Recommendations & Conclusions
21 items
2
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and aggression. It should also step-up its counter foreign information manipulation …
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The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and aggression. It should also step-up its counter foreign information manipulation and interference offering to allies in the Black Sea Region to ensure Russia cannot succeed in its attempts to influence election results. Failure to do so risks the potential for breaches of human rights and limits democracy. This would further threaten direct confrontation with NATO and European security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 26)
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Government response AI summary
The government responds with general statements about national security, threats from China, and the Counter-Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, but does not address the recommendation to prioritize funds for civil society/media or step up counter-FIMI efforts in the Black Sea region and Western Balkans …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
3
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at the cost of trading security for economic growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
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The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at the cost of trading security for economic growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph 36)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response is entirely focused on its commitment to protecting the UK from hostile activity by Iran, including sanctions and the FCDO Iran Unit's expertise, and does not address the Committee's conclusion regarding the government's "three C's" approach to China.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
4
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese state influence, including the use of cyber-attacks and disinformation. (Recommendation, …
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The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese state influence, including the use of cyber-attacks and disinformation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37) 83
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the CounterDaesh Communications Cell and its work against Daesh and al-Shabaab disinformation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding transparency on China's state influence and cyber-attacks.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
5
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. We support the Government’s action in specifying Iran under the …
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Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. We support the Government’s action in specifying Iran under the enhanced tier of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on its ongoing commitment to support Ukraine against Russian information operations and disinformation through the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership, and does not address the Committee's support for the specification of Iran under the National Security Act.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
6
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
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The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses entirely on its actions to counter Russian foreign information manipulation and interference in Georgia, including imposing sanctions, and does not address the recommendation to develop programming against Iranian FIMI.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
8
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to counter Daesh are effective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
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We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to counter Daesh are effective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses countering information manipulation in Armenia and the Western Balkans, completely failing to address the committee's concerns about the effectiveness of the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
9
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to deliver counter-Daesh narratives. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59) The scale of foreign …
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The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to deliver counter-Daesh narratives. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59) The scale of foreign information manipulation and interference
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on media freedom in Africa, the Media Freedom Coalition, and sanctions against a Russian information operation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding counter-Daesh communications and identifying partners.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
10
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom but for the security of Europe. We also applaud the …
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For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom but for the security of Europe. We also applaud the substantial support the UK Government continues to provide in aiding Ukraine to counter Russian information warfare. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses its concerns and actions regarding Chinese misinformation in Taiwan, and support for Taiwan's democratic processes, but does not address the Committee's commendation of UK support for Ukraine against Russian information warfare.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
11
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a two-way street, so that the UK can both support Ukraine …
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For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a two-way street, so that the UK can both support Ukraine and learn essential lessons. We are additionally concerned that there have been limited details to date on the roadmap 84 for how and when activities will be undertaken or whether this Agreement will be amended in the event of a peace agreement with Russia. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the UK's partnership with the US and freedom of speech, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement and its roadmap.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
14
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on those who are seeking to undermine the Georgian people’s desire …
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We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on those who are seeking to undermine the Georgian people’s desire for a European alignment and signify the UK’s support for Georgian democracy, not autocracy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 84)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses its longstanding commitment to protecting media freedoms and offers to provide verbal briefings, but it does not address the recommendation to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and other entities.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
15
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing instead a European future. Moldova’s resilience in the face of …
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Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing instead a European future. Moldova’s resilience in the face of persistent Russian disinformation, electoral interference, illicit financing, and political subversion should serve as a lesson for the UK. The Committee saw firsthand the essential support the UK Government is providing to help Moldova counter these threats. We commend the work of the British Embassy in Chișinău and welcome the UK Government’s continued commitment to ensuring that Moldova can safeguard its independence and pursue its chosen European path. (Conclusion, Paragraph 92)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on BBC World Service funding and acknowledges a separate recommendation for additional funding, thereby not addressing the provided conclusion regarding Moldova's resilience and UK support.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
16
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals and organisations responsible. The UK must make clear that there …
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The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals and organisations responsible. The UK must make clear that there are consequences for those who sought to deliberately interfere in Moldova’s democracy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the use of AI in information manipulation and its potential for countering FIMI, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope a bespoke AI counter disinformation sandbox, but does not address the recommendation to support Moldova's investigations …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
19
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, economic and security affairs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)
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The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, economic and security affairs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response details the FCDO's investment in FIMI training for staff in Africa and leveraging its diplomatic network to engage with host governments and civil society on FIMI threats, but it does not address the committee's observation regarding the West's alleged retreat from Africa …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
20
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government to ensure appropriate funding is available to ensure resilient and …
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The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government to ensure appropriate funding is available to ensure resilient and sustainable independent media organisations are able to thrive across the African continent. (Recommendation, Paragraph 107)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response details its commitment to increasing public awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference through publications and media literacy campaigns, but does not address the recommendation concerning reductions in aid programming or funding for independent media in Africa.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
21
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for increased destabilisation in the South China Sea, including the invasion …
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Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for increased destabilisation in the South China Sea, including the invasion of Taiwan. (Conclusion, Paragraph 114)
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Government response AI summary
The government shares the objective of improving FIMI awareness, highlights its track record of exposing and sanctioning FIMI actors (primarily Russia), and states it will continue to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, but does not specifically acknowledge the Committee's observation regarding Chinese FIMI targeting …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
22
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the Indo- Pacific and sharing of best practice on countering foreign …
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The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the Indo- Pacific and sharing of best practice on countering foreign information manipulation and interference threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115) 86
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on general media literacy campaigns and engagement with social media platforms, but it does not address the specific recommendation to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan or expand bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
23
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by malign disinformation actors, the Trump Administration has placed significant emphasis …
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The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by malign disinformation actors, the Trump Administration has placed significant emphasis on defending absolute freedom of speech and has criticised European and UK legislative initiatives as forms of censorship. This has led to the Trump Administration closing key US institutions, restricting funding for independent media and civil society organisations and instigating visa bans on prominent British and European anti-disinformation experts, whom the US government has accused of attempting to suppress American viewpoints through extraterritorial censorship. (Conclusion, Paragraph 127)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response addresses concerns about algorithms, the Online Safety Act, and a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but fails to engage with the committee's conclusion regarding the impact of the US political landscape on transatlantic cooperation and specific US actions.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
24
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, wherever in the world it occurs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128)
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These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, wherever in the world it occurs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128)
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Government response AI summary
The government describes its domestic legislative tools for countering foreign interference, such as the National Security Act 2023, but does not specifically address the recommendation for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States or standing up for those countering disinformation globally.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
25
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph 134)
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Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph 134)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses concerns about digital replicas and a forthcoming consultation on their potential harms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the information environment in Latin America.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
26
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be treated as peripheral to the Government’s counter-FIMI strategy. The Government …
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The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be treated as peripheral to the Government’s counter-FIMI strategy. The Government should ensure it has the required capacity to monitor the growing threat of foreign information manipulation and interference in the region. The Government should report to this Committee within six months on how it will strengthen UK monitoring, diplomatic engagement and democratic resilience partnerships in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Americas. (Recommendation, Paragraph 135) 87 FCDO’s approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference
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Government response AI summary
The government responds by discussing the Online Safety Act, VPN usage, and transnational repression, but does not address the recommendation to work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media, strengthen FIMI monitoring capacity, or report on diplomatic engagement in the specified regions.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
27
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other strategically important regions. This limited funding risks the UK further …
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The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other strategically important regions. This limited funding risks the UK further losing influence in key regions such as Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Indo-Pacific as it cuts Official Development Assistance. This is especially concerning given the recent commitments by the Government to target funds to raising defence spending to achieve the NATO commitment of 3.5% of GDP by 2035 and the reorganisation of the UK Integrated Security Fund to deliver the ambitions of the National Security Strategy. Without immediate action, threat actors will continue to outspend democratic nations like the UK, increasing the challenge in combatting information operations. Strengthening the UK’s soft power capability and combatting FIMI in the information war should be recognised as an integral part of the UK’s defence and security strategy (Conclusion, Paragraph 141)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response outlines measures related to the Representation of the People Bill, a consultation on digital replicas, an AI labelling taskforce, and a ban on crypto asset donations, failing to address the conclusion regarding FCDO funding limitations or the strategic recognition of FIMI.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office