.2 billion from 2021–22 to 2030–31, including £55 million for the re-procurement, £232 million for expansion projects and £808 million for the live service.33 Progress in delivering expansion projects

HMPPS launched alcohol monitoring services in October 2020 for offenders sentenced in the community. In November 2021 and June 2022, it extended the scheme to include those leaving prison, in Wales and in England respectively. Alcohol tags measure alcohol concentration in sweat and send an alert if the wearer has consumed alcohol. As at March 2021, 900 offenders were tagged as part of the alcohol monitoring service. HMPPS forecast that there will be around 1,900 individuals once the scheme has got into a ‘steady- state position’.34 HMPPS reported high abstinence rates of around 97% so far for those offenders tagged as part of the programme, but it does not yet know if the scheme promotes longer-term sobriety or reductions in alcohol fuelled offending. We asked the Ministry and HMPPS whether they can isolate the effect of wearing a tag from the other sentence requirements that offenders must fulfil, such as undertaking unpaid work or attending programmes to address offending behaviour. The Ministry told us that it cannot attribute the effect, but will be able to perform better evaluation as case numbers grow.35 An alcohol tagging order typically lasts 90 days. As part of its evaluation of alcohol monitoring, HMPPS told us that it planned to explore what is the right period for an individual to be tagged, and whether it was providing the right support to people to address their drinking and behaviour. We asked HMPPS what alternative support it provided alongside the tag, such as alcohol treatment programmes. It recognised that there was inconsistent provision for alcohol support services in England and Wales. It explained that it was reflecting on whether it should commission specific services for tagged offenders.36

HMPPS launched an acquisitive crime pilot in April 2021 to impose location monitoring on prison leavers convicted for theft, burglary or robbery offences. The 19 police forces participating in the pilot send data on alleged acquisitive offenders to HMPPS’s system, which compares this with GPS location data to assist forces’ investigation of crime when there has been a match.37 HMPPS told us that the pilot had helped the police to secure 30 charges for acquisitive offences and that the police forces value the scheme. It told us that it was early days for the pilot, but it was testing whether the scheme was leading 32 C&AG’s report, Figure 5 33 Q 54; C&AG’s report, para 4.1 34 Q 67, 69; C&AG’s report, Figure 15 35 Q 61 36 Qq 68–69 37 C&AG’s report, Figure 15 and para 4.7 Transforming electronic monitoring services 15 to longer-term changes in offenders’ behaviour. It explained that it planned to evaluate the scheme over the next three years and will not extend it further until it has evidence that it is working.38 We noted that HMPPS had achieved better capability in the pilot for a smaller upgrade compared to its £98 million investment in the Gemini case management system. HMPPS believed that the technology used in the pilot is better than the planned functionality that the Gemini case management system and user portal were designed for originally. It told us this was the first time that it has been leveraging the power of location data from GPS tags and that it sees future opportunities to use the data more broadly.39

HMPPS launched its Home Office Immigration Enforcement project, on behalf of the Home Office, in August 2021. This project extended the use of tagging using GPS tags to Foreign National Offenders who are subject to deportation proceedings. HMPPS rolled out standard fitted tags on schedule, but both it and G4S faced challenges in developing non-fitted devices: removable watches which capture facial recognition scans. Eleven months after HMPPS decided to pursue G4S’s solution, the Ministry of Justice’s Security Function advised that the device should no longer be pursued as the operating system was not compliant with cyber security standards.40 HMPPS told us that the Home Office’s original requirement for facial recognition technology significantly narrowed the available market and that the only potentially viable solution was an option available from G4S. HMPPS explained that once it learnt that the operating system was out of date, it, the Home Office and G4S agreed that the device could not be updated due to high costs. It told us that the Home Office has now opted to pursue devices which capture fingerprints instead, which has opened up more options in the market. HMPPS expected the new device to be available from September 2022.41

Given its poor experience of developing bespoke technology in its transformation programme, HMPPS told us that it was “very cautious” about commissioning further novel solutions. For example, while tags which monitor multiple drugs at the same time are currently unavailable on the market, it wanted to explore advances in drug testing and how this could be applied in the criminal justice system. HMPPS told us that it had created an £18.5 million innovation fund to explore how the market may be able to help develop tagging services in the future, including possible drug monitoring. In the meantime, it explained that it had started piloting tagging for other groups including domestic abuse perpetrators. It planned to roll out the use of GPS devices for high-risk domestic abuse offenders in 2023.42 Re-procuring contracts

In parallel with managing its expansion projects, HMPPS is undertaking a re- procurement for its contracts with companies to run the tagging services. HMPPS has relied on Capita’s ‘bridge’ contract throughout its transformation programme. This was only intended to be a temporary arrangement until HMPPS launched its new service through Gemini. HMPPS has extended Capita’s contract to its maximum period, so new 38 Qq 58–59 39 Qq 47, 72 40 C&AG’s report, paras 4.9–4.10, Figure 15 41 Q 65 42 Qq 72, 75 16 Transforming electronic monitoring services contracts must be in place by January 2024 to ensure continuity of services. It expected to award contracts in summer 2023, marking the start of a transition period between suppliers.43

HMPPS told us it had learnt lessons from its transformation programme and was applying these to its re-procurement of its contracts to deliver tagging services. In addition to pursuing off-the-shelf systems, it told us that it had decided to limit the number of suppliers in its new model to two. As part of the new model, one supplier will provide field and monitoring services while the other will provide tags and other hardware.44 The Ministry told us that it considered whether it should contract with a single supplier, but believed this would concentrate the market too much. It recognised that, by definition, having two suppliers introduces some element of complexity.45 HMPPS hopes to mitigate future integration risks by: • ensuring potential suppliers demonstrate they have proven technology in place; and • taking a phased approach to confirming future system requirements. It believed suppliers will be able to integrate their systems in six months, but this remains untested at this early stage of the procurement.46

We questioned HMPPS on what it saw as the biggest risks in the expansion programme. HMPPS told us that it is challenging reprocuring the service as it is changing and as the number of tagged people is increasing. It explained that it has been managing this in different ways, such as getting its expansion projects into live service ahead of the re- procurement, ensuring there are dedicated resources in place and introducing a “change freeze” to ensure there will be no major changes as it switches over to its new suppliers.47

Earlier in its transformation programme, HMPPS outsourced the role of systems and services integrator to Capita, which involved pulling together suppliers’ work to deliver an end-to-end tagging service.48 In 2017, we examined earlier progress in the programme. We found that this arrangement failed as, in part, the Ministry did not have sufficient transparency of the services being delivered in other parts of the programme. We recommended that the Ministry should ensure that it puts the right skills in place to properly oversee future projects from their outset and keeps them there, particularly those being delivered by private contractors.49 In its response to our report, the Department said it was building a centralised model for its Project Delivery staff which would ensure that it has skilled resources in place for its priority projects.50 Following a dispute with Capita and financial settlement, HMPPS took on the integrator role when it restarted 43 C&AG’s report, para 4.16 44 Qq 22, 73; C&AG’s report, Figure 17 45 Q 88 46 C&AG’s report, paras 4.19 and 4.21 47 Q 83 48 Comptroller and Auditor General, The new generation electronic monitoring programme, Session 2017–2019, HC 242, 12 July 2017, para 10 49 Committee of Public Accounts, Offender-monitoring tags, Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19, 24 January 2018, HC 458, para 2. 50 HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes, Government Response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Twelfth to the Nineteenth reports from Session 2017–19, March 2018 Transforming electronic monitoring services 17 its transformation programme in 2017. The NAO found that there were shortcomings in HMPPS’s performance as integrator and it did not intervene early enough to resolve cross- supplier integration issues.51

In early 2022, HMPPS decided to outsource this role again in its re-procurement and transition to the new service. The NAO outlined areas where HMPPS will need to be prepared to manage risks with this approach, including: • Parties having different interpretations of what the integrator role involves and where accountability sits if problems arise; • The integrator having no contractual oversight of the other supplier; and • The potential for real or perceived conflicts of interest, given that its field services supplier will be responsible for delivering substantial work while integrating others’ work.52

We asked HMPPS whether it will be prepared to step in to handle any problems arising from this approach. It told us that it was ready to step in and had strengthened its governance and is holding regular meetings with potential suppliers.53 51 C&AG’s report, para 10 52 C&AG’s report, paras 15 and 4.21 53 Q 23 18 Transforming electronic monitoring services