4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese … Read more The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese state influence, including the use of cyber-attacks and disinformation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37) 83 Show less

View Details →

The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to … Read more The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to deliver counter-Daesh narratives. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59) The scale of foreign information manipulation and interference Show less

View Details →

The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine, including specific information on the operation and intent of Article 7, combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. … Read more The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine, including specific information on the operation and intent of Article 7, combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. It should also set out what discussions, if any, have taken place with Ukraine regarding potential amendments to the Agreement in the event that a peace settlement with Russia is reached. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76) Show less

View Details →

We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on … Read more We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on those who are seeking to undermine the Georgian people’s desire for a European alignment and signify the UK’s support for Georgian democracy, not autocracy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 84) Show less

View Details →

The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government … Read more The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government to ensure appropriate funding is available to ensure resilient and sustainable independent media organisations are able to thrive across the African continent. (Recommendation, Paragraph 107) Show less

View Details →

The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the … Read more The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the Indo- Pacific and sharing of best practice on countering foreign information manipulation and interference threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115) 86 Show less

View Details →

These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, … Read more These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, wherever in the world it occurs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128) Show less

View Details →

The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be … Read more The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be treated as peripheral to the Government’s counter-FIMI strategy. The Government should ensure it has the required capacity to monitor the growing threat of foreign information manipulation and interference in the region. The Government should report to this Committee within six months on how it will strengthen UK monitoring, diplomatic engagement and democratic resilience partnerships in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Americas. (Recommendation, Paragraph 135) 87 FCDO’s approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference Show less

View Details →

Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is presently under-resourced. The Government should immediately rectify this by utilising the funds associated with the defence uplift to increase … Read more Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is presently under-resourced. The Government should immediately rectify this by utilising the funds associated with the defence uplift to increase funding and staffing within the newly formed Hybrid Threats Directorate. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office must have the necessary resources to ensure their critical work can be conducted across all regions of interest and take forward this ministerial priority. (Recommendation, Paragraph 142) Show less

View Details →

To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the Committee six-monthly updates, including an assessment of threats to media freedom and the UK’s response to foreign information manipulation and interference in priority regions. (Recommendation, … Read more To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the Committee six-monthly updates, including an assessment of threats to media freedom and the UK’s response to foreign information manipulation and interference in priority regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 149) BBC World Service Show less

View Details →

The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security and overseas interests and should be treated by Government as a strategic national asset in an era of information warfare. At a time when the … Read more The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security and overseas interests and should be treated by Government as a strategic national asset in an era of information warfare. At a time when the UK is reducing its Official Development Assistance and disinformation is spreading globally, the BBC World Service, is widely regarded as the world’s most trusted international broadcaster. Whilst we welcome the additional funding being provided by the Government over the next three years, this is nominal increase but due to inflation is likely to be a flat settlement. Therefore, the Government should provide the BBC World Service with a further increased funding settlement, drawn in part from the defence budget, so it can plan, invest, and deliver its services effectively. It should also be made clear that funding from the Ministry of Defence would be provided with appropriate safeguards and commitments to ensure that the BBC World Service is able to continue to operate independent of Government. If the BBC World Service does not receive the funding it needs, it will continue to contract with a diminishing influence. Its loss would significantly diminish the UK’s soft power and undermine our ability to counter information warfare. (Recommendation, Paragraph 160) 89 Show less

View Details →

The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation and technology. The sandbox should facilitate experimentation of AI tools across Whitehall, the intelligence community and trusted international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 165) Read more The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation and technology. The sandbox should facilitate experimentation of AI tools across Whitehall, the intelligence community and trusted international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 165) Show less

View Details →

The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU … Read more The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU partners to strengthen cooperation in detecting and responding to foreign information manipulation and interference to increase the cost for malign actors seeking to interfere in democracies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 172) The UK’s domestic response to foreign information manipulation and interference threats Show less

View Details →

To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre. The UK’s National Counter Disinformation Centre should be placed on a statutory footing, be subject to oversight by Parliament, and be directed to understand, identify … Read more To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre. The UK’s National Counter Disinformation Centre should be placed on a statutory footing, be subject to oversight by Parliament, and be directed to understand, identify and combat foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns being directed against the UK and its interests. The National Counter Disinformation Centre should be similar to Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, and France’s Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference service (VIGINUM). (Recommendation, Paragraph 181) Show less

View Details →

The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph … Read more The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph 183) Show less

View Details →

The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference. This should include the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect 91 democratic institutions. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and … Read more The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference. This should include the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect 91 democratic institutions. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office should launch a publicly accessible information portal to document the scale and aims of disinformation campaigns, similar to the European External Action Services’ highly-effective EUvsDisinfo resource. (Recommendation, Paragraph 188) Show less

View Details →

Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and … Read more Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and media organisations) with regular briefings on their work to combat foreign information manipulation and interference as well as training to identify and report disinformation campaigns. This should mirror the offerings provided by the National Cyber Security Centre for cyber security and resilience. (Recommendation, Paragraph 190) Media literacy Show less

View Details →

The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to strengthening and securing the UK’s national security, including foreign information manipulation and interference from malign actors. The Government should seek to learn best practice from … Read more The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to strengthening and securing the UK’s national security, including foreign information manipulation and interference from malign actors. The Government should seek to learn best practice from Baltic and Nordic countries and apply them to the UK, ensuring its approach focuses on all ages, not just the under-16s. (Recommendation, Paragraph 200) 92 Show less

View Details →

The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of … Read more The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of artificial amplification and foreign interference and the subsequent actions taken to remove such content. (Recommendation, Paragraph 216) Show less

View Details →

By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited … Read more By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited due to the need to establish that it is a foreign power behind the disinformation. We believe this makes the offence unworkable in practice and are concerned that social media companies may use the complexities of attribution to minimise their compliance. The Government should ensure that the foreign power condition does not create a loophole allowing hostile state-backed influence operations to evade enforcement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 230) Show less

View Details →

The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power … Read more The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power condition. (Recommendation, Paragraph 231) Show less

View Details →

We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including whether a new statutory regime of personality rights may be appropriate to protect individuals against the threat of deepfakes. At a minimum, the Government should … Read more We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including whether a new statutory regime of personality rights may be appropriate to protect individuals against the threat of deepfakes. At a minimum, the Government should ensure these personality rights cover a person’s likeness, voice and body. (Recommendation, Paragraph 232) Show less

View Details →

The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; … Read more The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; and 3) whether the connection to the platform was via a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 93 Social media companies should also be obliged to provide an opt-out function to safeguard users under the threat of transnational repression. (Recommendation, Paragraph 233) Show less

View Details →

The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated content, the creation and dissemination of disinformation, limits on the potential abuse of social media algorithmic biasing for political advantage, and a ban on cryptoasset … Read more The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated content, the creation and dissemination of disinformation, limits on the potential abuse of social media algorithmic biasing for political advantage, and a ban on cryptoasset donations to political parties. (Recommendation, Paragraph 239) 94 Show less

View Details →

Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity. Russia’s behaviour is that of a state at war against the West, and this will not …

View Details →

The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and aggression. It should also step-up its counter foreign information manipulation …

View Details →

The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at the cost of trading security for economic growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph …

View Details →

Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. We support the Government’s action in specifying Iran under the …

View Details →

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)

View Details →

We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three of its leaders in July 2025, mirroring those implemented by the European Union in December 2024. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)

View Details →

We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to counter Daesh are effective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)

View Details →

For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom but for the security of Europe. We also applaud the …

View Details →

For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a two-way street, so that the UK can both support Ukraine …

View Details →

The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on its current trajectory, will lead to an entrenched autocracy firmly under Russia’s sphere of influence, like Belarus. We condemn the actions of the Georgian Dream Government in suspending EU accession talks, repressing opposition voices, limiting …

View Details →

Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing instead a European future. Moldova’s resilience in the face of …

View Details →

The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals and organisations responsible. The UK must make clear that there …

View Details →

The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking to distort public opinion, promote authoritarian alternatives, and destabilise its democracies. Stability in the Western Balkans is vital for European security and NATO cohesion, while Armenia deserves support for its efforts to move closer to …

View Details →

Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil society organisations and media literacy whilst continuing to monitor and expose foreign influence operations in these regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)

View Details →

The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, economic and security affairs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)

View Details →

Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for increased destabilisation in the South China Sea, including the invasion …

View Details →

The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by malign disinformation actors, the Trump Administration has placed significant emphasis …

View Details →

Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph 134)

View Details →

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other strategically important regions. This limited funding risks the UK further …

View Details →

The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous time. Limits are increasingly being placed on journalists which in turn endangers liberty. As funding for independent media organisations like the BBC World Service and Radio Free Europe are reduced, it is imperative that the …

View Details →

The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in March 2026, following this Committee’s suggestion to Ministers. This indicates that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are serious about protecting media freedoms. However, under previous Governments, the 88 Foreign, …

View Details →

The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during conflict and crisis, whilst leading the global fight against disinformation and promoting democratic values. Much of the evidence received by the Committee highlights the essential role of the BBC World Service and calls on the …

View Details →

Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era by invigorating research and innovation, whilst introducing unique challenges to national security. AI offers malicious users the opportunities to create novel content at speed, greatly increasing their reach and impact. However, it can also be …

View Details →

Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with allies. Whilst we welcome the Government’s increased engagement with EU partners, there is a need to move faster and significantly increase coordination to deter malign actors. (Conclusion, Paragraph 171)

View Details →

It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion and bureaucracy over action. A more effective model already exists. …

View Details →

The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We are concerned that at present the Government is not adequately utilising the expertise and evidence collated by its overseas network to inform its domestic approach to combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. (Conclusion, …

View Details →

There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors. By exposing the broader public to the threat of malicious content the Government can inoculate the target audience from the threat of disinformation. Public awareness campaigns are an easily accessible method for the government to …

View Details →

We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy and overclassification, especially for state threats which risk leaving Parliament …

View Details →

The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined in the Strategic Defence Review, National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan. Yet media literacy was notably absent. Whilst we welcome the Government’s media literacy action plan, it places no overt responsibilities on social …

View Details →

Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation and interference. It is our opinion that they are failing to tackle the threat of foreign interference on their platforms. The continued lack of algorithmic transparency by social media companies is restricting legitimate access by …

View Details →

We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported during elections in other countries. We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to legislate to protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes and institutions through the Representation of the People Bill, but it does not …

View Details →