Recommendation 3

HM Government Acknowledged

The Government recognises the strength of the Committee’s view that the UK had a responsibility to Afghan nationals beyond those who had worked for HMG directly, and notes the parallel recommendation from the International Development Committee about those who work on UK aid-funded programmes overseas. That specific question is covered in the section below on the Evacuation and Resettlement policy (paragraphs 72 - 84). The Committee’s report raises the important wider question of whether due consideration was given across government in this period to whether, in the light of the Doha Agreement, the Government could and should offer resettlement in the UK to Afghan nationals, and whether the necessary plans were put in place to deliver on that. That issue was considered in this period, on a cross-Government basis. As a consequence of this work, members of the National Security Council and Domestic and Economy Implementation Committee agreed in December 2020 the new Afghanistan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP), which offered resettlement to current and former locally employed Afghan staff of HM Government who, as a result of their employment, face a high risk and imminent threat to life. Category Four of the ARAP scheme also made provision to consider, on a case-by-case basis, applications from Afghan nationals who had not been directly employed by HMG, but who had “worked in meaningful enabling roles for HMG, in extraordinary and unconventional contexts’. ARAP was, and remains, a whole of Government scheme, not confined to the former Afghan employees of any single Department. There was, therefore, by the end of 2020, a single cross-Government scheme, considered by members of the National Security Council and Domestic and Economy Implementation Committee and communicated publicly, through which resettlement would be offered to thousands of Afghans and qualifying dependants. It was agreed that the MOD and Home Office would jointly lead on the delivery of this new scheme, with significantly reinforced teams based at PJHQ and in the Home Office, and a civilian team based at the British Embassy in Kabul to carry out critical parts of the applications process, notably the collection of biometric data and visa issuing. Further details of how the ARAP scheme would operate were then worked up, and practical preparations made, for the scheme to open and begin operations as planned on 1 April 2021. Its implementation was accelerated as the crisis approached, enabling nearly 2,000 Afghans to be brought direct to the UK on charter flights under this new scheme before the military evacuation. The FCDO was involved in the administration and delivery of ARAP throughout: assessing applications from Afghans who had been employed by the FCDO; supporting the delivery of the scheme in Kabul (including hosting and contributing staff to the MOD-led civilian team which processed applications in Kabul); and securing essential permissions and support from the then Afghan Government for charter flights to bring successful applicants to the UK. The scope of the ARAP scheme reflected the collective view of members of the National Security Council and Domestic and Economy Implementation Committee of what was deliverable in practice, both in terms of the UK’s ability to bring Afghans out of Afghanistan, and to resettle people properly in the United Kingdom. The Government has always been acutely conscious that the demand for resettlement in the UK will inevitably vastly outstrip its capacity to resettle people, and that difficult choices are therefore inescapable, if it is to help anybody in this way. All such UK resettlement schemes need to be developed on a cross-Government basis, with immigration powers resting with the Home Secretary, and responsibility for finding suitable accommodation with DLUHC. The FCDO does not have the immigration powers, experience, or resources, to design and deliver resettlement schemes of its own. There was never a realistic alternative for the UK to evacuate Afghan nationals to any third countries without the promise of subsequent resettlement in the UK. No third country would have been prepared to admit Afghan nationals on the UK’s behalf on that basis. This meant that, when it came to evacuation planning, the Government could only plan to evacuate those with a clear right to come to the UK, either as British nationals, or as Afghan nationals whose resettlement in the UK had been agreed in advance.