Recommendations & Conclusions
19 items
1
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many years to come. There were systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, …
Government response. 6. The April 2021 decision to withdraw NATO forces, and the subsequent course of events to August 2021, were set in motion in substantial part by the US-Taliban Doha Agreement of February 2020. That Agreement was negotiated bilaterally between the …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Once the US decision was announced in February 2020, the UK Government should have immediately taken steps to develop a clear and coherent policv on who it would prioritise for evacuation; to gather and securely store information on eligible locally- employed staff, including biometric data; and to build contacts with …
Government response. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul. Those issues are covered in the sections below titled …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
3
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with the Home Office—for evacuating Afghans who supported the UK mission, without being directly employed by the UK Government. The Government was never going to be able to evacuate all—or even many—of these people. But it …
Government response. The Government recognises the strength of the Committee’s view that the UK had a responsibility to Afghan nationals beyond those who had worked for HMG directly, and notes the parallel recommendation from the International Development Committee about those who work …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
4
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Managing a complex evacuation requires Government departments to work together seamlessly, including the FCDO, MOD, intelligence agencies, Home Office and Cabinet Office. The National Security Council is “the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national security”. It failed to adequately coordinate cross-Government planning and preparation for …
Government response. The Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy wrote to Sir Stephen Lovegrove on 22 June seeking his response to these findings of the Committee’s report. The pace and intensity of cross-Government work on Afghanistan increased significantly from …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5
Recommendation
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff to ensure that any evacuation can be carried out more effectively. It should devise a policy, based on clear and fair principles, about the assistance that will be offered to local partners in the event …
Government response. The Government agrees with the Committee on the need to keep accurate, up-to- date records, securely held, on locally employed staff. The Government’s response to the question of whether it should offer resettlement to local partners not directly employed, in …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave indictment of the attitudes of the Government, representing a failure of leadership across the board in the Foreign Office. In particular, the fact that the department’s top civil servant did not return until the civilian …
Government response. The Government is grateful to the Foreign Affairs Committee for its report on the UK’s 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn, and to act on, from this experience and the feedback received. …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
7
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a heroic effort by the individuals involved, with many—both inside and outside Government—working under enormous pressure to save lives. We commend the bravery of the military and civilian personnel on the ground in Afghanistan during the …
Government response. The Government is grateful to the Foreign Affairs Committee for its report on the UK’s 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn, and to act on, from this experience and the feedback received. …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A total failure to plan how to help Afghans at risk …
Government response. The Government is grateful to the Foreign Affairs Committee for its report on the UK’s 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn, and to act on, from this experience and the feedback received. …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
9
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination. We have seen little evidence of this. To the contrary, decision-making was so unclear that even senior officials such as the National Security Adviser could not be certain how key decisions were authorised. It is clearly unacceptable that neither …
Government response. The Government is grateful to the Foreign Affairs Committee for its report on the UK’s 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn, and to act on, from this experience and the feedback received. …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The failure to plan for the Special Cases evacuations, or to put in place a fair and robust prioritisation system, left the process open to arbitrary political interventions. This is illustrated by the case of the Nowzad animal charity. Amid intense media attention, its staff were called for evacuation at …
Government response. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul. Those issues are covered in the sections below titled …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The FCDO has repeatedly given us answers that, in our judgement, are at best intentionally evasive, and often deliberately misleading. On Nowzad, they only admitted that the case had been in any way unusual when faced with the evidence of whistleblowers. At best, the Permanent Under-Secretary displayed a worrying lack …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
12
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken place at all, despite asking many questions on the topic. Parliament can only perform its role of holding Government to account if it can be confident that it is receiving honest answers to its questions. …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The FCDO failed to take the basic administrative step of recording its decisions. It is fundamental to any bureaucracy to know precisely what decisions have been made, by whom, with what authority, and when. This would be a serious failure at any time, but during the withdrawal from Afghanistan may …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
14
Recommendation
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The Taliban takeover is a tragedy for Afghanistan, marking the single biggest reversal in the rights of women and girls in a generation. We welcome the Government’s pragmatic engagement with the Taliban at official level: it is valid to withhold recognition, but attempts to isolate the new regime entirely may …
Government response. 106. The Government agrees with the Committee on the need for sustained, patient, and pragmatic UK engagement in Afghanistan, and that is the strategy it has pursued since last August. The Government agrees that any attempt to isolate the Taliban …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
15
Recommendation
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
It is important for the UK’s engagement with the Taliban to come alongside extensive and targeted outreach to Afghan civil society, particularly those active on the ground. It should consult these groups on its policies towards Afghanistan and support them where possible through funding and other forms of engagement. This …
Government response. 111. The Government agrees on the importance of helping sustain Afghan civil society, and that regular engagement and consultation should inform the UK’s approach. Following the Taliban takeover, FCDO Ministers and officials have continued to meet a range of civil …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
16
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country. The overriding goal of our policy towards Afghanistan should be to reduce the impact of the humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal. Humanitarian aid is vital, but will not be enough to avert catastrophe …
Government response. 115. The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of doing what it can to help mitigate the impact of the humanitarian crisis on the Afghan people. This has been one of the UK’s highest priorities since last August. …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The UK should try to mitigate the impact of the Taliban regime by thinking creatively about the provision of aid. For example, online classes accessible from home and alternative measures to help the most vulnerable Afghan citizens should be considered. These should include working with partners, including the US, to …
Government response. The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of doing what it can to help mitigate the impact of the humanitarian crisis on the Afghan people. This has been one of the UK’s highest priorities since last August. The …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18
Recommendation
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The halving of UK aid to Afghanistan in 2020/1 is an example of the harm done by aid cuts that were designed to reduce spending at speed, rather than considering wider UK strategic interests. These cuts, made at a time when Afghanistan was facing the withdrawal of international troops, speak …
Government response. The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of doing what it can to help mitigate the impact of the humanitarian crisis on the Afghan people. This has been one of the UK’s highest priorities since last August. The …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19
Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: UK le…
The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally imperative—that the UK commits to a serious strategy leading to future engagement with Afghanistan, in cooperation with allies and regional states. The withdrawal and the Taliban takeover have serious implications for British security and wider …
Government response. The Government’s commitment to Afghanistan and its people is enduring. The UK’s strategy for this period will be grounded in its enduring national interests in Afghanistan: preventing the return of terrorist threats to the UK from Afghan soil; protecting the …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office