Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 1
1
Paragraph: 12
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal...
Conclusion
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many years to come. There were systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, planning and preparation, which raise questions about machinery of Government, principally the National Security Council: • The UK Government failed effectively to shape or respond to Washington’s decision to withdraw, despite having had 18 months’ notice. • The UK Government failed to predict the speed of the Taliban’s takeover. The fact that this came as a surprise to many, including the militants themselves, does not excuse the UK’s failures, but rather makes it more urgent to identify where its intelligence gathering, analysis and planning fell short. The failure to heed warnings from the Kabul Embassy points to systemic shortcomings in drawing on officials’ in-country knowledge. Despite this, the FCDO has sought to avoid responsibility, and the parameters of its internal review have been set to avoid the topic of intelligence altogether. • The FCDO failed to make the necessary preparations for withdrawal, in terms of laying the groundwork for an evacuation with third countries, considering and planning for which of the UK’s in-country partners should be prioritised for evacuation, and putting in place a robust timeline to evacuate the Embassy that could adapt to fast-changing scenarios.
Paragraph Reference:
12
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
6. The April 2021 decision to withdraw NATO forces, and the subsequent course of events to August 2021, were set in motion in substantial part by the US-Taliban Doha Agreement of February 2020. That Agreement was negotiated bilaterally between the previous US Administration and the Taliban, and there was a parallel bilateral agreement between the US and the then Government of Afghanistan. 7. At the heart of the Doha Agreement was a pledge by the Taliban to enter negotiations with the then Afghan Government, with the aim of agreeing the establishment of a new power-sharing Government, as a means of finally ending Afghanistan’s multi-decade conflict, and in return for a pledge to withdraw US and other NATO forces by a specific date. This marked a fundamental change from the conditions-based approach to security transition in Afghanistan that NATO allies had followed until then. 8. From the time that the Doha Agreement was announced in February 2020, cross- Government discussions began to consider the implications for the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan. A series of National Security Council (NSC) meetings were held on Afghanistan in 2020 and 2021. As with all NSC meetings, these were attended by Cabinet Ministers across Government and informed by assessments of the situation and prospects made centrally by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), drawing on all available sources, including reporting from our Embassy in Kabul. 9. These NSC meetings considered the prospects for the peace process envisaged under the Doha Agreement, and how the UK could help maximize the chances of its success, as that outcome was judged to be likely to best serve UK long-term interests. In parallel, they also set in motion contingency planning for a range of scenarios, reflecting the outcomes judged most likely by the JIC. Planning for a possible military withdrawal named “Operation CATTALO” started in March 2020, including provision for Embassy closure and withdrawal of people and equipment if required. Standing plans for a military-led civilian evacuation were reviewed and updated from Spring 2020, alongside planning for potential military withdrawal. This became known as Operation PITTING in January 2021, and this planning was further accelerated following the April 2021 decision to withdraw NATO troops. 10. Over this period, the Government engaged the US Administration on multiple levels and channels, including military-to-military, to try to shape the evolving US approach, and to try to increase the chances that the peace process envisaged by Doha might succeed. The UK agreed to lead in particular on work to try to improve the strained relationship between the Afghan Government and the Pakistani Government. The UK also advocated to the Pakistani Government to press the Taliban to commit in earnest to the negotiations with the Afghan Government envisaged under Doha. In responding to the Doha Agreement in this way, the Government had no illusions about the chances of success, but it wanted to do everything possible to try to avert the sort of outcome that eventually followed. 11. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul. Those issues are covered in the sections below titled ‘Kabul Embassy Compound Closure’ (paragraphs 43–56) and ‘The Evacuation’ (paragraphs 57–71).