Recommendations & Conclusions
55 items
1
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity. Russia’s behaviour is that of a state at war against the West, and this will not …
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Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity. Russia’s behaviour is that of a state at war against the West, and this will not change whilst Putin is in power. Therefore, it is vital that the Government ensures the UK and its allies harden their information ecosystems to make them an impenetrable and unattractive target of Russian interference. (Conclusion, Paragraph 25)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the threat of Russian FIMI and details specific investments and support provided to countries in the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Armenia. This support includes strengthening civil society, independent media, cyber resilience, and media …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
2
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and aggression. It should also step-up its counter foreign information manipulation …
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The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and aggression. It should also step-up its counter foreign information manipulation and interference offering to allies in the Black Sea Region to ensure Russia cannot succeed in its attempts to influence election results. Failure to do so risks the potential for breaches of human rights and limits democracy. This would further threaten direct confrontation with NATO and European security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 26)
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Government response AI summary
The government responds with general statements about national security, threats from China, and the Counter-Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, but does not address the recommendation to prioritize funds for civil society/media or step up counter-FIMI efforts in the Black Sea region and Western Balkans …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
3
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at the cost of trading security for economic growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
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The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at the cost of trading security for economic growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph 36)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response is entirely focused on its commitment to protecting the UK from hostile activity by Iran, including sanctions and the FCDO Iran Unit's expertise, and does not address the Committee's conclusion regarding the government's "three C's" approach to China.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
4
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese state influence, including the use of cyber-attacks and disinformation. (Recommendation, …
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The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese state influence, including the use of cyber-attacks and disinformation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37) 83
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the CounterDaesh Communications Cell and its work against Daesh and al-Shabaab disinformation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding transparency on China's state influence and cyber-attacks.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
5
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. We support the Government’s action in specifying Iran under the …
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Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. We support the Government’s action in specifying Iran under the enhanced tier of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on its ongoing commitment to support Ukraine against Russian information operations and disinformation through the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership, and does not address the Committee's support for the specification of Iran under the National Security Act.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
6
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
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The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses entirely on its actions to counter Russian foreign information manipulation and interference in Georgia, including imposing sanctions, and does not address the recommendation to develop programming against Iranian FIMI.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
7
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three of its leaders in July 2025, mirroring those implemented by the European Union in December 2024. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the conclusion and provides further detail on its ongoing support for Moldova against Russian hybrid threats, including imposing sanctions on related networks and establishing a UK-Moldova Defence and Security Partnership.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
8
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to counter Daesh are effective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
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We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to counter Daesh are effective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses countering information manipulation in Armenia and the Western Balkans, completely failing to address the committee's concerns about the effectiveness of the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
9
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to deliver counter-Daesh narratives. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59) The scale of foreign …
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The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to deliver counter-Daesh narratives. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59) The scale of foreign information manipulation and interference
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on media freedom in Africa, the Media Freedom Coalition, and sanctions against a Russian information operation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding counter-Daesh communications and identifying partners.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
10
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom but for the security of Europe. We also applaud the …
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For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom but for the security of Europe. We also applaud the substantial support the UK Government continues to provide in aiding Ukraine to counter Russian information warfare. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses its concerns and actions regarding Chinese misinformation in Taiwan, and support for Taiwan's democratic processes, but does not address the Committee's commendation of UK support for Ukraine against Russian information warfare.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
11
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a two-way street, so that the UK can both support Ukraine …
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For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a two-way street, so that the UK can both support Ukraine and learn essential lessons. We are additionally concerned that there have been limited details to date on the roadmap 84 for how and when activities will be undertaken or whether this Agreement will be amended in the event of a peace agreement with Russia. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the UK's partnership with the US and freedom of speech, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement and its roadmap.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
12
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine, including specific information on the operation and intent of Article 7, combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. It should also set out what discussions, if any, have …
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The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine, including specific information on the operation and intent of Article 7, combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. It should also set out what discussions, if any, have taken place with Ukraine regarding potential amendments to the Agreement in the event that a peace settlement with Russia is reached. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)
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Government response AI summary
The government commits to providing a verbal briefing session to the Committee on its international approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, which partially addresses the request for clarity on the UK-Ukraine Partnership Agreement.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
13
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Acknowledged
The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on its current trajectory, will lead to an entrenched autocracy firmly under Russia’s sphere of influence, like Belarus. We condemn the actions of the Georgian Dream Government in suspending EU accession talks, repressing opposition voices, limiting …
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The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on its current trajectory, will lead to an entrenched autocracy firmly under Russia’s sphere of influence, like Belarus. We condemn the actions of the Georgian Dream Government in suspending EU accession talks, repressing opposition voices, limiting legitimate protest, and spreading disinformation. These actions imitate the Russian playbook and indicate coordination between Tbilisi and Moscow. We support the actions already taken by the UK Government in sanctioning Georgian officials responsible for enabling human rights violations in response to legitimate protests. (Conclusion, Paragraph 83)
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Government response AI summary
The government shares the Committee's concerns about threats to democracy and security, stating its commitment to go further and faster to counter hybrid threats, including FIMI, through existing departmental allocations and continued resource prioritization.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
14
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on those who are seeking to undermine the Georgian people’s desire …
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We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on those who are seeking to undermine the Georgian people’s desire for a European alignment and signify the UK’s support for Georgian democracy, not autocracy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 84)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses its longstanding commitment to protecting media freedoms and offers to provide verbal briefings, but it does not address the recommendation to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and other entities.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
15
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing instead a European future. Moldova’s resilience in the face of …
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Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing instead a European future. Moldova’s resilience in the face of persistent Russian disinformation, electoral interference, illicit financing, and political subversion should serve as a lesson for the UK. The Committee saw firsthand the essential support the UK Government is providing to help Moldova counter these threats. We commend the work of the British Embassy in Chișinău and welcome the UK Government’s continued commitment to ensuring that Moldova can safeguard its independence and pursue its chosen European path. (Conclusion, Paragraph 92)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on BBC World Service funding and acknowledges a separate recommendation for additional funding, thereby not addressing the provided conclusion regarding Moldova's resilience and UK support.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
16
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals and organisations responsible. The UK must make clear that there …
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The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals and organisations responsible. The UK must make clear that there are consequences for those who sought to deliberately interfere in Moldova’s democracy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses the use of AI in information manipulation and its potential for countering FIMI, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope a bespoke AI counter disinformation sandbox, but does not address the recommendation to support Moldova's investigations …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
17
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking to distort public opinion, promote authoritarian alternatives, and destabilise its democracies. Stability in the Western Balkans is vital for European security and NATO cohesion, while Armenia deserves support for its efforts to move closer to …
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The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking to distort public opinion, promote authoritarian alternatives, and destabilise its democracies. Stability in the Western Balkans is vital for European security and NATO cohesion, while Armenia deserves support for its efforts to move closer to Europe and the West. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99)
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Government response AI summary
The government describes ongoing actions to address hybrid threats and FIMI, including increased coordination with the EU and member states through the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, with consultations focusing on the Western Balkans. It commits to continuing this collaboration and joint action with European …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
18
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Acknowledged
Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil society organisations and media literacy whilst continuing to monitor and expose foreign influence operations in these regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)
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Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil society organisations and media literacy whilst continuing to monitor and expose foreign influence operations in these regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the committee's suggestion and states they will take it into account alongside the Rycroft Review and lessons from allies, as they are working to cohere the government's approach to countering foreign information threats.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
19
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, economic and security affairs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)
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The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, economic and security affairs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response details the FCDO's investment in FIMI training for staff in Africa and leveraging its diplomatic network to engage with host governments and civil society on FIMI threats, but it does not address the committee's observation regarding the West's alleged retreat from Africa …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
20
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government to ensure appropriate funding is available to ensure resilient and …
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The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government to ensure appropriate funding is available to ensure resilient and sustainable independent media organisations are able to thrive across the African continent. (Recommendation, Paragraph 107)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response details its commitment to increasing public awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference through publications and media literacy campaigns, but does not address the recommendation concerning reductions in aid programming or funding for independent media in Africa.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
21
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for increased destabilisation in the South China Sea, including the invasion …
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Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for increased destabilisation in the South China Sea, including the invasion of Taiwan. (Conclusion, Paragraph 114)
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Government response AI summary
The government shares the objective of improving FIMI awareness, highlights its track record of exposing and sanctioning FIMI actors (primarily Russia), and states it will continue to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, but does not specifically acknowledge the Committee's observation regarding Chinese FIMI targeting …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
22
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the Indo- Pacific and sharing of best practice on countering foreign …
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The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the Indo- Pacific and sharing of best practice on countering foreign information manipulation and interference threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115) 86
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focuses on general media literacy campaigns and engagement with social media platforms, but it does not address the specific recommendation to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan or expand bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
23
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by malign disinformation actors, the Trump Administration has placed significant emphasis …
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The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by malign disinformation actors, the Trump Administration has placed significant emphasis on defending absolute freedom of speech and has criticised European and UK legislative initiatives as forms of censorship. This has led to the Trump Administration closing key US institutions, restricting funding for independent media and civil society organisations and instigating visa bans on prominent British and European anti-disinformation experts, whom the US government has accused of attempting to suppress American viewpoints through extraterritorial censorship. (Conclusion, Paragraph 127)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response addresses concerns about algorithms, the Online Safety Act, and a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but fails to engage with the committee's conclusion regarding the impact of the US political landscape on transatlantic cooperation and specific US actions.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
24
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, wherever in the world it occurs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128)
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These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, wherever in the world it occurs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128)
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Government response AI summary
The government describes its domestic legislative tools for countering foreign interference, such as the National Security Act 2023, but does not specifically address the recommendation for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States or standing up for those countering disinformation globally.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
25
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph 134)
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Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph 134)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response discusses concerns about digital replicas and a forthcoming consultation on their potential harms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the information environment in Latin America.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
26
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be treated as peripheral to the Government’s counter-FIMI strategy. The Government …
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The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be treated as peripheral to the Government’s counter-FIMI strategy. The Government should ensure it has the required capacity to monitor the growing threat of foreign information manipulation and interference in the region. The Government should report to this Committee within six months on how it will strengthen UK monitoring, diplomatic engagement and democratic resilience partnerships in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Americas. (Recommendation, Paragraph 135) 87 FCDO’s approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference
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Government response AI summary
The government responds by discussing the Online Safety Act, VPN usage, and transnational repression, but does not address the recommendation to work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media, strengthen FIMI monitoring capacity, or report on diplomatic engagement in the specified regions.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
27
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Not Addressed
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other strategically important regions. This limited funding risks the UK further …
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The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other strategically important regions. This limited funding risks the UK further losing influence in key regions such as Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Indo-Pacific as it cuts Official Development Assistance. This is especially concerning given the recent commitments by the Government to target funds to raising defence spending to achieve the NATO commitment of 3.5% of GDP by 2035 and the reorganisation of the UK Integrated Security Fund to deliver the ambitions of the National Security Strategy. Without immediate action, threat actors will continue to outspend democratic nations like the UK, increasing the challenge in combatting information operations. Strengthening the UK’s soft power capability and combatting FIMI in the information war should be recognised as an integral part of the UK’s defence and security strategy (Conclusion, Paragraph 141)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response outlines measures related to the Representation of the People Bill, a consultation on digital replicas, an AI labelling taskforce, and a ban on crypto asset donations, failing to address the conclusion regarding FCDO funding limitations or the strategic recognition of FIMI.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
28
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is presently under-resourced. The Government should immediately rectify this by utilising the funds associated with the defence uplift to increase funding and staffing within the newly formed Hybrid Threats Directorate. …
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Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is presently under-resourced. The Government should immediately rectify this by utilising the funds associated with the defence uplift to increase funding and staffing within the newly formed Hybrid Threats Directorate. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office must have the necessary resources to ensure their critical work can be conducted across all regions of interest and take forward this ministerial priority. (Recommendation, Paragraph 142)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees with the importance of the issue, stating that it has ensured existing allocations target hybrid threats, and confirms the Hybrid Threats Directorate has been allocated a non-ODA budget for the current spending review period to enable effective action.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
29
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous time. Limits are increasingly being placed on journalists which in turn endangers liberty. As funding for independent media organisations like the BBC World Service and Radio Free Europe are reduced, it is imperative that the …
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The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous time. Limits are increasingly being placed on journalists which in turn endangers liberty. As funding for independent media organisations like the BBC World Service and Radio Free Europe are reduced, it is imperative that the democratic international community moves away from mere rhetoric and instead demonstrates meaningful defence of media freedoms. (Conclusion, Paragraph 147)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, reiterating its commitment to media freedom and outlining steps such as co-chairing the Media Freedom Coalition and a new approach to Africa, while also highlighting actions like sanctions to disrupt information networks.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
30
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in March 2026, following this Committee’s suggestion to Ministers. This indicates that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are serious about protecting media freedoms. However, under previous Governments, the 88 Foreign, …
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The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in March 2026, following this Committee’s suggestion to Ministers. This indicates that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are serious about protecting media freedoms. However, under previous Governments, the 88 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office committed to providing six-monthly updates to this Committee on its work on media freedoms. These have now stopped. (Conclusion, Paragraph 148)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, recognising the importance of updates on media freedoms and committing to periodic verbal briefing sessions for the Committee while reviewing options for formal written reporting, in response to the cessation of previous updates.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
31
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the Committee six-monthly updates, including an assessment of threats to media freedom and the UK’s response to foreign information manipulation and interference in priority regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 149) BBC World Service
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To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the Committee six-monthly updates, including an assessment of threats to media freedom and the UK’s response to foreign information manipulation and interference in priority regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 149) BBC World Service
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, committing to periodic verbal briefings for committee members on media freedoms while reviewing options for formal written reporting, rather than the requested six-monthly updates.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
32
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during conflict and crisis, whilst leading the global fight against disinformation and promoting democratic values. Much of the evidence received by the Committee highlights the essential role of the BBC World Service and calls on the …
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The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during conflict and crisis, whilst leading the global fight against disinformation and promoting democratic values. Much of the evidence received by the Committee highlights the essential role of the BBC World Service and calls on the Government to ensure its continued functions through increased funding. We welcome the Government’s announcement that it will increase funding of the BBC World Service by an additional £11 million per year for the next three years. It is essential that the BBC World Service is provided with the necessary funding to ensure it continues to tackle the threat of disinformation by providing independent, impartial journalism to a global audience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 159)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, highlighting its increased funding for the BBC World Service to £148 million per annum. However, it notes but does not commit to further additional funding, citing defence budget rules and deferring longer-term funding considerations to the BBC Charter Review.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
33
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security and overseas interests and should be treated by Government as a strategic national asset in an era of information warfare. At a time when the UK is reducing its Official Development Assistance and disinformation is …
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The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security and overseas interests and should be treated by Government as a strategic national asset in an era of information warfare. At a time when the UK is reducing its Official Development Assistance and disinformation is spreading globally, the BBC World Service, is widely regarded as the world’s most trusted international broadcaster. Whilst we welcome the additional funding being provided by the Government over the next three years, this is nominal increase but due to inflation is likely to be a flat settlement. Therefore, the Government should provide the BBC World Service with a further increased funding settlement, drawn in part from the defence budget, so it can plan, invest, and deliver its services effectively. It should also be made clear that funding from the Ministry of Defence would be provided with appropriate safeguards and commitments to ensure that the BBC World Service is able to continue to operate independent of Government. If the BBC World Service does not receive the funding it needs, it will continue to contract with a diminishing influence. Its loss would significantly diminish the UK’s soft power and undermine our ability to counter information warfare. (Recommendation, Paragraph 160) 89
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, stating it has already increased BBC World Service funding to £148 million per annum, which it considers a real-terms uplift. However, it defers the recommendation for further increased funding drawn from the defence budget, citing stringent NATO rules and the ongoing …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
34
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Acknowledged
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era by invigorating research and innovation, whilst introducing unique challenges to national security. AI offers malicious users the opportunities to create novel content at speed, greatly increasing their reach and impact. However, it can also be …
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Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era by invigorating research and innovation, whilst introducing unique challenges to national security. AI offers malicious users the opportunities to create novel content at speed, greatly increasing their reach and impact. However, it can also be deployed by defenders to analyse patterns, detecting campaigns before they can cause widespread harm. (Conclusion, Paragraph 164)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees with the Committee's observation on AI's dual nature, acknowledging its use for both information manipulation and defensive capabilities. It states that FCDO capabilities are under review and existing AI sandboxes are in place, with a commitment to assess their utility for …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
35
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Deferred
The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation and technology. The sandbox should facilitate experimentation of AI tools across Whitehall, the intelligence community and trusted international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 165)
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The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation and technology. The sandbox should facilitate experimentation of AI tools across Whitehall, the intelligence community and trusted international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 165)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope whether a bespoke AI counter-disinformation sandbox would be useful, rather than immediately establishing one.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
36
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with allies. Whilst we welcome the Government’s increased engagement with EU partners, there is a need to move faster and significantly increase coordination to deter malign actors. (Conclusion, Paragraph 171)
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Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with allies. Whilst we welcome the Government’s increased engagement with EU partners, there is a need to move faster and significantly increase coordination to deter malign actors. (Conclusion, Paragraph 171)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees, detailing recent increases in coordination with the EU and member states through consultations and bilateral agreements, and stating its intention to continue strengthening collaboration and joint action, including information sharing and coordinating sanctions.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
37
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU partners to strengthen cooperation in detecting and responding to foreign …
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The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU partners to strengthen cooperation in detecting and responding to foreign information manipulation and interference to increase the cost for malign actors seeking to interfere in democracies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 172) The UK’s domestic response to foreign information manipulation and interference threats
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees and confirms it has already initiated UK-EU consultations on hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), under the Security and Defence Partnership, and will continue to strengthen collaboration through information sharing, analysis, and coordinated sanctions.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
38
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Deferred
It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion and bureaucracy over action. A more effective model already exists. …
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It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion and bureaucracy over action. A more effective model already exists. In 2016, the Government established the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), within GCHQ, bringing together government, intelligence agencies and the private sector into one organisation, providing expert advice and guidance on cyber security. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) 90 has significantly strengthened the UK’s understanding of, and the response to, the most important cyber threats domestically and internationally. (Conclusion, Paragraph 180)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, noting that the Rycroft Review also highlighted fragmentation issues. It will take the Committee's suggestion for an NCSC-like model into account alongside the Rycroft Review conclusions and lessons from allies, without committing to specific action yet.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
39
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Deferred
To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre. The UK’s National Counter Disinformation Centre should be placed on a statutory footing, be subject to oversight by Parliament, and be directed to understand, identify and combat foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns being directed …
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To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre. The UK’s National Counter Disinformation Centre should be placed on a statutory footing, be subject to oversight by Parliament, and be directed to understand, identify and combat foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns being directed against the UK and its interests. The National Counter Disinformation Centre should be similar to Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, and France’s Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference service (VIGINUM). (Recommendation, Paragraph 181)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, acknowledging the need for a joined-up approach, but defers action by stating it will note the suggestion and take it into account alongside the conclusions of the Rycroft Review and lessons from allies.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
40
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We are concerned that at present the Government is not adequately utilising the expertise and evidence collated by its overseas network to inform its domestic approach to combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. (Conclusion, …
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The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We are concerned that at present the Government is not adequately utilising the expertise and evidence collated by its overseas network to inform its domestic approach to combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. (Conclusion, Paragraph 182)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the conclusion, stating that the FCDO is investing in staff training for FIMI, leveraging its overseas network of political officers for intelligence gathering and collaboration, and deepening dialogue with international partners.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
41
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph 183)
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The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph 183)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees and states the FCDO is investing in staff upskilling, leveraging its network of political officers, and using reporting from overseas missions to build a global picture of the threat which informs policy responses.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
42
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors. By exposing the broader public to the threat of malicious content the Government can inoculate the target audience from the threat of disinformation. Public awareness campaigns are an easily accessible method for the government to …
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There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors. By exposing the broader public to the threat of malicious content the Government can inoculate the target audience from the threat of disinformation. Public awareness campaigns are an easily accessible method for the government to spread reliable information across multiple channels and are under-utilised by the Government at present. It was suggested that publicising disinformation campaigns might do the malign actors’ jobs for them and undermine confidence in essential democratic institutions and processes. If these campaigns posed no danger to our democracy and it can be said with complete confidence that these campaigns have no effect on public opinion, then we would have some sympathy with this approach. However, our experience tells us that we cannot afford to be complacent. To defeat this hybrid warfare we must enlist the public and empower them with the necessary tools to identify disinformation and make their own informed decisions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 187)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees on the importance of public awareness, stating it will continue to highlight the threat via gov.uk and is considering adapting its existing "You Won’t Know Until You Ask" media literacy campaign to address foreign information manipulation and interference.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
43
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference. This should include the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect 91 democratic institutions. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office should launch a publicly accessible information portal to …
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The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference. This should include the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect 91 democratic institutions. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office should launch a publicly accessible information portal to document the scale and aims of disinformation campaigns, similar to the European External Action Services’ highly-effective EUvsDisinfo resource. (Recommendation, Paragraph 188)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, stating it will continue to highlight the threat and is already pursuing media literacy initiatives like the 'You Won't Know Until You Ask' campaign, which it is considering extending or adapting. It does not commit to launching a new dedicated information …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
44
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy and overclassification, especially for state threats which risk leaving Parliament …
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We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy and overclassification, especially for state threats which risk leaving Parliament and the public in the dark. (Conclusion, Paragraph 189)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees with the concern, highlighting its track record of publicly exposing foreign information manipulation and interference actors and committing to continue enhancing information sharing and stakeholder engagement while protecting sensitive intelligence.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
45
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and media organisations) with regular briefings on their work to combat …
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Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and media organisations) with regular briefings on their work to combat foreign information manipulation and interference as well as training to identify and report disinformation campaigns. This should mirror the offerings provided by the National Cyber Security Centre for cyber security and resilience. (Recommendation, Paragraph 190) Media literacy
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, highlighting its track record of exposing and sanctioning actors involved in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They commit to continuing to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, including briefings, and will engage with NCSC to understand best practice, while noting …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
46
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Acknowledged
The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined in the Strategic Defence Review, National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan. Yet media literacy was notably absent. Whilst we welcome the Government’s media literacy action plan, it places no overt responsibilities on social …
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The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined in the Strategic Defence Review, National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan. Yet media literacy was notably absent. Whilst we welcome the Government’s media literacy action plan, it places no overt responsibilities on social media platforms to support efforts to improve media literacy and does not include actions to inform the public about foreign malign actors spreading disinformation. If this responsibility continues to sit with Ofcom, the Committee is concerned that it may lack the capacity to undertake this role. (Conclusion, Paragraph 199)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that media literacy is crucial for resilience to FIMI and is evaluating its 'You Won’t Know Until You Ask’ campaign to adapt it for specific FIMI risks. It also acknowledges the critical role of social media platforms in promoting media literacy, stating …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
47
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to strengthening and securing the UK’s national security, including foreign information manipulation and interference from malign actors. The Government should seek to learn best practice from Baltic and Nordic countries and apply them to the UK, …
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The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to strengthening and securing the UK’s national security, including foreign information manipulation and interference from malign actors. The Government should seek to learn best practice from Baltic and Nordic countries and apply them to the UK, ensuring its approach focuses on all ages, not just the under-16s. (Recommendation, Paragraph 200) 92
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that media literacy is important and acknowledges the value of learning from Baltic and Nordic partners. It is evaluating its existing 'You Won't Know Until You Ask' campaign for children and considering options to extend or adapt it to address FIMI and …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
48
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation and interference. It is our opinion that they are failing to tackle the threat of foreign interference on their platforms. The continued lack of algorithmic transparency by social media companies is restricting legitimate access by …
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Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation and interference. It is our opinion that they are failing to tackle the threat of foreign interference on their platforms. The continued lack of algorithmic transparency by social media companies is restricting legitimate access by policymakers, academics and civil society who are seeking to examine how their content ranking systems are designed and potentially abused by malign actors posting controversial and incendiary content. This is not about policing content, but the design and processes used by online platforms to retain the engagement of users and its vulnerability to abuse. (Conclusion, Paragraph 215)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns about algorithms and noting Ofcom's existing powers, and commits to operationalising a legislated Researcher Access to Data Scheme through consultations and regulations later this year to provide legitimate data access to researchers.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
49
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of artificial amplification and foreign interference and the subsequent actions taken …
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The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of artificial amplification and foreign interference and the subsequent actions taken to remove such content. (Recommendation, Paragraph 216)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, noting the Online Safety Act already gives Ofcom powers to request algorithm design information. It agrees social media companies should provide legitimate data to researchers and will be consulting on how to operationalise a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
50
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Rejected
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited due to the need to establish that it is a …
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By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited due to the need to establish that it is a foreign power behind the disinformation. We believe this makes the offence unworkable in practice and are concerned that social media companies may use the complexities of attribution to minimise their compliance. The Government should ensure that the foreign power condition does not create a loophole allowing hostile state-backed influence operations to evade enforcement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 230)
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Government response AI summary
The government disagrees, stating the National Security Act 2023 is carefully designed and needs time to be robustly tested. They note a live case may clarify its operation and will review legislation, working with Ofcom on platform duties under the Online Safety Act.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
51
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Rejected
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power condition. (Recommendation, Paragraph 231)
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The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power condition. (Recommendation, Paragraph 231)
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Government response AI summary
The government disagrees with conducting an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, stating the Act is new and has not been robustly tested, with a live case expected to clarify its operation.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
52
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Deferred
We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including whether a new statutory regime of personality rights may be appropriate to protect individuals against the threat of deepfakes. At a minimum, the Government should ensure these personality rights cover a person’s likeness, voice and …
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We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including whether a new statutory regime of personality rights may be appropriate to protect individuals against the threat of deepfakes. At a minimum, the Government should ensure these personality rights cover a person’s likeness, voice and body. (Recommendation, Paragraph 232)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns but stating it will launch a consultation in the summer to seek views on addressing digital replica harms, deferring a commitment to specific personality rights coverage.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
53
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Rejected
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; and 3) whether the connection to the platform was via …
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The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; and 3) whether the connection to the platform was via a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 93 Social media companies should also be obliged to provide an opt-out function to safeguard users under the threat of transnational repression. (Recommendation, Paragraph 233)
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Government response AI summary
The government explicitly disagrees with amending the Online Safety Act, citing legitimate reasons for VPN use and confidence that the current Act effectively addresses online harms, including those associated with transnational repression. It will continue to monitor the Act's effectiveness.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
54
Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported during elections in other countries. We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to legislate to protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes and institutions through the Representation of the People Bill, but it does not …
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We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported during elections in other countries. We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to legislate to protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes and institutions through the Representation of the People Bill, but it does not go far enough to safeguard future elections. (Conclusion, Paragraph 238)
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns about democratic protection, and details further actions it is taking or planning, including a consultation on digital replicas, an AI-generated content labelling taskforce, ongoing review of the Online Safety Act framework, and a moratorium on crypto asset political donations …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
55
Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: …
Accepted in Part
The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated content, the creation and dissemination of disinformation, limits on the potential abuse of social media algorithmic biasing for political advantage, and a ban on cryptoasset donations to political parties. (Recommendation, Paragraph 239) 94
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The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated content, the creation and dissemination of disinformation, limits on the potential abuse of social media algorithmic biasing for political advantage, and a ban on cryptoasset donations to political parties. (Recommendation, Paragraph 239) 94
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees. It will launch a consultation and establish a taskforce on AI-generated content, and acknowledges concerns about algorithms, noting the Online Safety Act's powers. However, it fully accepts and will implement a moratorium on crypto asset donations through the Representation of the …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office