Forced Labour in UK Supply Chains

The evidence we heard demonstrates that goods produced by forced labour are being sold in the UK. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

There is currently a piecemeal and ad hoc approach to addressing forced labour using domestic policy. This does not prevent goods linked to forced labour being sold in the UK, nor provide clarity for businesses. (Conclusion, Paragraph 31) New legislation is needed to ensure that the UK’s market is protected from goods tainted by forced labour. This should establish: (i) that it is unlawful to import or sell goods linked to forced labour in the UK (ii) new mandatory human rights due diligence duties for businesses, (iii) a right for those who have suffered forced labour to bring a claim for civil liability against those responsible, (iv) the regulatory arrangements for imported goods, sale of goods, and ensuring business compliance with the new due diligence duties (iv) how such regulations will be enforced and how those responsible for enforcement will be resourced The legislation should be introduced within one year of the publication of this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)

There is a lack of visible leadership and coordination within government on tackling forced labour in UK supply chains. (Conclusion, Paragraph 34)

The Government should consider how it can provide visible leadership and coordination on the issue of forced labour in supply chains within government. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35) 76

The Government’s China Audit has missed an opportunity by not publicly setting out an approach to addressing state-imposed forced labour in China. (Conclusion, Paragraph 42) Corporate responsibility: Transparency reporting and mandatory human rights due diligence (mHRDD)

Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act is not effectively motivating companies to address forced labour in their supply chains. The Committee is pleased to see the Government are considering changes to strengthen the duty. (Conclusion, Paragraph 59)

Government should strengthen the reporting duty under s.54 by establishing effective accountability mechanisms for non-compliance. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60)

Government should remove s.54(4)(b) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which enables companies to comply by reporting that no action has been taken. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

Government should extend the TISC reporting duty to public organisations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

The UK’s current approach of relying on voluntary implementation of due diligence is not effectively tackling forced labour in supply chains. Implementing mandatory human rights due diligence requirements for companies would level the playing field and be welcomed by many responsible businesses. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76) The Government should legislate to introduce mandatory human rights due diligence requirements throughout supply chains for businesses trading in the UK. In developing this legislation, the Government should consult with businesses and ensure that there is sufficient lead time for any new requirements to be implemented. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)

In developing its own mandatory human rights due diligence, the UK should be mindful of the outcome of the CSDDD process in the EU, in order to ensure that businesses which operate in both the UK and EU are not placed under conflicting regulatory burdens. (Recommendation, Paragraph 84) 77

SMEs should be subject to lighter mHRDD requirements than larger companies, which should be proportional and risk-based to manage the specific risks of forced labour in their supply chains. Policymakers should support SMEs with guidance, tools and resources to help them comply without excessive burdens. (Recommendation, Paragraph 91)

The Committee supports the Government’s decision to establish a body that could play a role in supporting businesses to address the risks of forced labour in their supply chains. (Conclusion, Paragraph 98)

Verified supply chain and risk data and uniform supportive materials would be welcomed by business; having a single source of information would help to create consistency in practice across organisations and sectors. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99)

The Government’s newly announced Supply Chain Centre should support companies to conduct effective HRDD by providing a single point of access to verified information, guidance and resources. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)

Regulatory oversight and accountability measures will be required to ensure compliance with the new due diligence requirements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 105)

Imposing penalties for non-compliance with mHRDD would make the risks of non-compliance clear to companies and provide a rationale for conforming which does not exist at present. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)

Government should establish effective regulatory arrangements to ensure compliance with the new rules for mHRDD, including penalties for non-compliance that are proportional to company turn over. (Recommendation, Paragraph 107)

This regulatory function could be led either by the Office for Responsible Business Conduct or the Supply Chain Centre. The chosen body must be effectively resourced to deliver these new duties. (Recommendation, Paragraph 108) Import bans and restrictions

The UK’s current approach to imports is inadequate to prevent goods linked to forced labour from entering the UK. (Conclusion, Paragraph 116)

Other key comparator markets such as the EU and USA have put in place import bans on goods linked to forced labour. The UK’s lack of equivalent legislation puts the UK at risk of becoming a dumping ground for goods that cannot be sold elsewhere. (Conclusion, Paragraph 125) 78

The Government should introduce an import ban to prevent goods produced using forced labour from entering the UK market. This should establish: (i) how the risk of forced labour in supply chains will be identified; (ii) who is responsible for identifying forced labour risks in supply chains and what is done with this information; (iii) who is responsible for preventing the import of goods likely to be exposed to forced labour and if necessary confiscating goods; (iv) and what resulting processes will follow once goods are confiscated (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)

In cases of state-imposed forced labour, it is not possible to seek to use buyer leverage to improving working conditions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 136)

The import ban recommended above must clarify that no company which uses or allows state-imposed forced labour in its supply chains can import goods to the UK. (Recommendation, Paragraph 137)

Effective implementation of a forced labour import ban would require effective data sharing and co-ordination between multiple UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including HMRC, the NCA and Border Force. (Conclusion, Paragraph 146)

The Committee was encouraged by the reference in the UK’s Trade Strategy to plans to modernise detection capabilities and use pre-arrival data to enhance the tools available to Border Force. (Conclusion, Paragraph 147)

In taking steps to enable Border Force officers to find illicit consignments, the Government should ensure they are enabled to search out consignments of goods linked to forced labour. (Recommendation, Paragraph 148)

To aid enforcement, the UK’s import ban should include a rebuttable presumption that goods linked to regions where the UK Government considers state-imposed forced labour is imposed are linked to forced labour until proven otherwise. (Recommendation, Paragraph 155)

The UK’s import ban should establish or designate a responsible body to oversee the implementation of the import ban by facilitating data sharing and co-ordinating activity between different law enforcement agencies. Such a body must be provided with adequate powers and resources to fulfil this function. (Recommendation, Paragraph 156) 79 Other enforcement mechanisms

The powers already available under POCA are being underused by law enforcement agencies in relation to goods linked to forced labour which occurs outside of the UK. (Conclusion, Paragraph 178)

The NCA and Border Force should use the existing powers under POCA to prevent goods linked to forced labour being sold in the UK and to seize assets linked to forced labour. (Recommendation, Paragraph 179) Free Trade Agreements

The EU’s systemic approach to including human rights clauses in its free trade agreements provides an example of how the UK’s approach to trade could be used to project British values abroad. (Conclusion, Paragraph 194)

The UK has not yet developed a uniform approach to embedding obligations to uphold human rights in its trade agreements, and it is unclear how the impacts of such clauses are assessed and evaluated when used. (Conclusion, Paragraph 199)

Ensuring clauses on human rights are included in trade agreements can demonstrate the UK’s values and principles in terms of forced labour. (Conclusion, Paragraph 200)

The Government should make it an explicit policy to include provisions concerning forced labour in future trade deals. (Recommendation, Paragraph 201)

The UK should carry out effective impact assessments before entering trade negotiations with other nations. These assessments should include analysis of how enhanced trading arrangements with the UK will impact the use of forced labour in the contracting state, and whether an agreement would be likely to increase the UK’s exposure to forced labour in supply chains. (Recommendation, Paragraph 204)

The UK should not enter trade agreements or negotiations with states that actively and knowingly participate in gross violations of human rights, such as state-imposed forced labour. (Recommendation, Paragraph 205)

The Government should establish a regular, formal process to assess whether the obligations to uphold labour rights and human rights in trade agreements are being met. If breaches are found, the UK should have a policy of using dispute resolution mechanisms and exemptions under trade agreements to their fullest effect to prevent and deter future breaches. (Recommendation, Paragraph 206) 80 Public Procurement

Taxpayers are entitled to expect public money to be used carefully and responsibly. (Conclusion, Paragraph 210)

Public procurement carries a higher risk of exposure to forced labour. (Conclusion, Paragraph 211)

The Procurement Act and the Great British Energy Bill provide public buyers with new discretionary powers to reject suppliers if the use of forced labour is reasonably suspected. (Conclusion, Paragraph 222)

There is significant concern that public buyers, such as local authorities, will not have sufficient capacity to use discretionary powers effectively. (Conclusion, Paragraph 223)

The Government should assess how frequently the new discretionary powers are being used across public sector buyers by analysing the reports on excludable suppliers submitted to the Procurement Review Unit by Contracting Authorities. If it appears the discretionary powers are being underused, or there is a wide variance in the range of use, Government should consult with Contracting Authorities to understand why this is the case and explore whether further support is required. (Recommendation, Paragraph 224)

The exclusion regime under the PA 2023 presents an opportunity to tackle forced labour in public procurement if used correctly and to its full extent. However, this will depend on effective functioning of the Procurement Review Unit. (Conclusion, Paragraph 230)

The Government should review the actions of the Procurement Review Unit to assess if its investigations are taking account of all relevant evidence and are effectively informing the exclusion regime within 12 months of the enactment of the Procurement Act (February 2026). (Recommendation, Paragraph 231)

The Committee are encouraged by the Minister for Energy’s assurance that GBE will take action on issues or concerns relating to forced labour raised by the JCHR. (Conclusion, Paragraph 237)

Great British Energy must inform the Committee 12 months after this report is published to set out (i) how the objective on measures for ensuring that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in Great British Energy’s business or supply chain has been implemented, and (ii) what their plans are for the next 12 months in relation to this object. This information should also be included in GBE’s Annual Report and Accounts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 238) 81

The UK’s demand for imported critical minerals is highly likely to increase in the future as the green energy transition progresses. Based on the evidence we heard, the Committee is concerned that there is not a clear strategy for managing the risks of forced labour associated with critical minerals. (Conclusion, Paragraph 242)

The Critical Minerals Strategy should outline specific steps that the Government will take to address the UK’s reliance on critical minerals which are sourced from regions with high risks of forced labour and child labour. (Recommendation, Paragraph 243)

The risks of forced labour presented by the solar industry, which is a key element of the Government’s intended energy procurement programme, are not being effectively addressed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 255)

GBE and other public buyers must ensure that solar procurement decisions are made on the basis of independent assessments and not rely solely on the SSI to provide assurance of supply chains. (Recommendation, Paragraph 256)

The Solar Roadmap does not provide practical steps to reduce the risks of forced labour in solar supply chains and increase the diversity of supply to the UK market as suggested by Ministers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 257) The Government should evaluate the work of the Solar Taskforce to determine why the Solar Roadmap did not provide any further information on supply chains than that which was already publicly available, despite years of work and the establishment of a specific sub-group on supply chains. (Recommendation, Paragraph 257)

The Government should urgently address the omissions in the Solar Roadmap in relation to global supply chains and develop a viable strategy to address the risks of forced labour in the UK’s solar supply chain. In developing this strategy, government should engage with trade bodies, relevant NGOs, academics, civil society organisations and survivors of forced labour. (Recommendation, Paragraph 258) Access to justice for survivors

It is currently too difficult for individual survivors to access the courts in the UK when they have been subject to forced labour abroad in the supply chains of UK companies. (Conclusion, Paragraph 270)

The Government should implement the recommendation of the JCHR’s 2017 report. A civil cause of action of failure to prevent forced labour should be created, with the burden placed on the relevant corporation to prove that 82 they had adequate procedure in place to prevent such forced labour. It would be a defence for the corporation to demonstrate that they did have adequate procedures in place, for example due diligence processes. Those corporations which could not discharge that burden would be liable to pay compensation to the victims. (Recommendation, Paragraph 271)

We support the creation of a Survivor Advisory Council. Such a body could empower survivors of forced labour to contribute to meaningful legislative change and policy reform. (Conclusion, Paragraph 279)

We recommend that the Government works with the IAS Commissioner and takes the necessary steps - including financial - to facilitate the creation of a Survivor Advisory Council. (Recommendation, Paragraph 280) 83