Recommendations & Conclusions
10 items
1
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many years to come. There were systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, …
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The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many years to come. There were systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, planning and preparation, which raise questions about machinery of Government, principally the National Security Council: • The UK Government failed effectively to shape or respond to Washington’s decision to withdraw, despite having had 18 months’ notice. • The UK Government failed to predict the speed of the Taliban’s takeover. The fact that this came as a surprise to many, including the militants themselves, does not excuse the UK’s failures, but rather makes it more urgent to identify where its intelligence gathering, analysis and planning fell short. The failure to heed warnings from the Kabul Embassy points to systemic shortcomings in drawing on officials’ in-country knowledge. Despite this, the FCDO has sought to avoid responsibility, and the parameters of its internal review have been set to avoid the topic of intelligence altogether. • The FCDO failed to make the necessary preparations for withdrawal, in terms of laying the groundwork for an evacuation with third countries, considering and planning for which of the UK’s in-country partners should be prioritised for evacuation, and putting in place a robust timeline to evacuate the Embassy that could adapt to fast-changing scenarios.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the Doha Agreement and the UK's attempts to shape the US approach. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
3
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with the Home Office—for evacuating Afghans who supported the UK mission, without being directly employed by the UK Government. The Government was never going to be able to evacuate all—or even many—of these people. But it …
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Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with the Home Office—for evacuating Afghans who supported the UK mission, without being directly employed by the UK Government. The Government was never going to be able to evacuate all—or even many—of these people. But it failed to deliver the bare minimum that we owed them: a well-considered plan for who would be prioritised for extraction, and clear communications to those seeking help. The lack of clarity led to confusion and false hope, hindering individuals from making the best decision for themselves based on a realistic understanding of their situation. The UK has a responsibility to those who it encouraged and funded to take on high-profile roles that place them at risk from the Taliban, but the FCDO did not consider whether or how to evacuate these individuals until after the fall of Kabul in mid-August. This is a serious failure.
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Government response AI summary
The government recognizes the strength of the Committee's view that the UK had a responsibility to Afghan nationals beyond those who had worked for HMG directly. They state the issue was considered on a cross-Government basis but difficult choices were inescapable because its capacity to …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
5
Recommendation
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff to ensure that any evacuation can be carried out more effectively. It should devise a policy, based on clear and fair principles, about the assistance that will be offered to local partners in the event …
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When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff to ensure that any evacuation can be carried out more effectively. It should devise a policy, based on clear and fair principles, about the assistance that will be offered to local partners in the event of a security deterioration, and report to us when it has done so. In its response to this report, the FCDO should explain why its Lessons Learned review only covers the period from April 2021 onwards, and why it does not cover intelligence matters. We ask the Government to share with this Committee the results of its internal investigation into the failure to destroy sensitive documents at the Kabul Embassy. The FCDO should review its procedures for evacuating embassies and destroying sensitive documents and data, and report back to the Committee on the steps it will take to avoid a similar failure happening again. (Paragraph 16) The evacuation
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the need to keep accurate records on locally employed staff. They refer to other recommendations for their response on offering resettlement to local partners not directly employed and highlight that FCDO Travel Advice was strengthened.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
6
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave indictment of the attitudes of the Government, representing a failure of leadership across the board in the Foreign Office. In particular, the fact that the department’s top civil servant did not return until the civilian …
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The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave indictment of the attitudes of the Government, representing a failure of leadership across the board in the Foreign Office. In particular, the fact that the department’s top civil servant did not return until the civilian evacuation was over, while staff across the department struggled to implement a poorly-planned evacuation process under intense pressure, is difficult to understand and impossible to excuse. While it is essential for those at all levels in Government to take leave, this must be tempered at the most senior level by the need to exercise leadership in a crisis. Despite expressions of regret from the then-Foreign Secretary and Permanent Under-Secretary, there was no discussion of this point in the department’s Lessons Learned review. In addition to the absence of the FCDO leadership in London, there was a gap on the ground in Kabul: the Government withdrew all FCDO consular staff from Kabul as the evacuation operation began and there was a 48-hour wait 54 Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan before their replacements arrived. This mismanagement and under-resourcing of the evacuation effort in a crucial period likely cost hundreds of people their chance to leave the country, and as a result likely cost lives.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
7
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a heroic effort by the individuals involved, with many—both inside and outside Government—working under enormous pressure to save lives. We commend the bravery of the military and civilian personnel on the ground in Afghanistan during the …
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The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a heroic effort by the individuals involved, with many—both inside and outside Government—working under enormous pressure to save lives. We commend the bravery of the military and civilian personnel on the ground in Afghanistan during the evacuation, and the hard work and dedication of those coordinating it from elsewhere, including many dedicated civil servants in London. We regret that their sacrifices were undermined by deep failures of leadership in the system they were working within.
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Government response AI summary
The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
8
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A total failure to plan how to help Afghans at risk …
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However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A total failure to plan how to help Afghans at risk due to their work to promote British values without working directly for the Government—the “Special Cases”— left many in danger. Some will have not taken other options, as they remained with false hope of a rescue that would never come. The Foreign Office wasted time by exploring the options for such a scheme only after the Taliban takeover. The hasty effort to draw up a list of those eligible for evacuation was poorly devised, managed, and staffed. In the absence of criteria that allowed for meaningful prioritisation of cases, the scheme seemingly relied on MPs’ interventions as its primary measure of the vulnerability of those seeking extraction. Given MPs’ responsibility to represent constituents, not to triage needs, this was never going to be a reliable way to deliver the right outcome—but only to attempt to silence criticism. The department failed to perform the most basic crisis-management functions, such as rostering an adequate number of staff to key teams, despite the fact that this Committee raised similar issues around the FCDO’s response to the pandemic. Underlying operational problems— such as a failure to integrate FCO and DFID IT systems—further undermined the effort. Junior staff were left unsupported to deliver a poorly designed policy, making life-and-death decisions with little support or guidance, at a cost to their mental health. While a degree of chaos is to be expected in a crisis, the mismanagement of this category of evacuations was inexcusable. The chaos and lack of preparation was not the sole responsibility of the department. A lack of seriousness, application and coordination at a political level across Government fatally undermined the task in
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
9
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination. We have seen little evidence of this. To the contrary, decision-making was so unclear that even senior officials such as the National Security Adviser could not be certain how key decisions were authorised. It is clearly unacceptable that neither …
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The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination. We have seen little evidence of this. To the contrary, decision-making was so unclear that even senior officials such as the National Security Adviser could not be certain how key decisions were authorised. It is clearly unacceptable that neither ministers nor civil servants have been able to articulate the operational chain Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan 55 of command involved in conducting a major evacuation. The political leadership on offer vacillated so much that no clear priorities were set for who should be evacuated and in what order, giving many thousands of vulnerable people, to whom we owed a debt, a hope that could never be met. Although ministers claimed that they worked closely together, the decision to run the operation through three departments undermined coordination. This is particularly disturbing at a time when the UK faces significant foreign policy challenges, including in relation to Ukraine, Russia, the Balkan states, Yemen, and the Northern Ireland Protocol. Unity of purpose, clarity and coordination require serious intent and consistent political leadership.
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Government response AI summary
The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
12
Recommendation
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken place at all, despite asking many questions on the topic. Parliament can only perform its role of holding Government to account if it can be confident that it is receiving honest answers to its questions. …
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Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken place at all, despite asking many questions on the topic. Parliament can only perform its role of holding Government to account if it can be confident that it is receiving honest answers to its questions. The relationship between the Committee and department relies on a degree of candour and rigour, and this appears to have been sadly missing, with the integrity of the department’s senior leaders called into question. Officials should not be expected to engage— nor be complicit—in obscuring the facts in order to shield others from political accountability. Under the leadership of a Foreign Secretary who took up her post after these events, the FCDO has had the opportunity to make a fresh start and re-commit to transparency and positive engagement with Parliament. On this issue, it has so far failed to do so. We look forward to this being rectified. Those who lead the Foreign Office should be ashamed that two civil servants of great integrity and clear ability felt compelled to risk their careers to bring to light the appalling mismanagement of the Afghan crisis, and the misleading statements to Parliament that followed. The department should carry out a review of its internal processes for officials to register concerns about policies, and report its conclusions back to this Committee. It should study the testimony provided to this Committee by both whistleblowers and determine how it will address the problems they raise.
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Government response AI summary
The government expresses regret about whistleblowers and highlights existing and updated policies for staff to raise concerns internally. However, it does not explicitly commit to carrying out a review of internal processes in light of whistleblower testimony or reporting conclusions back to the Committee as …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
16
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country. The overriding goal of our policy towards Afghanistan should be to reduce the impact of the humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal. Humanitarian aid is vital, but will not be enough to avert catastrophe …
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The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country. The overriding goal of our policy towards Afghanistan should be to reduce the impact of the humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal. Humanitarian aid is vital, but will not be enough to avert catastrophe if the economy remains paralysed. A functioning economy is needed for delivery of aid at any scale, and for ordinary Afghans to support themselves. The current liquidity crisis is, in large part, created by the international community’s measures against the Taliban.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the impact of the humanitarian crisis, has delivered on its pledge to spend £286 million, and has committed the same amount again for the current financial year. They state that they are working with partners and have …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
19
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Acknowledged
The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally imperative—that the UK commits to a serious strategy leading to future engagement with Afghanistan, in cooperation with allies and regional states. The withdrawal and the Taliban takeover have serious implications for British security and wider …
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The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally imperative—that the UK commits to a serious strategy leading to future engagement with Afghanistan, in cooperation with allies and regional states. The withdrawal and the Taliban takeover have serious implications for British security and wider interests. It has heightened the terror threat and lessened our ability to identify and tackle these issues. In particular, remote counterterrorism operations run the risk of further damaging our interests in the country by causing civilian casualties. Along with traditional partners, such as the EU, the UK shares significant interests with countries in the region, such as China, in terms of regional stability, security, and avoiding state collapse. The UK should combine diplomacy, aid and trade in a concerted and strategic approach to future policy towards Afghanistan. This will mean patient committed engagement with the regime and with its domestic critics; investment in a substantial package of humanitarian and—eventually—development aid for the country; targeted support to rebuild the economy; and coordinated messaging towards the regime with both partner and antagonist governments. (Paragraph 60) Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan 59
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Government response AI summary
The government states its commitment to Afghanistan and its people is enduring, and that its strategy will be grounded in its enduring national interests. The government agrees it should combine diplomacy, aid, and trade in its strategy for Afghanistan and will continue to engage international …
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Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office